Case 3:20-cv-05671-JD Document 407-3 Filed 04/20/23 Page 1 of 598
`Case 3:20-cv-05671-JD Document 407-3 Filed 04/20/23 Page 1 of 598
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`EXHIBIT 2
`EXHIBIT 2
`PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION
`PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`STATE OF UTAH
`160 E 300 S, 5th Floor
`P.O. Box 140872
`Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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`STATE OF NEW YORK
`28 Liberty Street
`New York, NY 10005
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`STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
`P.O. Box 628
`Raleigh, NC 27602
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`STATE OF TENNESSEE
`P.O. Box 20207
`Nashville, TN 37202
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`STATE OF ARIZONA
`2005 North Central Avenue
`Phoenix, AZ 85004
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`STATE OF COLORADO
`1300 Broadway, 7th Floor
`Denver, CO 80203
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`STATE OF IOWA
`1305 E. Walnut St., 2nd Floor
`Des Moines, IA 50319
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`STATE OF NEBRASKA
`2115 Nebraska State Capitol
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`Case No. 3:21-cv-05227
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`Lincoln, NE 68509-8920
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`STATE OF ALASKA
`1031 W. Fourth Avenue, Suite 200
`Anchorage, AK 99501
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`STATE OF ARKANSAS
`323 Center Street, Suite 200
`Little Rock, AR 72201
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`STATE OF CALIFORNIA
`455 Golden Gate Ave, Suite 11000
`San Francisco, CA 94102
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`STATE OF CONNECTICUT
`165 Capitol Avenue
`Hartford, CT 06106
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`STATE OF DELAWARE
`820 N. French St., 5th Floor
`Wilmington, DE 19801
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`DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`400 6th Street, N.W, 10th Floor
`Washington, D.C. 20001
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`STATE OF FLORIDA
`PL-01, The Capitol
`Tallahassee, FL 32399
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`STATE OF IDAHO
`954 W. Jefferson Street, 2nd Floor
`P.O. Box 83720
`Boise, ID 83720
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`STATE OF INDIANA
`302 West Washington Street
`IGCS – 5th Floor
`Indianapolis, IN 46204
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`COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
`1024 Capital Center Drive, Suite 200
`Frankfort, KY 40601
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`STATE OF LOUISIANA
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`P.O. Box 94005
`1885 North 3rd Street
`Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
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`STATE OF MARYLAND
`200 St. Paul Place, 19th Floor
`Baltimore, MD 21202
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`COMMONWEALTH OF
`MASSACHUSETTS
`One Ashburton Place, 18th Fl.
`Boston, MA 02108
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`STATE OF MINNESOTA
`445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1400
`St. Paul, MN 55101
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`STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
`P.O. Box 220
`Jackson, MS 39205
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`STATE OF MISSOURI
`P.O. Box 899
`Jefferson City, MO 65102
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`STATE OF MONTANA
`P.O. Box 200151
`Helena, MT 59620
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`STATE OF NEVADA
`100 N. Carson St.
`Carson City, NV 89701
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`STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
`33 Capitol Street
`Concord, NH 03301
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`STATE OF NEW JERSEY
`124 Halsey Street, 5th Floor
`Newark, NJ 07102
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`STATE OF NEW MEXICO
`408 Galisteo St.
`Santa Fe, NM 87504
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`STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
`1050 E Interstate Ave, Ste 200
`Bismarck, ND 58503-5574
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`STATE OF OKLAHOMA
`313 NE 21st St
`Oklahoma City, OK 73105
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`STATE OF OREGON
`1162 Court St NE
`Salem, OR 97301
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`STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
`150 South Main Street
`Providence, RI 02903
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`STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
`1302 E. Hwy. 14, Suite 1
`Pierre, SD 57501
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`STATE OF TEXAS
`300 W. 15th Street
`Austin, Texas 78701
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`STATE OF VERMONT
`109 State Street
`Montpelier, VT 05609
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`COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
`202 North 9th Street
`Richmond, VA 23219
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`STATE OF WASHINGTON
`800 Fifth Ave., Suite 2000
`Seattle, WA 98104
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`STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
`812 Quarrier St., First Floor
`P.O. Box 1789
`Charleston, WV 25326
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`Plaintiffs,
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`GOOGLE LLC, GOOGLE IRELAND LIMITED,
`GOOGLE COMMERCE LIMITED, GOOGLE
`ASIA PACIFIC PTE. LIMITED, GOOGLE
`PAYMENT CORP., and ALPHABET INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`Expert Report of Dr. Marc Rysman
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`October 3, 2022
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`Case 3:20-cv-05671-JD Document 407-3 Filed 04/20/23 Page 7 of 598
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`Table of Contents
`Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 12
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`I.
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`A. Qualifications ....................................................................................................................... 12
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`B. Assignment .......................................................................................................................... 13
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`C. Materials Considered ........................................................................................................... 14
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`II.
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`Summary of Opinions ................................................................................................................ 15
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`III. Mobile Ecosystems and the Digital Economy ........................................................................... 22
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`A. Mobile Technology .............................................................................................................. 22
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`1. Mobile Devices, OEMs, and MNOs .............................................................................. 22
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`2. Mobile Operating Systems ............................................................................................. 28
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`3. Mobile Applications....................................................................................................... 33
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`B. Development of Mobile Applications .................................................................................. 35
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`C. Distribution of Mobile Applications .................................................................................... 38
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`1. App Stores ...................................................................................................................... 39
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`2. Sideloading .................................................................................................................... 41
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`D. In-App Billing Services ....................................................................................................... 43
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`IV. Google Agreements and the Challenged Conduct ..................................................................... 49
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`A. Google Background ............................................................................................................. 49
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`1. Development of the Android Mobile OS ....................................................................... 49
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`2. Android Mobile OS at Release ...................................................................................... 51
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`3. Google Mobile Services ................................................................................................. 53
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`4. The Google Play Store ................................................................................................... 55
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`5. Google Play Billing........................................................................................................ 59
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`6. Google Play Points ......................................................................................................... 63
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`B. Google’s Agreements with Carriers, OEMs, and Developers ............................................. 68
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`1. Apache License .............................................................................................................. 69
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`2. Mobile Application Distribution Agreement (“MADA”) .............................................. 71
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`3. Anti-Fragmentation Agreement (“AFA”) and Android Compatibility
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`Commitment (“ACC”) ................................................................................................... 72
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`4. Android Compatibility Test Suite (“CTS”) and Compatibility Definition
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`Document (“CDD”) ....................................................................................................... 74
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`5. Revenue Sharing Agreement (“RSA”) .......................................................................... 77
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`6. Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement (“DDA”) ........................................... 82
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`7. Google Reduced Commission Developer Programs and Agreements .......................... 85
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`C. Overview of the Challenged Conduct .................................................................................. 92
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`V. Market Definition....................................................................................................................... 93
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`A. Antitrust Principles of Market Definition ............................................................................ 93
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`1. Basics of Market Definition ........................................................................................... 93
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`2. Market Definition and Two-Sided Markets ................................................................... 97
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`B. Application of the Market Definition Framework to this Case ......................................... 102
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`C. App Distribution on Android Smart Mobile Devices is a Relevant Market ...................... 104
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`1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 104
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`2. Consumer Choice of App Distribution Method ........................................................... 106
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`3. Developer Choice of App Distribution Method........................................................... 112
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`4. App Distribution on Alternative Devices does not Constrain App Distribution on
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`Android Smart Mobile Devices ................................................................................... 116
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`5. Implementing the Hypothetical Monopolist Test ........................................................ 149
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`6. Geographic Market ...................................................................................................... 154
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`D. Android In-App Billing Services Market is a Relevant Market ........................................ 156
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`1. The Function of Android In-App Billing Services and Google Play Billing .............. 157
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`2. Google Play Billing and Android In-App Billing Services Are Products Separate
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`and Distinct from Android App Distribution ............................................................... 166
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`3. Android In-App Billing Services is a One-Sided Market Between Developers and
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`Service Providers ......................................................................................................... 176
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`4. Alternative Relevant Markets for In-App Billing Services ......................................... 178
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`5. Geographic Market ...................................................................................................... 180
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`VI. Google has Monopoly Power in the Relevant Antitrust Markets ............................................ 182
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`A. Google has Monopoly Power in Android App Distribution .............................................. 183
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`1. Google Imposes a Supracompetitive Commission on Google Play Store Purchases
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`And Earns Extraordinarily High Profits ...................................................................... 183
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`2. High Margins are Indicative of Market Power ............................................................ 189
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`3. Structural Evidence Demonstrates Google has Monopoly Power ............................... 193
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`4. Google’s Market Power in Android App Distribution Faces Limited Competitive
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`Constraints from Alternative App Distribution Systems ............................................. 211
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`5. Summary on Google’s Market Power in the Android App Distribution Market ........ 219
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`B. Google’s Market Share is Consistent with a Very High Degree of Market Power Even
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`if the Relevant Market Includes the Apple App Store ....................................................... 220
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`C. Google has Monopoly Power in the Android In-App Billing Services Market ................ 220
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`1. Google Profitably Imposes a Supracompetitive Commission ..................................... 221
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`2. Structural Evidence Demonstrates Google’s Monopoly Power .................................. 225
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`3. Summary on Google’s Market Power in the Android In-App Billing Services
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`Market 230
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`VII. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct Harmed Competition in Android App Distribution ........ 231
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`A. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct Reduced Competition in the Android App
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`Distribution Market ............................................................................................................ 233
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`1. Google Has Prevented Competing App Stores from Being Preloaded on Android
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`Smart Mobile Devices.................................................................................................. 233
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`2. Google Restricted Competition from Third-Party App Stores Through
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`Technological Barriers Aimed at Deterring Sideloading ............................................. 268
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`3. Google Restricted Competition by Paying Developers for Parity Terms .................... 278
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`4. Google Has Always Intended to Monopolize the Android App Distribution
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`Market 287
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`5. Google Used its Valuable Advertising Programs to Restrict Competition from
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`Rival App Stores .......................................................................................................... 291
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`B. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in the Android App Distribution Market Has
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`Allowed it to Impose Supracompetitive Commissions ...................................................... 293
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`1. Google Has Charged Commissions Substantially Above Its Marginal Costs and
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`Has Offered Lower Rates on Several Occasions ......................................................... 294
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`2. Competitive But-For World Commission .................................................................... 297
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`3. Competitive But-For World Commissions Are In-Line with Commissions on
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`Other App Stores.......................................................................................................... 299
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`4. Direct Discounts to Consumers ................................................................................... 302
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`C. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in the Android App Distribution Market Has
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`Lowered Output and Harmed Innovation .......................................................................... 305
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`VIII. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct Caused Harm to Competition in the Android In-App
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`Billing Services Market ........................................................................................................... 309
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`A. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in Android In-App Billing Services Market
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`Reduced Competition......................................................................................................... 310
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`1. Economics of Tying ..................................................................................................... 310
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`2. Google Has Tied Android App Distribution Through Google Play to Google Play
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`Billing In-App Billing Services ................................................................................... 311
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`3. Google Actively Enforces its Tie by Coercing App Developers into the Tying
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`Arrangement ................................................................................................................ 315
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`4. Developers May Prefer Alternatives to Google Play Billing for Various Reasons ..... 318
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`5. Google’s Anticompetitive Tying Arrangement Affects Nearly All Developers and
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`Foreclosed Rival In-App Billing Services Providers ................................................... 325
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`6. Conclusion: Google Successfully Imposed an Anticompetitive Tie ........................... 326
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`B. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in the In-App Billing Services Market Has
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`Allowed it to Impose Supracompetitive Commissions ...................................................... 326
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`1. Google Has Charged Commissions Substantially Above Its Marginal Costs and
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`Has Offered Lower Commissions on Several Occasions ............................................ 327
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`2. Competitive But-For World Commission .................................................................... 330
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`3. Competitive But-For World Commissions Are In-Line with Commissions on
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`Other App Stores.......................................................................................................... 331
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`4. Direct Discounts to Consumers ................................................................................... 332
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`C. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct in the Android In-App Billing Services Market
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`Has Lowered Output and Harmed Innovation ................................................................... 332
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`IX. Google’s Anticompetitive Conduct Has Harmed Consumers in the U.S. ............................... 336
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`A. Model of Competition ........................................................................................................ 336
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`1. Direct Effect of Lower Commissions and Earlier Introduction of Play Points on
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`Prices 337
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`2. Welfare Effect through Increased Varieties (Apps) ..................................................... 339
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`3. Total Welfare Effect of Lower Commissions or Earlier Launch of Play Points ........ 341
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`B. Developer Marginal Costs ................................................................................................. 342
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`C. Estimating Apps’ Own Price Elasticity of Demand .......................................................... 347
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`D. Methodology for Calculating Damages ............................................................................. 352
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`1. Direct Effect of Lower Commissions and Greater Play Points on Prices .................... 354
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`2. Welfare Effect through Increased Varieties (Apps) ..................................................... 356
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`3. Total Welfare Effect of Lower Commissions or Greater Play Points ......................... 356
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`E. Quantification of Damages to Consumers in the Plaintiff States ...................................... 357
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`X. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 363
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`I.
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`Introduction
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`A.
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`1.
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`Qualifications
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`My name is Marc Rysman. I am a Professor of Economics, and Chair of the
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`Department of Economics, at Boston University, where I teach undergraduate and graduate courses
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`in industrial organization, econometrics, antitrust, and regulation. I specialize in industrial
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`organization and applied econometrics, and my research focuses on industrial organization and
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`competition, and the related issues of antitrust and regulation. In particular, I focus on the issues of
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`network effects, platform markets, two-sided markets, standardization, and compatibility. I have
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`studied a variety of industries, such as financial markets, telecommunications, payment cards,
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`consumer electronics, and Yellow Pages directories. My research is primarily empirical but includes
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`theoretical work as well.
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`2.
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`I have been a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and of
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`Minneapolis, as well as at Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the
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`Center for Studies in Industrial Organization at Northwestern University. Since 2020, I have been
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`on the Scientific Committee for an Online Seminar on the Economics of Platforms at Toulouse
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`School of Economics in Toulouse, France. On invitation, I have taught several short courses in
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`economics related to two-sided markets, network effects, demand estimation, and econometrics,
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`including at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Fordham Competition Law Institute
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`Training for Agency Economists, and Hitotsubashi University. I have been an invited lecturer on
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`network effects, platforms, and digital industries at Toulouse School of Economics, the Federal
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`Reserve Bank, and the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics among others,
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`and at various conferences on platforms and payment networks.
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`3.
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`I am the author or co-author of more than 35 published articles, many of which have
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`been published in leading peer-reviewed journals, including the American Economic Review, RAND
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`Journal of Economics, Review of Network Economics, the Journal of Applied Econometrics, and the
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`Journal of Political Economy, among others. I have also held editorial positions at leading
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`economic journals, including RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics,
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`Review of Network Economics, and International Journal of Industrial Organization, and I am a
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`former President and current member of the Board of Directors of the Industrial Organization
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`Society. I have received several grants from the National Science Foundation, including grants to
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`study network effects, and from the Networks, Electronic Commerce and Telecommunications
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`(NET) Institute. I have received several awards, including the Christensen Award in Empirical
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`Economics, the Neu Family Award for Teaching Excellence (2006 and 2012), the Gerald M. Gitner
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`Award for Excellence in Undergraduate Teaching in Economics (2000), Graduate Advisor of the
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`Year in Economics (2022), and Professor of the Year for Boston University in 2007 (as chosen by
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`BU’s Greek societies). I received my Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Wisconsin-
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`Madison in 1999 and my B.A. in Economics from Columbia University in 1992.
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`4.
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`I have served as an expert witness in various legal proceedings, including antitrust
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`matters involving payment cards and the high-tech sector. I have also served as a consultant to
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`businesses and regulatory agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission and the
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`Federal Reserve Bank. In 2012, I was commissioned to write a paper on interchange fee policy and
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`its effect on competition in the payments card market, entitled “Payment Networks,” which I
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`presented to then-Chairman Ben Bernanke, then-Vice Chairman Janet Yellen, and the other
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`members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank at an “Academic Consultant’s
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`Conference for the members of the Board of Governors.”
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`5.
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`A copy of my curriculum vitae, which describes my education, teaching experience,
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`publications, and testifying experience, is attached as Appendix A.
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`B.
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`6.
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`Assignment
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`I have been retained as an independent expert in antitrust economics by the
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`Attorneys General for 39 states, commonwealths, and districts of the United States (hereafter
`referred to simply as the “States”)1 (a) to evaluate the competitive effects of certain alleged conduct
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` 1
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` The states, commonwealths, and districts include Utah, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arizona, Colorado,
`Iowa, Nebraska, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
`Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
`New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
`Washington, and West Virginia.
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`by Google in relation to the Google Play Store and Google Play Billing and (b) to quantify
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`damages, if any, to consumers in the States and nationwide resulting from this challenged conduct.
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`C. Materials Considered
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`7.
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`To evaluate the competitive effects of Google’s challenged conduct and form my
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`opinions, I have reviewed a series of materials, both publicly available and those produced in this
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`litigation. These include Google documents, deposition testimony and associated exhibits collected
`in this matter2, academic literature, regulatory reports and decisions in the U.S. and other
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` 2
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` Deposition of Christian Cramer, Finance Director for Play at Google, January 13-14, 2022 (hereafter “Cramer
`(Google) Deposition”); Deposition of David Kleidermacher, Vice President, Engineering, at Google, February 3-4,
`2022 (hereafter “Kleidermacher (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of James Kolotouros, Vice President, Android
`Platform Partnerships at Google, February 2-3, 2022 (hereafter “Kolotouros (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Jamie
`Rosenberg, Vice President of Strategy and Operations, Platforms and Ecosystems Division, at Google, February 10,
`2022 (hereafter “Rosenberg (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Michael Marchak, Director of Play Partnerships,
`Strategy and Operations, at Google, January 12-13, 2022 (hereafter “Marchak (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of
`Paul Feng, Product Management Director at Google, January 14 and 18, 2022 (hereafter “Feng (Google) Deposition”);
`Deposition of Sameer Samat, Vice President of Product Management at Google, February 2-3, 2022 (hereafter “Samat
`(Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Tian Lim, Vice President, Engineering, Product and UX, at Google, December 2,
`2021 (hereafter “Lim (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Ruth Porat, Chief Financial Officer at Google, September
`15, 2022 (hereafter “Porat (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Paul Perryman, Vice President of Business
`Development and Partnerships at Netflix, September 28, 2022 (hereafter “Perryman (Netflix) Deposition”); Deposition
`of Eric Chu, Engineering Director at Meta Platforms and formerly Director of the Android Developer Ecosystem at
`Google, December 20, 2021, and January 14, 2022 (hereafter “Chu (Meta Platforms (formerly Google)) Deposition”);
`Deposition of Lawrence Koh, General Manager of FIFA Mobile at EA and formerly Director and Global Head of
`Games Business Development at Google, December 9, 2021 (hereafter “Koh (EA (formerly Google)) Deposition”);
`Deposition of Haseeb Malik, Director of Mobile Publishing at Epic Games, March 4, 2022 (hereafter “Malik (Epic
`Games) Deposition”); Deposition of Patrick Brady, Vice President of Engineering for Android’s Automotive Efforts at
`Google, April 21, 2022 (hereafter “Brady (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Richard Czeslawski, Developer Class
`Representative and Chief Operating Officer and President of Pure Sweat Basketball, March 21, 2022 (hereafter
`“Czeslawski (Pure Sweat Basketball) Deposition”); Deposition of Lacey Ellis, Developer Class Representative and
`Founder and CEO of LittleHoots LLC, March 22, 2022 (hereafter “Ellis (LittleHoots) Deposition”); Deposition of
`Hiroshi Lockheimer, Senior Vice President of Platforms & Ecosystems at Google, August 15-16, 2022 (hereafter
`“Lockheimer (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Andrew Rubin, Co-founder of Android and formerly Senior Vice
`President, Mobile and Digital Content, at Google, May 17-18, 2022 (hereafter “Rubin (formerly Google) Deposition”);
`Deposition of Daniel Vogel, Chief Operating Officer at Epic Games, May 23, 2022, (hereafter “Vogel (Epic Games)
`Deposition”); Deposition of Jonathan Gold, Finance Manager for Android at Google, June 23-24, 2022 (hereafter “Gold
`(Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Kirsten Rasanen, formerly Business Development Director at Google, August 17,
`2022 (hereafter “Rasanen (formerly Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Christopher Li, Director and Head of Product
`Growth at Google, May 24-25, 2022 (hereafter “Li (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of Mrinalini Loew, Product Lead
`for Google Play Commerce at Google, September 15, 2022 (hereafter “Loew (Google) Deposition”); Deposition of
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`Case 3:20-cv-05671-JD Document 407-3 Filed 04/20/23 Page 16 of 598
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`jurisdictions, trade press, and structured data, including Google’s proprietary data and third-party
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`data from IDC, data.ai (formerly App Annie), Statcounter, and Statista, among others. Finally, I
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`understand that my support team has had access to all materials produced in this matter via the
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`Consumers’ and States’ document management database. A list of materials that I relied upon in
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`forming my expert opinions described herein is attached as Appendix B.
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`8.
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`The work presented in this report has been conducted by me and staff working under
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`my direction at AlixPartners, a global consulting firm. I am compensated at a rate of $700 per hour
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`for my work in this matter, and I receive additional compensation related to billings by staff at
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`AlixPartners who assisted on this report at my direction and who continue to support my work in
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`this matter. My compensation is not dependent on the outcome of this matter. My work is ongoing,
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`and I will continue to review the discovery record to understand the evidence in this case. I reserve
`the right to supplement and to amend my opinions.3
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`II.
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`Summary of Opinions
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`9.
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`Based on my analyses summarized in this report, my review of the record evidence,
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`and my experience as an industrial organization economist, I find that Google holds market power
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`in two relevant antitrust markets, each of which is pertinent to evaluating the effects of Google’s
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`challenged conduct. The first is the market for the distribution of Android apps on Android smart
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`mobile devices worldwide (excluding China) (“Android App Distribution Market”). The Android
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`App Distribution Market includes the Google Play Store, the online app store through which Google
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`Edward Cunningham, Product Manager for Android at Google, July 21-22, 2022 (hereafter Cunningham (Google)
`Deposition”); Deposition of Nick Sears, Android Co-founder at Google, July 1, 2022 (hereafter “Sears (Google)
`Deposition”); Deposition of Jamie Rosenberg, Vice President of Strategy and Operations, Platforms and Ecosystems
`Division, at Google, July 14, 2020 (hereafter “Rosenberg (Google) Deposition 2020”); Deposition of Christopher Dury,
`CEO at GetJar, September 16, 2022 (hereafter “Dury (GetJar) Deposition”); Deposition of Sandra Alzetta, Vice
`President of Payments at Spotify, September 29, 2022 (hereafter “Alzetta (Spotify) Deposition”); Deposition of George
`Christopoulos, Founder at SlideMe, September 9, 2022 (hereafter “Christopoulos (SlideMe) Deposition”); Deposition
`of Donn Morrill, Director of Developer Relations for Entertainment Devices and Services at Amazon, August 11, 2022
`(hereafter “Morrill (Amazon) Deposition”); and Deposition of Sebastian Porst, Security Engineering Manager at
`Google, July 13-14, 2022 (hereafter “Porst (Google) Deposition”).
`3 For example, I understand that Google recently produced transaction data through May 2022. Due to the size of the
`production and due to the technical issues that have arisen in processing the data, I reserve my rights to update my
`analyses (including charts and appendices) to reflect the newly produced data.
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`NON-PARTY AND PARTY HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY
`15
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`Case 3:20-cv-05671-JD Document 407-3 Filed 04/20/23 Page 17 of 598
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`distributes mobile apps for the Android operating system;, original equipment manufacturers
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`(“OEMs”) Android app stores (e.g., the Samsung Galaxy Store); other third-party Android app
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`stores (e.g., the Amazon Appstore and F-Droid),; and sideloading (i.e., downloading an app onto a
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`smart mobile device directly from a developer’s website). Those distribution channels could be
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`competitively viable alternatives to the Google Play Store in the absence of Google’s challenged
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`conduct. I focus my report on smart mobile devices, which includes smart