Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 1 of 23
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`SONAL N. MEHTA (SBN 222086)
` Sonal.Mehta@wilmerhale.com
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`950 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, California 94303
`Telephone: (650) 858-6000
`Facsimile: (650) 858-6100
`
`DAVID Z. GRINGER (pro hac vice)
` David.Gringer@wilmerhale.com
`ARI HOLTZBLATT (pro hac vice)
` Ari.Holtzblatt@wilmerhale.com
`MOLLY M. JENNINGS (pro hac vice)
` Molly.Jennings@wilmerhale.com
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Ave NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 663-6000
`Facsimile: (202) 663-6363
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`FACEBOOK, INC.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`REVEAL CHAT HOLDCO, LLC, a Delaware
`limited liability company, USA TECHNOLOGY
`AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (d/b/a
`Lenddo USA), a Delaware corporation, CIR.CL,
`INC., a dissolved Delaware corporation, and
`BEEHIVE BIOMETRIC, INC., a dissolved
`Delaware corporation,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
` Case No. 5:20-CV-00363-BLF
`
`DEFENDANT FACEBOOK INC.’S
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
`TO DISMISS
`
`Hearing Date: June 11, 2020
`Time: 9:00 AM
`Judge: Hon. Beth Labson Freeman
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`FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware corporation,
`
`
`v.
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`NO. 5:20-CV-00363-BLF FACEBOOK’S REPLY ISO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 2 of 23
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................2 
`I. 
`Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Time-Barred .....................................................................................2 
`A. 
`Fraudulent Concealment Does Not Save Any of Plaintiffs’ Claims........................2 
`B. 
`Counts IV and V are Untimely ................................................................................5 
`1. 
`Count IV is Untimely ...................................................................................5 
`2. 
`Count V Is Untimely ....................................................................................7 
`Laches Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims For Injunctive Relief ..............................................7 
`C. 
`Plaintiffs Have Not Plausibly Alleged Causal Antitrust Injury ...........................................8 
`Plaintiffs’ Alleged Relevant Product Markets Are Invalid ..................................................9 
`A. 
`“Social Data” Is Not A Valid Product Market .........................................................9 
`B. 
`“Social Advertising” Is Not A Valid Product Market ...........................................10 
`Plaintiffs Have Failed To State Claims Under The Sherman Act .....................................11 
`A. 
`Counts I, II and V Do Not State Section 2 Claims ................................................11 
`B. 
`Count III Does Not State A Section 1 Claim .........................................................13 
`C. 
`Counts IV and V Fail To Allege Antitrust Injury ..................................................15 
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................15 
`
`
`II. 
`III. 
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`IV. 
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 3 of 23
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co.,
`472 U.S. 585 (1985) .................................................................................................1, 12, 13
`
`Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp.,
`331 F.3d 704 (9th Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................................8, 9
`
`Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
`675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) .........................................................................10, 12, 14, 15
`
`Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,
`479 U.S. 104 (1986) .............................................................................................................8
`
`Carnero v. Elk Grove Fin., LLC,
`2017 WL 1315575 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) (Freeman, J.) .................................................2
`
`City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co.,
`955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992) ...........................................................................................11
`
`City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.,
`662 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1981)...............................................................................................11
`
`City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
`2020 WL 2079256 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020) .....................................................................9
`
`Complete Entertainment Resources LLC v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.,
`2016 WL 3457177 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) .............................................................5, 6, 7
`
`Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc.,
`858 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1988) ...........................................................................................2, 3
`
`Federal Trade Commission v. Wilh. Wilhemsen Holding ASA,
`341 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D.D.C. 2018) .......................................................................................9
`
`Feitelson v. Google Inc.,
`80 F. Supp. 3d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ...............................................................................15
`
`Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
`703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Chroma
`Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., 111 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................12
`
`Free FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe Systems Inc.,
`852 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ...............................................................................6
`
`Frenzel v. AliphCom,
`76 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .................................................................................14
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 4 of 23
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`Garrison v. Oracle Corp.,
`159 F. Supp. 3d 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ...............................................................................4
`
`Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc.,
`681 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................................4
`
`Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
`897 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018) .....................................................................................10, 11
`
`Hoang v. Bank of America, N.A.,
`910 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................2
`
`Image Tech. Servs. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
`125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) ...........................................................................................10
`
`In re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation,
`2020 WL 1066934 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2020) .......................................................................3
`
`In re Musical Instruments and Equipment Antirust Litigation,
`798 F.3d 1186 (2015) .........................................................................................................14
`
`Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc.,
`232 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................................8
`
`Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
`475 U.S. 574 (1986) ...........................................................................................................15
`
`MetroNet Services Corp. v. Qwest Corp.,
`383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) ...........................................................................................13
`
`Midwestern Machinery Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
`392 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 2004) .......................................................................................5, 6, 7
`
`NorthBay Healthcare Group, Inc. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,
`305 F. Supp. 3d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ...............................................................................8
`
`Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013) .........................................................................................13
`
`NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,
`525 U.S. 128 (1998) ...........................................................................................................14
`
`Oliver v. SD-3C LLC,
`751 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) .........................................................................................5, 7
`
`Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hospital,
`861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988) .............................................................................................9
`
`Planet Drum Foundation v. Hart,
`2017 WL 4236932 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2017) ....................................................................8
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 5 of 23
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`Pool Water Products v. Olin Corp.,
`258 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................................15
`
`Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose and Rubber Co.,
`576 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1978) ...............................................................................................4
`
`Ryan v. Microsoft Corp.,
`147 F. Supp. 3d 868 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .................................................................................4
`
`Sambreel Holdings LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,
`906 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Cal. 2012) ..............................................................................13
`
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Panasonic Corp.,
`747 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2014) .........................................................................................6, 7
`
`SD3 II LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.,
`888 F.3d 98 (4th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................4
`
`Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp.,
`2008 WL 4911230 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2008) ..................................................................11
`
`United States v. eBay, Inc.,
`968 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2013) .............................................................................14
`
`Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
`540 U.S. 398 (2004) .....................................................................................................11, 13
`
`Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.,
`951 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................................13
`
`Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
`592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010) ...............................................................................................3
`
`Warner v. Tinder, Inc.,
`105 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2015) .............................................................................14
`
`William Inglis v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
`668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................................3
`
`Z Technologies Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
`753 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2014) ...............................................................................................7
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`STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
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`15 U.S.C. § 15b ................................................................................................................................2
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`Deepa Seetharaman and Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook’s Restrictions on User
`Data Cast a Long Shadow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2015) ...............................................2, 3
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 6 of 23
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`HERBERT HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, Wolters Kluwer
`(4th ed. 2018) ...............................................................................................................3, 6, 7
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 7 of 23
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`Plaintiffs’ opposition is most notable for what it does not say. It does not dispute that the
`public acts challenged all occurred more than four years ago, outside the statute of limitations
`period. It does not dispute that the artificial “social” markets plaintiffs have alleged are broad
`enough to include such disparate companies as Apple, Lyft, and Nissan. Nor does it dispute that
`their monopolization claims depend on the extremely narrow exception in Aspen Skiing or that
`they have failed to allege necessary elements of the hub-and-spoke scheme set forth in their
`Complaint. Instead, it defends against arguments Facebook did not make while ignoring those it
`did, and disclaims the Complaint’s theories while advancing brand new ones not alleged.
`Facebook’s lead argument is that the Complaint is untimely. Revealingly, plaintiffs wait
`until their brief’s conclusion to address this dispositive argument, contending that the public acts
`that they challenge were somehow hidden fraudulently. But plaintiffs have not pled any relevant
`facts that were concealed from them during the limitations period, much less that those facts
`were fraudulently concealed. Plaintiffs’ only other answer is to point, repeatedly, to the
`unremarkable back-end integration of Instagram and WhatsApp. The integration of an acquired
`asset is not a new, unlawful act and it caused plaintiffs—most of whom no longer exist—no new
`injury. It is irrelevant here.
`Plaintiffs fare no better in arguing that their proposed relevant markets are well-defined
`based on a single document that identifies certain Facebook competitors. Instead, these artificial
`“social” markets are implausible on their face and fail to account for obvious substitutes. And
`plaintiffs have still not explained how any of the challenged conduct caused them antitrust
`injury, beyond conclusory statements of “exclusion.”
`Finally, plaintiffs’ attempts to recharacterize their Section 1 and Section 2 claims are
`unsuccessful. Plaintiffs cannot abandon their allegations of a hub-and-spoke scheme by labeling
`the agreements they challenge as “horizontal” and, in any event, have not alleged any coherent
`theory of harm to competition. The Section 2 claims are likewise not saved, even when viewed
`“holistically,” because none of the conduct at issue is anticompetitive as a matter of law.
`The Complaint should be dismissed. And since plaintiffs claim to have “painstakingly”
`set out their theories in a 451-paragraph Complaint, and even in opposing a motion to dismiss
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 8 of 23
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`have identified no further factual allegations that could cure the legal defects in their theories,
`leave to amend would be futile. See Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir.
`2018) (“leave to amend” futile “when the claims are barred by the applicable statute of
`limitations”); Carnero v. Elk Grove Fin., LLC, 2017 WL 1315575, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017)
`(Freeman, J.) (leave to amend futile where claim time-barred and neither complaint “nor
`argument presented in the opposition demonstrates … claim can be allowed through sufficient
`pleading of … tolling”).
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`I.
`
`ARGUMENT
`PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED
`A.
`Fraudulent Concealment Does Not Save Any of Plaintiffs’ Claims
`Plaintiffs do not argue that Facebook’s challenged conduct falls within the four-year
`statute of limitations, see 15 U.S.C. § 15b, and do not dispute that they claim (in conclusory
`fashion) to have been injured by those acts at the time they occurred, see Compl. ¶¶ 141, 220,
`268, 292-293. Plaintiffs instead argue Counts I-III and V are timely because of Facebook’s
`purported fraudulent concealment of facts giving rise to their claims. See Opp. 21-24. But
`plaintiffs’ allegations themselves preclude application of that doctrine here.
`First, to invoke the doctrine, plaintiffs have the burden to show that they had neither
`actual nor constructive knowledge of the facts constituting their claims for relief despite their due
`diligence in trying to uncover those facts. See Conmar Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., 858
`F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1988). But even knowing their claims may rise and fall on these critical
`questions, neither the Complaint nor the opposition disputes that the challenged acts were public
`or identifies any diligence performed by plaintiffs at all. This is dispositive.
`The best plaintiffs can muster is the contention that Facebook’s anticompetitive scheme
`was so well-hidden that they were not aware of the “particulars” giving rise to their Sherman Act
`claims until November 2019. See Opp. 20-21. Not so. The Complaint itself establishes that the
`API withdrawal, as well as the Instagram and WhatsApp acquisitions were all public knowledge
`long before January 2016. See MTD at 6. The so-called Whitelisting agreements, too, were
`reported by the Wall Street Journal as early as 2015. See Seetharaman and Dwoskin, Facebook’s
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 9 of 23
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`Restrictions on User Data Cast a Long Shadow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2015),
`https://tinyurl.com/ya67zwtq.1 Plaintiffs cannot transform public facts into private ones through
`amendment.
`And all of the above was sufficient to put plaintiffs on at least constructive notice of the
`relevant facts, and if nothing else should have suggested to plaintiffs that a diligent inquiry was
`appropriate. Indeed, so long as the plaintiff is aware of “any fact that should excite his
`suspicion,” the plaintiff is deemed to have “actual knowledge of his entire claim.” Conmar, 858
`F.2d at 502 (emphasis added). The public facts here plainly clear that bar—a point plaintiffs
`themselves acknowledge when they allege in their Complaint that the 2015 API deprecation “had
`only one plausible purpose” (i.e., elimination of competition). Compl. ¶ 167; see also Compl.
`¶ 218 (anticompetitive effects of “whitelisting” agreements were “facially apparent”). As the
`leading antitrust treatise explains: “[m]ore than almost any other plaintiff, the victim of a direct
`refusal to deal knows immediately that it has occurred.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law,
`¶ 320 (4th ed. 2018). This alone distinguishes this case from In re Glumetza, 2020 WL 1066934
`(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2020) (cited at Opp. 23-24), where the public facts were insufficient to “excite
`the reasonable plaintiffs’ curiosity,” id. at *7.
`It is no answer that plaintiffs claim to have been unaware of Facebook’s supposedly anti-
`competitive intent. Opp. 24. Intent is not an element of most of plaintiffs’ claims, see MTD at
`10, and for the only claim where it is arguably relevant (attempted monopolization) plaintiffs did
`not need to plead direct evidence of intent, see William Inglis v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d
`1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981) (“specific intent may be established not only by direct evidence of
`unlawful design, but by circumstantial evidence”). In any event, the law does not require a
`plaintiff to have actual or even constructive knowledge of each element of a cause of action for
`the statute of limitations to run. Conmar, 858 F.2d at 502. By no later than 2015, plaintiffs
`
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`1 The court may take judicial notice of newspaper articles “as an indication of what information
`was in the public realm at the time.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
`592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010).
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`knew of the supposedly anticompetitive conduct by Facebook, and claim to have been negatively
`affected by it. That knowledge suffices. See, e.g., SD3 II LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc.,
`888 F.3d 98, 109 (4th Cir. 2018) (antitrust statute of limitations runs once plaintiff “had
`sufficient information for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes to plead and identify its antitrust injury, the
`scope of that injury, and the parties responsible for causing it”).
`Second, plaintiffs have not identified—either in their Complaint or opposition—the
`requisite affirmative misrepresentations by Facebook during the limitations period. Most
`statements proffered (at 21-22) as evidence of Facebook’s “concealment” occurred before the
`dates on which the various elements of Facebook’s supposed scheme became public. Even
`accepting plaintiffs’ allegations, whether Facebook concealed its plans to deprecate the APIs
`from 2012-2014, for example, is now irrelevant because those plans became public in April
`2014. See Garrison v. Oracle Corp., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
`The only activity plaintiffs identify that occurred after the public disclosure of each
`challenged act is Facebook’s non-disclosure of internal documents. See Opp. 22. But that is not
`enough, because a successful fraudulent concealment claim requires proof “that the defendant
`affirmatively misled” the plaintiff, Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1060
`(9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). “Silence or passive conduct of the defendant is not deemed
`fraudulent, unless the relationship of the parties imposes a duty upon the defendant to make
`disclosure.” Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978).
`Plaintiffs have not suggested, let alone pled, any such duty here and could not do so.
`Third, accepting plaintiffs’ allegations and crediting them fully, none would rise to the
`level of fraudulent concealment. In the Ninth Circuit, the types of affirmative acts that give rise
`to fraudulent concealment range from affirmative steps to destroy evidence to the use of “secret
`codes” and other affirmative acts “to keep the conspiracy secret.” Garrison, 159 F. Supp. 3d at
`1077; see also Ryan v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 868, 888-892 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In other
`words, the alleged “concealment” must be fraudulent. Plaintiffs’ identification of a few stray
`emails analyzing the decision to withdraw the APIs (Opp. 22-23) falls well short of this standard,
`particularly since that decision was subsequently (and publicly) announced. Again, by the time
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`Case 5:20-cv-00363-BLF Document 49 Filed 05/28/20 Page 11 of 23
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`the four-year limitations period began to run, plaintiffs were aware of each act they now
`challenge. Even accepting plaintiffs’ allegations, these emails do not toll the limitations period.
`B.
`Counts IV and V are Untimely
`The Complaint’s allegations concerning the back-end integration of Instagram and
`WhatsApp cannot revive as a matter of law their untimely challenges to these six- and eight-year
`old acquisitions. Opp. 24-25. Plaintiffs’ argument relies on inapplicable or nonexistent
`doctrines and requires, at a minimum, that the integration caused plaintiffs a new injury—an
`allegation plaintiffs do not and cannot plausibly make.
`1.
`Count IV is Untimely
`
`Plaintiffs have abandoned any fraudulent concealment argument on their Section 7 claim.
`Instead, plaintiffs attempt to rescue this claim in two ways: first, by arguing that it seeks to
`remedy ongoing conduct and harm, and second, by invoking the so-called hold-and-use doctrine.
`Opp. 24-25. Even accepting plaintiffs’ allegations, both arguments fail as a matter of law.
`Plaintiffs’ theory of ongoing harm, which is tied solely to the back-end integration, Opp.
`24, in substance depends on the “continuing violation” doctrine, under which a “‘new and
`independent’” act that “inflict[s] new … injury” can “restart” the limitations and laches periods.
`Oliver v. SD-3C LLC, 751 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014). For good reason, plaintiffs do not
`invoke this doctrine by name. “Applying [the continuing violation doctrine] to mergers makes
`no sense.” Midwestern Machinery Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 392 F.3d 265, 271 (8th
`Cir. 2004); accord Complete Entm’t Res. LLC v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 2016 WL 3457177, at
`*1 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2016). Thus, “[o]nce a merger is completed, there is no continuing
`violation possible under § 7 that would justify extending the statute of limitations.” Id.
`Nor can the purported “hold-and-use” doctrine save the Section 7 claim. While plaintiffs
`present their argument as relying on well-settled precedent, neither the Supreme Court nor the
`Ninth Circuit has ever adopted the doctrine. As one court in the Central District recently
`observed, the doctrine “is not particularly well-developed” and stems from two “cases that did
`not even involve the statute of limitations.” Complete Entm’t, 2016 WL 3457177, at *2; see also
`Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 320c5 (hold-and-use doctrine based on “unfortunate dicta”).
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`If the “doctrine” even exists, plaintiffs’ claim does not implicate it. As the only court to
`ever toll the limitations period under hold-and-use has explained, it requires both that the
`acquired assets be “used in a different manner from the way that they were used when the initial
`acquisition occurred, and that new use injures the plaintiff[.]” Free FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe
`Sys. Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Neither is present.
`First, the claimed different use—the “back-end” integration of Instagram and WhatsApp
`with core Facebook, Opp. 25, does not entail using the assets in a different manner. “Mergers …
`normally lead to progressive integration of the assets and operations of the merged firms.”
`Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 320g. Plaintiffs themselves allege that Facebook has been gradually
`integrating WhatsApp into its other products since the acquisition. Compl. ¶¶ 296-297.
`Common sense thus dictates that the back-end integration is merely an “implementation” of the
`acquisitions, Midwestern Machinery, 392 F.3d at 270—the kind of “unabated inertial
`consequences of some pre-limitations action” that does not toll the limitations or laches periods,
`Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Panasonic Corp., 747 F.3d 1199, 1202-1203 (9th Cir. 2014).
`Second, plaintiffs fail to plausibly explain how the back-end integration causes them new
`injury. Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that Facebook previously operated the companies
`“independently,” Compl. ¶ 300, both should not be credited (Instagram and WhatsApp ceased to
`be “independent” platforms once they were acquired by Facebook), and is irrelevant given
`plaintiffs’ theory of injury. The integration supposedly endangers plaintiffs because Instagram
`and WhatsApp will not “become viable platform alternatives to Facebook’s Platform,” Compl.
`¶ 302, and because integration will increase some unspecified barriers to re-entry, Opp. 25. But
`any such injury stems not from integration, but from Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and
`WhatsApp over six years ago. After all, plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that Instagram and
`WhatsApp could emerge as rival platforms to Facebook while owned by Facebook. And, even if
`Instagram and WhatsApp were completely independent of Facebook, which of course they are
`not, there are no plausible allegations that any of the plaintiffs could successfully “re-enter” or
`that Instagram and WhatsApp would willingly serve as platforms for the plaintiffs if they did.
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`Finally, if the hold-and-use doctrine is valid at all, it “cannot be so broad that any change
`in operations at any time post-merger allows a long consummated merger to be challenged.”
`Complete Entm’t, 2016 WL 3457177, at *2. To hold otherwise would “eviscerate the statute of
`limitations for section 7,” id., undermining the “particularly strong” policy that “antitrust
`challenges be timely made” to “‘mergers,” Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 320a. It is telling that
`plaintiffs do not identify a single case extending the statute of limitations based on integration of
`assets previously acquired.
`2.
`Count V Is Untimely
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`For similar reasons, the back-end integration cannot render Count V timely. Here,
`plaintiffs claim that the back-end integration is a “new and independent act” that inflicted injury
`on plaintiff Lenddo. Opp. 25. But as explained, back-end integration is not “independent” from
`the underlying acquisition, no matter how many times plaintiffs argue otherwise, and it certainly
`has not plausibly caused any plaintiff a new injury. See Samsung, 747 F.3d at 1203. This does
`not change merely because plaintiffs proceed here under Section 2: “There is no reason to treat
`the same conduct differently in sister statutes that are designed to promote the same legislative
`objective.” Z Techs. Corp. v. Lubrizol Corp., 753 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs have
`alleged no facts tending to show why it would not have perceived the acquisitions as
`anticompetitive when they occurred, and even in opposing this motion have identified none. As
`a result, the count is untimely. See Midwestern Machinery, 392 F.3d at 273.
`C.
`Laches Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims For Injunctive Relief
`Plaintiffs’ sole defense (Opp. 24) against the applicability of laches is that the back-end
`integration of Instagram and WhatsApp excuses the delay. But that is wrong. As explained, the
`integration of acquired assets does not restart the statute of limitations as a matter of law, and
`thus cannot restart the laches period either. See Oliver, 751 F.3d at 1086 (courts use “the same
`legal rules that animate the four-year statute of limitations” in “applying laches”).
`Critically, plaintiffs do not dispute that dismissal on laches grounds is appropriate when,
`as here, the defense “is clear on the face of the complaint, and where it is clear that the plaintiff
`can prove no set of facts to avoid the [defense].” MTD at 7 (citing Planet Drum Found. v. Hart,
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`2017 WL 4236932, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2017)). Nor do they even attempt to—because
`they cannot—refute the p