`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`COMCAST CABLE
`COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
`Plaintiff,
`
` v.
`OPENTV, INC., and NAGRAVISION SA,
`Defendants.
` /
`
`No. C 16-06180 WHA
`
`ORDER RE MOTION TO
`STRIKE AND MOTION TO
`AMEND INFRINGEMENT
`CONTENTIONS
`
`INTRODUCTION
`In this action for declaratory judgment of patent noninfringement, plaintiff moves to
`strike the patent owners’ infringement contentions for failure to comply with Patent Local Rule
`3-1. The patent owners oppose and separately move to amend their infringement contentions.
`Plaintiff’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The patent owners’
`motion to amend is GRANTED subject to the conditions stated herein.
`STATEMENT
`This patent dispute began in October 2015, when defendants OpenTV, Inc., and
`Nagravision SA, both subsidiaries of Kudelski SA, approached plaintiff Comcast Cable
`Communications, LLC, to negotiate a licensing deal based on the premise that certain Comcast
`products infringed Kudelski’s patent portfolio.
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`In October 2016, Comcast filed this action for declaratory judgment of noninfringement
`of certain patents from Kudelski’s portfolio.1
`After an initial case management conference, a case management order set forth a
`procedure for pilot summary judgment motions from both sides as to one chosen claim per side
`(Dkt. No. 82). Since then, the parties have agreed to cross-move for early summary judgment
`as to the same claim (claim 1 of the ’595 patent) (Dkt. No. 114). The patent owners have also
`notified Comcast of their intent to provide covenants not to sue on four of the patents asserted in
`this case (id. at 1 n.1). Under the current case management schedule, fact discovery for the pilot
`summary judgment motions will close on June 2 and the motions will be filed on June 26, to be
`heard on August 3 (Dkt. No. 135).
`On March 27, the patent owners answered and counterclaimed for infringement of the
`’082, ’139, ’327, ’389, ’461, ’586, and ’595 patents. On April 3, Comcast moved to dismiss
`count four of the counterclaim, which concerns the ’139 patent (Dkt. No. 96). On April 17, the
`patent owners opposed the motion to dismiss and separately cross-moved to amend their
`infringement contentions for the ’139 patent (Dkt. Nos. 99–100). On April 24, the patent
`owners filed a first amended answer and counterclaim (Dkt. No. 105), thereby mooting the
`motion to dismiss and the cross-motion to amend infringement contentions for the ’139 patent
`(see Dkt. No. 138 at 11:25–12:21).
`On April 19, the patent owners filed another motion to amend their infringement
`contentions as to the ’586 patent (Dkt. No. 101). On April 20, Comcast moved to strike the
`infringement contentions as to the ’082, ’139, ’461, ’586, and ’595 patents with prejudice (Dkt.
`No. 102). This order follows full briefing and oral argument.2
`
`1 The initial complaint concerned ten patents — 6,530,082 (“the ’082 patent”), 7,243,139 (“the ’139
`patent”), 7,900,229 (“the ’229 patent”), 5,907,322 (“the ’322 patent”), 7,028,327 (“the ’327 patent”), 6,799,328
`(“the ’328 patent”), 6,345,389 (“the ’389 patent”), 6,725,461 (“the ’461 patent”), 6,985,586 (“the ’586 patent”),
`and 6,895,595 (“the ’595 patent”). The amended complaint added three additional patents — 8,356,188 (“the
`’188 patent”), 7,725,720 (“the ’720 patent”), and 7,725,740 (“the ’740 patent”). Proceedings as to the latter
`three patents, however, remain stayed pending parallel proceedings in Texas (see Dkt. No. 81 at 12).
`
`2 Proceedings as to the ’327 and ’389 patents remain stayed pending the final determination of the
`United States International Trade Commission (Dkt. No. 93).
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`ANALYSIS
`COMCAST’S MOTION TO STRIKE.
`1.
`As a preliminary matter, the patent owners contend Comcast’s motion to strike should
`be denied as “procedurally deficient” because Comcast did not meet and confer prior to filing
`pursuant to Civil Local Rule 37-1(a) (Dkt. No. 111 at 5–7). That rule falls under CLR 37,
`which concerns “motions to compel disclosure or discovery or for sanctions,” and states, “The
`Court will not entertain a request or a motion to resolve a disclosure or discovery dispute
`unless, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, counsel have previously conferred for the purpose of
`attempting to resolve all disputed issues.” The patent owners posit that CLR 37-1(a) applies to
`Comcast’s motion to strike because “[a] motion to strike a party’s disclosure of asserted claims
`and infringement contentions, by definition, constitutes a ‘disclosure or discovery dispute.’”
`(Dkt. No. 111 at 6 (emphasis in original)).
`This myopic focus on the word “disclosure” ignores the substance and context of CLR
`37. Each provision of that rule (save and except for CLR 37-4, which concerns motions for
`sanctions) unambiguously concerns discovery disputes and motions to compel discovery.
`Furthermore, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which provides the context for CLR 37,
`makes clear that motions to compel “disclosure” thereunder contemplate discovery disclosures
`required by FRCP 26(a). See F.R.C.P. 37(a). Thus, contrary to the patent owners, mere overlap
`of the word “disclosure” between CLR 37 and PLR 3-1 does not suggest that the meet-and-
`confer requirement of the former should apply to the latter. None of the decisions cited by the
`patent owners so held. This order therefore declines to deny as “procedurally deficient”
`Comcast’s motion to strike and proceeds to consider the motion on its merits.3
`Comcast contends the patent owners’ infringement contentions violate PLR 3-1 by (1)
`relying too much on “information and belief,” (2) charting asserted claims for only one or two
`accused products despite purporting to accuse more products of infringement, (3) asserting
`
`3 In response to Comcast’s criticisms that their infringement contentions fall short of complying with
`PLR 3-1, the patent owners occasionally mention that they would have “clarified” their infringement theories
`had Comcast simply met its obligation to meet-and-confer prior to filing its motions (see Dkt. No. 111 at 17
`n.15, 19 n.18). This is a non-starter because Comcast had no such obligation, and in any case the possibility of
`informal elucidation would not absolve the patent owners of their responsibility to comply with PLR 3-1.
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`indirect infringement theories in generic terms by merely tracking the pertinent statutory
`language, (4) using only boilerplate language to assert infringement under the doctrine of
`equivalents, and (5) failing to specifically identify the patent owners’ own “instrumentalities
`and products purportedly embodying the ’139 Patent” (Dkt. No. 102 at 3).
`A.
`Allegations Upon “Information and Belief.”
`Comcast argues that the patent owners’ infringement contentions should be stricken for
`lack of “pre-suit investigation” because their reliance on “information and belief” violates PLR
`3-1(c) (see Dkt. No. 102 at 5–10). That rule requires only “[a] chart identifying specifically
`where and how each limitation of each asserted claim is found within each Accused
`Instrumentality, including for each limitation that such party contends is governed by 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(6), the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or material(s) in the Accused Instrumentality
`that performs the claimed function.” It does not prohibit allegations made upon “information
`and belief.” Indeed, reading PLR 3-1 as a whole makes clear that it requires specific allegations
`but not evidence of infringement at the disclosure stage. See, e.g., P.L.R. 3-1(b) (requiring
`identification of each accused instrumentality “of which the party is aware” to be “as specific as
`possible” to the extent known).
`Comcast points out that PLR 3-1(c) “necessitates a level of detail that reverse
`engineering or its equivalent would provide” (Dkt. No. 102 at 10). Infineon Techs. v. Volterra
`Semiconductor, No. C 11–06239 MMC (DMR), 2013 WL 322570, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
`2013). Yet PLR 3-1 “does not necessarily require the patent holder to produce evidence of
`infringement.” The purpose of the rule is “to further the goal of full, timely discovery and
`provide all parties with adequate notice of and information with which to litigate their cases.” It
`therefore distinguishes “between the required identification of the precise element of any
`accused product alleged to practice a particular claim limitation, and every evidentiary item of
`proof showing that the accused element did in fact practice the limitation.” AntiCancer, Inc. v.
`Pfizer, Inc., 769 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted) (interpreting PLR 3-1
`based on decisions from this district). This distinction is particularly appropriate here since the
`patent owners contend, and Comcast does not dispute, that their ability to reverse engineer the
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`accused products has been limited because Comcast “prevents access to its source code and
`encrypted data streams” and “contractually restrict[s] what a customer can do to examine its set-
`top boxes” (see Dkt. Nos. 111 at 8–9; 118 at 5).
`Applying the foregoing principles here, Comcast’s motion to strike essentially argues
`that the infringement contentions here lack evidentiary support, but this does not compel the
`further conclusion that the contentions lack the specificity required by PLR 3-1 (see Dkt. No.
`118 at 6–9). Comcast cites a laundry list of decisions from this district for the proposition that
`reliance on “information and belief” in infringement contentions is improper under PLR 3-1
`(Dkt. No. 102 at 10). Those decisions, however, actually stand for the different proposition that
`improper reliance on “information and belief” in lieu of specific factual allegations violates
`PLR 3-1 where the resulting infringement contentions are too vague and conclusory to provide
`reasonable notice as to why the patent owner believes it has a reasonable chance of proving
`infringement. See Tech. Props. Ltd. LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 3d 842, 850
`(N.D. Cal. 2015) (Judge Paul Grewal); Solannex, Inc. v. MiaSole, Inc., No.
`11–CV–00171–PSG, 2013 WL 1701062, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013) (Judge Paul
`Grewal); Theranos, Inc. v. Fuisz Pharma LLC, Nos. 11–cv–05236–YGR, 12–cv–03323–YGR,
`2012 WL 6000798, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (Judge Yvonne Rogers).
`That is not our case. This order discusses as an illustrative example the proposed
`amended infringement contentions for the ’586 patent, which also bear on the patent owners’
`separate motion to amend. Comcast accuses the proposed amended infringement contentions of
`relying solely on “information and belief” to allege, without any explanation, that an “operating
`centre” transmits necessary data to Comcast’s set-top boxes (Dkt. No. 118 at 8–9). Actually,
`entire pages of the proposed amended infringement contentions are dedicated to illustrative
`screenshots that provide factual predicates supporting the patent owners’ allegation, on
`“information and belief,” that an operating center transmits necessary data to the set-top boxes
`(Dkt. No. 101-3 at 37–49). Some screenshots show messages indicating that set-top boxes
`require “authorization” for use, and others show “On Demand” features that stream television
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`programs directly from the Cloud, both suggesting that set-top boxes are capable of receiving
`data directly from an operating center (e.g., id. at 42).
`During oral argument, the undersigned judge also repeatedly invited counsel for
`Comcast to present their best example of improper reliance on “information and belief” in the
`infringement contentions. Counsel made several attempts but ultimately did not identify any
`example that would warrant striking with prejudice (see Dkt. No. 138 at 14:3–36:5). That
`lengthy colloquy, during which both sides and the undersigned judge examined Comcast’s best
`examples in excruciating detail, need not be repeated here. The upshot is Comcast has not
`shown that the patent owners improperly relied on “information and belief” so as to warrant
`striking of their infringement contentions.
`B.
`Use of “Representative” Accused Products.
`Comcast also argues that the infringement contentions violate PLR 3-1(c) by failing to
`chart asserted claims as to each accused product. See P.L.R. 3-1(c) (requiring “[a] chart
`identifying specifically where and how each limitation of each asserted claim is found within
`each Accused Instrumentality” (emphasis added)). Despite the absolute phrasing of PLR 3-1(c),
`“representative infringement contentions may suffice” when “supported by adequate analysis
`showing that the accused products share the same critical characteristics.” Network Protection
`Sciences, LLC v. Fortinet, Inc., No. C 12–01106 WHA, 2013 WL 5402089, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
`Sept. 26, 2013).
`Taking again the example of the ’586 patent, this order agrees that the patent owners
`have not adequately shown that their purportedly representative claims in fact share the same
`critical characteristics as other accused products. That patent “discloses a system and a method
`for distributing content by and between an operating centre and a plurality of user units” (Dkt.
`Nos. 90 at 26; 84-6). The patent owners argue in their briefing that the proposed amended
`infringement contentions are adequate because all of the accused products “support AnyRoom
`DVR functionality” (Dkt. No. 111 at 14–15). The proposed amended infringement contentions,
`however, actually state (Dkt. No. 101-3 at 1 (emphasis added)):
`The products associated with the accused systems (“the Accused
`Products”) include, but are not limited to, Comcast servers, ARRIS
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`and Pace XFINITY X1-enabled devices that support AnyRoom
`DVR functionality, including but not limited to: XG1 models . . .
`XG2 models . . . RNG models . . . Xi3 models . . . XiD models . . .
`and Xi5 models . . . and other products that are the same as or
`substantially similar to these devices.
`So, contrary to the patent owners’ argument, their proposed amended infringement contentions
`expressly undermine the purported typicality of their charted products by refusing to limit the
`universe of accused products based on that typicality. Comcast’s objection to the improper use
`of “representative” infringement contentions is therefore well-taken.
`For this reason and the additional reasons discussed during oral argument (see Dkt. No.
`138 at 29:16–37:14), this order makes clear that, notwithstanding the strategic language quoted
`above, the patent owners will be strictly limited to accusing products that truly fit the theories
`described in their infringement contentions. The patent owners do not have leave to amend to
`add explanations about how the charted accused products are representative of other accused
`products. Nor do they have leave to amend to chart additional “representative” products.
`C.
`Generic Indirect Infringement Theories.
`Comcast further contends the patent owners disclosed “bare bones and conclusory
`indirect infringement contentions” in violation of PLR 3-1(d), which requires, “For each claim
`which is alleged to have been indirectly infringed, an identification of any direct infringement
`and a description of the acts of the alleged indirect infringer that contribute to or are inducing
`that direct infringement. Insofar as alleged direct infringement is based on joint acts of multiple
`parties, the role of each such party in the direct infringement must be described.” The patent
`owners respond that they intend to pursue an indirect infringement theory only as to the ’595
`patent if given leave to amend their infringement contentions, and that said theory is adequately
`disclosed in the infringement contentions.4
`
`4 This representation is inconsistent with the patent owners’ actual infringement contentions. For
`example, the patent owners’ opposition brief states that “In [their] proposed amended contentions . . . [they]
`assert[] only claim 4 of the ’586 Patent and do[] not pursue an indirect infringement theory” (Dkt. No. 111 at 16
`n.14). But the proposed amended infringement contentions for the ’586 patent open with the same boilerplate
`language about indirect infringement as do all other infringement contentions disclosed by the patent owners
`(Dkt. No. 101-3 at 1). This order credits counsel’s statement in briefing over the aforementioned boilerplate
`language and understands that the patent owners will assert indirect infringement only as to the ’595 patent if
`given leave to amend.
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`The patent owners do not dispute Comcast’s assertion that the infringement contentions
`for the ’595 patent, like all infringement contentions for the patent owners, open with
`boilerplate language about indirect infringement that does not satisfy PLR 3-1 (see Dkt. No. 90-
`1 at 1). They contend, however, that the body of their infringement contentions adequately
`discloses their indirect infringement theory, citing Blue Spike LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., Case
`No. 14–cv–01647–YGR (JSC), 2015 WL 335842, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2015) (Judge
`Jacqueline Corley), for the proposition that “courts in this District have upheld indirect
`infringement contentions so long as the plaintiff discloses sufficient information to set forth its
`theory of infringement, identifies a particular product line that was sold to customers, and
`contends that the indirect infringement occurs when the customer uses the technology” (Dkt.
`No. 111 at 16).
`Based on this proposition, the patent owners argue that their incorporation of “specific
`references to, and screenshots of, Comcast’s website and user manuals touting the accused
`features or instructing customers how to use them” suffices to disclose their indirect
`infringement theory. A footnote to the foregoing argument, however, acknowledges that the
`patent owners “did not expressly tie Comcast’s marketing materials to [their] allegations of
`direct infringement” but nevertheless insists that “the substance of [their] contentions revealed
`[their] theories of indirect infringement” (Dkt. No. 111 at 17 & n.15). Significantly, Blue Spike
`— after the section quoted by the patent owners — went on to conclude, “although Blue Spike
`included advertisements for Adobe’s products in support of its [infringement contentions], it
`neither specifies which particular product each advertisement endorsed nor indicates which
`advertisement led to infringing behavior. Such circumstances create only insufficient
`boilerplate allegations of indirect infringement.” 2015 WL 335842, at *7 (citing Creagri, Inc.
`v. Pinnaclife Inc., LLC, No. 11–cv–06635–LHK–PSG, 2012 WL 5389775, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
`Nov. 2, 2012) (Judge Paul Grewal)).
`In other words, boilerplate language that simply claims an accused infringer provided
`instructions on, advertised, or promoted the use of an accused product, without describing
`which instructions, advertisements, or promotions led to what infringing behavior, does not
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`suffice under PLR 3-1(d). See France Telecom, S.A. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., No.
`12–cv–04967 WHA (NC), 2013 WL 1878912, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) (Judge Nathanael
`Cousins) (citing Creagri, 2012 WL 5389775, at *5). Here, because the patent owners
`admittedly failed to tie Comcast’s marketing materials to their allegations of direct
`infringement, they have not adequately disclosed their indirect infringement theory as required
`by PLR 3-1(d).
`Boilerplate Assertions re Doctrine of Equivalents.
`D.
`Comcast also contends that neither the current nor the proposed amended infringement
`contentions for the ’586 patent adequately disclose the asserted theory of infringement under
`the doctrine of equivalents as to that patent (Dkt. No. 102 at 17). The patent owners respond
`that both versions of their infringement contentions for the ’586 patent adequately show
`equivalence on a limitation-by-limitation basis because both versions explain that “the accused
`Comcast Operating Center, or headend, transmits an authorization to a second set-top box to
`decrypt a DVR recording (i.e., the “function”), through a box restart or reset by a customer or
`XFINITY agent (i.e., the “way”), which allows the second set-top box to decrypt the DVR
`recording from the primary box (i.e., the “result”)” (Dkt. No. 111 at 18–19).
`The relevant portions of the infringement contentions actually cited by the patent
`owners, however, provide the foregoing explanation only in support of assertions of literal
`infringement. They provide no explanation whatsoever as to how the accused products infringe
`under the doctrine of equivalents even if they do not literally infringe (see Dkt. Nos. 90-3 at
`30–34; 101-3 at 37–49). This order therefore agrees with Comcast that neither the current nor
`the proposed amended infringement contentions for the ’586 patent adequately disclose a theory
`of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
`E.
`Identification of Patent Owners’ Own Instrumentalities.
`Finally, Comcast argues that the patent owners have not complied with PLR 3-1(g) as to
`the ’139 patent. That rule states, “If a party claiming patent infringement wishes to preserve the
`right to rely, for any purpose, on the assertion that its own or its licensee’s apparatus, product,
`device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality practices the claimed invention, the party
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`shall identify, separately for each asserted claim, each such apparatus, product, device, process,
`method, act, or other instrumentality that incorporates or reflects that particular claim.” The
`patent owners respond that, “[f]or the purpose of this litigation only, [they] no longer intend[] to
`rely on the assertion that [their] products practice the ’139 Patent” (Dkt. No. 111 at 1 n.2). This
`order therefore does not address this point further.
`F.
`Leave to Amend.
`Comcast argues that the patent owners should not be allowed to amend their
`infringement contentions because such amendment would be futile and they have not shown
`good cause for the amendment pursuant to PLR 3-6.
`First, this order disagrees with Comcast that amendment to cure the deficiencies pointed
`out in its motion to strike would be futile. Second, in this district, motions to strike initial
`infringement contentions are frequently treated as motions to compel amendment of said
`infringement contentions. Geovector Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., Case No.
`16-cv-02463-WHO, 2017 WL 76950, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2017) (Judge William Orrick). In
`Geovector the accused infringer, like Comcast here, sought to strike the patent owner’s
`infringement contentions and to require the patent owner to seek leave to amend with a showing
`of good cause under PLR 3-6. Judge Orrick observed, “While some courts have required a
`party asserting infringement to show good cause before being granted leave to amend initial
`contentions, many have simply compelled the asserting party to file compliant infringement
`contentions.” Although the initial contentions in Geovector were “clearly deficient,” striking
`with prejudice was unwarranted because it was the first time the accused infringer had moved to
`strike and many of the identified issues appeared curable with amendment. Ibid.
`Under the circumstances here, this order agrees that striking with prejudice is
`unwarranted, at least at this stage. It therefore treats Comcast’s motion to strike as a motion to
`compel amendment of the infringement contentions so that the patent owners will have an
`opportunity to cure the deficiencies therein.
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`PATENT OWNERS’ MOTION TO AMEND.
`2.
`The patent owners’ separate motion to amend their infringement contentions, however,
`does require analysis under PLR 3-6 because it does not seek amendment solely to address
`deficiencies identified in Comcast’s motion to strike. PLR 3-6 permits amendment of
`infringement contentions upon a timely showing of good cause. The good cause inquiry
`considers (1) the diligence of the moving party and (2) prejudice to the nonmoving party. The
`rule is designed to prevent the “shifting sands” approach to claim construction. E.g., Symantec
`Corp. v. Acronis Corp., Case No.: 11–5310 EMC (JSC), 2013 WL 5368053, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
`Sept. 25, 2013) (Judge Jacqueline Corley).
`First, the patent owners seek amendment to (1) eliminate references to patents for which
`they have given Comcast covenants not to sue, (2) correct a typographical error, and (3) omit
`references to their own products previously alleged to practice the patents in suit (Dkt. No. 101
`at 1 & n.1). The first proposed amendment reflects covenants not to sue that materialized very
`recently in this litigation, so the patent owners have been diligent in moving on that basis. The
`patent owners have also been diligent in seeking the second proposed amendment to correct
`typographical errors in their initial infringement contentions, which they served approximately
`one month ago. The third proposed amendment is not dependent on a showing of good cause
`under PLR 3-6 because it directly addresses a deficiency pointed out in Comcast’s motion to
`strike. Additionally, all three proposed amendments would narrow the scope of the case. None
`would constitute a “shifting sands” approach to claim construction or prejudice Comcast.
`Second, the patent owners seek amendment to add in claim 4 of the ’586 patent because
`“Comcast has created a controversy over claim 4” in its second amended complaint. “To
`maintain the relative scope of this action and eliminate any risk of prejudice,” the patent owners
`have offered to withdraw allegations concerning claim 1 if granted leave to amend (id. at 1).
`(The patent owners do not, however, agree that judgment of noninfringement should be entered
`in Comcast’s favor as to claim 1.) Comcast opposes the motion because it did not learn of the
`patent owners’ intent to assert claim 4 of the ’586 patent until approximately 48 hours before it
`had to select a claim for pilot summary judgment, and it has already served invalidity
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`Case 3:16-cv-06180-WHA Document 145 Filed 06/19/17 Page 12 of 12
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`contentions for claim 1 (Dkt. No. 108 at 1). Comcast points out that it has consistently asserted
`that it does not violate any claim of the ’586 patent, but it did not specifically mention claim 4
`as an example of noninfringement until the second amended complaint (compare Dkt. No. 24 at
`14 with Dkt. No. 84 at 14).
`This order concludes the patent owners may amend their infringement contentions to
`substitute claim 4 for claim 1 of the ’586 patent on the conditions that (1) the amended
`infringement contentions fully comply with the requirements of PLR 3-1, and (2) Comcast is
`also permitted to amend its invalidity contentions to include claim 4.
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, Comcast’s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART insofar as it
`essentially seeks to compel the patent owners to comply with PLR 3-1 but DENIED IN PART
`insofar as it seeks to strike their infringement contentions with prejudice. The patent owners
`shall amend their initial infringement contentions to fully comply with PLR 3-1 in all respects
`(not just to cure deficiencies specifically identified in this order) by JUNE 26 AT NOON. Their
`separate motion to amend is GRANTED subject to the conditions stated herein.
`Going forward, except for discovery disputes, no motions may be filed in this action
`without the Court’s advance permission. A party seeking to file a motion must submit a précis
`summarizing the key arguments from and relief sought by the proposed motion, as well as its
`timing needs. The opposing side will then have 48 HOURS to submit a response. The précis and
`the response are each limited to THREE PAGES in length (12-point font, double-spaced, with no
`footnotes or attachments) and must state whether the proposed motion would be argued by a
`young attorney. After considering the précis and response (if any), the Court will either grant or
`deny leave to file the motion. If leave is granted, a briefing schedule and hearing will be set.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: June 19, 2017.
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`WILLIAM ALSUP
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`For the Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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