`
`Date: June 16, 2022
`
`Judge: EDWARD M. CHEN
`
`OFFICE OF THE CLERK
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`Northern District of California
`CIVIL MINUTES
`Time: 1:27-1:54
` 27 Minutes
`
`Case Name: In re Tesla Inc. Securities Litigation v.
`Case No.: 18-cv-04865-EMC
`Attorneys for Plaintiff: Nicholas Porritt, Adam Apton and Adam McCall
`Attorney for Defendant: Kathleen Sullivan
`
`
`Deputy Clerk: Vicky Ayala
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`
`
`
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`Court Reporter: Teri Veres
`
`PROCEEDINGS
`Motion for Certificate of Appealability. - held
`SUMMARY
`
`
`Parties stated appearances.
`Pending before the Court were (1) Defendants’ motion for leave to seek
`reconsideration and (2) Defendants’ motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal
`under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
` The motions had partial overlap on the issues of materiality and reliance. On these
`issues, the Court affirmed its earlier ruling in its summary judgment order. The
`statements at issue were false and made with scienter but the Court left the issue of
`whether the statements were material (which also impacts reliance) for the jury to
`decide. The Court rejected Defendants’ argument that the issue of factual falsity and
`materiality had to be decided in tandem. A statement can be factually false but not
`material.
` Defendants’ motion for an interlocutory appeal also raised the issue of “whether the
`Court must consider the forum of the statement (in this case Twitter) when assessing
`whether the statement was materially misleading.” Mot. at 2. Here Defendants failed
`to show a substantial ground for a difference of opinion. As Plaintiff noted in his
`papers, “[s]ection 10(b) and SEC Rule 10(b)-5 are clear that it is unlawful to make
`‘any untrue statement of a material fact’”; “the plain meaning of the word ‘any’ in
`statute provides no limitation of coverage of the securities laws to formal regulatory
`filings [–] [t]here is no carve out for tweets.” Opp’n at 8.
`
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`Case 3:18-cv-04865-EMC Document 446 Filed 06/16/22 Page 2 of 2
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` Defendants’ motion for leave to seek reconsideration further raised a factual
`challenge – in essence, contending that the Court must have overlooked certain record
`evidence since it was not discussed in the Court’s order. But a court is not required to
`address each and every piece of record evidence in a summary judgment order. See
`Zuno v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-2392, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104629, at *9
`(E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2009) (“The Court is not required to address every piece of evidence
`and/or testimony in its [summary judgment] opinion, and the fact that each item on
`Plaintiff's list was not specifically addressed in my memorandum does not mean that it
`was not appropriately considered.”); Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., No.
`04 C 3341, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15689, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2005) (“[T]he
`court is not required to make specific reference to every piece of evidence it reviews
`and Paz incorrectly presumes to know exactly what evidence was considered by the
`court. The court gave a thorough consideration to all of the evidence submitted by
`both parties when rendering its decision.”). Furthermore, Defendants did not point to
`any critical evidence that the Court failed to provide express commentary on.
` Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for relief were both denied.
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