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`Case 2:23-cv-02797-DJC-SCR Document 42 Filed 04/15/25 Page 1 of 26
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`PAUL HENREID,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`RAYMOND NEAL HAYNES, DAVID
`SOTELO, and RICHARD SKAGGS,
`Defendants.
`
`No. 2:23-cv-2797-DJC-SCR
`
`ORDER AND AMENDED FINDINGS AND
`RECOMMENDATIONS
`
`
`Plaintiff Paul Henreid is proceeding pro se in this action, which was referred to the
`undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending
`before the undersigned is a joint motion by Defendants Richard Skaggs and Raymond Haynes to
`dismiss this action for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 17), their joint motion for $10,000 in
`sanctions (ECF No. 18), and Defendant Judge David Sotelo’s motion to dismiss this action both
`for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim (ECF No. 19). On March 18,
`2025, the undersigned recommended the motions to dismiss be granted without leave to amend
`and the motion for sanctions be granted. ECF No. 37. Plaintiff then filed objections to the
`findings and recommendations (ECF No. 39) and a motion seeking leave to file a second
`amended complaint (ECF No. 40). Plaintiff also moved to recuse the undersigned. ECF No. 41.
`The undersigned issues these amended findings and recommendations to address Plaintiff’s
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`objections and new motions, along with the other pending motions.
`In this action, Plaintiff is effectively seeking to relitigate in federal court a defamation
`lawsuit that he pursued and lost in state court. Plaintiff alleges defamation and other causes of
`action against Skaggs (the defendant in the underlying defamation lawsuit), Haynes (who
`represented Skaggs in that lawsuit), and Judge Sotelo (the state court judge in that lawsuit). As
`explained below, Plaintiff’s asserted causes of action are either barred by the litigation privilege,
`absolute immunity, or are not cognizable. The undersigned accordingly recommends that the
`Court dismiss all causes of action without leave to amend and grant the motion for sanctions in
`full. The undersigned also denies Plaintiff’s recusal motion.
`BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`I.
`The Underlying Defamation Litigation in State Court
`In 2018, Plaintiff was a member of the Oso Town Council (“Council”), a local group in an
`unincorporated community in Los Angeles County, until a 20-year-old allegation of criminal
`activity resurfaced. ECF No. 17-1 at 6. In 1999, Plaintiff had been accused of using a hidden
`camera to record sexual encounters with various dates without their knowledge in Missouri. Id. at
`179. The charges were later expunged pursuant to Missouri law, but Plaintiff still agreed to
`resign from the Council after it learned about this history. Id. at 6-7. When someone applied to
`fill the vacancy, Defendant Skaggs—then-president of the Council—sent an email to the other
`Council members stating that the Council would not be deceived like it was with “Paul Henreid,
`who has a history of criminal convictions[.]”1 Id. at 7.
`Based on Skaggs’ email, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against him in Los Angeles County
`Superior Court (“LASC”), Henreid v. Skaggs, Case No. 19STCV20592 (“Henreid I”), alleging
`defamation per se and invasion of privacy by false light. Id. Defendant Haynes represented
`Skaggs in that action, while Defendant Judge Sotelo, who has since retired from the LASC,
`presided over the jury trial. ECF No. 5 (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)) at 6.
`Prior to trial, Judge Sotelo ruled that Plaintiff was either a public figure or involved in a
`
`
`1 The email contained a brief additional phrase characterizing Plaintiff’s alleged criminal conduct
`that the Court will not repeat here.
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`matter of public concern and therefore needed to prove actual malice by clear and convincing
`evidence to prevail on his defamation claim. ECF No. 17-1 at 8. At trial, the jury found that
`although Skaggs had made false statements about Plaintiff, Plaintiff failed to show by clear and
`convincing evidence that Skaggs either knew the statements were false or had serious doubts
`about their veracity. Id. at 10. Judge Sotelo entered judgment against Plaintiff.
`Plaintiff appealed. See Henreid v. Skaggs, Case No. B314741 (Ct. of App. 2d App. Dist.)
`(“Henreid II”); ECF No. 17-1 at 10. On February 10, 2023, while the appeal was pending and
`after Judge Sotelo’s retirement, Plaintiff moved the LASC to strike from the trial court record any
`allegations of criminal conduct by Plaintiff (collectively, the “Representations”).2 ECF No. 17-1
`at 29-30. He also moved to sanction Haynes and hold him in contempt for spreading the
`Representations through an objection to Plaintiff’s proposed Statement on Appeal, despite
`knowing the Representations were false. Id. at 30. Plaintiff argued that although Haynes had
`invoked the litigation privilege in an email to Plaintiff, this privilege did not apply to
`“premeditated, libelous, and criminal misrepresentations to courts[.]” Id. at 37, 43. Haynes and
`Skaggs opposed the motion for sanctions on April 27, 2023. Id. at 46, 51.
`On July 10, 2023, LASC Judge Anne Richardson granted Plaintiff’s motion to strike the
`Representations from Haynes’ objection to Plaintiff’s proposed Statement on Appeal. ECF No.
`21-1 at 42, 44. Judge Richardson also struck from the record and sealed any reference to the
`Representations in the objection, the opposition brief to Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, and her
`own order. Id. at 42-43. Citing California Rules of Court, Rule 2.550(d), she held there was “an
`overriding interest in protecting” Plaintiff from having the erroneous Representations reproduced
`in the public sphere. Id. at 43. Judge Richardson denied the request for sanctions, however,
`because she found insufficient evidence that Skaggs had engaged in or agreed to any deceit or
`collusion. Id. She also advised Plaintiff that her rulings extended only to the trial court record,
`and that sealing such Representations in the appellate record would require a separate request to
`
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`2 As the FAC in the instant action indicates, the specific Representations to which Plaintiff
`objects are that he has a “conviction for statutory rape” and was “charge[d]” with “distributing
`child pornography and child molestation … [and] child abuse.” ECF No. 5 at 8.
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`the appellate court. Id. By then Plaintiff had already sought sanctions in Henreid II based on the
`reiteration of Representations in the appellate record. ECF No. 17-1 at 62-63, 82.
`On February 16, 2024, the appellate court in Henreid II affirmed the LASC’s judgment
`against Plaintiff. ECF No. 17-1 at 5, 27. Because Plaintiff had not objected to Skaggs’ pre-trial
`motion concerning a heightened standard of proof, the Henreid II court held Plaintiff failed to
`preserve any such objection for appeal. Id. at 15. Plaintiff also failed to provide an adequate
`record for review of that issue. Id. at 16. The appellate court also found that Plaintiff failed to
`show that Judge Sotelo had erred in his rulings in Henreid I. Id. at 20.
`The Henreid II court also denied Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against Haynes, finding
`he failed to show that Haynes’ conduct was sanctionable under the California Rules of Court. Id.
`at 26. As to Plaintiff’s request to redact any reference to the Representations in the appellate
`record, the court found that he had failed to file a properly noticed motion to that effect. Id.
`II.
`Allegations in the First Amended Complaint
`Plaintiff, an attorney in good standing with the California Bar, commenced this action on
`December 1, 2023. The initial complaint named Haynes as the sole defendant. ECF No. 1. The
`operative FAC, filed May 13, 2024, adds Skaggs and Judge Sotelo as defendants.
`
`The FAC alleges that in filings made in Henreid I, Skaggs and Haynes “intentionally and
`repeatedly” lied about Plaintiff having a “conviction for statutory rape, and the charges for
`distributing child pornography and child molestation … [and] child abuse” (again, collectively
`referred to as the “Representations”). FAC at 8. Judicially noticed government records establish
`that the Representations are not true. Id. Plaintiff accuses Skaggs and Haynes of intentionally
`discrediting and defaming Plaintiff through these knowingly false assertions, including by using
`his name instead of “Plaintiff.” Id. at 8-9. Skaggs and Haynes sought to use court filings to
`spread the Representations online, insofar as searching Plaintiff’s name would yield snippets of
`filings that repeated the Representations. Id. at 9.
`
`The FAC further alleges that Judge Sotelo’s ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for summary
`judgment in Henreid I, dated February 2, 2021, stated that one claim “factually involved a ‘sex
`crime’ with a minor[.]” Id. at 23. The FAC alleges that this statement, once republished online,
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`would make Plaintiff look guilty of a crime even though the charges were dismissed decades ago
`and the case is deemed confidential under Missouri law. Id. at 24-25. Plaintiff moved for
`reconsideration of Judge Sotelo’s summary judgment ruling, but Judge Sotelo’s amended ruling
`still contained these “defamatory fabrications[.]” Id. at 25. Judge Sotelo then repeated them in a
`subsequent ruling on a different motion. Id.
`
`On June 11, 2021, the jury in Henreid I returned a verdict in Skaggs’ favor because
`Plaintiff failed to show that Skaggs knew the Representations were false or acted with reckless
`disregard for that possibility. Id. at 20. The FAC argues that the jury only applied this standard
`because Judge Sotelo ruled that Plaintiff was a public figure. Id. The FAC also alleges that
`Judge Sotelo should not have even submitted the truth of the Representations to the jury, and that
`he did so because it provided another opportunity for Plaintiff to lose. Id. at 20, 25.
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`On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Skaggs and Haynes a “Demand to Retract
`Defamatory Statements From Public Court Record[.]” Id. at 9. Haynes denied that he had done
`anything wrong and threatened to move for Rule 11 sanctions if Plaintiff did not withdraw the
`demand.3 Id. Haynes filed for such sanctions on the same day that Plaintiff moved for summary
`judgment in Henreid I, on the basis that whether Plaintiff had a criminal record was a question of
`law to be resolved by a judge rather than a jury. Id. at 9-10.
`
`The FAC also alleges that Judge Sotelo emboldened Haynes and Skaggs by continuously
`ruling in their favor, even when the law unambiguously favored Plaintiff. Id. at 10. Judge Sotelo
`improperly prevented Plaintiff from showing the jury laws that Plaintiff believes would have
`exposed Judge Sotelo’s erroneous legal rulings. Id. at 19. He allowed Haynes to testify at trial
`because Skaggs was absent, and to submit irrelevant newspaper articles during cross-examination
`of Plaintiff, despite this exceeding the scope of permissible cross-examination. Id. at 28. Judge
`Sotelo retired one day after Plaintiff filed his opening appellate brief in Henreid II. Id. at 10.
`Plaintiff also complains of Defendants’ actions with respect to Henreid II. Id. On January
`13, 2023, despite being retired, Judge Sotelo issue a Settled Statement of Appeal for the Record
`
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`3 One presumes that Plaintiff meant Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, even
`though Henreid I was in state court and subject to state procedural rules.
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`on Appeal (“Settled Statement”), which still included the Representations. Id. at 11. Haynes then
`admitted during appellate oral argument on November 30, 2023 that he had made mistakes, only
`to repeat the Representations thirty seconds later. Id.
`The FAC asserts the following causes of action and theories of liability: (1) defamation
`per se based on the allegation that Defendants repeated the Representations while Henreid I was
`on appeal, both in the trial court record and the Settled Statement; (2) fraud based on Defendants’
`attempt to improperly leverage the legal system, by spreading the Representations from court
`filings online so Defendants could later use the affirmative defense in some states that protects
`reliance on “contents of public records”; (3) negligence as to Skaggs and Haynes, for making the
`damaging and clearly erroneous Representations; and (4) negligence per se as to Skaggs and
`Haynes, because charges from a dismissed case are made confidential by California law, and
`disclosure of those charges was therefore illegal.4 ECF No. 5 at 14-15, 36 (citing Cal. Penal Code
`§ 13303; Cal. Rules of the Court, Rule 2.503).
`The FAC separately alleges tax fraud based on an income tax notice Plaintiff received on
`August 30, 2023, alleging he owed $11,890.95 to the Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”) for the 2020
`tax year. Id. at 34. Plaintiff lived in Oklahoma between 2018 and 2021, yet he never received
`such a notice for any other year that he was not living and earning an income in California. Id. at
`34-35. In October 2023, the FTB removed the income tax notice and explained it had stemmed
`from Plaintiff having an active law license throughout 2020 and not filing a return, despite his law
`license being active since 2001. Id. at 34. Plaintiff ties this notice to Haynes’ status as a veteran
`California litigator with many government connections. Id. at 35. It accuses Defendants of
`colluding with the government to retaliate against Plaintiff for questioning Skaggs about the
`Council, its use of funds, and its relationship with the IRS. Id.
`
`The FAC seeks $1,000,000 in economic and non-economic damages, for pain and
`suffering, and punitive damages. Id. at 37. It also seeks injunctive relief enjoining Defendants
`
`
`4 Although the FAC’s title page also alleges “Invasion of Privacy – False Light and Intrusion
`Upon Seclusion” and “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” (“IIED”), the FAC itself does
`not explain either claim. FAC at 2.
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`from continuing to spread the Representations and compelling them to redact or delete them from
`the public court record, databases, and any other records on the internet or in print. Id.
`III.
`Pending Motions
`Defendants Skaggs and Haynes filed both of their motions on August 24, 2024. ECF Nos.
`17-18. Judge Sotelo filed his motion to dismiss the FAC as against him on September 9, 2024.
`ECF No. 19. Plaintiff has filed opposition briefs and other responses to the motions and
`Defendants have filed replies.5 The motions were fully briefed and taken under submission
`without oral argument.
`On March 18, 2025, the undersigned recommended the motions to dismiss be granted
`without leave to amend and the motion for sanctions be granted. ECF No. 37. Plaintiff then filed
`objections to the findings and recommendations (ECF No. 39) and a motion seeking leave to file
`a second amended complaint (ECF No. 40). Plaintiff also moved to recuse the undersigned
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. ECF No. 41. Much of Plaintiff’s recent filings
`concern an explosion and fire that reportedly destroyed much of his property on March 27, 2025
`and the purported government cover-up concerning the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`I.
`
`Motion to Dismiss
`A defendant may move to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(1) if the court lacks subject-
`matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Alternatively, a defendant may move to dismiss a
`claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the allegation “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
`granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive, the plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient
`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
`(2007)).
`A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
`
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`5 On March 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed notice of related cases, including Henreid I and Henreid v.
`Feuer et al, Case No. 2:25-cv-01379-DSF-PVC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2025). ECF No. 36. No
`action is required as to that notice.
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`court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This standard is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
`to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and to “draw all
`reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773
`(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d
`938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Stating a claim “requires more than
`labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
`The factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
`and “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” needed to support the
`claim. Id. at 556.
`On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider all materials incorporated into the
`complaint by reference, as well as evidence properly subject to judicial notice. Weston Fam.
`P’ship LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 617-18 (9th Cir. 2022). “Ultimately, dismissal is
`proper under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of
`facts to support its claims.” Boquist, 32 F.4th at 773–74 (internal citation and quotation marks
`omitted) (cleaned up). A pro se plaintiff's factual allegations are interpreted liberally on a
`12(b)(6) motion, and the court must apply a less stringent pleading standard than if the plaintiff
`was represented by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
`The court may dismiss for failure to state a claim when the allegations of the complaint
`and judicially noticeable materials establish an affirmative defense or other bar to recovery, such
`as the expiration of the statute of limitations. See Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th
`Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)); see also Goddard v. Google Inc.,
`640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199, n. 5 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that “affirmative defenses routinely
`serve as a basis for granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions where the defense is apparent from the face of
`the [c]omplaint”). However, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper if the allegations of the
`complaint and judicially noticeable materials concerning the defense raise disputed issues of fact.
`ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pacific R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Scott v.
`Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).
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`A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an
`opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See
`Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012).
`II. Motion for Sanctions
`Whenever filing a pleading, written motion, or other paper with the court, the attorney or
`unrepresented party implicitly:
`
`certifies to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief,
`formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
`
`(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
`harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
`of litigation;
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`(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
`by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
`modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
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`(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
`so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a
`reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
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`(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence
`or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or
`a lack of information.
`
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). When making such certification, a party or its counsel has a duty to both
`“conduct a reasonable factual investigation” and “perform adequate legal research that confirms
`whether the theoretical underpinnings of the complaint are ‘warranted by existing law or a good
`faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.’” Christian v. Mattel,
`Inc, 286 F. 3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs
`Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537 (9th Cir.1986)).
`A party may move for the court to award sanctions based on a violation of Rule 11(b) by
`filing a separate motion outlining the specific conduct that allegedly violates this rule. Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 11(c)(1)-(2). When the complaint is the subject of the motion, the court must ask “(1)
`whether the complaint is legally or factually ‘baseless’ from an objective perspective, and (2) if
`the attorney has conducted ‘a reasonable and competent inquiry’ before signing and filing it.”
`Christian, 286 F. 3d at 1127 (citing Buster v. Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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`If the court grants the motion, the amount of such sanction must be limited to an amount
`sufficient “to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). This can include, “if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
`deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s
`fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” Id.
`III. Recusal
`Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “recusal is required if ... [the judge’s] ‘impartiality might
`reasonably be questioned.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 916
`(2004). The fact that a judge made rulings adverse to a party, standing alone, is not a basis for
`disqualification under Section 455. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); United
`States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1581 (9th Cir. 1989).
`The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 is the same:
`“[W]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s
`impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-
`54 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir.
`1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Impermissible “personal bias” is generally a bias
`derived from extra-judicial origins, as opposed to an opinion formed during the course of
`litigation. Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1927); accord United States v.
`Carignan, 600 F.2d 762, 763-64 (9th Cir. 1979).
`ANALYSIS
`
`I.
`
`Judicial Notice
`
`A court may judicially notice facts “not subject to reasonable dispute because,” inter alia,
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`they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
`be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
`A. Defendants’ Requests
`Defendants Haynes and Skaggs seek judicial notice of (1) the decision in Henreid II, filed
`February 16, 2024 (Exhibit 1) (ECF No. 17-1 at 4-27); (2) Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions in
`Henreid I, filed February 10, 2023 (Exhibit 2) (ECF No. 17-1 at 28-44); (3) Skagg’s opposition
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`thereto, filed in May 2023 (Exhibit 3) (ECF No. 17-1 at 45-60); (4) Plaintiff’s motion for
`sanctions in Henreid II (Exhibit 4) (ECF No. 17-1 at 61-84); (5) Designation of Record on Appeal
`by Plaintiff (Exhibit 5) (ECF No. 17-1 at 85-90); (6) Plaintiff’s motion to augment the record of
`Henreid II (Exhibit 6) (ECF No. 17-1 at 91-104); (7) a Minute Order on the Settled Statement
`(Exhibit 7) (ECF No. 17-1 at 105-106); (8) a Record of Proceedings on the Settled Statement
`(Exhibit 8) (ECF No. 17-1 at 107-167); (9) the Final Settled Statement (Exhibit 9) (ECF No. 17-1
`at 168-177); and (10) an article entitled From 1999: Law student who taped sex partners gets jail
`term by The Post-Dispatch, dated August 28, 1999 (Exhibit 10) (ECF No. 17-1 at 178-180).
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`Plaintiff objects to judicial notice of Exhibits 1, 3, 5, and 7-10. Plaintiff first argues that
`these documents are not relevant at the pleading stage because the court must take the pleadings
`as true. ECF No. 23 at 1. To the contrary, it is axiomatic that a court may take judicial notice of
`properly noticeable records on a motion to dismiss. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc, 899
`F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[a] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record
`without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment”).
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`As to Exhibit 1, Plaintiff then argues that California appellate opinions are not citeable if
`unpublished. ECF No. 23 at 2 (citing Cal. Rules of the Court, Rule 8.1115). The applicable rule
`includes an exception for cases “relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or
`collateral estoppel[,]” which are among the arguments Defendants Haynes and Skaggs raise here.
`Cal. Rules of the Court, Rule 8.1115(b)(1). In any event, the California Rules of Court do not
`apply in federal court.
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`Plaintiff then argues that as to Exhibit 1, no preclusive effect or litigation privilege
`attaches to sanction motions. ECF No. 23 at 2 (citing Wright v. Ripley, 65 Cal.App.4th 1189,
`1191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Anka & Yeager, 31 Cal. App. 5th 1115, 1121 (Cal.
`Ct. App. 2019)). As to Exhibit 3, Plaintiff argues that the relevant motion for sanctions was not
`fully briefed because of the timing of service. ECF No. 23 at 2-3. As to Exhibits 7-9, Plaintiff
`accuses Defendants of using the “convoluted mess” of litigation surrounding the Settled
`Statement to selectively have specific facts judicially noticed. Id. at 3.
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`These arguments are more relevant—if at all—to the merits of the pending motions, rather
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`than the request for judicial notice. Additionally, these arguments fail to distinguish between
`judicial notice of the documents and judicial notice of the allegations or assertions therein. While
`it is true that a court generally cannot consider as true the content of judicially noticed documents,
`documents remain noticeable for other purposes. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999-1000.
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`Plaintiff argues that Exhibit 5 is irrelevant, and that its admission would violate the Best
`Evidence Rule because it was not the operative Designation of Record. ECF No. 23 at 3. After
`the Court of Appeal granted Plaintiff’s motion to augment the record in Henreid II, it issued a
`different Designation of Record that replaced the original. Id. The Best Evidence Rule provides
`only that unless the Federal Rules of Evidence state otherwise, a litigant can only prove the
`“content” of a “writing, recording, or photograph” through an original copy. Fed. R. Evid. 1002.
`The original Designation of Record is still relevant if Defendants seek to make arguments based
`on what that Designation said, even if it did not remain the operative version.
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`Finally, Plaintiff argues that Exhibit 10 is a veiled attempt to inject an out-of-court
`statement at the pleading stage to confuse the Court by repeating the same purported falsehoods
`Defendants have spread about Plaintiff. ECF No. 23 at 4-5; ECF No. 24 at 2. Plaintiff again
`mischaracterizes the extent of any judicial notice. The Ninth Circuit has permitted judicial notice
`of published articles as proof of “what was in the public realm at the time, not whether the
`contents of those articles were in fact true.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at
`Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital
`Mgmt., 435 F.3d 396, 401 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001)). Defendants’ motion cites the article to challenge
`the FAC’s defamation claim and the assertion that “no such allegations” of criminal conduct
`“ever existed…” ECF No. 17 at 8 (citing FAC at 5-6) (emphasis added). Challenging this only
`requires that the article made such allegations to the public, not that the allegations were true.
`Defendants do not seek admission of this article for an improper purpose.
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`All ten of Skaggs and Haynes’ requests for judicial notice are granted. The Court
`emphasizes, however, that judicial notice only extends to the authenticity and content of each
`document, not to the truth of such contents.
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`B. Plaintiff’s Requests
`Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of (1) his response, filed June 1, 2023, to the LASC order in
`Henreid I granting his motion to strike defamatory statements from Defendants’ filings in the
`court record (Exhibit A) (ECF No. 21-1 at 3-40); (2) the fact that the LASC docket shows
`Defendants never replied to this response; (3) the order in Henreid I to redact defamatory per se
`content from the public court record, dated July 10, 2023 (Exhibit C) (ECF No. 21-1 at 40-44);
`(4) a letter from the State of California Department of Justice, dated September 10, 2018, stating
`that a search for Plaintiff’s fingerprints did not yield criminal records (Exhibit D) (ECF No. 21-1
`at 45-46); (5) a No Match Notification from the Missouri Highway Patrol, dated February 17,
`2020 (Exhibit E) (ECF No. 21-1 at 47-48); (6) a screenshot from Backgroundchecks.com of a
`national criminal background check yielding no results for Plaintiff (Exhibit F) (ECF No. 21-1 at
`49-57); and (7) an Audit Agreement with the Council dated November 1, 2018 (Exhibit G) (ECF
`No. 21-1 at 58-59).
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`Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that either Backgroundchecks.com or a handwritten
`agreement could be “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.
`201(b)(2). Nor does Plaintiff provide any evidence that the docket would show no reply to
`Exhibit A, as Plaintiff claims in his second request. Judicial notice is granted only as to Exhibits
`A and C-E.
`II.
`Plaintiff’s Purported “Tax Fraud” Claim
`Plaintiff argues that his claims are no