Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 1 of 17
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`SONOS, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`No. C 20-06754 WHA
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`ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR
`PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`AS TO CLAIM 1 OF ’885 PATENT
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`INTRODUCTION
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`In this patent infringement action, the patent owner moves for summary judgment of
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`infringement of claim 1 of United States Patent No. 10,848,885. The alleged infringer cross
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`moves for summary judgment of noninfringement and invalidity. For the reasons that follow,
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`the patent owner’s motion is GRANTED.
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`STATEMENT
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`Patent owner Sonos, Inc. asserts that Google LLC infringes its patents, including United
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`States Patent Nos. 10,848,885 and 9,967,615. Pursuant to our “patent showdown” procedure
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`(Dkt. Nos. 68, 206), Sonos moves for summary judgment of infringement of claim 1 of the ’885
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`patent. Google, meanwhile, cross moves for summary judgment of noninfringement as to that
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`claim and separately moves for summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 13 of the ’615
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`patent. Google also raises a variety of invalidity theories as to both claims. This order
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 2 of 17
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`considers the motions related to the ’885 patent. A separate order will follow as to Google’s
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`motion on the ’615 patent.
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`The technology at issue in this case broadly relates to wireless multi-room audio systems.
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`These wireless audio systems include “networked audio players” now commonly referred to as
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`“smart” speakers. Smart speakers can communicate with each other and with other “networked
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`devices” over the internet. This ability to communicate with other networked devices allows
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`smart speakers to be controlled using a smart phone or other computer, which makes it easier to
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`play music or other audio.
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`The accused products provide a helpful example. Imagine someone has a smart phone, a
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`networked device connected to the internet. On the smart phone is the Google Play Music app,
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`which offers a library of songs. Smart phone speakers generally produce lesser-quality sound,
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`so listeners may prefer to listen to songs on an external, higher-quality speaker. Prior to the
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`arrival of smart speakers, the external, better speaker would have to be connected to the phone
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`through wires. Smart speakers, however, can connect to the smart phone over the internet,
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`without wires. Using the Google Play Music app, the user can tap a button to connect the phone
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`to the smart speaker. After the devices are connected, the audio that would have otherwise
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`played through the phone’s speaker will play through the smart speaker instead. Google calls
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`such connecting “casting,” and the parties herein refer to this feature as “cast” technology.
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`Now, imagine our user has smart speakers in several rooms, e.g., one in each of the living
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`room, kitchen, and bedroom. Sometimes the user may want to play music in only the living
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`room. At other times, the user may want to play music in only the living room and kitchen.
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`And at yet other times, the user may want to play music in all three rooms. The ’885 patent
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`broadly relates to managing and organizing these groups of smart speakers and other
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`“multimedia players.”
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 3 of 17
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`In particular, the patent is directed toward a “method and apparatus for controlling or
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`manipulating a plurality of multimedia players in a multi-zone system” (’885 patent at 1:32–
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`34). A player is a speaker or television or other similar device that can play content. The patent
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`refers to the player’s location, such as a bedroom or kitchen, as a “zone” and the player therein
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`as a “zone player” (see, e.g., id. at 2:36–41; 3:13–23). Figure 1 of the patent illustrates what
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`this system looks like:
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`Sonos filed the application that led to the ’885 patent in April 2019, but the patent
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`application claims priority through a long chain of continuation applications dating back to a
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`provisional application filed in September 2006. The patent’s specification recounts that, prior
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`to 2006, it was difficult for users to dynamically control speaker groups. In a “traditional multi-
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`zone audio system,” the specification explains, audio sources are “hard-wired” or “controlled by
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`a pre-configured and pre-programmed controller,” which makes it cumbersome to “dynamically
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`manag[e] the ad hoc creation and deletion of groups,” particularly when desired groups overlap
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`(id. at 1:62–2:2:25). As an illustrative example, the specification laments that someone who
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`enjoys “listen[ing] to broadcast news from his/her favorite radio station in a bedroom, a
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`bathroom, and a den while preparing to go to work in the morning” but also prefers to “listen in
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`the den and the living room to music . . . in the evening” would not easily be able to configure a
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 4 of 17
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`traditional audio system to accommodate those preferences (ibid.). The specification describes
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`both technological and physical hurdles that made such dynamic grouping “difficult” (ibid.).
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`The ’885 patent announced that it solved this problem by providing a “mechanism” to
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`“allow a user to group” multimedia players “according to a theme or scene, where each of the
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`players is located in a zone” (id. at 2:36–41). Then, “[w]hen the scene is activated, the players
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`in the scene react in a synchronized manner” (id. at 2:41–42). In other words, the ’885 patent
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`allows a user to customize and save multiple groups of smart speakers or other players, each
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`according to a “theme or scene,” and then later “activate” a customized group, called a “zone
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`scene,” on demand (id. at 2:46–51). For example, the person described above who enjoys
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`listening to broadcast news in the morning can form a “zone scene” called “Morning” that is
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`composed of speakers in the bedroom, bathroom, and den. Figure 5A illustrates a user forming
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`a zone scene called “Morning”:
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 5 of 17
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`After saving the “Morning” zone scene, the user can “invoke” the group on demand through an
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`app on the “controller” device (e.g., a smart phone).
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`Claim 1 of the ’885 patent was written from the perspective of a “zone player” that
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`connects to other “zone players” to form a “zone scene.” Using Google’s paragraph numbering,
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`claim 1 recites:
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`[1.pre] A first zone player comprising:
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`[1.1] a network interface that is configured to communicatively
`couple the first zone player to at least one data network;
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`[1.2] one or more processors;
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`[1.3] a non-transitory computer-readable medium; and
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`[1.4] program instructions stored on the non-transitory computer-
`readable medium that, when executed by the one or more
`processors, cause the first zone player to perform functions
`comprising:
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`[1.5] while operating in a standalone mode in which the first zone
`player is configured to play back media individually in a
`networked media playback system comprising the first zone player
`and at least two other zone players:
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`(i) receiving, from a network device over a data network, a first
`indication that the first zone player has been added to a first zone
`scene comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players
`including at least the first zone player and a second zone player
`that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media when
`the first zone scene is invoked; and
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`(ii) receiving, from the network device over the data network, a
`second indication that the first zone player has been added to a
`second zone scene comprising a second predefined grouping of
`zone players including at least the first zone player and a third zone
`player that are to be configured for synchronous playback of media
`when the second zone scene is invoked, wherein the second zone
`player is different than the third zone player;
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`[1.6] after receiving the first and second indications, continuing to
`operate in the standalone mode until a given one of the first and
`second zone scenes has been selected for invocation;
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`[1.7] after the given one of the first and second zone scenes has
`been selected for invocation, receiving, from the network device
`over the data network, an instruction to operate in accordance with
`a given one of the first and second zone scenes respectively
`comprising a given one of the first and second predefined
`groupings of zone players; and
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 6 of 17
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`[1.8] based on the instruction, transitioning from operating in the
`standalone mode to operating in accordance with the given one of
`the first and second predefined groupings of zone players such that
`the first zone player is configured to coordinate with at least one
`other zone player in the given one of the first and second
`predefined groupings of zone players over a data network in order
`to output media in synchrony with output of media by the at least
`one other zone player in the given one of the first and second
`predefined groupings of zone players.
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`The most contested terms are italicized. Note that the parties concentrate their fire on limitation
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`1.5.
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`Sonos contends that Google’s products that employ cast technology infringe claim 1
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`because they allow users to “create, save, and name as many speaker groups as desired” (Br. 6).
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`Accused products include Google’s “Cast-enabled apps” such as the Google Home app, Google
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`Play Music app, and YouTube Music app (Br. 3–7). Google opposes, arguing that the accused
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`products do not infringe under its proposed construction of the term “zone scene.” Google
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`further argues that its accused products do not receive the “indications” it asserts is required by
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`limitation 1.5. In addition to its noninfringement arguments, Google raises two invalidity
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`theories.
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`This order follows full briefing and oral argument.
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`ANALYSIS
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`Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the
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`moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(a). A genuine dispute of
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`material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
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`Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary
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`judgment, the court must accept the non-movant’s non-conclusory evidence and draw all
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`justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
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`1.
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`INFRINGEMENT.
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`Analysis of patent infringement requires a claim to be properly construed to determine its
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`scope and meaning, which is then compared to the accused device or process. See Tessera, Inc.
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`v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro
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`Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993). To prove infringement, Sonos must
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`show that Google’s accused products meet each properly construed limitation of claim 1 either
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`literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Deering Precision Instruments, LLC v. Vector
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`Distribution Sys., Inc., 347 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, Sonos asserts that Google’s
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`products literally infringe. To establish literal infringement, all of the elements of the claim, as
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`correctly construed, must be present in the accused products. TechSearch, LLC v. Intel Corp.,
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`286 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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`Sonos has provided evidence that the accused products practice each element of claim 1
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`(see Br. 11–24). In reply, Google raises three noninfringement arguments. This order
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`addresses each in turn.
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`First, Google argues that the accused products do not allow users to form a “zone scene,”
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`which it proposes defining as “a previously-saved grouping of zone players according to a
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`common theme” (Opp. 4–7). Even assuming, arguendo, that this is the proper construction of
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`“zone scene,” this order concludes that the accused products meet this limitation.
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`It may be helpful to step back. Using Google’s taxonomy laid out above, limitation 1.5(i)
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`requires that the claimed zone player receive “a first indication that the first zone player has
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`been added to a first zone scene comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players
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`including at least the first zone player and a second zone player that are to be configured for
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`synchronous playback of media when the first zone scene is invoked” (emphasis added).
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`Limitation 1.5(ii) then repeats this requirement as to a second indication and second zone scene.
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`As briefly explained, the specification states that users can form groups of speakers
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`“according to a theme or scene” (’885 patent at 2:39–40). Thus, as the specification explains, a
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`user who prefers to listen to broadcast news in the morning in certain rooms can form a “zone
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`scene” called “Morning” that only includes speakers in those rooms (id. at 1:67–2:17; 8:53–61).
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`In addition to “Morning,” the specification’s examples of names of zone scenes include
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`“Afternoon,” “Garden,” “Garden Party,” “Wakeup,” and “Party Mode” (see ’885 patent at fig.
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`8; 8:52–9:15).
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`Google vigorously argues that its products do not allow users to form such zone scenes.
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`Google admits that its users can form speaker groups and name the groups anything (Opp. 7).
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 8 of 17
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`Google contends, however, that a user merely naming a group something does not supply the
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`kind of a thematic “characteristics” the claim requires (ibid.). Specifically, Google argues that
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`the claim requires zone scenes to be accompanied by “theme attributes” such as the ability to
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`“[s]et volume levels in each zone” and “[s]elect and play specific music in the zones” (id. at 4–
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`5). In support, Google points to the specification describing a “zone scene” embodiment as
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`allowing “zones” to be “configured to a particular scene (e.g., morning, afternoon, or garden),
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`where a predefined zone grouping and setting of attributes for the grouping are automatically
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`effectuated” (’885 patent at 8:47–51 (emphasis added)).
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`The specification, however, then goes on to state that “a zone scene command could
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`apply” such “attributes,” not that zone scenes must apply them (id. at 9:20–30 (emphasis
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`added)). Moreover, nothing in the specification links such attributes to the “common theme” of
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`a zone scene (Reply Br. 3). Instead, the specification suggests themes based on location (e.g.,
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`“Garden”), time of day (e.g., “Morning” or “Evening”), or purpose (e.g., “Party Mode”) (see
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`’885 patent at fig. 8; 8:52–9:15).
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`The question, then, is simply whether a user’s ability to name speaker groups means that
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`the user can group speakers according to a common theme. The answer is yes. While the
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`specification is largely barren on this point, it expressly states that a user can make a zone scene
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`by “mak[ing] a group of 3 zones named after ‘Morning’” (’885 patent at 8:53–61 (emphasis
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`added)). The specification does not suggest anything else is necessary. This conclusion also
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`aligns with the basic purpose of the invention, which is to allow users to pre-save customized
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`speaker groups and later “invoke” the named group on demand (see, e.g., id. at 9:15–20; fig. 6).
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`The name serves to allow the user to remember the theme that binds a particular set of speakers.
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`Google briefly objects that its users can name speaker groups something “completely
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`abstract or random” such as “A,” “B,” and “C” (Opp. 7). In other words, Google argues that it
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`should escape infringement because the accused products allow users to make speaker groups
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`that are not bound by a thematic name. This only shows, however, that Google’s products have
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`capabilities in addition to those recited by the claim. This does not avoid infringement. See
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`Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (infringement is
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`not avoided “if a claimed feature performs not only as shown in the patent, but also performs an
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`additional function”). Moreover, as Sonos points out, the accused products only need to be
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`reasonably capable of satisfying the limitation (see Reply Br. 3). The Court of Appeals for the
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`Federal Circuit has explained that
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`to infringe a claim that recites capability and not actual operation,
`an accused device need only be capable of operating in the
`described mode. Thus, depending on the claims, an accused device
`may be found to infringe if it is reasonably capable of satisfying
`the claim limitations, even though it may also be capable of
`noninfringing modes of operation.
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`Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citations
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`omitted and emphasis added). This reasoning applies to our claim, which recites “a non-
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`transitory computer-readable medium that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause
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`the first zone player to perform functions comprising. . . .” (’885 patent at 11:43–45 (emphasis
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`added)). See NetFuel, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
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`(Judge Edward J. Davila) (applying the “reasonably capable” test to a claim similarly
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`employing “when executed” language). Google admits that its accused products are readily
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`capable of allowing users to pre-save groups of speakers and give them thematic names.
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`Consequently, the accused products allow users to form zone scenes.
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`Second, Google argues that its accused products do not receive an “indication” that the
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`“zone player has been added to” a first or second zone scene. To recap, limitations 1.5(i) and
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`1.5(ii) require that the “zone player” receive “from a network device over a data network, a[n] .
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`. . indication that the . . . zone player has been added to . . . a zone scene” (emphasis added).
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`Sonos asserts that the accused Google players satisfy this limitation by receiving a “join_group
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`message,” which includes “a unique ID identifying the group” and a “name” (Br. 16; Reply Br.
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`4 (citing Dkt. No. 203-3, Ex. B)). The message is sent to the accused Google player after a user
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`adds the player to a group on the Google Home app (ibid.).
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`Google replies that, even if the “join_group message” adds a speaker to the group, it does
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`not indicate that the speaker “has been added” to the group (Opp. 8–9). This distinction
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`between past and present tense is critical, Google argues, because the “has been added”
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`language requires the speaker to receive a message regarding its grouping status later, after it
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`has already been added to the group by some prior command. Google accordingly
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`acknowledges that its “join_group” message instructs a speaker to join a group, but nonetheless
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`maintains that it does not “memorializ[e] that the speaker has been added to the group” (ibid.;
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`see also Schonfeld Decl. ¶ 37).
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`Sonos disagrees with Google’s reading of the claim. It insists that the past-tense phrase
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`“has been added” refers only to “some ‘add[]’ action’ that previously took place at the network
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`device prior to the ‘indication’ being sent and received” (Reply Br. 4). In other words, Sonos
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`contends that the phrase “has been added” refers to the user’s action that adds a speaker to a
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`zone scene. After the user takes such action — by, as a hypothetical example, tapping “add” on
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`the Google Home app — the network device subsequently sends the “join_group message” to
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`the accused player. This sequence of events, Sonos argues, satisfies the “has been added”
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`limitation.
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`This order again sides with Sonos. The plain language of the claim does not require a
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`follow-up indication memorializing that the zone player has already been added to the group by
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`an initial command so that the zone player can use that information later. Rather, the claim
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`simply requires the zone player to receive an indication from the network device that it has been
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`added to a zone scene. Because the accused players only receive the “join_group message”
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`after some action has been taken to add them to a group, they meet this limitation.
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`Third, Google argues that its accused players do not receive an “indication” identifying “at
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`least the first zone player and second zone player” (Opp. 10). Put differently, Google’s view is
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`that the claim requires a speaker that has been added to a zone scene to know what other
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`speakers are in the group. Google’s argument is based on limitation 1.5(i) requirement that a
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`the “first zone player” receive a “first indication that the first zone player has been added to a
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`first zone scene comprising a first predefined grouping of zone players including at least the
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`first zone player and a second/third zone player. . . .” (emphasis added). Limitation 1.5(ii) then
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`repeats this requirement as to a second zone player and second zone scene.
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`Google’s argument, however, requires reading the word “comprising” to modify
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`“indication.” A more natural reading of the claim is that “comprising” modifies “zone scene.”
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`This reading also makes more sense in the context of the invention. The “comprising” phrase
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`serves to clarify that a zone scene is required to be comprised of a group of zone players, not
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`that the indication is required to be comprised of a group of zone players. Limitation 1.7 further
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`supports this conclusion by stating, without referring to any required indication, that the “first
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`and second zone scenes respectively compris[e] a given one of the first and second predefined
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`groupings of zone players.”
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`In sum, Google’s noninfringement arguments as to limitation 1.5 fail to present triable
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`questions and lack merit. Further, Sonos has adequately shown that the accused products
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`practice the remaining elements of the claim (see Br. 11–24). Google did not dispute these
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`contentions in its briefing. Accordingly, Sonos’s motion for summary judgment of
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`infringement is GRANTED.
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`2.
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`VALIDITY.
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`Google supplements its infringement arguments with two invalidity theories. First,
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`Google argues that claim 1 of the ’885 patent is directed toward unpatentable subject-matter.
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`Second, Google contends that the patent lacks written description support. As explained below,
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`both theories also fail to convince.
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`A.
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`PATENTABLE SUBJECT-MATTER.
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`Google argues that claim 1 is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for failing to meet the two-
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`part Alice test. Under well-established Supreme Court precedent, laws of nature, natural
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`phenomena, and abstract ideas remain patent-ineligible under Section 101. See, e.g., Ass’n for
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`Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (citations and
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`quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has set forth a two-step “framework for distinguishing
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`patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
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`patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
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`U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S.
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`66, 71 (2012)). Under this framework, a court must first “determine whether the claims at issue
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 12 of 17
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`are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Ibid. If so, then the court must further
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`“consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
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`determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
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`eligible application.” Ibid.
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`At step one, courts must first examine the “patent’s ‘claimed advance’ to determine
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`whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea.” Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879
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`F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “[T]he first step in the Alice inquiry . . . asks whether the
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`focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or,
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`instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely
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`as a tool.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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`This order finds that claim 1 of the ’885 patent survives step one. The thrust of Google’s
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`argument is that the claim is directed toward the abstract idea of “grouping and controlling
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`speakers” because the invention merely automates the “age-old process of manually plugging
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`speakers in to create speaker groups” (Opp. 13). This is not convincing. True, the Court of
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`Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that merely “‘claiming the improved speed or
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`efficiency inherent with applying the abstract idea on a computer’ is insufficient to render the
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`claims patent eligible.” Enco Sys., Inc. v. DaVincia, LLC, 845 F. App’x 953, 957 (Fed. Cir.
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`2021) (citations omitted). Claim 1, however, does not merely automate the process of plugging
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`in speakers, nor does it merely employ computer software as a blunt tool. Rather, claim 1
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`recites a specific kind of device — a “zone player” — that can be readily placed in pre-saved
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`groups with other zone players to allow synchronous playback on demand. The claimed ability
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`to customize and save overlapping speaker groups and easily control group playback represents
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`a clear technological improvement over the “conventional multi-zone audio system,” which, as
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`the specification explained, presents significant technological and physical obstacles to forming
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`speaker groups. See, e.g., CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
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`2020) (finding claims non-abstract where they were sufficiently “directed to technological
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`improvements”); MicroPairing Techs. LLC v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. C 21-4034, 2021
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`WL 6618817, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021) (Judge James V. Selna) (idea “does not become
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`conventional simply because it improves on a more rudimentary version of a task previously
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`done by humans”).
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`Google briefly presents two additional step one arguments. First, Google argues that the
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`claims are vague and “purely functional” (Opp. 15). This order disagrees. The specification
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`adequately details how the claimed set of functions is employed. Cf. Affinity Labs of Texas,
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`LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claim abstract in part
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`because “neither the claim nor the specification reveals any concrete way of employing a
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`customized user interface”). Moreover, as Sonos points out, the cases that Google relies on to
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`support this argument are directed to the generally abstract idea of collecting, organizing, and
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`storing information (see Reply Br. 15 n.10). These cases are inapposite, and Google has not
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`adequately explained how they would translate to the technology at issue here.
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`Second, Google contends that the claim is directed to an abstract idea because forming
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`zone scenes necessarily relies on the “subjective intent of the user at the time of grouping”
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`(Opp. 16). The cases Google cites to support this proposition, however, relate to computers
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`implementing human mental processes through, for example, an algorithm. See, e.g., Synopsys,
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`Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 958, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1138
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`(Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding asserted claims invalid where they “add nothing other than a way to
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`implement [a] mental process on a computer”). Google again fails to adequately explain how
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`these cases are relevant. Moreover, the act of naming zone scenes is just one aspect of the
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`claim. Taken as a whole, the idea of the claim — to allow users to pre-save customized speaker
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`groups and invoke them on demand for synchronized playback — is not directed toward a
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`subjective mental process. See CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1367 (“At step one, we consider the
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`claims in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to excluded
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`subject matter”) (cleaned up and emphasis added); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
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`654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding subject matter of a claim unpatentable where all
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`of the claimed method steps could be performed in the human mind).
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`This order is also not convinced that the idea of naming zone scenes depends on a
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`subjective mental process. The kinds of “scenes or themes” suggested by the patent are
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`Case 3:20-cv-06754-WHA Document 309 Filed 07/21/22 Page 14 of 17
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`sufficiently tethered to the technology to render them non-abstract. The patent does not suggest
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`that a user can form a zone scene based on any arbitrary theme. Rather, the patent describes
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`themes logically connected to the utility of speakers such as time of day, location, and purpose.
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`Even Google acknowledges that there is a distinction between the claimed zone scenes and
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`speaker group themes that are “completely abstract and random” such as those named “A,” “B,”
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`and “C” (Opp. 7).
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`This order accordingly finds that claim 1 is not directed toward an abstract idea. Having
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`found that the claim survives step one, it is unnecessary to proceed to step two.
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`B.
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`WRITTEN DESCRIPTION.
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`This order now considers Google’s written description challenge. Written description
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`requires the specification to “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that
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`the inventor invented what is claimed.” Ariad Pharmas., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 5