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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SMART AUTHENTICATION IP, LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ELECTRONIC ARTS INC.,
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`Case No. 19-cv-01994-SI
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Re: Dkt. No. 21
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`Defendant.
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`Before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by defendant Electronic Arts Inc. (“EA”),
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`which seeks a finding that U.S. Patent No. 8,082,213 (the “‘213 patent”) is invalid and patent-
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`ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Dkt. No. 21 (Motion to Dismiss). This matter came on for hearing
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`on August 9, 2019. Having read the papers and heard the parties’ arguments the Court hereby
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`GRANTS defendant’s motion, finding the ‘213 patent invalid under § 101 and dismisses the
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`complaint with prejudice.
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`BACKGROUND
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`On December 20, 2011, the ‘213 patent, entitled “Method and System for Personalized
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`Online Security,” was duly and lawfully issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Compl.
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`¶ 7. Plaintiff, Smart Authentication, is the assignee and owner of the right, title and interest in and
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`to the ‘213 patent. Compl. ¶ 8. The inventions of the ‘213 patent generally relate to methods and
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`systems for multi-factor authentication of users over multiple communications media. Compl. ¶ 9.
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`The ‘213’s patent abstract states:
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 2 of 15
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`Various embodiments of the present invention provide strong authentication of users
`on behalf of commercial entities and other parties to electronic transactions. In these
`embodiments of the present invention, a user interacts with an authentication service
`provider [“ASP”] to establish policies for subsequent authentication of the user.
`Thus, in these embodiments of the present invention, a user controls the level and
`complexity of authentication processes carried out by the authentication service
`provider on behalf of both the user and commercial entities and other entities seeking
`to authenticate the user in the course of conducting electronic transactions, electronic
`dialogues, and other interactions for which user authentication is needed. The
`policies specified by a user may
`include specification of variable-factor
`authentication, in which the user, during the course of an authentication, provides
`both secret information as well as evidence of control of a tangible object.
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`Dkt. No. 25-2 at 16 (‘213 Patent).1 Figure 3 of the ‘213 patent provides a helpful illustration of
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`one of the patent’s potential uses. Specifically, it models an interaction between a user, an ASP
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`client, and an ASP. Id. at 5.
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`1 For ease of reference, page citations to docket entries will refer to the ECF assigned page
`number in the upper right hand corner of each page.
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 3 of 15
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`The ‘213 patent contemplates a user trying to login to the user’s account on a website, for
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`example. In order to strengthen the security of the user’s login credentials and protect the user’s
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`information, the user could be prompted to select an alternative form of authorization confirmation.
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`The user could select to confirm her authorization via a secondary medium, including, but not
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`limited to, a text message on her cell phone or an email. The secondary authenticating medium
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`would occur outside the purview of the initial login credentials. This second form of authentication
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`confirms the user’s identity.
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`Prior to filing the instant action, Smart Authentication was engaged in proceedings before
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`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Claim 11 emerged as the sole remaining claim following an
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`inter partes review (IPR). Dkt. No. 21 at 10, Footnote 2 (Motion to Dismiss); see also Dkt. Nos.
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`25-3 and 25-4 (Decision on Appeal and Final Written Decision, respectively, attached to the Shekhar
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`Vyas Declaration in Support of Opposition). Claim 11 is dependent upon claims 1, 9, and 10 (all of
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`which were invalidated in the IPR). The relevant claims read:
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`1. A user-authentication service implemented as routines that execute one or more
`computer systems interconnected by two or more communications media with both
`an authentication-service client, and a user, the user-authentication service
`comprising:
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`the one or more computer systems;
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`stored user-authentication policies specified by the user;
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`stored user information;
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`account interface routines that implement an account interface by which the user
`specifies, modifies, adds, and deletes user-authentication policies; and
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`authentication-interface routines that implement an authentication interface by
`which, following initiation of a transaction by the user with the authentication service
`client, the authentication-service client submits an authentication request, through
`the first communications medium or through a second communications medium, to
`authenticate the user, the authentication interface routines employing a variable-
`factor authentication, when specified to do so by stored user-authentication policies,
`to authenticate the user on behalf of the authentication-service client during which
`the user communicates with the user-authentication service through a third
`communications medium different from the first and second communications media
`and a user device different from that employed by the user to initiate the transaction
`with the authentication-service client.
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`9. The user-authentication service of claim 1 wherein a user-authentication policy
`specifies one or more of: constraints and parameters associated with user-
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 4 of 15
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`authentication processes carried out by the user-authentication service on behalf of
`one or more, specified authentication-service clients.
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`10. The user-authentication service of claim 9 wherein constraints include one or
`more of:
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`geographical constraints;
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`time-of-day constraints;
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`date constraints;
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`communications -medium-related constraints;
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`user-authentication service actions; and
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`event constraints.
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`11. The user-authentication service of claim 10 wherein user-authentication service
`actions include one or more of:
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`halting authorization service after detecting a specified event;
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`employing particular types of user-authentication procedures; and
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`providing alerts upon detecting specified events.
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`Dkt. No. 25-2 at 16-17 (‘213 Patent).
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`Plaintiff’s complaint, filed in April 2019, alleges a single cause of action for direct
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`infringement against defendant EA. Specifically, plaintiff alleges:
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`Without license or authorization and in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), Defendant is
`liable for infringement of claim 11 of the ‘213 patent by making, using, importing,
`offering for sale, selling and/or hosting a method for authenticating a user that
`requires two-factor authentication, including, but not limited to Login Verification,
`because each and every element is met either literally or equivalently.
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`Compl. ¶ 16.
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`I.
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`Motion to Dismiss
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if
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`it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
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`dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
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`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard requires
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`the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 5 of 15
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`unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require “heightened
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`fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the
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`speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
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`To state a claim for patent infringement, “a patentee need only plead facts sufficient to place
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`the alleged infringer on notice. This requirement ensures that the accused infringer has sufficient
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`knowledge of the facts alleged to enable it to answer the complaint and defend itself.”
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`Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 794 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The
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`Federal Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper to determine
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`patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial
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`L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`II.
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`Subject Matter Eligibility Under § 101
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`Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the scope of patentable subject matter encompasses “any new and
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`useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
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`thereof.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). Section 101
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`“contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
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`are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass'n for
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`Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). They are not patent-
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`eligible because “they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” which are “free to
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`all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
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`566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained that
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`allowing patents for such purported inventions “might tend to impede innovation more than it would
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`tend to promote it[,]” thereby thwarting the primary objective of patent laws. Id.
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`Alice provides the relevant analytical framework for “distinguishing patents that claim laws
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`of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications
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`of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. First, the court must determine whether the claims at
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`issue are directed to one of the patent-ineligible concepts. Id. Second, if the claims are directed to
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`a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea, the court must “consider the elements of each
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`claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the additional elements
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`transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (citation and quotation
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`marks omitted). Step two is often described “as a search for an 'inventive concept[.]’” Id. at 217-
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`18. “When viewing claim elements individually, the court must remember that recitation of
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`conventional, routine, or well-understood activity will not save an abstract claim.” California Inst.
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`of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 980 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223).
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`However, “[w]hen viewing claim elements as an ordered combination, the court should not ignore
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`the presence of any element, even if the element, viewed separately, is abstract.” Id. “If the ordered
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`combination of elements constitutes conventional activity, the claim is not patentable, but courts
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`should remember that a series of conventional elements may together form an unconventional,
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`patentable combination.” Id.
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`The Federal Circuit has recently held that “[w]hether something is well-understood, routine,
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`and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” Berkheimer
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`v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, the Berkheimer court also clarified that
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`“[n]othing in this decision should be viewed as casting doubt on the propriety of those cases”
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`resolving § 101 inquiries on motions to dismiss or summary judgment, where there is no genuine
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`dispute over the underlying material facts. Id. “When there is no genuine issue of material fact
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`regarding whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-understood, routine,
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`conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field, this issue can be decided . . . as a matter of
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`law.” Id. “To the extent that the Court must resolve underlying questions of fact related to
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`eligibility, they must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Broadband iTV, Inc. v. Oceanic
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`Time Warner Cable, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188 (D. Haw. 2015), aff'd sub nom. Broadband
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`iTV, Inc. v. Hawaiian Telcom, Inc., 669 F. App’x 555 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
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`DISCUSSION
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`EA requests the Court dismiss this action, arguing that claim 11, the only claim that survived
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`the ‘213 patent IPR proceeding, claims patent-ineligible subject matter. Specifically, EA argues
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`claim 11 of the ‘213 patent is directed to an abstract idea that lacks an inventive concept.
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 7 of 15
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`Plaintiff opposes defendant’s motion on three grounds, namely: (1) unresolved issues of
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`claim construction and underlying factual disputes preclude summary disposition; (2) claim 11 of
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`the ‘213 patent is not abstract because “[i]t is directed to a computer-centric problem of reliable
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`authentication of remote users involved in electronic transactions to improve network security,” and
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`solves problems associated with the prior art; and (3) claim 11 “reflects an inventive concept, as it
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`provides a specific technological way to improve network security by reliably authenticating remote
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`users involved in electronic transactions,” and discloses “a specific, inventive combination of
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`elements to address known problems in prior art authentication systems.” Dkt. No. 25 at 5
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`(Opposition) ( bolding in original).
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`The parties’ arguments are discussed in turn below.
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`I.
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`No Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Determination of Eligibility
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`Plaintiff argues the following issues of fact preclude summary determination: (1) paragraphs
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`9-12 of the complaint (Dkt. No. 25 at 11 (Opposition)); (2) the ‘213 patent’s specification,
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`explaining the shortcomings of prior authentication systems and how the alleged non-conventional
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`arrangement of the claimed invention solves these problems (Dkt. No. 25 at 10 (Opposition)); and
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`(3) claim construction (Id.). During the August 9, 2019 oral argument, when asked what, if any,
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`factual disputes existed precluding summary determination of eligibility, plaintiff again cited
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`paragraphs 9-12 of the complaint and stated claim construction would create issues of fact.
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`Transcript of August 9, 2019 Hearing at 8:16-25. The Court disagrees.
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`First, paragraphs 9-12 of the complaint merely summarize the ‘213 patent’s functionality,
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`stating in total:
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`9. The inventions of the ‘213 patent generally relate to methods and systems for
`multi-factor authentication of users over multiple communications mediums.
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`10. The ‘213 patent discloses an Authentication Service Provider (“ASP”), which “is
`generally implemented above a software and hardware platform or platforms . . . that
`include operating systems, lower-level applications, and computer-server hardware."
`Ex. A at col. 4, ll. 13-16. “In many embodiments, the ASP . . . is a software
`implemented service that runs on one or more computer systems interconnected by
`various communications media with both ASP clients and users.” Id. at col. 2, ll. 47-
`50. In certain embodiments, the “ASP may interact with the user via two different
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`communications media, such as a combination of the Internet and a cell phone.” Id.
`at col. 3, ll. 23-25.
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`11. In another example of disclosed embodiments, “[t]he [] third interface 208 allows
`the ASP to interface with user devices through alternative communications media,
`such as a cell phone, fax machine, telephone, or other communications devices. The
`third interface 208 allows the ASP to interface with virtually any network enabled
`resource through an appropriate medium, including both physical devices such as a
`cell phone, fax machine, telephone, or other communications devices, and also soft
`devices, such as an instant messaging account, or an email account.” Id. at col. 3, ll.
`37-46.
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`12. As one example of the asserted claim, the ‘213 patent recites a novel method
`of providing a user-authentication policy that specifies constraints associated with
`user authentication processes carried out by the user authentication service. The
`constraints include different user-authentication service actions, such as 1) halting
`authorization service after detecting a specified event; 2) employing particular types
`of user-authentication procedures; or 3) providing alerts upon detecting specified
`events. (bolding added)
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`The closest any language in paragraphs 9-12 comes to raising an issue of fact is the bolded language
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`in paragraph 12 above. But this is not enough. Although the Court must take the allegations in a
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`well-pleaded complaint as true at this stage, the Court is not required to accept as true “allegations
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`that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re
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`Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Uniloc USA Inc. v. LG Elecs.
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`USA Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 974, 986-87 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding § 101 issues properly addressed
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`in Rule 12 motion to dismiss where “[p]laintiffs’ second amended complaint features nothing but
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`conclusions by, for instance, calling the ‘049 Patent ‘novel and inventive.’”).
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`For the same reason, the patent’s specification—explaining shortcomings of prior
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`authentication systems and alleging that the non-conventional arrangement of the claimed invention
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`solves these problems—does not raise an issue of fact. In Cisco Sys. v. Uniloc USA, Inc., 386 F.
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`Supp. 3d 1185, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2019), this Court rejected a nearly identical argument, and it does
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`so again here.
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`Finally, plaintiff’s claim construction argument also fails. Although the Federal Circuit has
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`stated “that it will ordinarily be desirable—and often necessary—to resolve claim construction
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`disputes prior to a § 101 analysis, for the determination of patent eligibility requires a full
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`understanding of the basic character of the claimed subject matter[,]” it has also stated that “claim
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`construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.” Bancorp
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 9 of 15
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`Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In
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`any event, looking to the proposed terms and proposed construction in plaintiff’s brief (see Dkt. No.
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`25 at 10 (Opposition)), the Court finds that construction of these terms would not aid or alter the
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`Court’s determination today regarding the subject matter eligibility of the ‘213 patent.2
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`The Court finds that in the circumstances of this case it is appropriate to resolve the question
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`of patent eligibility under § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
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`
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`II.
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`Step 1: Abstraction
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`The Supreme Court has not articulated a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an
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`“abstract idea” sufficient to satisfy the first step of the Mayo/Alice inquiry. Rather, both the Federal
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`Circuit and the Supreme Court have compared the claims at issue to claims already found to be
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`directed to an abstract idea in previous cases. Alice, 527 U.S.. at 221 (“[The Court] need not labor
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`to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case. It is enough to recognize
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`that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept
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`of intermediated settlement at issue here.”); see also Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
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`1334-1335 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2016). Fundamental economic and conventional business practices
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`are often found to be abstract ideas, even if performed on a computer. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v.
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`Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Furthermore, a new application or
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`computer-implemented function that simply utilizes a computer generally as a tool to conduct a
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`known or obvious process will likely be considered abstract, whereas an application or computer-
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`implemented function that improves the capability of the system, will overcome or avoid
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`abstraction. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`For the action at bar, there are several cases directly on point to guide the analysis of the
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`‘213 patent’s eligibility under § 101. First, in Asghari-Kamrani v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No.
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`2 For purposes of the motion to dismiss, defendant accepted plaintiff’s proposed claim
`constructions as correct. Dkt. No. 26 at 18 (Reply Brief). Defendant points out, and the Court
`agrees, that plaintiff’s claim constructions do not transform claim 11 into patentable subject matter.
`Id.
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`United States District Court
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 10 of 15
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`2:15cv478, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87065, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 5, 2016), affirmed by the Federal
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`circuit,3 the district court found a patent invalid where the patent was generally described as an
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`“invention relat[ing] to a system and method provided by a Central-Entity for centralized
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`identification and authentication of users and their transactions to increase security in e-commerce.”
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`The ‘213 patent—described by plaintiff as generally relating to “methods and systems for multi-
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`factor authentication of users over multiple communications mediums”—is very similar. Compl.
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`¶ 9. The representative claim in the Asghari case stated:
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`A method for authenticating a user during an electronic transaction between the user
`and an external-entity, the method comprising:
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`receiving electronically a request for a dynamic code for the user by a computer
`associated with a central-entity during the transaction between the user and the
`external-entity;
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`generating by the central-entity during the transaction a dynamic code for the user in
`response to the request, wherein the dynamic code is valid for a predefined time and
`becomes invalid after being used;
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`providing by the computer associated with the central-entity said generated dynamic
`code to the user during the transaction;
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`receiving electronically by the central-entity a request for authenticating the user
`from a computer associated with the external-entity based on a user-specific
`information and the dynamic code as a digital identity included in the request which
`said dynamic code was received by the user during the transaction and was provided
`to the external-entity by the user during the transaction; and
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`authenticating by the central-entity the user and providing a result of the
`authenticating to the external-entity during the transaction if the digital identity is
`valid.
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`Id. at 5-6. With respect to the first Alice step, the court in Asghari ultimately concluded
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`[a]ll of the claims in the ‘432 patent require the use of a computer. … However,
`despite the electronic setting and purportedly Internet specific problem addressed,
`the patent claims are directed to a common method for solving an old problem. The
`claims are directed to the abstract idea of using a third party and a random, time-
`sensitive code to confirm the identity of a participant to a transaction. This
`formulation is admittedly verbose. It is verbose because the patent claims combine
`two abstract ideas: the use of a third party intermediary to confirm the identity of a
`participant to a transaction and the use of a temporary code to confirm the identity
`of a participant to a transaction. It is an obvious combination, and nothing about the
`combination removes the patent claims from the realm of the abstract.
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`Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The Asghari court’s reasoning is relevant to the case at bar. The ‘213
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`3 The procedural history of this case is summarized at 737 Fed.Appx. 539 (2018).
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 11 of 15
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`patent is highly similar to the abstract ideas emphasized in the quote above. The Asghari court
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`distinguished the patent there from patents that were not found to be abstract because the other
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`patents “were directed to an improvement in computer technology.” Id. at 14. Here, there is no
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`evidence that the ‘213 patent improves computer technology by making it faster, cheaper, or more
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`efficient.
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`The second case particularly on point is Strikeforce Techs., Inc. v. SecureAuth Corp., No.
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`LA CV17-04314 JAK (SKx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222516, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2017), aff’d,
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`753 F. App’x 914 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In that case, the patents in dispute were directed
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`to multichannel security systems and methods for authenticating a user seeking to
`gain access to a secure network. Such networks include those used for online
`banking, social networking and business activities. This field of technology is related
`to “out-of-band” authentication, or “two-factor” or “multi-factor” authentication.
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`Id. (citations omitted). Again, this case involved highly similar subject matter to the ‘213 patent.
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`The plaintiff in Strikeforce made the same argument Smart Authentication makes here: that the
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`patent in question addressed a technology-specific problem by providing a technology-specific
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`solution. Dkt. No. 25 at 9 (Opposition) (“Thus, claim 11 provides a solution that is necessarily
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`rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specific to electronic communications.”);
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`Strikeforce Techs., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222516, at *9 (“Plaintiff argues that the Asserted
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`Claims address a technology-specific problem by providing a technology-specific solution.”). This
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`Court reaches the same conclusion as the court in Strikeforce: plaintiff has simply applied “familiar
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`processes in the context of the use of computers that are connected to the internet.” Strikeforce
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`Techs., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222516, at *17. The ‘213 patent, like those in both Asghari
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`and Strikeforce, is abstract.
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`
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`The third analogous case is Prism Technologies LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 Fed. Appx.
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`1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Generally, the patent there related to “systems and methods [controlling] access
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`to protected computer resources by authenticating identity data, i.e., unique identifying information of
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`computer components.” Id. at 1016. The Federal Circuit found Prism’s patent abstract, and because it
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`was directed to the abstract process of “(1) receiving identity data from a device with a request for access
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`to resources; (2) confirming the authenticity of the identity data associated with that device; (3)
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 12 of 15
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`determining whether the device identified is authorized to access the resources requested; and (4) if
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`authorized, permitting access to the requested resources.” Id. at 117. While Smart Authentication’s
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`patent involves authentication using two electronic media, and Prism’s used different servers, the
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`underlying principle is the same.
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`The ‘213 patent lacks specificity and amounts to generalized steps using generic computer
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`functionality. The patent describes a functional system and method that is not special in its
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`composition or unique in terms of its result. There are no technical details; rather, the ‘213 patent
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`offers a “myriad of software implementation choices” and a “wide variety” of communication
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`channels to implement claim 11. Dkt. No. 25-2 at 16 (‘213 Patent). The patent does not state how
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`it should be implemented. To the contrary, the ‘213 patent’s specification states:
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`[T]he ASP can be implemented in an almost limitless number of different ways,
`using different control structures, data structures, hardware and software platforms,
`modular organizations, protocols, and any of various other myriad software
`implementation choices and parameters …. ASPs may run on single server
`computers, on multi-processor systems, or on distributed computer systems.
`Multiple, geographically dispersed ASPs may be employed to efficiently handle
`ASP-client-transaction requests received through any of a wide variety of different
`types of communications media.
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`Id. Thus, the ‘213 patent recites a method for authenticating a user in more than one way over
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`multiple electronic mediums but does not provide any “unconventional, patentable combination,”
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`such that straightforward steps to be done on a computer are transformed into something non-
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`abstract. California Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc'ns, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d at 980.
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`Because the ‘213 patent is directed to the abstract idea of verifying the identify of a user in
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`more than one way over multiple communications mediums, the Court must proceed to Step 2 of
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`the Alice inquiry.
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`III.
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`Step 2: Inventive Concept
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`At step two of the Alice framework, the court considers the elements of each claim and asks,
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`“what else is there in the claims before us?” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The Supreme Court describes
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`this process as searching for an “‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements
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`that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
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`Case 3:19-cv-01994-SI Document 40 Filed 09/11/19 Page 13 of 15
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`upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217-18. For an abstract idea involving a computer to
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`be patent-eligible, “the claim ha[s] to supply a ‘new and useful’ application of the idea.” Id. at 222
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`(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
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`177 (1981) (validating a claim employing a mathematical equation used in a larger pr