Case 3:21-cv-00618 Document 1 Filed 01/26/21 Page 1 of 87
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`Jennie Lee Anderson (SBN 203586)
`ANDRUS ANDERSON LLP
`155 Montgomery Street, Suite 900
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Tel. (415) 986-1400; Fax. (415) 986-1474
`jennie@andrusanderson.com
`Garrett D. Blanchfield
`Brant Penney
`REINHARDT WENDORF & BLANCHFIELD
`332 Minnesota Street, Suite W1099
`St. Paul, MN 55101
`Tel. (651) 287-2100; Fax. (651) 287-2103
`g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com
`b.penney@rwblawfirm.com
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`Counsel for Plaintiff
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`(1) MONOPOLIZATION OF SOCIAL
`NETWORK MARKET
`Violation of the Sherman Act
`(15 U.S.C. § 2)
`(2) ATTEMPTED
`MONOPOLIZATION OF SOCIAL
`NETWORK MARKET
`Violation of the Sherman Act
`(15 U.S.C. § 2)
`(3) MONOPOLIZATION OF SOCIAL
`MEDIA MARKET
`Violation of the Sherman Act
`(15 U.S.C. § 2)
`(4) ATTEMPTED
`MONOPOLIZATION OF SOCIAL
`MEDIA MARKET
`Violation of the Sherman Act
` (15 U.S.C. § 2)
`(5) UNJUST ENRICHMENT
`(6) VIOLATION OF UNFAIR
`COMPETITION ACT
`(7) VIOLATION OF THE
`CARTTWRIGHT ACT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`of all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiff,
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`RITA GARVIN, individually and on behalf
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`vs.
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`FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware corporation
`headquartered in California,
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`Defendant.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00618 Document 1 Filed 01/26/21 Page 2 of 87
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`1.
`Plaintiff, by her undersigned counsel, hereby brings this action against
`Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), individually and on behalf of a class of similarly
`situated persons, and alleges as follows:
`INTRODUCTION
`2.
`Facebook began as a website that allowed college students to connect with their
`friends on campus. Today, through its website (www.facebook.com) and smartphone
`application(“app”), Facebook has grown into the largest social media platform in the world.
`3. As recently as July 2020, Facebook reported having 2.7 billion monthly active users.
`When all of Facebook’s primary product offerings are included (Facebook, Instagram, Facebook
`Messenger, WhatsApp, and Oculus), Facebook commands 2.47 billion daily active users and 3.14
`billion monthly active users. In the United States alone, Facebook accounts for over 45 percent of
`monthly social media visits. Moreover, Facebook Messenger, a standalone chat app, is one of the
`most popular mobile messenger apps worldwide.
`4.
` Facebook achieved market dominance not through fair competition and
`innovation, but rather through the anticompetitive conduct alleged herein. Specifically,
`Facebook repeatedly deceived its consumers about the privacy protections it provided to its
`users and used its market power to “acquire, copy or kill” any competitors.
`5.
`Facebook users do not pay money to use Facebook. Instead, users exchange their
`time, attention, and personal data, for access to Facebook’s services. Facebook, in turn, then sells
`for money, in quantifiable units, its users’ information and attention. Facebook’s source of profit is
`from selling ads –indeed in 2019 alone, Facebook collected $70.7 billion in revenue, almost entirely
`from allowing companies to serve targeted ads to its users.
`6.
` Early on, Facebook recognized that promising stringent privacy protections was
`necessary for it to win the race for market dominance. Many users ultimately chose Facebook over
`other competitors due to Facebook’s stated commitment to its users’ privacy. When users sign up
`for a Facebook account, they agree to certain terms. Consumers give Facebook personal data about
`themselves and Facebook allows users to access its social media network and pledges to protect
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`Case 3:21-cv-00618 Document 1 Filed 01/26/21 Page 3 of 87
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`users’ privacy. Facebook’s current Terms of Service state:
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`Instead of paying to use Facebook and the other products and services
`we offer, by using the Facebook Products covered by these Terms, you
`agree that we can show you ads that businesses and organizations pay us
`to promote on and off the Facebook Company Products. We use your
`personal data, such as information about your activity and interests, to
`show you ads that are more relevant to you.1
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`Significantly, Facebook suggests to its users that the extent to which it utilizes their data is
`limited, and that the extent of the data collection is limited to Facebook’s services themselves.
`7.
` Facebook’s Terms of Service further state that “In exchange [for access to Facebook’s
`services] we need you to make [certain] commitments.” Among those “commitments” is
`“[p]ermission to use your name, profile picture, and information about your actions with ads and
`sponsored content.” The Terms then state that protecting user “privacy is central to how [Facebook
`has] designed [its] ad system.” In other words, users give up personal information and agree to
`receive targeted advertisements on the Facebook platform in exchange for access to Facebook’s
`social media network and for a commitment from Facebook to protect user privacy. They do not
`agree to anything beyond that.
`8.
` In truth, Facebook deceptively concealed the real scope of the data it collected from its
`users and the ways in which it used that data to eliminate competition. Facebook’s deceptions
`allowed the company to gain and illegally maintain its control over on the Social Network and
`Social Media Markets.
`9.
`The data Facebook collects from its users has enormous economic value. A recent
`majority staff report from the United States House of Representatives Antitrust Subcommittee
`explained that “[o]nline platforms rarely charge consumers a monetary price—products appear to be
`‘free’ but are monetized through people’s attention or with their data.”2 The same House Report
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`1 Facebook Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last accessed December 22,
`2020).
`2 See Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, Majority Staff Report and Recommendations
`(“House Report”), Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the
`Committee on the Judiciary, at 18 (emphasis added), October 6, 2020, available at
`https://kl.link/3jGISfK.
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`recognizes the monstrous monetary value that Facebook reaps from the data that it extracts from its
`users.3
`10. Facebook itself touts the economic value of the data it collects from consumers. For
`example, Facebook describes its massive advertising earnings in terms of average revenue per user
`(“ARPU”) in its public filings. For 2019, Facebook’s ARPU was over $41 per user in the United
`States and Canada.4
`11.
` Facebook, driven by fear that it would lose its market dominance due to new
`competitors and innovations, engaged in the illegal course of conduct alleged herein. Facebook’s
`“acquire, copy, or kill” strategy has been wildly successful at the expense of users. Facebook’s
`anticompetitive scheme has lessened, if not eliminated, competition and harmed users.
`12. As Facebook’s founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg observed, “[o]ne thing about
`startups . . . is you can often acquire them,” indicating at other times that such acquisitions would
`enable Facebook to “build a competitive moat” or “neutralize a competitor.”
`13. Facebook uses the valuable data it deceitfully collects from its users to execute its
`“acquire, copy, or kill” business plan. Rather than competing on the merits, Facebook uses this
`valuable consumer data to identify incipient competitors with the most likely path to meaningful
`market share gains. Often, these competitors are Facebook users’ preferred alternatives.
`14. Facebook has made it clear that it would copy incipient competitors’ innovations and
`discriminatorily shut off these firms’ access to Facebook’s valuable user data if they did not sell
`their businesses to Facebook first. The message to its competitors was explicit: sell at a bargain, or
`Facebook will go into “destroy mode.” All of this was enabled by Facebook’s deception.
`15. Two of Facebook’s largest acquisitions, the mobile social photo app Instagram and the
`mobile messaging service WhatsApp, are examples of Facebook executing its plan. Each posed a
`unique and dire threat to Facebook’s monopoly, each had enormous and rapidly growing user
`networks, and each was well positioned to encroach on Facebook’s dominant market position.
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`3 Id. at 18.
`4 Facebook Q4 2019 Results at 4, available at https://kl.link/36yIY5J.
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`16. Facebook’s destruction of competition has caused consumers to suffer substantial
`economic injury. Consumers give up something of material value when agreeing to Facebook’s
`Terms of Service: their personal information and their attention. User information and attention is
`then sold in measurable units to advertisers in exchange for money. Consumers thus give up
`valuable consideration in using Facebook pursuant to Facebook’s Terms of Service. As
`Facebook’s co-founder explained, “[Facebook] is not actually free, and it certainly isn’t harmless. . .
`. We pay for Facebook with our data and our attention, and by either measure it doesn’t come
`cheap.”5
`17. Absent Facebook’s anticompetitive scheme, fair competition would have required
`Facebook to provide consumers greater value in return for consumers’ data, but Facebook instead
`took that data without providing adequate compensation to its users (i.e., the members of the
`putative class in this action). That constitutes antitrust injury. Through its deception and the
`acquisitions enabled by its deception, Facebook prevented competition on the merits, and as a result
`of that reduction in competition, users received less value for their data than they would have
`received in some form assent the reduction.
`18. Facebook’s acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power continues to harm
`consumers. Prior to Facebook’s consolidation of the Social Network and Social Media Markets, a
`number of firms vigorously competed to win over consumers by offering competing products which
`differed in non-price attributes such as quality. For instance, early social media companies,
`including Facebook, competed for market share by offering competing products to consumers that
`highlighted particular privacy features. Absent Facebook’s anticompetitive scheme, which has
`allowed Facebook to place consumers under its monopolistic thumb, competition from Facebook’s
`rivals would require Facebook to offer products of quality superior to those it thrusts upon
`consumers today. Instead, Facebook’s anticompetitive conduct has allowed Facebook to artificially
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`5 Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, NY Times, May 9, 2019, available at
`https://kl.link/3dUTshC.
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`stifle innovation and deprive consumers of any meaningful alternative to Facebook’s social media
`empire. As such, consumers are faced with a “take it or leave it choice” that provides no choice at
`all: accept a Facebook of lesser quality or forgo use of the only social media platform used by most
`consumers’ friends and family members.
`19.
` Facebook’s monopolistic conduct violates the antitrust laws and harms consumers.
`Facebook is dominant in the Social Network Market and the Social Media Market, and has engaged
`in predatory and exclusionary conduct in order to monopolize, causing Plaintiff and Class members
`to suffer substantial economic injury as a result of Facebook’s competition-reducing violations of
`law. This action seeks recovery for consumers’ losses and Facebook’s unlawful gains, and it seeks
`other appropriate equitable relief to prevent Facebook from continuing to destroy competition and
`harm consumers.
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`PARTIES
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`Plaintiff
`20. Plaintiff Rita Garvin is a natural person and citizen of the State of Arizona. Plaintiff
`created a Facebook account in approximately 2011, maintains an active account, and regularly uses
`Facebook.
`21. Plaintiff actively uses her the Facebook Messenger feature and her WhatsApp account.
`22. Plaintiff cares about her online privacy and trusted Facebook to protect her privacy.
`But since the Cambridge Analytica scandal broke in 2018 and exposed Facebook’s lack of privacy
`protections and subpar data privacy practices, she now questions Facebook’s ability and intent to
`protect her online privacy. Plaintiff does not like the invasiveness of Facebook and its products.
`Despite this, Plaintiff continues to use Facebook and its products because virtually everyone she
`knows uses them and there are no other suitable alternatives to connect with her friends and family
`and issues that matter to her. Additionally, during the current pandemic, connection via social
`media is important to Plaintiff since she can no longer socialize with people face-to- face.
`23. Facebook lied and misled its users about its data privacy practices and the scope of the
`data it collected and made available to third parties. If Plaintiff had known the truth about
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`Facebook’s privacy practices years ago, she would not have agreed to give Facebook such all-
`encompassing access to her personal data.
`Defendant
`24. Defendant Facebook, founded by Mark Zuckerberg in 2003, is a Delaware corporation
`with its principal place of business located in Menlo Park, California, where it owns and leases 3
`million square feet of office buildings and 130 acres of land for future expansion.
`25. Facebook is a social media company that provides online services to more than 3.14
`billion users. Facebook owns and operates several business divisions, including:
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`
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`Facebook. Facebook’s core social media application, which bears the company’s
`name, is, according to Facebook’s filings with shareholders, designed to “enable people
`to connect, share, discover, and communicate with each other on mobile devices and
`personal computers.” The Facebook core product contains a “News Feed” that displays
`an algorithmically-ranked series of content and advertisements individualized for each
`person.
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`
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`Instagram. Instagram is a social media photo-sharing application that allows users to
`share photos, videos, and messages on mobile devices. Facebook acquired Instagram in
`April 2012.
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` Messenger. Facebook’s Messenger application is a multimedia messaging application,
`allowing messages that include photos and videos to be sent from person to person
`across platforms and devices.
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` WhatsApp. WhatsApp is a secure messaging application used by individuals and
`businesses. Facebook acquired WhatsApp in 2014.
`26.
`In exchange for providing services, Facebook collects user data, which it allows
`advertisers to use for targeted advertising to Facebook users. Facebook’s principal revenue is from
`targeted social media advertising that it provides to advertisers as a data broker. In 2019, Facebook
`collected $70.7 billion in revenue, almost entirely from allowing companies to serve ads to its users.
`27. Facebook has over 50,000 employees and offices worldwide.
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`JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CHOICE OF LAW
`28. This action arises under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and
`Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. The action seeks to recover treble damages or
`disgorgement of profits, interest, costs of suit, equitable relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees for
`damages to Plaintiff and members of the Class resulting from Defendant’s restraints of trade and
`monopolization of the Social Network and Social Media Markets described herein.
`29. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question),
`and 1332 (class action diversity jurisdiction). The Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over the
`state law unjust enrichment claims presented in this action under 28 U.S.C. 1367 (supplemental
`jurisdiction).
`30. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Facebook because it is subject to general
`jurisdiction in the State of California, where it maintains its headquarters and its principal place of
`business, and Facebook’s Terms provide that consumers must bring these claims in this Court. The
`scheme to monopolize alleged in this Complaint caused injury to persons throughout the United
`States, including in this District. Moreover, Facebook also conducted substantial business from
`which the claims in this case arise in California and has agreed to personal jurisdiction in this Court.
`31. Venue is appropriate in this District under 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (Clayton Act), 15 U.S.C.
`§ 22 (nationwide venue for antitrust matters), and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (general venue provision).
`Facebook transacts business within this District, and it transacts its affairs and carries out interstate
`trade and commerce, in substantial part, in this District.
`32. Facebook’s “Terms of Service” provide that “the laws of the State of California,”
`which includes the federal antitrust laws, govern the Terms and “any claim” between Facebook and
`its users.6
`///
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`6 Facebook Terms of Service, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last accessed: December
`11, 2020).
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`INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
`33. Under Civil Local Rule 3-2(c) and (e), this action is properly assigned to the San Jose
`Division of this District because Facebook is headquartered here, and a substantial part of the events
`or omissions that give rise to the claim occurred in San Mateo County.
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`General Background on the Social Media Industry
`34. At a high level, the various participants in the social media industry include the
`following: social media platforms, consumers, advertisers, and content providers (which can be any
`of the previous three types of market participants, or can be third parties).
`35.
` Social media platforms provide social networking, messaging, and/or media tools to
`consumers “designed to engage people by facilitating sharing, creating, and communicating content
`and information online.”7
`36. Social media platforms typically allow users on their networks to interact with people
`the users know, participate in “groups” which join users with a particular background or common
`interest, and display content through linear feeds.8 Facebook’s social media platform—which
`allows users to interact with others, join and participate in groups, and displays content linearly—is
`pictured below:9
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`7 House Report, supra, at 88.
`8 Id.
`9 Jan. 11, 2018, available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/01/11/facebook-newsfeed-
`big-change/1023331001/ (last accessed December 11, 2020).
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`37. A common feature of the social media industry is that social media platforms typically
`offer their services to consumers for non-cash consideration.10 In consideration for providing this
`service, social media platforms obtain valuable personal data from their users. The extent of the
`information obtained from users varies by social media platform, as does the disclosures about what
`data is obtained and the use(s) to which it is subsequently put.
`38. Social media platforms monetize the data they obtain from users by selling the data to
`third parties. As an example, advertisers often pay social media platforms for certain aspects of the
`platform’s user data, in order to learn more about the demographics that are most interested in
`certain products. Advertisers, product manufacturers, and service providers also often pay a social
`media platform to direct curated ads specifically towards particular user segments. Similarly,
`application developers (“app developers”) purchase users’ data from social media platforms to
`attract users that, in turn, brings profit to the developers in the forms of application purchases and
`ad-revenue.
`General Background on Facebook
`39. Facebook’s core offering to consumers is access to its social media network, which
`contains the individualized profiles of well over 200 million users in the United States and billions
`of users worldwide. In exchange for access to the only social media network that allows consumers
`to connect online with most of their family, friends, and acquaintances, Facebook requires users to
`provide their personal data and receive targeted advertisements.
`40. The personal data and user attention that Facebook obtains from consumers in this
`exchange is not just the users’ consideration paid to use Facebook products; they are what provides
`significant monetary value to Facebook’s enterprise. Facebook uses the data obtained from its
`massive user base to generate its largest source of income: selling targeted advertisements to its
`users.
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`41. Facebook’s machine learning algorithms mine patterns in the data for advertisers,
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`10 House Report, supra, at 88.
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`which allows advertisers to reach precisely the right audience to convert into sales, user signups, or
`the generation of sales leads. To protect its exclusive control over user data and attention, Facebook
`has brought legal action against actors that have copied publicly available user data and made it
`available outside of Facebook.11
`42. The data is also monetized by commercializing access—for example, by providing
`application developers, content generators, and advertisers with direct access to the information
`embedded in Facebook’s network, such as the interconnection between users, user attributes, and
`user behavior. That data can then be mined by these third parties.
`43. From the beginning, Facebook has sought to entice consumers based on its supposed
`commitment to maintaining the privacy of its users’ data. Unlike earlier competing social media
`platforms that allowed anyone interested to join anonymously or by using unverified usernames,
`Facebook required that those interested in joining to use their real-world identities.
`44. This qualitative distinction had clear privacy implications. Ironically, early platforms
`that allowed users to register anonymously or with pseudonyms caused more privacy problems for
`users because wrongdoers that obtained and/or used fellow users’ personal information could hide
`behind their online (anonymous or unverified) identities.
`45.
`In contrast, Facebook claimed that it created a level of accountability, because users
`ostensibly knew who was on the other side of the screen from them and were connected to them in
`some way in real life. Indeed, Facebook’s website “was one of the first social networks where users
`actually identified themselves using their real names.”12 By making users “real,” Facebook claimed
`(and users agreed by voting with their feet) that their social interactions online were better protected
`and more meaningful. But all of this required Facebook to promise privacy protection in order to
`induce users to provide their real-world identities and data.
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`11 Facebook brought one such suit as recently as November 19, 2020. See Jessica
`Romero,Combating Clone Sites, Facebook Newsroom, Nov. 19, 2020, available at
`https://about.fb.com/news/2020/11/combating-clone-sites/ (last accessed December 11, 2020).
`12 See John Gallaugher, Getting the Most Out of Information Systems § 8.3, available at
`https://kl.link/3dX3BKN (last accessed December 11, 2020
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`46.
`Prior to founding Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg learned the importance of privacy to
`consumer preference early on. While a student at Harvard University, Mr. Zuckerberg created
`“Facemash,” which “juxtaposed the pictures of two random Harvard undergraduates and asked users
`to judge their physical attractiveness.”13 Notably, Facemash obtained the students’ photos without
`their permission, “dr[a]w[ing] the ire of students and administrators alike[.]”14 While promoting
`“thefacebook.com,” Facebook’s predecessor, Zuckerberg vowed that he had learned from his
`experience with Facemash building into “thefacebook.com” “intensive privacy options,” which “he
`hoped would help to restore his reputation[.]”15 In reality, thefacebook.com’s—and later
`Facebook’s—representations regarding privacy were part of an orchestrated scheme, designed to
`secure and prolong its monopoly status.
`47.
`At first, Facebook was closed to all but those users who could validate their own
`real-world identities, such as by verifying that he or she was legitimate via an e-mail address issued
`by an organization, such as a university or a firm:16
`It was this “realness” that became Facebook’s distinguishing feature—bringing
`along with it – and also depending on – a perceived degree of safety and comfort
`that enabled Facebook to become a true social utility and build out a solid social
`graph consisting of verified relationships. Since “friending” (which is a link
`between nodes in the social graph) required both users to approve the
`relationship, the network fostered an incredible amount of trust. Today, many
`Facebook users post their cell phone numbers and their birthdays, offer personal
`photos, and otherwise share information they’d never do outside their circle of
`friends.
`48.
`The data Facebook has since collected derives much of its value from the ability to
`identify Facebook’s users by their real-world identity. Other platforms, such as Twitter, have only
`loosely enforced identity rules, and have never required users to disclose granular details about
`themselves.
`
`
`13 Alan J. Tabak, Hundreds Register for New Facebook Website, The Harvard Crimson (Feb.
`9, 2004), available at https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/2/9/hundreds-register-for-new-
`facebook-website/ (last accessed Dec. 11, 2020)
`14 Id.
`15 Id.
`16 Gallaugher, supra, § 8.3.
`
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`49.
`Facebook characterizes each user’s disclosure of his or her identity as increasing the
`value of the experience for all users, who are purportedly able to benefit from others’ disclosures by
`connecting with and following the activities of their real-world connections.17 Disclosure also
`increases the market value of the information Facebook obtains from its users. Knowing the internet
`habits of “YankeesFan123” is less valuable than knowing the browsing habits of a specific
`individual whose love of the Yankees can be linked with information about his shopping habits,
`income, family, friends, travel, dining, dating, and a myriad of other data points.
`50.
`In the years since its inception, Facebook has tracked trillions of data points about
`consumers with a powerful data structure that it calls the “social graph.” The social graph concept
`“refers to Facebook’s ability to collect, express, and leverage the connections between the site’s
`users, or as some describe it, ‘the global mapping of everyone and how they’re related.’”18 All of the
`data on Facebook can be thought of as a “node” or “endpoint” that is connected to other data on
`Facebook:
`You’re connected to other users (your friends), photos about you are tagged, comments
`you’ve posted carry your name, you’re a member of groups, you’re connected to
`applications you’ve installed—Facebook links them all.19
`
`51.
`Given Facebook’s size and reach, as well as the extent of its surreptitious user data
`collection (discussed further below) the social graph is a unique and uniquely valuable dataset, even
`among the giants of the tech world. Much of this value stems from the fact that the majority of
`Facebook’s social graph cannot be viewed by the public or search engines, and because it contains
`extraordinary amounts of data that users unwittingly provided Facebook regarding their most minute
`everyday habits.
`52.
`Facebook is a so-called “walled garden”—a closed ecosystem run by a single
`
`
`17 Apple’s Senior Director for Global Privacy recently expressed skepticism that social media
`platforms such as Facebook encourage disclosure of personal information solely to create a richer
`“personalized experience” for other users. See Apple Privacy Letter, November 19, 2020,
`available at https://kl.link/33bhK2Y (“What some companies call ‘personalized experiences’ are
`often veiled attempt to gather as much data as possible about individuals, build extensive profiles
`on them, and then monetize those profiles.”).
`18 Gallaugher, supra, (quoting A. Iskold, “Social Graph: Concepts and Issues,” ReadWriteWeb,
`September 12, 2007).
`19 Id. (citing A. Zeichick, “How Facebook Works,” Technology Review, July/August 2008).
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`operator. Advertisers must go through Facebook in order to reach Facebook users. And Facebook
`can decide how much of its social graph it allows app developers, including competitors, to access.
`53.
`The personal data of Facebook’s users takes many forms including data about the
`information users share on their personal profile pages, the photos and profiles users have viewed,
`what information users share with others, and even what users put in messages to other users. This
`granular data all allows targeted advertising on a scale that has never before existed. Facebook’s
`platform allows advertisers to target Facebook’s user base by their attributes and behavior. Third
`party advertisers have been able to use Facebook’s advertising platform to track and target
`consumers all throughout the internet, even when Facebook users are “logged-out” of Facebook.
`Facebook is Dominant in the Social Network and Social Media Relevant Markets.
`54.
`There are two relevant markets applicable to this dispute. They are: (1) “the Social
`Network Market”; and (2) “the Social Media Market.” Facebook has unlawfully acquired and
`maintained monopoly power in both markets.
`The Social Network
`55.
`The Social Network Market is the product market consisting of social networks,
`which are websites (and accompanying mobile applications) that: (1) facilitate users of a given
`network finding, interacting, and networking with other people either whom the users already know
`or to whom they are connected through others they already know online; and (2) provide users with
`additional substantive features beyond the ability to communicate with other users and share
`multimedia. As explained more fully below, the definitions of the Social Media and Social Network
`Markets are distinct, although Social Networks may offer Social Media platforms on their networks
`(as Facebook, for example, does).20 To that extent, the Social Network Market is a distinct part or
`sub-part of the Social Media Market.
`56.
`Search engines, such as Google, Yahoo, or Bing, are not “social networks”
`
`
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`20The House Antitrust Subcommittee has recognized the Social Network Market as a relevant
`market that