Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 1 of 38
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`Robert W. Dickerson, Jr. (SBN 89367)
`E-mail: rdickerson@bwslaw.com
`BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
`444 South Flower Street, Suite 2400
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-2953
`Tel: 213.236.0600
`Fax: 213.236.2700
`Patricia L. Peden (SBN 206440)
`E-mail: ppeden@bwslaw.com
`BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
`1901 Harrison Street, Suite 900
`Oakland, CA 94612-3501
`Tel: 510-273-8780
`Fax: 510-839-9104
`Lenny Huang (SBN 264386)
`E-mail: lhuang@bwslaw.com
`BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP
`60 S. Market St., Suite 1000
`San Jose, CA 95113-2336
`Tel:408-606-6300
`Fax: 408-606-6333
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`RUMBLE, INC.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`RUMBLE, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`GOOGLE LLC and DOES 1-10,
`inclusive,
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No.
`COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
`AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DUE
`TO ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
`
`For its complaint against defendant Google LLC (“Google” or “Defendant”),
`plaintiff Rumble, Inc. (“Rumble”) alleges as follows:
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`COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 2 of 38
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`INTRODUCTION
`Rumble brings this action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
`1.
`(15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2), and Sections 4 and 15 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 4
`and 15), against Google for monetary damages well in excess of $2,000,000,000
`that Rumble has sustained and continues to sustain as a proximate result of
`Google’s antitrust violations, and for injunctive relief to prevent Google from
`continuing unlawfully to maintain its monopoly in the relevant market –online
`video-sharing platforms –through anticompetitive and exclusionary practices.
`2.
`These practices include Google rigging its search algorithms
`purposefully and unlawfully to always give preference to Google’s YouTube video-
`sharing platform over Rumble (and other platforms) in Google search results, such
`that the Google search page result for online videos lists links to the YouTube site
`as the first search results, even if the search specified Rumble, such as “dog videos
`on rumble.”
`By unfairly rigging its search algorithms such that YouTube is the
`3.
`first-listed links “above the fold” on its search results page, Google, through its
`search engine, was able to wrongfully divert massive traffic to YouTube, depriving
`Rumble of the additional traffic, users, uploads, brand awareness and revenue it
`would have otherwise received.
`4.
`Google has also forced Android-based smartphone manufacturers to
`include YouTube as a preinstalled app on their phones in order to acquire the right
`to use the Android operating system, which constitutes an illegal tying
`arrangement. This also has damaged and continues to damage Rumble by further
`self-preferencing YouTube over Rumble (and other platforms, which harms
`competition in addition to Rumble). Because much of the online searching for
`videos is done on smartphones, this further ensures that Google’s YouTube
`platform receives unfair preferential treatment. Google thus wrongfully acquired
`and maintains a monopoly over the market for online video-sharing platforms.
`COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 3 of 38
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`Rumble is unique among video-sharing platforms in that it has an
`5.
`extensive catalog of exclusively-assigned original content videos, thus
`differentiating itself from other video-sharing platforms. Rumble receives between
`$10 and $30 per thousand views of its exclusive videos on its platform, but when
`that search traffic has been diverted to YouTube through Google’s wrongful
`conduct, Rumble has received only forty-eight cents ($0.48) on average per
`thousand views of its videos from YouTube. It is Google’s unlawfully acquired
`monopoly power in the relevant market that has allowed it to pay so little, and keep
`so much, of the advertising revenue.
`6.
`Unlike other websites or video-sharing platforms, Rumble, with its
`thousands of high value exclusive video assets which it has syndicated to YouTube
`(which have generated billions of views on YouTube), has the unique ability to
`discover, track and determine its damages both on its exclusive and on its non-
`exclusive catalog, which have been proximately caused by Google’s unlawful
`conduct. Notably, this conduct is also in violation of Google’s own duplicate
`content and original sourced reporting best practices which it purports to follow,
`but evidently does not.
`7.
`Set forth below are screenshots (Figures 1 and 2) showing a recent
`example of this unlawful self-preferencing by Google of its own video platform,
`YouTube. The searched-for video is entitled “Baby preciously cuddles cat for nap
`time.” It is a Rumble exclusive video, so Rumble is the original source for that
`video. That title –“Baby preciously cuddles cat for nap time” –is verbatim how it
`is listed on the Rumble platform. Because Rumble is the original source, it was
`able to release the video to whom and when it chose. In this instance, to test
`whether the Google search algorithms were rigged to give unfair preference to
`YouTube, Rumble “handicapped” YouTube by releasing the video to
`Google/YouTube last.
`8.
`Figure 1 demonstrates how Rumble provided the video to MSN and
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 4 of 38
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`Yahoo prior to YouTube. Yahoo is listed first, followed by MSN and then
`followed by multiple miscellaneous unrelated YouTube videos that do not contain
`the title searched for. Significantly, MSN even provides a canonical URL referring
`to Rumble’s original page, yet Google still lists its unrelated YouTube videos ahead
`of Rumble.com’s listing. In fact, Rumble.com’s listing is nowhere to be found
`despite all the credit, linkbacks, canonicals and submission to Google Webmaster
`Tools that identified Rumble as the original source for this video.
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`Figure 1
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`COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 5 of 38
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`Prior to the search shown in Figure 1, Google was made aware that
`9.
`this “Baby preciously cuddles” video was a Rumble exclusive and original asset by
`multiple means; for example, no webpages prior to Rumble had duplicate metadata,
`MSN’s canonical URL pointed to Rumble.com as the original source; Yahoo also
`references Rumble; there is even a linkback to the Rumble’s URL on the YouTube
`video; and by an automatic sitemap submission to Google Webmaster Tools.
`Pursuant to Google’s multiple different publicly stated policies, Rumble should
`have been elevated in the search results (actually should have been listed first), and
`even though the search was for the exact title for the video as on Rumble’s
`platform, the Rumble platform is not even listed at all on the Google search page
`for this specific video.
`10.
`Once the Rumble URL was documented to be indexed in Google
`according to Webmaster Tools, and both Yahoo and MSN took the lead on the
`search results, Rumble decided to provide YouTube the video with credit and
`linkbacks to the Rumble.com website. As shown in Figure 2 below, which is a
`screen shot of the Google search and search page results for the search on
`November 24, 2020, about 2 hours after Figure 1 was taken, Google immediately
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`gives the top listing to YouTube, de-ranks both Yahoo and MSN, lists a different
`YouTube video in the 4th spot, and still avoids listing Rumble:
`
`Figure 2
`
`11. Amazingly, even though Rumble is the original source for this video,
`even though Google was aware of that fact, even though the search term was
`verbatim the title for the video as on Rumble’s platform, even though all sources
`point back to Rumble as the original content source, and even though the video was
`released to Google/YouTube last in time, the Google search results still listed
`YouTube’s platform first, and doesn’t list Rumble at all on its first page of search
`results.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 7 of 38
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`RUMBLE AND THE SERVICE IT PROVIDES
`FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTENT CREATORS
`Since 2013, Rumble has operated an online video-sharing platform.
`12.
`Today, Rumble is one of the most respected independent and privately owned
`companies in the online video-sharing platform industry and market, and its
`business model is premised upon helping the “little guy/gal” video content creators
`monetize their videos.
`13. Video content creators upload their copyright-protected videos to the
`Rumble platform (rumble.com or app), many of whom exclusively assign to
`Rumble the licensing and enforcement rights in the uploaded video. Rumble in turn
`makes the videos (“Rumble Videos”) available under license to other companies
`who have websites or other social media sites, and who want to make those videos
`available to visitors to their sites in order to generate advertising revenue.
`14.
`Since its launch in 2013, Rumble Videos have received approximately
`9.3 billion views worldwide just on YouTube alone according to YouTube’s
`Analytics.
`The original author (the content-creator) of the video should be
`15.
`compensated for the publication of his or her video. More often than not in the
`past, however, he or she was not. This is where Rumble came and comes into the
`picture.
`16. Rumble provides an important service to the untold number of “little
`guy/gal” videographers who create the video content that is uploaded to the
`internet, enjoyed by millions, and monetized by only a few. By themselves, these
`individual content-creators cannot effectively monetize their videos, even those that
`go “viral” and obtain millions of views within the first few days of being available
`online.
`17. Rumble provides a platform for those individual content-creators to
`monetize their copyrighted videos. By simply appointing Rumble as their exclusive
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 8 of 38
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`licensee to their copyrighted video(s), and then uploading their video(s) to
`Rumble’s platform, Rumble takes over and does all the rest. Rumble makes its
`portfolio of exclusively-licensed videos available to others to use for a fee (and a
`portion of the downstream revenue collected by the user), monitors that use,
`collects the fee (and revenue), and shares it with the content-creator. There are
`some individual content-creators who are receiving royalties in the 6-figures
`annually, and many that are receiving annual 5-figure royalties from Rumble.
`18. Rumble’s platform and proprietary software sources, validates,
`provides clearance management, distribution and monetization for video content.
`It is a content-creator-centric platform, whose main goal and core business model
`has always been to help video creators increase distribution and monetize their
`videos. Rumble allows video creators to create channels, host, share, monetize and
`distribute their video content from one centralized account on the Rumble platform.
`19. Rumble has working relationships with some of the most respected
`video creators and Rumble licenses video content through its revenue-share video
`player and, if licenses permit, through other video players to many very well-known
`websites, including some of the largest and most well-known companies and
`websites in the world.
`20. Rumble currently has more than 2 million amateur and professional
`video content-creators that now contribute to more than 100 million streams per
`month. Some of the top video content-creators use Rumble’s platform. Rumble’s
`creator-centric platform has enabled more of these amateur and professional video
`content-creators, media companies, and celebrities to distribute and monetize their
`social videos more than ever before.
`21. Rumble’s success, however, has been far less than it could and should
`have been as a direct result of Google’s unlawful anticompetitive and monopolistic
`behavior, and coincided with Google’s unlawful rise to monopoly prominence in
`the search engine market as detailed in the recently filed case United States of
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`America et. al. v. Google LLC, Case 1:20-cv-03010, Document No. 1, 10/20/2020
`(D.D.C.) (“the DOJ Complaint”). Using that ill-gotten prominence, Google
`promoted YouTube to the exclusion of other online video-sharing platforms,
`including specifically Rumble, to obtain and maintain an unlawfully-achieved
`monopoly in that market as well.
`22. When video content creators upload their videos to Rumble’s platform,
`those videos are then available for viewing on Rumble’s website, generating
`advertising revenue. Unlike most video-sharing platforms, Rumble obtains an
`exclusive license for many of the uploaded videos. Even though Rumble has the
`exclusive license to these videos, because of the monopoly Google has obtained for
`its YouTube platform through its unlawful anti-competitive conduct, Rumble must
`syndicate its exclusive videos to YouTube in order to survive. Notably, other
`video-sharing platforms do not have a large exclusive catalog to syndicate. Rather,
`their revenue depends on non-exclusive licenses for the videos uploaded by their
`creators –the same way YouTube operates. Those other video-sharing platforms
`solely depend on growth from search traffic to their non-exclusively uploaded
`videos, which they will monetize.
`23.
`The information and evidence now available to Rumble also exposes
`how Google’s conduct in this regard has not only harmed Rumble, but also other
`similarly situated online video-sharing platforms throughout the world, who have
`been deprived of the views, users, uploads, traffic and brand awareness needed to
`survive and prosper. As testament to this fact, since Google purchased YouTube in
`2006 the number of competitive video-sharing platforms has dwindled dramatically
`as other platforms were not able to survive as a direct result of Googles’unlawful
`and exclusionary conduct.
`24.
`Indeed, the extensive unlawful and exclusionary tactics and willful
`misconduct as meticulously detailed in the DOJ Complaint expose the many ways
`in which Google illegally achieved and now maintains monopoly power in the
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 10 of 38
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`internet search engine relevant market, and equally expose Google’s game plan,
`mindset and goal that have motivated it to do so across the entire expanse of its
`empire, including the relevant market here –online video-sharing platforms –
`which illegal game plan Google has executed to near perfect to actually achieve and
`maintain a monopoly in that market, and thereby to achieve a monopolist’s profits
`and to drive out meaningful competition, to Rumble’s great disadvantage and
`damages.
`GOOGLE’S UNLAWFUL ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
`25. Google has willfully and unlawfully created and maintained a
`monopoly in the online video-sharing platform market in at least two ways. First,
`by manipulating the algorithms by which searched-for-video results are listed,
`Google insures that the videos on YouTube are listed first, and that those of its
`competitors, such as Rumble, are listed way down the list on the first page of the
`search results, or not on the first page at all; and second, by pre-installation of the
`YouTube app as the default online video-sharing app on Google smart phones, and
`by entering into anti-competitive, illegal tying agreements with other smartphone
`manufacturers to do the same.
`26.
`This first way has been recently confirmed and reported in the Wall
`Street Journal:
`
`When choosing the best video clips to promote from
`around the web, Alphabet Inc.’s Google gives a secret
`advantage to one source in particular: itself.
`Or, more specifically, its giant online-video service,
`YouTube.
`Take a clip of basketball star Zion Williamson that the
`National Basketball Association posted online in January,
`when he made his highly anticipated pro debut. The clip
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`Case 3:21-cv-00229-TSH Document 1 Filed 01/11/21 Page 11 of 38
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`was popular on Facebook Inc., drawing more than one
`million views and nearly 900 comments as of March. A
`nearly identical YouTube version of the clip with the same
`title was seen about 182,000 times and garnered fewer
`than 400 comments.
`But when The Wall Street Journal’s automated bots
`searched Google for the clip’s title, the YouTube version
`featured much more prominently than the Facebook
`version.
`The Journal conducted Google searches for a selection of
`other videos and channels that are available on YouTube
`as well as on competitors’platforms. The YouTube
`versions were significantly more prominent in the results
`in the vast majority of cases.
`This isn’t by accident.
`Engineers at Google have made changes that effectively
`preference YouTube over other video sources, according
`to people familiar with the matter. Google executives in
`recent years made decisions to prioritize YouTube on the
`first page of search results, in part to drive traffic to
`YouTube rather than to competitors, and also to give
`YouTube more leverage in business deals with content
`providers seeking traffic for their videos, one of those
`people said.
`“All else being equal, YouTube will be first,” the person
`said.
`
`Reprinted from article entitled “Searching for Videos? Google Pushes YouTube
`Over Rivals”, The Wall Street Journal, by Sam Schechner, Kirsten Grind and John
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`West, posted online July 14, 2020 at 12:47 pm EDT (“the WSJ Article”).1
`27.
`Similarly, this reprint from the recently released Report by the
`House of Representatives also found that Google has engaged in the
`unlawful anti-competitive self-preferencing activity:
`Although these four corporations [including Google] differ in
`important ways, studying their business practices has revealed
`common problems. First, each platform now serves as a gatekeeper
`over a key channel of distribution. By controlling access to markets,
`these giants can pick winners and losers throughout our economy.
`They not only wield tremendous power, but they also abuse it by
`charging exorbitant fees, imposing oppressive contract terms, and
`extracting valuable data from the people and businesses that rely on
`them. Second, each platform uses its gatekeeper position to maintain
`its market power. By controlling the infrastructure of the digital age,
`they have surveilled other businesses to identify potential rivals, and
`have ultimately bought out, copied, or cut off their competitive
`threats. And, finally, these firms have abused their role as
`intermediaries to further entrench and expand their dominance.
`Whether through self-preferencing, predatory pricing, or
`exclusionary conduct, the dominant platforms have exploited
`their power in order to become even more dominant.
`To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy,
`underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become
`the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and
`railroad tycoons. Although these firms have delivered clear benefits
`
`1 https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-steers-users-to-youtube-over-rivals-
`11594745232.
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`to society, the dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google
`has come at a price. These firms typically run the marketplace
`while also competing in it— a position that enables them to write
`one set of rules for others, while they play by another, or to
`engage in a form of their own private quasi regulation that is
`unaccountable to anyone but themselves.2
`28.
`The House Report also included a section that was especially damning
`as to Google’s conduct at issue here:
`In July, the Wall Street Journal reported that Google also gives
`preferential treatment to YouTube. Tests conducted by the Journal
`found that searching Google for videos delivered YouTube in results
`much more prominently than competing video providers, even when
`competitor videos had more engagement. Reflecting interviews with
`those familiar with the matter, the piece stated that Google engineers:
`[M]ade changes that effectively preference YouTube over
`other video sources. Google executives in recent years made
`decisions to prioritize YouTube on the first page of search results,
`in part to drive traffic to YouTube rather than to competitors,
`and also to give YouTube more leverage in business deals with
`content providers seeking traffic for their videos.”
`In response to Questions for the Record from Subcommittee
`
`2 Report entitled Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, Majority Staff
`Report and Recommendations, released on October 6, 2020, by the United States
`Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and
`Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary (“the House Report”), pages
`6-7 (emphasis added).
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`Chairman David N. Cicilline (D-RI), the company denied that Google
`Search is designed to favor YouTube. Although Google stated that it
`disagreed with the methodology used by the Journal, Google did
`not provide the Subcommittee with any data or internal reports
`that would support its claim.3
`29. Google did not provide the Subcommittee with any such refuting data
`or internal reports because it could not do so –the statements made in the WSJ
`Article are true, which Rumble has confirmed through its own tests as detailed in
`this Complaint. Significantly, it appears that Google’s denials were part and parcel
`of its ongoing attempt fraudulently to conceal its unlawful antitrust behavior.
`30. Google has engaged and continues to engage in this unlawful conduct
`which has proximately caused and continues to cause tremendous damage to
`Rumble (and to other online video-sharing platforms as well), to competition and to
`consumers.
`In this regard, the House Report also included this relevant section,
`31.
`which addresses one of the ways that Google’s unlawful anti-competitive conduct
`injures its competitors:
`Numerous market participants noted that Google’s favoring
`of its own sites and demoting those of third parties has
`effectively increased their cost of distribution. Since demoted
`sites can generally only recover traffic through advertising on
`Google, the platform “essentially requires competitors to pay for
`their websites to appear above Google’s own links,” according
`to one market participant. Another business recalled that in 2016
`Google demoted one of its vertical offerings, citing a policy of
`diversifying content. The firm stated that once it was penalized
`
`3 The House Report, page 191 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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`in organic rankings, it “could not get an appropriate customer
`service response for months” and ultimately “had to increase
`[marketing spend on Google] to regain lost traffic— a win-win
`for Google but a loss for [our business] and its users.
`Meanwhile, Google’s own competing vertical “is always
`listed at the top” of search results. The incident highlights
`how demoting rivals can enrich Google in two ways: first,
`through diverting greater traffic and business to its own
`products; and second, through earning ad revenues from the
`penalized sites that are subsequently scrambling to recover
`their search placement. When demoting firms that Google
`views as actual or potential competitive threats, Google is
`effectively raising rivals’costs.4
`32.
`The second way Google has unlawfully achieved, expanded,
`maintained and continues to maintain its monopoly in the online video-sharing
`platform market is to ensure that its YouTube app is preinstalled on as many new
`smartphones as possible. This anticompetitive conduct has also been recently
`reported:
`
`Google's apps are front-and-center on newer Android phones
`for a reason: Google wants you to use its services on Android,
`and it has contracts in place to that end.
`According to confidential contracts obtained by The
`Information, phonemakers like Samsung and HTC need to
`include a whole lot of Google-branded widgets and icons to be
`allowed to include Google's Play Store. The requirements in the
`contracts show that Google is demanding cushier placement for
`
`4 The House Report, pages 191-192 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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`its apps and services than it used to.
`One requirement: Phones need to show a "Google" icon that
`opens to a collection of 13 apps. Some are genuinely useful,
`like YouTube, Google Maps, Google Drive, Gmail, and Google
`Chrome.5
`33.
`This unlawful anticompetitive conduct has also been detailed in the
`DOJ Complaint, paragraphs 133 to 135 (emphasis added):
`133. Google uses preinstallation agreements— MADAs— to
`ensure that its entire suite of search-related products is given
`premium placement on Android GMS devices. Consumers
`naturally and regularly turn to these prominently placed search
`access points to conduct searches. Preinstallation agreements also
`reinforce Google’s anti-forking requirements, either by including an
`anti-forking clause of their own or, more commonly, requiring device
`manufacturers to be signatories to an anti-forking agreement.
`134.
`If a manufacturer wants even one of Google’s key apps
`and APIs, the device must be preloaded with a bundle of other
`Google apps selected by Google. The six “core” apps are Google
`Play, Chrome, Google’s search app, Gmail, Maps, and YouTube.
`Manufacturers must preinstall the core apps in a manner that prevents
`the consumer from deleting them, regardless of whether the
`consumer wants them. These preinstallation agreements cover
`almost all Android devices sold in the United States.
`
`5 Article entitled Why Android Phones Now Come With So Many More Google
`Apps - (Kate Knibbs, published 9-26-2014) (https://gizmodo.com/why-android-
`phones-now-come-with-so-many-more-google-ap-1639529342).
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`135. Google’s preinstallation agreements effectuate a tie, that
`is, they condition the distribution of Google Play and GPS to the
`distribution of these other apps. This tie reinforces Google’s
`monopolies. The preinstallation agreements provide Android device
`manufacturers an all-or-nothing choice: if a manufacturer wants
`Google Play or GPS, then the manufacturer must also preinstall, and
`in some cases give premium placement to, an entire suite of Google
`apps, including Google’s search products. The forced
`preinstallation of Google’s apps deters manufacturers from
`preinstalling those of competitors. This forecloses distribution
`opportunities to rival general search engines, protecting Google’s
`monopolies.
`34.
`This conduct by Google also injures consumers as well as competition
`and its competitors such as Rumble. The affected consumers here are the people
`who search for and view videos on video sharing platforms such as YouTube and
`Rumble; and more specifically those who upload their own videos to these
`platforms. By uploading to Rumble’s platform, the users can receive a portion of
`the revenue that Rumble obtains my monetizing the content creator’s video. A
`video viewed on Rumble’s platform generates much more revenue per CPM (1000
`views) than if viewed on the YouTube platform. Because of its unlawfully
`achieved monopoly in the video-sharing market, Google has been able to force
`competitors, such as Rumble, to post their videos to YouTube in order to survive.
`Google’s monopoly and monopoly power, however, have allowed Google to pay to
`Rumble (and content owners) a small portion of the ad revenue generated on videos
`on YouTube (on average $.048 per 1000 views of Rumble Videos), and to allow
`Google to retain the large majority of that revenue for itself.
`35.
`In contrast, on average, Rumble receives $20 or more per CPM of one
`of its videos if viewed on the Rumble platform. Therefore, if the Google search
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`page diverts traffic to the YouTube platform instead of Rumble’s, Rumble and the
`content creator receive much less revenue. This has also caused and is causing
`direct injury to competition (many video-sharing platforms who were active online
`before Google purchased YouTube no longer exist), to competitors (such as
`Rumble), and to consumers, who upload their original content videos to Rumble’s
`platform in return for a portion of the ad revenue Rumble receives from views of
`that video.
`The loss on initial views is only a part of the damages caused to
`36.
`Rumble and consumers. Rumble also has evidence that a percentage of users who
`find Rumble through online searching for videos subsequently become uploaders of
`their own videos to the Rumble platform, and thereafter receive revenue. By
`rigging its search algorithms to remove Rumble from the first page search results,
`by forcing smart phone manufacturers to preinstall the YouTube app on their
`phones, and thereby directing users away from Rumble, not only is Rumble
`deprived of the added revenue, but the many diverted users are deprived of that
`revenue. This is also direct injury to the consumer.
`37. Rumble (and in turn its content creators) have been tremendously
`damaged and continues to be damaged by Google’s willfully unlawful conduct.
`Indeed, Rumble believes that at trial it will seek and obtain an award well in excess
`of $2,000,000,000 (Two Billion Dollars) before trebling, and that it will also
`receive an award of its attorney fees and expenses.
`THE PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND COMMERCE
`38.
`Plaintiff Rumble is a Canadian corporation, with its p