`
`SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN (SBN 310719)
`(sliss@llrlaw.com)
`ANNE KRAMER, SBN 315131
`(akramer@llrlaw.com)
`LICHTEN & LISS-RIORDAN, P.C.
`729 Boylston Street, Suite 2000
`Boston, MA 02116
`Telephone:
`(617) 994-5800
`Facsimile:
`(617) 994-5801
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff Thomas Liu,
`on behalf of himself and all others
`similarly situated
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`
`
`THOMAS LIU, individually and on behalf of
`all others similarly situated,
`
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`Case No. 20-cv-07499
`
`HON. VINCE CHHABRIA
`
` v.
`
`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
`
`
` Defendant
`
`
`THIRD AMENDED CLASS ACTION
`COMPLAINT
`
`
`1. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
`ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E, ET.
`SEQ.
`
`2. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 ET.
`SEQ.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`THIRD AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 2 of 20
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`This class action case is brought by Plaintiff Thomas Liu against Defendant Uber
`1.
`Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), alleging that Uber has violated federal and state law by
`discriminating against minority drivers through use of its “star rating system,” in which Uber
`passengers are asked to evaluate drivers on a one to five scale after each ride, and which is used
`by Uber to determine which drivers get terminated (or “deactivated”, in Uber’s language).
`Uber’s use of this system to determine driver terminations constitutes race discrimination, as it is
`widely recognized that customer evaluations of workers are frequently racially biased. Indeed,
`Uber itself has recognized the racial bias of its own customers. Uber’s use of this customer
`rating system to decide employment terminations constitutes disparate impact discrimination
`against non-white drivers.1
`Plaintiff brings Count I of this action on behalf of himself and similarly situated
`2.
`Uber drivers across the country who have been subject to Uber’s discriminatory use of its star
`rating system to terminate drivers. This claim is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
`of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
`Plaintiff brings Count II of this action on behalf of himself and similarly situated
`3.
`Uber drivers in California who have been subject to Uber’s discriminatory use of its star rating
`system to terminate drivers. This claim is brought under Cal. Gov't Code § 12940.
`II.
`PARTIES
`Plaintiff Thomas Liu resides in San Diego, California, and worked for Uber in
`4.
`California as a driver prior to his deactivation in October 2015.
`
`
`1
`Plaintiff’s claim that Uber’s use of this customer rating system constitutes intentional
`disparate treatment discrimination as well was dismissed by the Court’s Order of July 30, 2021
`(Dkt. 41). Plaintiff has therefore omitted this claim in this Second Amended Complaint but does
`not, by doing so, waive this claim. The Court indicated in its order that the claim may be
`allowed to be added back in after discovery, id. at 4. Plaintiff also reserves the right to pursue
`this claim if necessary on appeal.
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 3 of 20
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`Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) is a headquartered in San Francisco,
`
`5.
`California.
`III.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`This Court has general federal question jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
`6.
`28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this case arises under federal law, namely, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
`of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
`This Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over Plaintiff’s
`7.
`state law claim because the federal and state claims raised here derive from a common nucleus of
`operative facts.
`The Northern District of California is a proper venue for this action pursuant to 28
`8.
`U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. is headquartered in San
`Francisco, California. Furthermore, Uber engages in business activities in and throughout the
`State of California, including San Francisco.
`IV.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`Uber is a San Francisco-based transportation service, which engages drivers
`9.
`across the country to transport riders.
`Uber offers customers the ability to order rides via a mobile phone application,
`10.
`which its drivers then carry out.
`In order to evaluate its drivers, Uber uses a passenger rating system, in which
`11.
`passengers are asked to rate their driver on a one to five scale after each ride. Uber calls this
`rating system its “star rating system.”
`In order to continue working for Uber, drivers must maintain a minimum average
`12.
`star rating. The minimum star rating is set by Uber management. The minimum star rating has
`frequently been set very high, even close to a perfect a score.
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 4 of 20
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`For instance, in order to be allowed to continue working for Uber, drivers in the
`13.
`San Diego area in 2015 were required to maintain a star rating of at least 4.6 on a scale of 1 to 5.
`In October 2015, Plaintiff Thomas Liu was deactivated by Uber because his
`14.
`average star rating fell below 4.6.
`Plaintiff Liu is Asian and from Hawaii and speaks with a slight accent. While
`15.
`driving for Uber, Plaintiff Liu noticed passengers appearing hostile to him, which appeared to
`him to be a result of racial discrimination. For example, he noticed riders cancelling ride
`requests after he had already accepted the ride and the rider was able to view his picture. He also
`experienced riders asking where he was from in an unfriendly way.
`Plaintiff may seek to drive for Uber again in the future.
`16.
`17.
`Plaintiff alleges that Uber’s use of the passenger star rating system to determine
`terminations had a disparate impact on him, as well as other minority drivers across the United
`States.
`
`Uber has long known that relying on a system that depends on passenger
`18.
`evaluation of drivers is discriminatory, as Uber is aware that passengers frequently discriminate
`against Uber drivers. Indeed, in the past, before it allowed tipping on the app, Uber tried to
`justify its refusal to add a method for passengers to tip drivers through the app based upon its
`assertion that passengers discriminate against racial minorities, and Uber professed concern that
`allowing tipping would therefore discriminate against minority drivers in the wages they would
`receive. See Dan Adams, Uber’s argument against tipping: Riders have a racial bias, The
`Boston Globe (April 27, 2016) available at
`https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/04/27/uber-resists-adding-tipping-its-
`app/BNEfLpo8dLcfC9czdcvtzI/story.html.2
`
`
`2
`In support of its position, Uber relied upon a 2008 study by two Cornell University
`professors that found “that consumers of both races discriminate against black service providers
`by tipping them less….” Lynn, M., Sturman, M. C., Ganley, C., Adams, E., Douglas, M., &
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 5 of 20
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`In response to Uber’s position that tipping could lead to disparate pay based on
`19.
`race, drivers also raised concerns that, under the same reasoning, “customer bias could affect
`their ratings in Uber’s zero-to-five-star ranking system, which the company uses to identify,
`retrain, and sometimes ‘deactivate’ poor drivers.” Adams, Uber’s argument against tipping:
`Riders have a racial bias, supra.
`There have been other reports as well, over the years, highlighting concerns to
`20.
`Uber that its star rating systems is racially biased. See Joshua Brustein, Uber Says Tips Are Bad
`for Black People. But What About Ratings Bias?, Bloomberg, Apr. 28, 2016,
`https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-28/uber-says-tips-are-bad-for-black-people-
`but-what-about-ratings-bias; see also Benjamin Hanrahan, Ning Ma & Chien Wen Tina Yuan,
`The Roots of Bias on Uber, College of Information Sciences and Technology at Pennsylvania
`State University, at Section 4.1.1 (reporting on driver comments regarding racial bias in the
`driver rating system).
`Indeed, it is well recognized in social science research that employers’ reliance on
`21.
`customer evaluation systems often leads to discriminatory impact on racial minorities. This
`research includes a paper that “analyzes the Uber platform as a case study to explore how bias
`may creep into evaluations of drivers through consumer-sourced rating systems.” Rosenblat, A.,
`Levy, K., Barocas, S., & Hwang, T. (2016), Discriminating Tastes: Customer Ratings as
`Vehicles for Bias, Intelligence and Autonomy, available at:
`https://datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Discriminating_Tastes_Customer_Ratings_as_Vehicles_for_Bias.
`pdf. In the paper, the authors find that:
`
`
`McNeil J. (2008), Consumer racial discrimination in tipping: A replication and extension,
`Cornell University, School of Hospitality Administration site:
`http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/27.
`
`
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 6 of 20
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`Consumer-sourced ratings like those used by Uber are highly likely to be
`influenced by bias on the basis of factors like race or ethnicity. If a platform bases
`material employment determinations on such ratings, these systems—while
`appearing outwardly neutral—can operate as vehicles through which consumer
`bias can adversely impact protected groups … A plethora of social science
`research has established that racial and gender bias commonly “creeps into”
`ratings of all sorts.
`
`Id. The paper was based on a review of the Uber rating system and numerous social
`science studies including: Ayres, I., M. Banaji, and C. Jolls. 2015. “Race effects on
`eBay.” The RAND Journal of Economics 46, no. 4 (2015): 891- 917; Edelman, B., M.
`Luca, and D. Svirsky. 2016. “Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence
`from a Field Experiment.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
`Forthcoming. http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-
`2016-01-06.pdf; Doleac, J.L., and L.C.D. Stein. “The visible hand: Race and online
`market outcomes.” The Economic Journal 123, no. 572 (2013): F469-F492; Edelman, B.,
`M. Luca, and D. Svirsky. 2016. “Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy:
`Evidence from a Field Experiment.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
`Forthcoming. http://www.benedelman.org/publications/airbnb-guest-discrimination-
`2016-01-06.pdf; Edelman, B. 2016. “Responses to Airbnb’s Report on Discrimination.”
`September 19, 2016. http://www.benedelman.org/news/091916-1.html; Elvira, M.M., and
`R. Town. 2001. “The Effects of Race and Worker Productivity on Performance
`Evaluations.” Industrial Relations 40 (4): 571–90; Kraiger, K., and J.K. Ford. "A meta-
`analysis of ratee race effects in performance ratings." Journal of applied psychology 70.1
`(1985): 56; Mobley, W.H. 1982. “Supervisor and Employee Race Effects on Performance
`Appraisals: A Field Study of Adverse Impact and Generalizability.” Academy of
`Management Journal 25 (3): 598–606; Rogers, B. 2015. “The Social Costs of Uber.” The
`University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue 82:85.
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 7 of 20
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`https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Rog
`ers_Dialogue.pdf; Shohat, M., and J. Musch. 2003. "Online auctions as a research tool: A
`field experiment on ethnic discrimination." Swiss Journal of Psychology/Schweizerische
`Zeitschrift für Psychologie/Revue Suisse de Psychologie 62, (2): 139; Wang D., S. Xi,
`and J. Gilheany. 2015. “The Model Minority? Not on Airbnb.com: A Hedonic Pricing
`Model to Quantify Racial Bias against Asian Americans.” Technology Science.
`September 1. http://techscience.org/a/2015090104/.
`At least one news outlet covered the 2016 study and noted that Uber did
`22.
`not respond to a request for comment. See Aviva Rutkin, Do Uber Ratings Let
`Passengers Discriminate Against Drivers?, NewScientist, Oct. 12, 2016,
`https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23230953-000-do-uber-ratings-let-passengers-
`discriminate-against-drivers/.
`In light of research in this area, as well as Uber’s self-professed statement that it
`23.
`would not allow tipping for drivers because of its concerns regarding customer bias, Uber’s use
`of its star rating system to determine driver terminations is racially discriminatory, as it has a
`disparate impact on minority drivers.
`Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel conducted a survey of Uber drivers that confirmed that
`24.
`Uber’s policy of terminating drivers based on not meeting a minimum star rating has had an
`adverse impact on minority drivers.3
`In November 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a survey by electronic mail to
`25.
`approximately 20,000 Uber drivers (who are clients of Plaintiff’s counsel). The survey asked the
`
`
`3
`In its Order of July 30, 2021 (Dkt. 41), at 3, the Court indicated that Plaintiff
`“must make a more sophisticated effort at the front end to develop a plausible factual basis in
`support of his assertion that terminations at Uber occur on a racially disparate basis.” As shown
`here through these amended allegations, Plaintiff’s counsel has now done this “legwork”, which
`overwhelmingly supports Plaintiff’s allegation that Uber’s policy has a disparate impact on
`minority drivers.
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 8 of 20
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`drivers whether they had been deactivated by Uber based upon their star ratings, and it asked
`them to identify their race.
`In response to the survey, 4,093 Uber drivers responded with answers to these
`26.
`questions. The results are shown here4:
`
`
`If you have been deactivated by Uber,
`was it because your star ratings were too low?
`
`
`What is your race?
`
`
`White
`
`Asian
`
`Black
`
`Latinx
`
`Other
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Yes
`
`275
`
`125
`
`201
`
`117
`
`118
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`No
`
`1310
`
` 384
`
` 633
`
` 574
`
` 356
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`% Yes Statistical significance
` in disparity with whites?
`
`.174
`
`.246
`
`.241
`
`.169
`
`.249
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`--
`
`.0002
`
`<.0001
`
`no
`
`.0003
`
`As shown above, 17.4% of white respondents indicated that they had been
`27.
`deactivated by Uber based on star ratings. In contrast, 24.6% of Asian respondents, 24.1% of
`Black respondents, and 24.9% of respondents who identified their race as “Other” than the
`
`4
`In its Order of May 23, 2022 (Dkt. 56), the Court dismissed the previous version of this
`complaint (Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint), based upon the belief that the respondents
`to this survey only included drivers who had been deactivated. In fact, the respondents included
`a mix of drivers who had been deactivated and who had not been deactivated. Thus, a “no”
`answer includes drivers who were not deactivated, as well as drivers who were deactivated for
`reasons other than their star rating.
`In order to confirm this, following the issuance of that Order, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a
`follow-up email to the survey respondents who had answered “no”, to clarify whether or not they
`had been deactivated for any reason. Of the respondents who answered “no” to the survey (and
`responded to the follow-up request for clarification), 51.7% indicated that they had not been
`deactivated and 48.3% indicated that they had been deactivated for reasons other than star
`ratings. Of the drivers who answered “no” to the survey, 56.5% responded to the follow-up
`request for clarification.
`
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 9 of 20
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`choices provided indicated that they had been deactivated by Uber based on star ratings. Only
`16.9% of Latinx respondents indicated that they had been deactivated by Uber based on star
`ratings.5
`Plaintiff’s counsel consulted with Dr. Mark Killingsworth, a professor in the
`28.
`Department of Economics at Rutgers University.6 Dr. Killingsworth examined the survey
`responses and found the results to be highly statistically significant that race is associated with
`Uber drivers in the survey reporting that they had been deactivated based on their star ratings.
`According to Dr. Killingsworth, overall the chance that the survey results, shown
`29.
`above, would have resulted, had race played no role in drivers being deactivated based on their
`star ratings, is less than 1 in 10,000 (<.0001 probability). This result is highly statistically
`significant.7
`
`
`5
`A large number of respondents who checked “Other” on the race question self-identified
`themselves as “Hispanic”, “Latino”, “Mexican American”, or other identities that may be
`considered “Latinx”. However, their responses were tabulated under “Other”, rather than
`“Latinx”, because they checked “Other” in response to the survey.
`
`
`
`A federal court has described Dr. Killingsworth’s qualifications as follows:
`
` 6
`
`
`
`Dr. Killingsworth is a labor economist with more than 40 years of experience and has a
`substantial record as an expert witness in federal and state litigation. He is the author of
`Labor Supply and The Economics of Comparable Worth, and has also authored numerous
`publications in the areas of comparable worth, pay equity, employment discrimination,
`and wage differentials. Also, Dr. Killingsworth has testified in front of United States
`Congressional Committees and the General Assembly of Pennsylvania. In addition, he
`has been a consultant to United States District Judge Robert L. Carter, the Canadian
`Department of Justice, and the United States Departments of Justice and Labor. Dr.
`Killingsworth graduated from the University of Michigan and received M.Phil. and
`D.Phil. degrees from the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.
`
`
`Artunduaga v. Uni. Of Chicago Med. Ctr., 2016 WL 7384432, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2016)
`(citing cases).
`
` 7
`
`Probabilities of less than .05 are generally considered statistically significant. A
`
`probability of less than .0001 is thus highly statistically significant.
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 10 of 20
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`According to Dr. Killingsworth, as shown in the table above, with respect to the
`30.
`comparison of results of particular races to white respondents, the chance of race having played
`no role in drivers being deactivated based on their star ratings is 2 in 10,000 (.0002 probability)
`for Asian respondents, less than 1 in 10,000 (<.0001 probability) for Black respondents, and 3 in
`10,000 (.0003 probability) for respondents who identified their race as “Other” than one of the
`given categories. For drivers who identified themselves as “Latinx”, there was no statistically
`significant disparity between them and white drivers with respect to whether they reported
`having been deactivated by Uber based on star ratings (indeed, a smaller proportion of “Latinx”
`drivers indicated they had been deactivated based on ratings than white drivers) (but see note 4
`supra).
`31. While these survey results were pulled from just a relatively small sampling of
`Uber drivers, who Plaintiff’s counsel was able to survey without cooperation from Uber, or
`access to data or other information in Uber’s possession, and are entirely self-reported, the
`striking statistical significance of the results provides a “plausible factual basis in support of
`[Plaintiff’s] assertion that terminations at Uber [due to its star rating policy] occur on a racially
`disparate basis.” Order of July 30, 2021 (Dkt. 41), at 3.
`Although Uber drivers are classified as independent contractors, they are actually
`32.
`employees under Title VII, as well as under California state discrimination law (at least up until
`the passage of Proposition 22), for the purposes of the claims alleged herein.
`Drivers perform a service in the usual course of Uber’s business, since Uber is a
`33.
`car service that provides transportation to its customers, and drivers such as Plaintiff Liu have
`performed that transportation service. Uber holds itself out as a transportation service, for
`example, by billing itself as “[a] company that moves people”, and whose core mission is to
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 11 of 20
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`“get[] you from point A to point B”.8 Uber generates its revenue primarily from customers
`paying for the very rides that its drivers perform. Without drivers to provide rides for Uber’s
`customers, Uber would not exist. Indeed, Uber’s prospectus for its 2019 IPO describes how its
`drivers are the lifeline of its business: “If we are unable to attract or maintain a critical mass of
`Drivers … our platform will become less appealing to platform users, and our financial results
`would be adversely impacted … Any decline in the number of Drivers … using our platform
`would reduce the value of our network and would harm our further operating results.” Uber
`SEC S-1, pp. 29-30 [Filing Date: March 1, 2019] (emphasis added).
`Uber also requires its drivers to abide by a litany of policies and rules designed to
`34.
`control the drivers’ work performance, which it closely monitors. Examples of this control
`include, but are not limited, to the following:
`a. Uber screens its drivers and requires that drivers meet certain requirements prior
`to being approved to drive for Uber. For example, Uber requires that its drivers
`undergo a background check. Uber has also required that drivers upload photos of
`their licenses and proof of personal insurance. At times, Uber has required
`drivers to attend in-person training classes and pass a written test as a prerequisite
`to driving for Uber. At other times, Uber has required drivers to undergo
`retraining, after they have been terminated, in order to work again as a driver;
`b. Drivers’ vehicles must meet Uber’s quality standards, which it determines and
`may change at any time at its sole discretion. For example, Uber has set age
`restrictions on the vehicles drivers may use;
`
`8
`In responding to COVID-19, Uber advertised that “A company that moves people is
`asking you not to move.” See @Uber, Instagram, March 31, 2020,
`https://www.instagram.com/p/B-Z8d5ppbi7/?hl=en. Uber’s CEO has held the company out as
`having the mission of moving people from point A to point B. See Dara Kerr, Uber Wants to be
`the “Amazon of Transportation,” Cnet, Sept. 16, 2018 , https://www.cnet.com/news/uber-wants-
`to-be-the-amazon-of-transportation/.
`
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`c. Uber has monitored its drivers’ work hours and logs a driver off its app for six
`hours if the driver reaches a twelve-hour driving limit. Uber has also sent
`messages to drivers to encourage them to go on-duty during high-demand hours;
`d. Uber has used its app to constantly monitor and control its drivers’ behavior while
`its drivers are logged into the app. Indeed, Uber tracks its drivers, and the drivers
`must notify Uber through the Uber app of the drivers’ trip status at every key step
`of the on-demand ride: (1) acceptance of the rider’s ride request, (2) arrival to the
`pick-up location of the rider, (3) start of the trip, and (4) end of the trip;
`e. Uber has retained the right to suspend or terminate drivers who do not accept
`enough rides, cancel too many rides, do not take what Uber deems to be the most
`efficient routes, or engage in other conduct that Uber, in its sole discretion, may
`determine constitutes grounds for suspension or termination. Uber has retained
`discretion to terminate a driver if the driver behaves in a way that Uber believes is
`inappropriate or has violated one of Uber’s rules or standards. As set forth here,
`drivers have been subject to termination based on Uber’s system of using
`customer rating feedback; drivers can be terminated if their average star rating
`falls below a minimum threshold set by Uber;
`f. Uber mediates drivers’ interactions with passengers. Uber takes complaints from
`customers regarding drivers and works with drivers to address the issues raised.
`Uber has also retained sole discretion to resolve driver requests for cleaning
`reimbursements, meaning that a driver is barred from directly requesting
`reimbursement from a passenger who has, for example, vomited in their vehicle;
`g. At various points in time, Uber has instructed drivers via email and online
`training videos on how to maintain their vehicles for cleanliness and
`presentation, how to pick up passengers, how to behave while driving, and how
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 13 of 20
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`to raise their star rating. While these best practices have been couched as
`suggestions, since Uber has retained the right to terminate drivers in its sole
`discretion, failure to comply may and has resulted in drivers’ termination.
`35. When driving for Uber, drivers are not engaged in their own transportation
`business. Instead, when driving Uber customers, drivers wear the “hat” of Uber. Specifically:
`a. Using the Uber app, passengers cannot request a particular driver. When they
`request a ride, they are made to understand that they are using Uber to obtain the
`ride;
`b. Passengers pay Uber for the ride and cannot pay the driver directly;
`c. The passengers are Uber’s customers, not customers of the individual driver;
`d. Uber is and has been deeply involved in marketing its transportation services,
`qualifying and selecting the drivers, regulating and monitoring their performance,
`and fare setting. Uber has trademarked the slogan, “Everyone’s Private Driver.”
`Uber also advertises: “We built Uber to deliver rides at the touch of a button”;
`“Always the ride you want”; “Request a ride, hop in, and go”: “Sign up to ride.
`Rides on demand”; and “Get a reliable ride in minutes, at any time and on any day
`of the year.”;
`e. Uber has branded the rides that its drivers provide to Uber passengers as Uber
`rides. For example, Uber has required drivers to display Uber trade dress while
`performing transportation services for Uber, such as requiring drivers to display
`an Uber “U” decal on windshields when providing rides to Uber passengers.
`Uber does not require drivers to possess any skill above and beyond that
`36.
`necessary to obtain an ordinary driver’s license.
`Uber provides the drivers with the primary instrumentality with which they can
`37.
`perform services for Uber because it provides the Uber app, and Uber only derives a benefit
`
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 14 of 20
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`from the drivers’ labor when they use Uber’s software. In contrast, drivers do not invest in any
`equipment or materials required for their services; rather, all drivers must already own or have
`the legal right to operate a vehicle in good operating condition before they can work as an Uber
`driver.
`Uber unilaterally determines drivers’ compensation and method of payment:
`38.
`a. Uber sets the method by which drivers’ pay is calculated, as it calculates drivers’
`fares according to a formula that it has set in its sole discretion;
`b. Uber then collects the fare from the passenger and disburses a portion of those
`fares to the driver as compensation for providing the on-demand ride the
`passenger ordered, while retaining the remainder of the fare for itself;
`c. Uber handles all invoicing, claim and fare reconciliation, and resolution of
`complaints that arise from drivers and passengers;
`d. Uber has also at times actively sought drivers with advertisements promising a
`set hourly rate.
`Drivers’ tenures with Uber have been for an indefinite period of time, although
`39.
`Uber has retained the right to terminate drivers in its sole discretion.
`Uber drivers are engaged in interstate commerce. At times, drivers transport
`40.
`passengers across state lines. Furthermore, drivers are engaged in interstate commerce insofar
`as they transport passengers who are within the flow of interstate commerce; indeed, drivers
`often drive passengers to or from airports, train stations, and bus stations, as part of their
`interstate journeys. Uber has partnered with various airlines to allow passengers to begin or end
`their interstate journeys with an Uber ride, by offering them various promotional deals to book a
`ride with Uber to take them to or from the airport.
`
`
`
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`THIRD AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 15 of 20
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`V.
`
`TITLE VII CLASS ALLEGATIONS
`Plaintiff brings this case as a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
`41.
`of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, on behalf of all non-white Uber drivers across the country who
`have been terminated (or put at risk of termination) based upon Uber’s star rating system.
`This class meets the prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
`42.
`23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) specifically, in that:
`The class is so numerous that joining all members is impracticable.
`a.
`The exact number of the members of the class is unknown, but
`numerous (likely thousands) of non-white Uber drivers across the
`country have been terminated (or put at risk of termination) based on
`Uber’s use of the star rating system. As a result, joinder of all these
`individuals is impracticable.
`b. There are questions of fact and law common to all of these potential
`class members, because all of these individuals have been terminated
`(or put at risk of termination) based upon Uber’s use of its star rating
`system to set a minimum standard to continue driving for Uber.
`The claims of the named plaintiff is typical of the claims of the
`drivers across the country who have been subject to Uber’s use of
`the star rating system to terminate drivers.
`Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the
`interests of the class. The named plaintiff has no interests adverse to
`or in conflict with the class members whom he proposes to represent.
`Plaintiff’s counsel are well qualified to litigate this case, as they have
`been recognized as leading counsel nationally for representing the
`
`c.
`
`d.
`
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`THIRD AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 16 of 20
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`e.
`
`f.
`
`rights of employees in class action and other employment litigation
`across the nation.
`The questions of law or fact common to all members of each class
`predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
`The common questions include, among other things, whether Uber’s
`use of its star rating system is racially discriminatory.
`Litigating these claims as a class action is superior to other available
`methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of these claims.
`Among other things, individual adjudications would result in highly
`inefficient duplication of discovery, legal briefing, court
`proceedings, and the risk of inconsistent legal rulings. Further, the
`alternative to a class action may be no redress for many Uber drivers
`across the country who would not litigate these claims individually.
`
`
`VI. CALIFORNIA CLASS ALLEGATIONS
`Plaintiff brings this case as a class action on behalf of all non-white Uber drivers
`43.
`who have driven for Uber in California and who have been terminated (or put at risk for
`termination) based upon Uber’s star rating system.
`This class meets prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)
`44.
`and 23(b)(3) specifically, in that:
`The class is so numerous that joining all members is impracticable.
`a.
`The exact number of the members of the class is unknown, but
`numerous (likely thousands) of non-white Uber drivers in California
`have been terminated (or put at risk of termination) based on Uber’s
`
`16
`THIRD AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`
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`Case 3:20-cv-07499-VC Document 57 Filed 06/20/22 Page 17 of 20
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`c.
`
`d.
`
`use of the star rating system. As a result, joinder of all these
`individuals is impracticable.
`
`b. There are questions of fact and law common to all of these potentia