Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 1 of 36
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`Corey Worcester (pro hac vice)
`coreyworcester@quinnemanuel.com
`Renita Sharma (pro hac vice)
`renitasharma@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND SULLIVAN LLP
`51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
`New York, NY 10010
`Telephone:
`(212) 849-7000
`
`Terry L. Wit (SBN 233473)
`terrywit@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND SULLIVAN LLP
`50 California Street, 22nd Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone:
`(415) 875-6600
`
`Adam B. Wolfson (SBN 262125)
`adamwolfson@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART AND SULLIVAN LLP
`865 Figueroa St., 10th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90017
`Telephone:
`(213) 443-3000
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff hiQ Labs, Inc.
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`
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`hiQ Labs, Inc.,
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`Case No. 3:17-cv-03301-EMC
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
`VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
`(15 U.S.C. §§ 1 AND 2) AND THE
`CLAYTON ACT (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 AND 16)
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`DECLARATORY JUDGMENT UNDER 22
`U.S.C. § 2201 THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NOT
`VIOLATED: (1) THE COMPUTER FRAUD
`AND ABUSE ACT (18 U.S.C. § 1030); (2)
`THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
`COPYRIGHT ACT (17 U.S.C. §1201);(3)
`COMMON LAW TRESPASS TO
`CHATTELS; OR (4) CAL. PENAL CODE
`§ 502(c);
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`INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO ENJOIN: (1)
`VIOLATIONS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
`(15 U.S.C. §§ 1 AND 2); (2) INTENTIONAL
`INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
`AND PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
`ADVANTAGE; (3) UNFAIR
`COMPETITION (CAL. BUS. & PROF.
`CODE § 17200); AND RELATED
`MONETARY RELIEF
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`Case No. 3:17-cv-03301-EMC
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`LinkedIn Corp.,
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`Defendant.
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 2 of 36
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`Plaintiff hiQ Labs, Inc. (“hiQ”), by its undersigned counsel, hereby brings this action
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`against Defendant LinkedIn Corporation (“Defendant” or “LinkedIn”) and alleges as follows:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`hiQ brings this action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1
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`and 2, and under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. hiQ seeks to
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`recover the damages it suffered as a result of LinkedIn’s anticompetitive conduct, as well as obtain
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`a declaration from the Court that hiQ has not violated and will not violate federal or state law by
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`accessing and copying wholly public information from LinkedIn’s website. hiQ further seeks
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`injunctive relief preventing LinkedIn from misusing the law to complete its attempted destruction
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`of hiQ’s business, and prevent LinkedIn from continuing to strangle competition by giving itself
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`an unfair competitive advantage through unlawful and unfair business practices.
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`2.
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`LinkedIn is the world’s largest professional social network, with over 660 million
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`members. Particularly relevant here is that LinkedIn rose to dominance in the professional social
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`networking platform market because it created a social network platform in which users could
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`publicly post all or portions of their resumes and work history, so that those users could connect
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`with potential employers or other potential professional contacts. The public portion of LinkedIn
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`users’ profiles has long been one of the network’s primary selling points, and LinkedIn’s website
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`and user agreement have long stated that the information users chose to make public remained
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`theirs to provide to whomever viewed it online. These fundamental representations helped fuel
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`LinkedIn’s massive growth, which resulted in it obtaining undisputed monopoly power in the
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`professional social networking platform market.
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`3.
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`hiQ, in contrast, is a tech startup nowhere near LinkedIn’s size. hiQ identified an
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`opportunity for a new kind of “people analytics” service based on the massive trove of public
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`information individuals chose to share in their professional social networking. By collecting and
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`analyzing public profile information on LinkedIn, hiQ provided its clients – mostly large
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`companies – with insights and other data analytics about their employees, such as which
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 3 of 36
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`employees are most at risk to leave the company or which skills its employees have. This service
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`– the likes of which did not exist before hiQ and constitutes its own unique relevant market today
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`– provides enormous value to both employers and employees, because it creates a way for
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`employers to, inter alia, approach those employees that are at the highest risk of leaving the
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`company in order to either renegotiate their pay and benefit packages (i.e., provide better
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`compensation to the employee), or otherwise address concerns those employees might have with
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`their current employment situation, instead of incurring the significant cost and disruption of
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`replacing a departed employee. Similarly, people analytics help employers identify better
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`positions and potential training for their employees within the company, so that their skillsets are
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`further developed and put to their fullest and best use. Enabling these types of proactive activities
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`results in a win-win situation for all involved. As reported by LinkedIn’s 2020 Global Talent
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`Trends report, “55% of talent professionals say they still need help putting basic people analytics
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`into practice.” hiQ’s services did just that.
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`4.
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`In order to provide people analytics services to its clients, hiQ does not analyze the
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`private sections of LinkedIn, such as profile information that is only visible when you are signed-
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`in as a member, or member private data that is visible only when you are “connected” to a
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`member. Rather, the information hiQ uses is wholly public information visible to anyone with an
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`internet connection. And, as noted, far from harming LinkedIn members, hiQ’s access to this
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`public information promotes precisely the type of professional and employment opportunities that
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`lead LinkedIn members to make all or even just a portion of their profiles public in the first place.
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`5.
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`For years, LinkedIn knew about and sanctioned hiQ’s services, because LinkedIn
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`profited from doing so. hiQ increased employer engagement on LinkedIn, because those
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`employers paid more attention to their employees’ LinkedIn public profiles to see when they
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`might leave the company, and/or whether they might be better placed elsewhere within the
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`organization. It also incentivized employers to either directly or implicitly encourage their
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`employees to use LinkedIn in the first place. Employer participation in the LinkedIn network
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`distinguishes that network from other social networks, and, indeed, it is one of the company’s
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`raisons d’etre. As LinkedIn advertises on its website, it is a social network meant to help users
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 4 of 36
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`“[f]ind the right job or internship for you,” “post your job for millions of people to see,” and act as
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`the social network for “[a]nyone looking to navigate their professional life.” Moreover,
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`employers, employees, and recruiters often choose to pay LinkedIn subscription and other fees for
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`a variety of reasons. Increased employer and employee engagement through the “free advertising”
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`LinkedIn received from hiQ’s services directly led to higher revenues for LinkedIn.
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`6.
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`LinkedIn eventually realized that it might be able to profit by providing the same
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`type of innovative and revolutionary analytics hiQ pioneered, and it developed its own competing
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`version of that analytics service. Then, in May 2017, LinkedIn abruptly, unlawfully and without
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`cause denied hiQ access to the portion of the LinkedIn website containing wholly public member
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`profiles. hiQ relies on that public data, available nowhere but LinkedIn, for its data analytics
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`business, which, prior to LinkedIn’s conduct described herein, served well-known, innovative
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`clients including eBay, Capital One, and GoDaddy.
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`7.
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`More specifically, on May 23, 2017, LinkedIn sent hiQ a cease-and-desist letter
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`ordering hiQ to stop accessing LinkedIn and asserting that hiQ’s continued access to the website
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`violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and California
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`Penal Code § 502(c) and constituted common law trespass to chattels. This came as a surprise to
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`hiQ, given that LinkedIn was aware of hiQ’s activities for several years and never once objected to
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`hiQ’s use of this public information.
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`8.
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`In an attempt to justify this about-face, which followed years of profitable dealing
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`with hiQ and other people analytics providers, LinkedIn asserted (pretextually) that it needs to
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`protect LinkedIn member data even though LinkedIn members have expressly made that
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`information public and LinkedIn has identified no harm to itself or its members. LinkedIn
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`publicly acknowledges on its own website that public profile data belongs to LinkedIn members,
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`not to LinkedIn, and that each member is free to choose the level of public disclosure allowed for
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`his or her own information. LinkedIn members can choose to (1) keep their profile information
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`private; (2) share only with their direct connections; (3) share with connections within three
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`degrees of separation; (4) allow access only to other signed-in LinkedIn members, or (5) allow
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`access to everyone, even members of the general public who may have no LinkedIn account and
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 5 of 36
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`who can access the information without signing in or using any password. It is only this fifth
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`category of information – wholly public profiles – that is at issue here: hiQ only accesses the
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`profiles that LinkedIn members have made available to the general public.
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`9.
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`LinkedIn’s entire stated complaint is that hiQ “copies” the data its members have
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`made public, but LinkedIn asserts no copyright or other exclusive propriety interest in the data and
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`it clearly has none. Moreover, hiQ does not collect all (or even a substantial proportion) of the
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`member profiles on LinkedIn, nor does it compete with LinkedIn by creating a substitute social
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`network or job posting forum. Rather, hiQ accesses public data for a limited subset of users –
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`usually its client’s employees – and uses scientific methodologies to analyze the information. hiQ
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`then provides its clients with this new, refined data that it produced in a form that is by necessity
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`very different from the public profile pages on LinkedIn.
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`10.
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`Because LinkedIn has no legitimate copyright claim, it has instead resorted to self-
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`help by actively preventing hiQ from obtaining the public data in LinkedIn users’ profiles through
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`systematic means. LinkedIn also threatened to sue hiQ under federal and state laws pertaining to
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`hacking and unauthorized computer and network access in order to intimidate hiQ and force it to
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`stop accessing these public profiles. But LinkedIn cannot use those laws for an improper purpose
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`to obtain exclusive proprietary control over wholly public data in which it otherwise has no
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`exclusive interest and which hiQ, and anyone else, can freely access on the world wide web with
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`no log-in credentials or password. Indeed, LinkedIn would not have that data on its website in the
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`first place but for its promise to LinkedIn members that they can publicly disclose that information
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`on LinkedIn for all the world to see and use.
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`11.
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`LinkedIn’s about-face and active attempts to prevent hiQ (and, on information and
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`belief, all other people analytics providers) from obtaining employment data LinkedIn users make
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`public has had massive, immediate consequences for hiQ. Suddenly, the public data source on
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`which all of its and its non-LinkedIn competitors’ people analytics services rely was taken away.
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`This was long after LinkedIn told its members their profile information was their own and locked
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`them into its professional social networking platform based on that promise. LinkedIn’s about-
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`face, which followed years of profitable dealing with hiQ, prevented hiQ and other people
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 6 of 36
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`analytics providers from providing the people analytics their clients needed, and those clients –
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`including, particularly, hiQ’s marquee Fortune 500 clients – quickly disappeared. There is no
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`point paying for a service one cannot receive, and there was nothing hiQ could do to prevent the
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`attrition. Unfortunately for competition, this has also meant that, today, LinkedIn has not only
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`obtained monopoly power in that market through anticompetitive means, but has also crowded out
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`hiQ, LinkedIn’s best-in-class competitor – a competitor that created the market in the first place.
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`12.
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`As a consequence, hiQ lost the majority of its revenues almost overnight and today
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`is unfortunately a shadow of what it once promised to be. This has caused hiQ substantial
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`monetary damages in the form of, inter alia, lost profits and diminution in business value. hiQ
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`intends to prove its damages at trial, but the Court should also enjoin LinkedIn from denying hiQ
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`access to its public employment information database because LinkedIn’s real motivation is
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`obviously anticompetitive: to prevent anyone but LinkedIn from being able to use that public
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`information for data analytics.
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`13.
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`Plaintiff hiQ is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San
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`THE PARTIES
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`Francisco, California.
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`14.
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`On information and belief, Defendant LinkedIn is a Delaware corporation with its
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`principal place of business in Sunnyvale, California.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`15.
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`The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
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`and 1337, because (a) Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
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`U.S.C. §§ 15 and 16, for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2,
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`and (b) Plaintiff’s first and second claims for relief seek a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 2201 and 2202 that Plaintiff has not violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 1030, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C § 1201.
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`16.
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`Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
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`third through tenth claims for relief because they arise out of the same common set of facts and
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`conduct as Plaintiff’s federal claims for relief.
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 7 of 36
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`17.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant LinkedIn in this action
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`because, on information and belief, LinkedIn’s corporate headquarters and principal place of
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`business is within this judicial district, and LinkedIn has engaged in substantial business within
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`this district.
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`18.
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`Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) and (2) because
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`Defendant LinkedIn conducts substantial business within this District and a substantial part of the
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`acts or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District. Venue is further proper
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`in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a) because this action relates to copyrights and
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`Defendant LinkedIn resides in this District.
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`INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
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`Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 3-2(c), this case is, inter alia, an intellectual
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`property action appropriate for assignment on a district-wide basis.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`LinkedIn, the Professional Social Networking Platform Market, and the Public Member
`Profile Portion of LinkedIn’s Professional Social Network Platform
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`The core of LinkedIn’s business is a professional social network platform that
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`aggregates the profile information of well over half a billion professionals, their interrelationships,
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`their posts, and their cross-endorsements. LinkedIn states that the purpose of the service is to
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`“promote economic opportunity” and provide a place for professionals “to meet, exchange ideas,
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`learn, and find opportunities....” See Exhibit 1 (LinkedIn User Agreement). For individuals, it is
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`a place to network and seek out jobs; for companies and recruiters, it is an essential platform to
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`post jobs and source talent. For all, the focus is on business relationships.
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`21.
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`As opposed to other social networks, such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.,
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`LinkedIn’s focus on professional social networking puts it in a separate category. Users
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`participate in LinkedIn’s network because its purpose is to connect professionals of all stripes, and
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`to act as a constantly-updated repository of users’ business information. This is different than
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`other social networks, which often focus on non-business-related aspects of their users’ lives (e.g.,
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`sharing family photos, posting thoughts or news stories, uploading videos). Thus, the primary
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 8 of 36
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`service LinkedIn provides its users – the provision of a business-focused social network – is
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`different in purpose and scope from other social networks, and satisfies a different need for its
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`users. In practice, LinkedIn users often have other social network accounts, but they do not
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`typically use those other social networks for business purposes. As a group, professional social
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`networking platforms therefore constitute a separate relevant market, because consumers would
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`reasonably switch to other professional social network platforms for business purposes (if they
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`could), but would not similarly use more traditional social networks for the same purposes.
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`22.
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`LinkedIn was launched in May 2003 and, within one month, had over 4,500 users.
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`This was approximately the same time period in which Facebook was founded (after MySpace,
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`arguably the first major social networking platform, demonstrated the popularity of this new form
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`of connecting online), but the two then-fledgling social networking platforms had very different
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`purposes. As the concept of social networking caught on in the broader populace, LinkedIn
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`experienced meteoric growth because of the new professional social networking platform market it
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`created. Over the next 15 years, LinkedIn added hundreds of millions of users to its base, now
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`with over 660 million members. Today, LinkedIn is established in more than 200 countries,
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`receives more than 100 million unique visitors a month, and reports that up to 60% of U.S.
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`companies use it to hire staff.
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`23.
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`One of the main keys to LinkedIn’s initial and then sustained growth was that it
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`acted as a repository and platform for users to share their work history, also known as a curriculum
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`vitae (“CV”) or resume information. LinkedIn member profiles contain resume information such
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`as education, skills, publications, certifications, and employment history. They also contain
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`endorsements from colleagues and others within the member’s professional social network.
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`Members can connect their LinkedIn profiles to those of colleagues around the world.
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`As particularly relevant to this lawsuit, users had – and, as of this filing, still have –
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`the option to publicly share as much or as little of their CV as they want. Most LinkedIn users
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`choose to share at least a portion of their CV, because it allows other professionals to search them
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`out for networking or recruiting purposes, and because it also helps elevate their professional
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`profile in online searches. This “public option” has long been one of LinkedIn’s main value
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 9 of 36
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`drivers, because it facilitates the site’s core professional social networking services and is one of
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`the key reasons users first signed up for, and then maintained, their LinkedIn accounts. Without
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`the ability to publicly share CV information, LinkedIn would not be the dominant professional
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`social network platform it is today. Indeed, the entire purpose of a social network is to share
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`information with those in your network, or who wish to join your network. LinkedIn always
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`promoted this core tenet of social networking (although, as discussed below, it has recently
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`reneged on its promises that the information its members choose to share publicly shall remain
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`freely accessible).
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`25.
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`As LinkedIn grew, so did its power in professional social networking platforms. It
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`was the first mover in the professional social networking platform market, and its explosive
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`growth was self-reinforcing with respect to its market power. A social network derives a major
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`part of its value from the number and scope of users in the network; i.e., the more users in the
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`network and the broader the scope of those users, the more opportunities one has to be social and
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`connect, and the more one is incentivized to be in that network rather than in smaller, less-
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`populated networks. LinkedIn was, for many years, the only real professional social networking
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`platform and became the de facto, dominant standard for such networking. Today, LinkedIn’s
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`collection of profiles is a one-of-a-kind resource. It is the single largest, most up-to-date, and
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`authoritative repository about the world’s professional community. There is no comparable data
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`source anywhere else in the world, and no current likelihood that any other company can craft a
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`similar database of information and users. LinkedIn is the unquestioned, most dominant
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`professional social networking platform in the world, counting, on information and belief, well
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`over 75% of all professional social network users in the United States.1
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`26.
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`Put simply, LinkedIn has monopoly power in the professional social networking
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`platform market, and it has erected substantial barriers to new entry by any professional social
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`network platform that wishes to rival its power. The first such barrier is simply the number of
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`1 To the extent professionals are members of other, smaller professional social networks, hiQ
`understands, on information and belief, that they typically also belong to LinkedIn.
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`LinkedIn users that currently exist. As noted above, a social network derives its value (and power)
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`from the number and scope of users in the network; a concept called “network effects.” A new
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`entrant would need to sign up a substantial portion of LinkedIn users for its own platform in order
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`to even begin to take share away from LinkedIn. Second, the information LinkedIn currently
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`houses on its servers is another barrier to entry, because a new rival would need to obtain similar
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`amounts of information about its users in order to take share away from LinkedIn. Third is the
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`cost and logistical expense of creating a worldwide network with the same resources as LinkedIn.
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`This includes not only the front-end website and/or application members use when accessing the
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`social network, but also the massive back-end infrastructure needed to facilitate such large
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`networking operations, and to generate members’ ongoing trust in the network’s reliability and
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`security.
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`27.
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`LinkedIn grew to what it is today by telling its prospective members that their
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`employment information would always remain their own, even if they include that information in
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`their member profiles. In its User Agreement, LinkedIn admits it does not own the data that its
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`members decide to share publicly on LinkedIn’s website. LinkedIn explains to members that “you
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`own the content and information that you submit.” See Exhibit 1 (LinkedIn User Agreement) at
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`3.1. LinkedIn is unequivocal that members control their profiles: “You control the visibility and
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`reach of your LinkedIn profile.” See Exhibit 2 (Public & Private Profiles | LinkedIn Help).
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`LinkedIn gives members the ability and right to specify which portions of their profiles will be
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`visible to their direct connections, their network (those within three degrees of separation), all
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`LinkedIn members, and the “public.” The “public” setting (which is at issue here) allows
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`“[a]nyone [to] see [members’] public profile[s] in search engines, as well as in apps and other
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`services.” Exhibit 3 (showing public profile settings). Public profiles may be reached via third-
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`party services (e.g., Google and Bing) and directly via a web address (URL) that LinkedIn creates
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`for its members. Thus, LinkedIn acknowledges that a public setting will permit access for anyone
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`in the world with an internet connection. The Privacy Policy advises members: “Your profile is
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`fully visible to all Members and customers of our Services. Subject to your settings, it can also be
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`visible to others on or off of our Services (e.g., Visitors to our Services or users of third-party
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 11 of 36
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`search engines.” Exhibit 6 (LinkedIn Privacy Policy) at 3.1.
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`28.
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`By encouraging the proliferation of public employment information in order to
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`exponentially grow its professional social network (and therefore lock its users into that network),
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`LinkedIn has effectively become a public forum where professionals can meet and exchange ideas,
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`information, and news articles. LinkedIn describes itself as a “community” and users are able to
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`post publicly, share other members’ posts, and comment on other members’ posts. LinkedIn
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`cannot – consistent with the free speech clause of the California Constitution – selectively exclude
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`hiQ from this “public” forum, even if LinkedIn’s servers are considered “private” property. The
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`California Supreme Court has definitively interpreted these constitutionally guaranteed free speech
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`rights as precluding an owner of private property from prohibiting such access when the property
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`has been opened to the public and constitutes a public forum. The United States Supreme Court
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`has in turn upheld this California constitutional right as against a challenge that it amounts to a
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`“taking” of private property under the United States Constitution. LinkedIn cannot have it both
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`ways even on its own web servers: promising a public forum and public access on the one hand,
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`and then selectively excluding members of the public on the other.
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`29.
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`Since its launch in 2003, LinkedIn has created numerous successful revenue
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`streams, including selling services to corporations that help with their recruiting and sales
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`processes, memberships to corporate and individual users, targeted advertising based on members’
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`usage of the site, and others. All of this follows on LinkedIn’s status as the world’s largest and
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`most recognizable professional social networking platform, and derives from its key decision early
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`on to allow members to make any portion of the member profile public. As of hiQ’s launch in
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`2012, LinkedIn’s annual revenues were on the order of nearly $1 billion, a number that had nearly
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`quadrupled by the end of 2016. In late 2016, LinkedIn was purchased by Microsoft Corporation
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`for $26 billion.
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`hiQ Labs Creates a New “People Analytics” Market Based on Professional Social
`Networkers’ Publicly-Shared Information
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`30.
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`hiQ was formed in July 2012 and has since raised $14.5 million in multiple rounds
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`of funding. It once had 24 employees, the majority of whom were in its San Francisco office, and
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 12 of 36
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`11 of whom had advanced degrees, including several PhDs. Today, however, hiQ’s workforce has
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`been reduced to just one employee, because its business unfortunately cratered as a result of
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`LinkedIn’s anticompetitive acts described herein.
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`31. When it was founded, hiQ identified a previously-unmet need among employers
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`(particularly large employers, such as Fortune 500 companies) to identify those employees that
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`were at the highest risk of leaving the company, as well as uncover the full scope of current and
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`potential employees’ skills. Although one would expect this latter task to be the simpler of the
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`two, it has proven an elusive goal over the years, because employees often do not know to share
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`their full skillsets with their employer, or do not know that skills they possess might warrant a
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`different or better job (i.e., better “fit”) within the company.
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`32.
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`hiQ’s innovation was the realization that the facts employees choose to share about
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`themselves publicly in a professional social network strongly predict their employment
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`satisfaction and also demonstrate what skills they can bring to current and future jobs. By
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`utilizing modern technology to analyze this data, employers can eliminate inefficiencies in their
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`organizations and also reduce transaction costs for themselves and their employees by highlighting
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`which highly-valued employees are most at risk of leaving the company. Employees seeking new
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`jobs must spend time and effort to do so, and employers losing valued employees must spend
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`time, money, and energy looking for new hires (or identifying those within the organization that
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`can either be promoted to replace the lost employee, or have their jobs combined with some of the
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`departing employee’s responsibilities). By predicting employee behavior and identifying
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`hidden/adjacent skills based on the information those same employees or employee prospects
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`share publicly, hiQ reduced these costs and helped their clients create a happier, better-
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`23
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`compensated workforce that was simultaneously more suited for their jobs.
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`24
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`33.
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`In response to this realization, hiQ developed “people analytics,” a new type of
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`25
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`predictive data analytics aimed at providing employers in-depth, predictive insights into their
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`26
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`workforce. People analytics generally work by performing computerized analyses of employees’
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`27
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`public professional information and history that then show which employees are at higher risk of
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`28
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`looking for a new job, and which may have skills that are not being utilized in their current job.
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`Case No. 3:17-cv-03301-EMC
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`Case 3:17-cv-03301-EMC Document 131 Filed 02/14/20 Page 13 of 36
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`hiQ created two specific analy