Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 1 of 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
`FRANCISCO, et al.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`PURDUE PHARMA L.P., et al.,
`
`Case No. 18-cv-07591-CRB
`
`
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
`DENYING IN PART PLAINTFF’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY
`JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS’
`AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
`
`Defendants.
`
`Re: Dkt. No. 973
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants collectively assert 390 affirmative defenses for which they will bear the
`
`burden of proof at trial. See MSJ (dkt. 973) at 3 (citing Ex. A (dkt. 973–1)). Plaintiff
`
`argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, to summary
`
`judgment on all 390 affirmative defenses because there is “an absence of evidence as to all
`
`of Defendants’ affirmative defenses because they are too vague, conclusory, and factually
`
`unsupported to raise genuine disputes of material fact.” MSJ at 3. For the reasons
`
`discussed below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
`
`I.
`
`DISCUSSION
`
`Plaintiff asserts UCL and public nuisance claims against Defendants. The UCL
`
`claim seeks civil penalties and injunctive relief, and the public nuisance claim seeks an
`
`abatement fund to redress prospective harm expected to occur because of the ongoing
`
`opioid epidemic in San Francisco. See MSJ at 1. Plaintiff does not seek “damages or
`
`recovery of historical costs” or “restitution as remedy.” Id.
`
`Plaintiff broadly argues that “Defendants assert boilerplate affirmative defenses that
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 2 of 10
`
`
`
`are without factual support or that are denials of Plaintiff’s prima facie case and are not
`
`actual affirmative defenses.” See MSJ at 4. The argument targets all 390 of the affirmative
`
`defenses collectively asserted by Defendants. But Plaintiff identifies only a handful of the
`
`defenses that it contends are insufficiently pled, factually unsupported, or otherwise fail as
`
`a matter of law. See generally id. In other words, Plaintiff’s motion does not specifically
`
`address many of the 390 defenses for which it contends that it is entitled to judgment on
`
`the pleadings or summary judgment.
`
`Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment or judgment on
`
`the pleadings for any defense that is not specifically challenged. See Opp. at 4–5. The
`
`Court agrees. To the extent that Plaintiff does not make specific arguments about a certain
`
`defenses or category of defenses—which is the case for many of the 390 defenses that
`
`Plaintiff purports to challenge—the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. The Court considers
`
`each of Plaintiff’s arguments regarding specific defenses and categories of defenses
`
`below.1
`
`A.
`
`Blanket Defenses
`
`Defendants allege what Plaintiff characterizes as several broad “catchall” defenses.
`
`See MSJ at 5 (citing Endo Answ. at 167; Par Answ. at 135; Walgreens Answ. at 151; Teva
`
`Answ. at 144; Cephalon Answ. at 144). Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion as to
`
`these defenses. Thus, summary judgment is granted for these defenses.
`
`B.
`
`Inapplicable Defenses
`
`Plaintiff argues that the following defenses “have no conceivable applicability” to
`
`the public nuisance and UCL claims. MSJ at 5.
`
`• Voluntary payment doctrine (Walgreens Answ. at 151; Teva Answ. at 138;
`
`Cephalon Answ. at 138; Endo Answ. at 172; Par Answ. at 139; Actavis Answ. at
`
`
`1 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is procedurally
`proper to the extent that it seeks judgment on the pleadings for defenses that are insufficiently
`pled. See Opp. at 5–7 (“Once the deadline for filing a motion to strike has passed, any non-
`evidence-based challenge to an affirmative defense must be limited to its ‘legal’ viability.”); see
`also Reply at 3–6. Because the Court’s rulings are based on Rule 56, the Court does not reach this
`argument.
`
`2
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 3 of 10
`
`
`
`160)
`
`• Products liability defenses (Anda Answ. at 119; Allergan Answ. at 134;
`
`Walgreens Answ. at 158)
`
`•
`
` Subrogation and insurance defenses (Anda Answ. at 122; Allergan Answ. at
`
`136; Par Answ. at 143; Walgreens Answ. at 152)
`
`• Workers’ compensation claims (Anda Answ. at 122; Allergan Answ. at 137;
`
`Walgreens Answ. at 153)
`
`Each defense is considered in turn.
`
`1.
`
`Voluntary Payment Doctrine
`
`The “voluntary payment doctrine” is based on the principle that “a payment
`
`voluntarily made with knowledge of the facts affords no ground for an action to recover it
`
`back.” Am. Oil Serv. v. Hope Oil Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 209, 213 (Ct. App. 1961); see also W.
`
`Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. & Tr. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 257, 265, 206 P.2d 643, 648 (1949)
`
`(“Payments voluntarily made, with knowledge of the facts, cannot be recovered.”).
`
`Plaintiff argues that the doctrine does not apply here because the “nuisance and
`
`UCL claims do not seek to recover any payments made.” See MSJ at 5. Plaintiff has
`
`dropped its claim for restitution, and the only monetary relief that Plaintiff seeks is civil
`
`penalties and a forward-looking abatement fund. Id.
`
`Defendants respond that even though Plaintiff does not seek money damages, the
`
`voluntary payment doctrine should still apply because Plaintiff’s request for an abatement
`
`fund “is really just a request for a huge pot of money” to cover costs Plaintiff expects to
`
`incur in coming years to redress opioid-related harms. Opp. at 11.
`
`Defendants cite no authority to support their argument that the voluntary payment
`
`doctrine applies to a prospective abatement fund. Nor do Defendants otherwise show why
`
`the doctrine should apply to Plaintiff’s claims for civil penalties and abatement. Thus,
`
`summary judgment on the voluntary payment defense is granted.
`
`2.
`
`Products Liability Defenses
`
`In its opening brief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ strict products liability
`
`3
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 4 of 10
`
`
`
`defense has “no conceivable applicability” to the nuisance and UCL claims because the
`
`defense applies only to products liability actions. MSJ at 5. Although they recognize that
`
`Plaintiff is not asserting a products liability action, Defendants contend that Plaintiff is
`
`effectively pursuing a products liability action “in the guise of a nuisance action.” Opp. at
`
`12.
`
`Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. The “telltale sign” of a products liability
`
`action is that the plaintiff is “seeking to hold the defendant liable precisely because the
`
`product’s potential for harm substantially outweighs any possible benefit derived from it.”
`
`Opp. at 12 (citing Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 465, 478 (2001) (cleaned up)). But
`
`here, Plaintiff’s theories of liability are that (1) Defendants made false and misleading
`
`statements about the safety and efficacy of opioids and (2) Defendants failed to implement
`
`effective systems to monitor for suspicious orders of opioids and to prevent diversion of
`
`opioids. Neither theory alleges that the potential for harm from opioids substantially
`
`outweighs their benefits—rather, the theories are based on alleged misrepresentations and
`
`systemic failures to monitor for diversion. Thus, summary judgment is granted as to the
`
`products liability defenses.
`
`3.
`
`Subrogation
`
`Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ defense of subrogation is only relevant to insurers’
`
`claims. See MTD at 5–6. Defendants respond that subrogation claims may arise here
`
`because Plaintiff’s claims are based on the theory that “Defendants’ alleged wrongful
`
`conduct resulted in personal injury and death to individuals.” Opp. at 13. But Defendants
`
`do not identify any specific subrogation interests at issue, nor do Defendants identify any
`
`person who may hold a subrogation interest. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted
`
`as to the subrogation defenses.
`
`4.
`
`Remoteness and Derivative Injury
`
`Plaintiffs argue that the defenses of remoteness and derivative injury are limited to
`
`workers compensation cases. MSJ at 5. In their opposition, Defendants appear to argue
`
`that the defenses apply here because Plaintiff “must prove proximate causation, and a
`
`4
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 5 of 10
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`defendant may not be held liable if the alleged misconduct is ‘too remote’ to be a ‘legally
`
`sufficient proximate cause.” Opp. at 13–14. But Defendants’ arguments attack Plaintiff’s
`
`ability to carry its burden of proving the elements of its claims. Defendants do not show
`
`why the affirmative defenses of remoteness and derivative injury apply here. Accordingly,
`
`summary judgment is granted with respect to these defenses.
`
`C.
`
`Factually Unsupported Defenses
`
`In its opening brief, Plaintiff argues that certain defenses are “boilerplate defenses”
`
`pled without factual support. MSJ at 4-5. Plaintiff specifically points to the following:
`
`• Actavis, Cephalon, and Teva’s defenses asserting doctrines of laches, waiver,
`
`unclean hands, estoppel, release, and/or ratification (“equitable defenses”)
`
`• Anda’s defense asserting that Plaintiff’s action is “arbitrary and capricious”
`
`• Endo and Par’s affirmative defenses asserting the statute of limitations
`
`In its reply brief, Plaintiff concedes that Defendants’ statute of limitations defense is
`
`viable. See Reply at 1 (“Defendants fail to show triable issues on any but the UCL statute
`
`of limitations.”). And Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion as to the “arbitrary and
`
`capricious” defense. See generally Opp. Thus, the motion is denied as to the statute of
`
`limitations defenses and granted as to the “arbitrary and capricious” defenses.
`
`As to the equitable defenses, Defendants argue that they are entitled to assert the
`
`equitable defenses because Plaintiff is “seeking equitable remedies” and “California law
`
`permits equitable defenses to be asserted against a government entity seeking such relief.”
`
`See Opp. at 9. Defendants also cite evidence supporting the defenses, including evidence
`
`suggesting that Plaintiff delayed in filing their claims. Opp. at 10.
`
`In ConAgra, the California Court of Appeals held that “‘neither the doctrine of
`
`estoppel nor any other equitable principle may be invoked against a governmental body
`
`where it would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the
`
`public.’” 17 Cal. App. 5th 51, 136 (quoting County of San Diego v. California Water &
`
`Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 826 (1947)). There, the court rejected defendant’s assertion of
`
`laches because the “application would defeat a public policy aimed at protecting the
`
`5
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 6 of 10
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`public.” Id. The court reasoned that “Civil Code section 3479 is an expression of the
`
`Legislature’s public policy against public nuisances, and it is plainly aimed at protecting
`
`the public from the hazards created by public nuisances.” Id. Thus, the Court held that
`
`“[s]ince laches is an equitable defense, it could not be asserted against the government []
`
`because such an application would defeat a public policy aimed at protecting the public.”
`
`Id.; see also People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Outdoor Media Group, 13 Cal. App.
`
`4th 1067, 1081 (1993) (“The law is also clear that equitable considerations such as
`
`estoppel provide no defense in an action to enjoin a nuisance.”).
`
`While ConAgra addressed a public nuisance claim, the same reasoning applies to
`
`Plaintiff’s UCL claim, as the UCL is “an expression of the Legislature’s public policy
`
`against” unfair competition within the state. See ConAgra, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 136;
`
`Paduano v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1453, 1468 (2009) (The UCL is
`
`“directed toward the public's right to protection from fraud, deceit, and unlawful conduct.”
`
`conduct.”). Thus, the Court grants summary judgment on the equitable defenses.
`
`D.
`
`Argumentative Defenses
`
`Plaintiff contends that some of the defenses are “not properly defenses at all, but
`
`merely abstract argument.” See MSJ at 6 (citing Allergan’s twenty-six and fifty-third
`
`affirmative defenses and page 151 of Walgreens’ answer). Defendants do not oppose
`
`Plaintiffs’ motion as to these defenses. See generally Opp. Thus, summary judgment is
`
`granted with respect to these defenses.
`
`E.
`
`Fault and Cost Shifting Defenses
`
`Plaintiff identifies 29 fault and cost shifting defenses asserted by Defendants. MSJ
`
`at 8 (citing Ex. B (dkt. 973–2)). Plaintiff argues that the defenses fail for two separate
`
`reasons: (1) Plaintiff does not seek compensation in damages and (2) the defenses “cannot
`
`be used to shift Defendants’ liability to the People onto the nonparty City.” MSJ at 8.
`
`1.
`
`Contributory Negligence
`
`Plaintiff argues that to the extent that Defendants assert the defense of contributory
`
`negligence, it fails as a matter of law because the California Supreme Court has jettisoned
`
`6
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 7 of 10
`
`
`
`the defense. See MSJ at 8-9. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court
`
`abolished the defense of contributory negligence and replaced it with a system of
`
`comparative negligence. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828–29 (1975). Thus, summary judgment is
`
`granted as to the contributory negligence defense.
`
`2.
`
`Comparative Negligence, Comparative Fault, and Failure to
`Mitigate
`
`Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ defenses of comparative negligence, comparative
`
`fault, and failure to mitigate “have no application to plaintiffs not seeking damages.” See
`
`MSJ at 9.
`
`California courts distinguish between (1) abatement funds and civil penalties and
`
`(2) damages that are intended to compensate a plaintiff for past harms. See People v.
`
`ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 569 (Ct. App. 2017) (describing an
`
`abatement fund as an “equitable remedy” whose “sole purpose is to eliminate the hazard
`
`that is causing prospective harm” while damages are a “legal remedy” “directed at
`
`compensating the plaintiff for prior harm accrued”); Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v.
`
`Super. Ct., 462 P.3d 461, 488 (Cal. 2020) (“the civil penalties that may be awarded under
`
`the UCL … unlike … damages, are noncompensatory in nature”). California courts have
`
`also made clear that “in an action to abate a nuisance, the fact that plaintiff has suffered
`
`property damage therefrom to which his own negligence contributed is no defense against
`
`the remedy of abatement.” See Curtis v. Kastner, 30 P.2d 26, 29 (Cal. 1934).
`
`In the Orange County action, the court addressed similar arguments and granted
`
`plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to fault and cost shifting defenses, reasoning
`
`that under California case law comparative fault and negligence do not apply where a
`
`plaintiff “seeks only abatement as a remedy in a nuisance action[.]” People of the State of
`
`California, acting by and through Santa Clara County Counsel Orry P. Korb and Orange
`
`County District Attorney Tony Rackauckas vs. Purdue Pharma L.P., Case No. 30-2014-
`
`00725287-CU-BT-CXC, Order at 24-26 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Cnty. Mar. 12, 2021).
`
`Similarly, the court found that “penalties under the UCL” are “equitable remedies that
`
`7
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 8 of 10
`
`
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`provide no compensation to a plaintiff and do not even require proof of actual harm to or
`
`loss incurred by the plaintiff” and that, as a result, “comparative fault or comparative
`
`negligence does not apply as a defense to” the plaintiff’s UCL claim. Id. The reasoning
`
`applies here, and Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment with respect to these defenses.
`
`Plaintiff also argues that it is entitled to summary adjudication on Defendants’
`
`affirmative defense of failure to mitigate (also known as the “avoidable consequences”
`
`doctrine). See MSJ at 9–10. In State Dep’t of Health Servs. V. Super. Ct., the California
`
`Supreme Court made clear that the failure to mitigate defenses applies to damages, not to
`
`abatement or civil penalties. 31 Cal. 4th 1026, 1042–45 (describing the doctrine as “part
`
`of the law of damages”); see id. at 1043 (“a person injured by another’s wrongful conduct
`
`will not be compensated for damages that the injured person could have avoided by
`
`reasonable effort or expenditure”). Because Plaintiff does not seek compensatory damages
`
`for past injuries, the failure to mitigate defense does not apply here.
`
`Accordingly, summary judgment is granted with respect to the defenses of
`
`comparative negligence, comparative fault, and failure to mitigate.2
`
`F.
`
`Collateral Source and Setoff Defenses
`
`Plaintiff identifies 26 collateral source and setoff defenses asserted by Defendants.
`
`MSJ at 13–14 (citing Ex. C (dkt. 973–3)). Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary
`
`judgment on these defenses because (1) “Defendants have not pleaded and cannot show a
`
`triable issue as to whether [Plaintiff] is a recipient of collateral source funds or any setoffs”
`
`and (2) “no matter whether they implicate the City or the People, these defenses fail as a
`
`matter of law.” Id. at 14. Defendants agree that the defenses do not apply the Plaintiff’s
`
`UCL claim, but they contend that the defenses are applicable to the remedy of abatement.
`
`Opp. at 14.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff argues that neither setoff nor collateral source reduction apply to nuisance
`
`
`2 Because the Court grants Plaintiff summary judgment with respect to the fault and cost shifting
`defenses on the ground that the defenses are inapplicable as a matter of law, the Court does not
`reach Plaintiff’s argument that the defenses improperly attempt to shift liability to the City of San
`Francisco. See MSJ at 11–13.
`
`8
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 9 of 10
`
`
`
`claims because the “abatement remedy is not intended to (indeed, may not) compensate the
`
`plaintiff; it is intended to terminate the nuisance.” See MSJ at 15 (citing ConAgra, 227
`
`Cal. Rptr. 3d at 569). In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants “cannot show a triable
`
`issue as to whether [Plaintiff] is a recipient of collateral source funds or any setoffs.” Id.
`
`at 14.
`
`Defendants again argue that while the abatement fund is not intended to compensate
`
`Plaintiff, it is no more than “a huge pot of money” and funds from a collateral source can
`
`be used to offset Defendants’ contribution to the fund. See Opp. at 14. The Court rejects
`
`this argument for the reasons discussed above. California case law makes clear that the
`
`setoff defense applies to actions for damages, not the equitable remedy of an abatement
`
`fund. See Schreiber v. Lee, 47 Cal. App. 5th 745, 760 (2020) (the setoff defense stems
`
`from the principle that “a plaintiff may not recover in excess of the amount of damages
`
`which will fully compensate him for his injury”); see also ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
`
`569 (purpose of abatement fund is “not to recompense anyone for accrued harm but solely
`
`to pay for the prospective removal of the hazards defendants had created”).
`
`Similarly, Defendants argue that “the relief sought by [Plaintiff] raises the very risk
`
`of double recovery that collateral source and setoff defenses are designed to avoid.” Opp.
`
`at 14. But Defendants do not identify any sources of collateral funds that may be relevant
`
`here, much less make a colorable argument that the funds could be used to offset an
`
`abatement fund.
`
`Accordingly, summary judgment is granted as to the setoff and collateral source
`
`defenses.
`
`II.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Defendants’
`
`affirmative defenses is granted in part and denied in part.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-07591-CRB Document 1250 Filed 04/18/22 Page 10 of 10
`
`
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`Dated: April __, 2022
`
`
`
`
`CHARLES R. BREYER
`United States District Judge
`
`
`
`10
`
`1
`
`2
`
`3
`
`4
`
`5
`
`6
`
`7
`
`8
`
`9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`
`United States District Court
`
`18
`
`