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`Case 3:20-cv-09321-JCS Document 1 Filed 12/23/20 Page 1 of 45
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`Sophia M. Rios (305801)
`BERGER MONTAGUE PC
`12544 High Bluff Drive, Suite 340
`San Diego, CA 92130
`Tel: (619) 489-0300
`Fax: (215) 875-4604
`srios@bm.net
`
`Eric L. Cramer (Pro Hac Vice to be filed)
`Michael C. Dell’Angelo (Pro Hac Vice to be filed)
`Patrick F. Madden (Pro Hac Vice to be filed)
`Michaela Wallin (Pro Hac Vice to be filed)
`BERGER MONTAGUE PC
`1818 Market Street, Suite 3600
`Philadelphia, PA 19103
`Tel: (215) 875-3000
`Fax: (215) 875-4604
`ecramer@bm.net
`mdellangelo@bm.net
`pmadden@bm.net
`mwallin@bm.net
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class
`[Additional counsel listed on signature page]
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`STERLING INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING
`GROUP, on behalf of itself and all others similarly
`situated,
`
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No.: 20-CV-9321
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Case 3:20-cv-09321-JCS Document 1 Filed 12/23/20 Page 2 of 45
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`Table of Contents
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
`
`V.
`VI.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`NATURE OF ACTION AND SUMMARY .....................................................................................1
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................................4
`PARTIES ..........................................................................................................................................5
`DIGITAL DISPLAY ADVERTISING .............................................................................................5
`A.
`How Digital Display Advertising Works .............................................................................6
`B. (cid:3680)e Importance of Data in Digital Advertising ....................................................................8
`GOOGLE’S BUSINESS ..................................................................................................................9
`GOOGLE’S MARKET POWER IN THE PUBLISHER AD SERVER MARKET ......................10
`A. (cid:3680)e Relevant Market ..........................................................................................................10
`B.
`Google Dominates the Relevant Market ............................................................................ 11
`VII. GOOGLE’S ANTICOMPETITIVE SCHEME .............................................................................13
`A.
`Google Engaged In A Series Of Acquisitions To Acquire A Foothold At Each Level
`Of (cid:3680)e Ad Tech Stack. .......................................................................................................14
`Google Used Its Dominant Position (cid:3680)roughout the Ad Tech Stack to Engage In
`Exclusionary Conduct ........................................................................................................16
`Google Manipulates Its Ad Auction Processes to Preference Its Own Tied Auctions .......17
`1. (cid:3680)e Waterfall System (Pre-2009) ...........................................................................18
`2.
`Dynamic Allocation (2009)....................................................................................20
`3.
`Enhanced Dynamic Allocation (2014) ...................................................................21
`4.
`Header Bidding (2015) ..........................................................................................21
`5.
`Exchange Bidding (2018) ......................................................................................24
`6.
`First-Price Unified Auction ....................................................................................24
`Google Uses Its Monopoly Power In Other Markets To Impair Potential
`Competitors In (cid:3680)e Publisher Ad Server Market. ..............................................................26
`Google Made an Unlawful Agreement with Its Biggest Competitor to Suppress
`Competition........................................................................................................................27
`VIII. GOOGLE’S SCHEME FORECLOSED THE PUBLISHER AD SERVER MARKET ................30
`IX.
`GOOGLE’S SCHEME CAUSES ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS ...........................................31
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`Google’s Scheme Suppresses Ad Revenues Publishers Receive for (cid:3680)eir Ad
`Inventory Below Competitive Levels ................................................................................31
`Google’s Scheme Reduces Publishers’ Content Output and Quality Along with
`Publishers’ Revenue-Generating Abilities. ........................................................................32
`Google’s Scheme Causes Anticompetitive Effects for Both Google’s Advertiser
`Clients and Non-Google Advertisers. ................................................................................33
`GOOGLE’S SCHEME CAUSES PUBLISHERS ANTITRUST INJURY ...................................34
`X.
`INTERSTATE COMMERCE ........................................................................................................35
`XI.
`XII. CLASS ALLEGATIONS ...............................................................................................................35
`XIII. CAUSES OF ACTION ..................................................................................................................38
`XIV. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT .......................................................................................................41
`XV.
`JURY TRIAL DEMAND ...............................................................................................................41
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`Case 3:20-cv-09321-JCS Document 1 Filed 12/23/20 Page 4 of 45
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`Sterling International Consulting Group (“Plaintiff”) files this action on behalf of itself and as a
`class action on behalf of all others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
`Procedure, against Defendant Google LLC (“Google” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff seeks treble damages
`and injunctive relief for Defendant’s violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2.
`Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows based on: (a) its personal knowledge; (b) the investigation of
`Plaintiff’s counsel; and (c) information and belief.
`I.
`NATURE OF ACTION AND SUMMARY
`1. (cid:3680)is is a civil antitrust action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for treble
`damages and other relief arising out of Google’s overarching anticompetitive scheme (the “Scheme”) to
`capture a dominant share of the revenues associated with services required to place open-web display
`ads. Specifically, Google has obtained and maintained a monopoly in the market for providing publisher
`ad server services (the “Publisher Ad Server Market”), and has used that power to artificially inflate its
`prices charged to “Publishers.”
`2.
`Plaintiff is a “Publisher”: Plaintiff operates a website on which it sells space to advertisers
`to place digital display ads.
`3.
`To sell its ad space, Plaintiff directly purchases publisher ad server services from Google.
`Publisher ad servers identify ad space that gets created when users load Publishers’ webpages, and then
`solicit and organize bids from various sources of advertiser demand to fill the space. Publisher ad server
`providers receive compensation in a form of a cut of the payments advertisers make for their ads to
`appear in Publishers’ webpages.
`4.
`Plaintiff, like other purchasers of Google’s publisher ad server services, depends on
`Google to solicit and organize bids from advertisers for its website’s ad inventory.
`5.
`When users generate ad inventory on Publishers’ sites by loading the page, this sets off a
`series of processes in what is known as the “Ad Tech Stack.” (cid:3680)e publisher ad server notifies demand
`sources (e.g., “ad exchanges” or “ad networks” that run auctions between advertisers) of the existence of
`ad space. (cid:3680)e demand sources provide bids from their participating advertisers to the publisher ad server.
`Once the ad server identifies the winning bid, it obtains the winning advertisement from the advertiser’s
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`representatives in the Ad Tech Stack and places the ads. (cid:3680)e entire process typically takes less than a
`second.
`6.
`Google controls the dominant services at each level of the Ad Tech Stack. Most
`importantly, Google controls (1) the dominant publisher ad server products, (2) the dominant ad
`exchange and ad network, and (3) the dominant advertiser ad server.
`7.
`Google thus controls which ad inventory a dominant share of advertisers will bid on,
`which advertisers can participate in the most significant auctions (Google’s auctions), and how Publishers
`prioritize and compare different demand sources (e.g., ad exchange auctions, ads sold directly by a
`Publisher to an advertiser, and other auction types) to identify the advertiser that ultimately “wins” the
`right to place an ad in a particular ad slot.
`8. (cid:3680)rough a series of anticompetitive acts beginning by at least 2007 and continuing
`through the present (together, the “Scheme”), Google has illegally acquired, enhanced, and maintained
`dominant positions in the Publisher Ad Server Market.
`9.
`First, Google engaged in a series of acquisitions designed to give it a significant market
`presence at each level of the Ad Tech Stack. Most notably, Google acquired DoubleClick in 2007, a
`company with the then-highest market share in the Publisher Ad Server Market.
`10.
`Second, Google engaged in exclusionary conduct designed to entrench its offerings at
`each level of the Ad Tech Stack and disadvantage actual and potential rivals. For example, in selling its
`services to advertisers, Google ties its ad targeting and attribution data services to its advertiser-facing ad
`tech services.1 Because these data services are critical to advertisers, Google was able to amass a
`substantial pool of advertiser clients through the tying arrangement. Google then used its positions at
`other levels of the Ad Tech Stack to control Publishers’ access to that pool of advertiser demand.
`Specifically, Google required its advertisers to bid in Google-controlled auctions (through Google’s ad
`exchange and/or ad network). Google then controlled how Publishers could access bids from Google-
`
`
`
`1 As set forth herein, Google’s data on users is unparalleled. Google gleans data from its consumer-facing
`offerings including, inter alia, its market-leading web browser (Chrome), its popular email service
`(Gmail), the Android operating system (“OS”) in use on hundreds of millions of mobile devices,
`Google’s search data, and Google’s ad placement products.
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`controlled auctions, essentially requiring Publishers who wanted to receive bids from Google-controlled
`auctions to use a Google publisher ad server. (cid:3680)is conduct coerces Publishers to use Google’s publisher
`ad server products.
`11. (cid:3680)ird, as more and more Publishers adopted Google’s publisher ad server products,
`Google reinforced its control on the advertiser side of the Ad Tech Stack through similar conduct. In
`particular, Google gave its own demand sources (e.g., bids from its ad exchange) privileged access to
`Google’s Publisher-clients’ ad space through its control over a dominant share of Publishers’ ad servers.
`By disadvantaging bids from non-Google demand sources, advertisers who want to display ads on
`Google’s Publisher-clients must use Google’s advertiser-facing products. (cid:3680)e resulting increase in the
`number of advertisers in Google’s pool of clients then further increases Publishers’ need to use Google ad
`servers, further entrenching Google’s market dominance.
`12.
`Fourth, Google has taken a variety of measures to impair potential rivals’ ability to collect
`user data and use such data to target advertisements. For example, Google has coerced Publishers to
`create content for mobile users in a format known as “accelerated mobile pages” or “AMP” by
`suppressing non-AMP content in Google Search results. (cid:3680)en, when Publishers offer content in AMP
`format, Google caches the AMP pages such that when a user attempts to navigate to the content from,
`inter alia, Google Search results or the Google News app, Google serves the content from Google’s (and
`not the Publisher’s) servers. As a result, Publishers (and any third-party tracker the Publishers engage)
`cannot obtain data from their users that could later be used to target advertisements. Similarly, Google
`has announced imminent changes to features of its popular Chrome web browser that will inhibit
`potential rivals from collecting data through third-party cookies and/or DNS data.2
`13.
`Fifth, according to the complaint filed by the Texas Attorney General (and other state
`attorneys general), Google made an unlawful agreement with its largest potential rival—Facebook, Inc.
`(cid:3680)rough the agreement the two advertising behemoths agreed to cooperate rather than compete. Such
`conduct removed significant competitive pressure on Google.
`
`2 As discussed infra, third-party cookies and DNS data tracking are mechanisms that potential
`competitors can use to amass data that would allow advertisers to target their advertisements without
`
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`relying on Google’s data services.
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`14. (cid:3680)e absence of competition in the Publisher Ad Server Market caused by Google’s
`Scheme allows Google to charge Publishers supracompetitive prices for its publisher ad server services.
`Because Google’s Scheme has effectively destroyed competition in the Publisher Ad Server Market,
`Publishers have no choice but to pay the supracompetitive prices—extracted as a percentage of their
`advertising revenue.
`15.
`As alleged herein, Google’s conduct has had substantial anticompetitive effects in the
`Publisher Ad Server Market and has harmed Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff and members of
`the proposed Class accordingly seek compensatory and injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman
`Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
`II.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`16.
`Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
`17.
`Plaintiff has been injured, and is likely to continue to be injured, as a direct result of
`Defendant’s unlawful conduct alleged herein.
`18. (cid:3680)e United States District Court for the Northern District of California has subject matter
`jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a), and Section 4 of the Clayton Act,
`15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2).
`19. (cid:3680)e United States District Court for the Northern District of California also has subject
`matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (cid:3680)e amount in controversy exceeds
`$5,000,000 exclusive of interests and costs, and Plaintiff and a significant proportion of the members of
`the proposed Class are citizens of a state different from Defendant.
`20.
`Venue is proper in this District under Sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
`§§ 15, 22. Google is headquartered in this District, its principal business operations are based in this
`District, and the Scheme was formulated and carried out in this District. Venue also is proper pursuant to
`28 U.S.C. § 1391 for the same reasons.
`21.
`Additionally, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class have contracts with Google
`containing a forum selection clause. (cid:3680)e forum selection clause requires all claims between the parties to
`be resolved “exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara County, California,” which includes
`this District.
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`III.
`PARTIES
`22.
`Plaintiff Sterling International Consulting Group is a Delaware Corporation with its
`principal place of business in Statesville, NC. Plaintiff operates an ad-supported website that uses a
`Google publisher ad server to identify the creation of ad inventory, obtain bids from demand sources, and
`fill the ad space.
`23.
`Defendant Google is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
`Mountain View, California.
`IV. DIGITAL DISPLAY ADVERTISING
`24.
`Digital advertising has exploded in recent years. Worldwide digital advertising spending
`was estimated to be $194.6 billion in 2016 and rose to $325 billion in 2019.
`25. (cid:3680)e United States accounts for a substantial proportion of those revenue figures. In 2019,
`for example, the United States accounted for approximately 40% of the global digital advertising
`revenues.
`26.
`Digital advertising takes several complementary forms. For example, advertisements can
`be targeted to consumers, inter alia, as text-based ads to appear with search engine query results (“search
`ads”), as display ads appearing in-line in Publishers’ content such as blog posts or news articles (“display
`ads”), or as ads in social media feeds.
`27.
`Advertisers purchase one format or another to serve their different goals. For instance,
`advertisers may purchase search ads to reach consumers actively looking to make a purchase by
`searching for a particular product or company. By contrast, they may purchase display ads on a
`Publisher’s site to increase brand awareness or to market a product to a user that put the product in his
`shopping cart but did not complete the purchase.
`28. While search ads are targeted principally based on the search terms the user inputs into the
`search engine, display ads are shown to each user who loads a webpage programmed to display
`advertising. (cid:3680)us, data about the webpage user is critical to advertisers seeking to display their
`advertisement to such user.
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`29.
`Publishers, who operate websites and mobile applications, are necessarily restricted in the
`types of ad formats they can sell. A news website, for example, can generally sell display ads alongside
`its news articles but cannot generally sell search ads to monetize the same content.
`A. How Digital Display Advertising Works
`30.
`Publishers sell their ad inventory to advertisers either directly through their marketing
`departments or indirectly through programmatic ad auctions run by their publisher ad server and/or ad
`exchanges and ad networks.
`31.
`Generally, only large Publishers have the means and/or incentive to sell advertisements
`directly to advertisers (so-called “direct-sold” ads) due to the need for internal staffing and general
`advertiser demand for the Publishers’ ad inventory.
`32.
`Even those Publishers that sell ad space directly to advertisers cannot always predict how
`many ad spaces they have available for direct-sold ads because the number of ad spaces is dependent on
`the number of users who visit each Publisher’s website (as well as other factors specific to the Publishers’
`deals with advertisers, e.g., specific criteria for users who would be targeted with the ads). (cid:3680)us, selling
`inventory through programmatic ad auctions permits Publishers to sell their remnant inventory that either
`does not qualify for their direct-sold deals or where the programmatic placement would fetch a higher
`price than the direct-sold ad deals. Additionally, some Publishers sell the entirety of their inventory
`indirectly through programmatic ad auctions.
`33.
`Programmatic ad auctions are run in various forms by ad exchange, ad networks, and ad
`servers. (cid:3680)eir purpose is to determine which advertiser can place its ad in a particular ad slot created
`when a user loads a Publisher’s webpage.
`34.
`Instead of advertisers placing an order for a fixed amount of impressions (i.e., user views)
`from a Publisher as they would in direct-sold ads, each auction organizer (i.e., the ad exchange, ad server,
`or ad network) auctions the ad slot between its participating advertisers in real time when the page is
`loaded. (cid:3680)is process—in which a user loads a webpage, the auction organizer conducts the auction, and
`the ad gets placed—occurs automatically (usually taking a few hundred milliseconds).
`35. (cid:3680)e process involves several entities providing services in the “Ad Tech Stack.” On one
`end of the Ad Tech Stack, the Publisher engages a publisher ad server. (cid:3680)e ad server can conduct its own
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`auctions and/or it can solicit bids from ad exchanges and/or ad networks, each of which serve as
`middlemen between Publishers and advertisers.
`36.
`On the other end of the Ad Tech Stack, advertisers engage an advertiser ad server and a
`“demand side platform”3 or “DSP.” (cid:3680)e advertiser ad server performs the function of storing the
`advertisers’ ads, serving advertisers ads when the advertiser wins auctions, and tracks the advertiser’ ad
`campaign results. (cid:3680)e DSP manages advertisers’ programmatic ad buying. (cid:3680)e DSP essentially automates
`the process of bidding on advertisers’ behalf in ad auctions.
`37. (cid:3680)us, the Ad Tech Stack looks like this:
`
`Publisher
`
`Publisher Ad 
`Server
`
`Ad Exchange/Ad 
`Network
`
`Demand Side 
`Platform
`
`Advertiser Ad 
`Server
`
`Advertiser
`
`Figure 1: The Ad Tech Stack
`38. (cid:3680)e Publisher- and advertiser-facing services in the Ad Tech Stack are not always fully
`interoperable, meaning that ad tech service providers control the extent to which other service providers’
`clients (Publishers or advertisers) can transact with each other.
`39.
`As one relevant example, Google has not allowed Publishers who are not customers of
`Google’s ad tech services on the supply side4 to access Google’s auctions to obtain real-time bids from
`Google’s pool of advertisers on the demand side.
`40.
`As a result of this interoperability issue, Publishers (and advertisers) consider the demand
`(supply) that their publisher ad server (advertiser ad server and/or DSP) can access. In other words, a key
`consideration for Publishers in selecting an ad server is what demand (and on what terms) the ad server
`can solicit bids from different demand sources; the more advertisers (who are expected to bid the most)
`who participate in the auctions the ad server can access the better. Conversely, if a publisher ad server
`
`
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`3 Publishers may also engage a platform (called a “supply side platform” or “SSP”) to work with ad
`exchanges. Google has collapsed many of these functions into single offerings. As a result, there is
`relatively little distinction between the function of a publisher ad server and a SSP today.
`4 Publishers are the “supply” side because they generate the “supply” of ad inventory. Advertisers are the
`“demand” side because they purchase the ability to place ads in Publishers’ ad inventory.
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`cannot access significant demand pools, the publisher ad server cannot compete effectively in the market
`against Google’s publisher ad server products.
`B. (cid:3680)e Importance of Data in Digital Advertising
`41. (cid:3680)e digital economy more broadly relies heavily on collecting, mining, analyzing, and
`monetizing data. Personal information collected by companies in the digital economy has become a
`substantial intangible asset used to create value, not unlike copyrights, patents, and goodwill.
`42.
`Traditionally, advertising has relied on targeting methods. For example, when an
`advertiser wanted to market nationwide, the advertiser might purchase advertising space in nationally
`distributed newspapers and magazines (e.g., USA Today or Newsweek). As a result, newspapers,
`magazines, and television stations tracked and kept detailed reader/viewer data. (cid:3680)eir marketing
`departments (and/or contractors) would then work with advertisers (and/or their agents and contractors)
`to provide information on the potential reach and targeting capability of advertising on the media.
`43.
`Digital advertising is not different in its reliance on targeting. However, the availability of
`data on users enable digital advertisers to target advertising with far more precision.
`44.
`Different forms of digital advertising use different types of data. For example, when an
`advertiser markets to users of a search engine, the advertiser is using the user’s search terms to target
`advertising. When seeking to use display advertisements, whether on a social network platform or on a
`Publisher’s site, an advertiser can target users better with more personalized data about the individual
`users. So, if an advertiser knows a particular person used the advertiser’s website and placed merchandise
`in his or her shopping cart without purchasing the item, that advertiser may place significant value being
`able to market that merchandise to that person as the person visits other websites. As another example, a
`particular advertiser (whether a retailer, political campaign, or services provider, etc.) may know that
`people with particular characteristics (e.g., with certain interests like sports, travel, etc., with certain
`incomes or wealth, or located in a particular place) would be receptive to their marketing. To such
`advertisers, data on who is receiving advertisements is a valuable and critical element to their advertising
`campaigns.
`45.
`One company ran a trial in 2019 to compare the revenue Publishers in the United
`Kingdom received from advertising benefiting from personalized data with revenue received from
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`advertising that did not use personalized data. (cid:3680)e results indicated that U.K. Publishers earned between
`50% and 65% less revenue when they were unable to sell personalized advertising but competed with
`others who could.
`46.
`In digital advertising, a key input is data on consumers who would be targeted by a given
`advertisement. (cid:3680)e more targeted an ad, the more likely it is that users act upon it (e.g., click on the ad’s
`link), and therefore the higher the return on investment is. (cid:3680)us, advertisers are willing to (and do) bid far
`more when they have significant data on a user than when they have little or no data.
`47.
`It is precisely because consumer data is the key input that Google and Facebook have
`emerged as the dominant players in the broader digital advertising sphere. (cid:3680)rough its data access,
`Google dominates search advertising and the ad tech services that place advertising on Publishers’
`websites. Google achieved its dominance in no small part because of its ability to collect particular types
`of user data. Google’s control over consumer-facing products, e.g., Search, Android OS, Gmail, Maps,
`YouTube, Chrome, and its ad tech services, provides Google with unmatched access to user data based
`on what websites users view, what they search for, what emails they receive, where they go and how
`often they go there, where they live, where they work, what videos they watch on YouTube, what apps
`they use on their phone, and more.
`V.
`GOOGLE’S BUSINESS
`48.
`Google offers myriad “free” services to consumers, such as Google Search, Google
`Chrome, Google Maps, YouTube, and Android OS. While consumers do not compensate Google for
`those services with money, consumers do allow Google to collect data from them relating to those
`interactions. For example, Google’s Android OS provides Google with location data, Google Search
`provides Google with data on what a particular user is looking for online, and YouTube provides Google
`with data on user interests.
`49.
`Google uses the data gathered from consumers using these “free” services (as well as
`other Google business lines, including its advertising services) to target advertisements displayed on
`Publishers’ webpages, making billions of dollars a year in the process.
`50.
`Because of the data Google gleans from users of its “free” services, Google has a nearly
`unparalleled ability to target advertisements to users. As a result, one of Google’s most significant
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`revenue streams comes from assisting Publishers in filling their ad inventory, a role Google complements
`with interrelated services throughout the Ad Tech Stack.
`51.
`Google’s unparalleled access to user data has been a significant factor in Google’s
`domination of the digital display ad ecosystem with its offerings at each level of the Ad Tech Stack.
`Google’s offerings include services that work together to (1) identify advertising inventory when a user
`loads a Publisher’s content, (2) collect bids from advertisers interested in serving an ad to particular
`Publishers, (3) determine the winning advertiser, and (4) serve the ad—all of which happens in
`milliseconds.
`VI. GOOGLE’S MARKET POWER IN THE PUBLISHER AD SERVER MARKET
`A. (cid:3680)e Relevant Market
`52. (cid:3680)e Relevant Market is the market for publisher ad server services (the “Publisher Ad
`Server Market” or the “Market”).
`53.
`Publishers are purchasers of services in the Publisher Ad Server Market. Companies, like
`Google, who offer publisher ad server products are sellers of services in the Market.
`54.
`Publisher ad servers are inventory management systems that Publishers use to holistically
`manage their online display advertising inventory—the image-based graphical ads alongside web
`content. (cid:3680)ey provide features such as: (1) reservation-based sales technology to support a Publisher’s
`direct sales efforts; (2) inventory forecasting technology to help a Publisher determine what inventory
`will be available to sell; (3) a user interface through which a Publisher’s sales team can input directly
`sold campaign requirements; (4) co-management of direct and indirect sales channels; (5) report
`generation of ad inventory performance; (6) invoicing capabilities for a Publisher’s direct campaigns; and
`(7) yield management technology.
`55. (cid:3680)e relevant geographic market is the United States, or in the alternative, predominantly
`English-speaking countries of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Publishers
`seek out publisher ad server services based on the service provider’s ability to connect the Publisher with
`advertisers that would seek to target the Publisher’s users. Because Publishers sell advertising space to
`advertisers based on, inter alia, the location of the Publishers’ users, the geographic market’s scope is
`determined by the Publishers’ targeted user geographies, here, the United States, or in the alternative,
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`predominantly English-speaking countries of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
`Australia. A publisher ad server that could not connect Publishers with a significant pool of advertisers
`seeking to target American (