Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 1 of 84
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`Keith Mathews
`Pro Hac Vice Pending
`Associated Attorneys of New England
`PO Box 278
`Manchester, NH 03105
`Ph. 603-622-8100
`keith@aaone.law
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`DANIEL CLASEN, ESQ. #326,667
`1309 Coffeen Ave STE #2358
`Sheridan, WY 82801
`+1 (747) 221-4144
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`CORONAVIRUS REPORTER,
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`CALID INC
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`on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated
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`Plaintiffs,
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`vs.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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`Defendants.
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`CAND Docket: 21-cv- -YGR
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`SHERMAN ACT ANTITRUST
`COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
`AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 2 of 84
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`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1. This class action seeks to redress the injustices Apple committed to the developer base
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`that the monopoly necessarily relies upon to exist. Documented herein are the anti-
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`competitive business practices that have become the norm at Apple, and how they have
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`harmed Coronavirus Reporter, CALID (CALendar IDentifier scheduling platform), and
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`countless other class members that shall be identified in expedited discovery.
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`2. Two decades ago, the United States Department of Justice expended considerable
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`resources to prosecute the Microsoft Corporation for alleged anti-competitive activity that
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`amounted to bundling the Explorer web browser too prominently with the Windows
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`operating system. Notably, Microsoft did not restrict each and every software developer
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`from directly selling software to PC consumers. Microsoft did not require programmers
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`to submit their applications for approval, in order to distribute software in a brick-and-
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`mortar store. Microsoft did not reject 40,000 software applications per week, wasting
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`millions of person-hours of labor. Microsoft did not demand an economically inefficient
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`33% tax on all PC software. And Microsoft did not charge $99/year to every aspiring
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`computer programmer, many of whom are students or entrepreneurs with no income or
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`benefits, simply to access the Windows SDK. There seems to be little question that had
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`Microsoft committed the above antitrust violations, public outrage would have ensued,
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`the company would have been broken up, and likely, faced criminal charges.
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`3. Apple, by breathtaking comparison, has secured its position as the wealthiest company in
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`the world by committing all of those enumerated crimes under the guise of popularity and
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`commitment to quality. There can be little doubt that Tim Cook sought to compensate for
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 3 of 84
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`the tragic loss of Steve Jobs – and his gift for innovation – by seeking reckless profits on
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`the heels of the success that Apple enjoyed with the iPhone. This stealth transition
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`occurred relatively quickly, over the last ten years.
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`4. Most consumers associate Apple with their past days of creative good, and hence, the
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`company now operates as a stealth monopolist. To be sure, many consumers eagerly
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`await opening or “unboxing” their new iPhone, not fully aware that this bundle of
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`hardware and software would be even better if Apple ceased their greedy practices.
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`Nonetheless, concerns over Big Tech are increasingly garnering public attention. This
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`Court is well aware of the public interest in the Epic case over competing app stores. As
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`remarked, scant is the evidence that Apple cares about its developers – surveys, R&D
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`funds, focus groups, transparent development assistance programs, etc, don’t seem to
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`exist at the magnitude one would expect. A reactionary “developer center” at Apple
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`Campus is too little, too late. The simple fact is Apple treats developers like second class
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`citizens. Developers who speak out face retaliation and even harassment by Apple in
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`court (see FTC cause of action).
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`5. A recent academic law journal articles explain the difficulty thus far legal experts have
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`encountered in defining Apple’s ecosystem within existing “pigeonholes” of anti-trust
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`law. The US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust has issued
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`recommendation that Sherman civil law be revised so as to prevent the motion practice
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`Apple engages to stall these types of cases.
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`6. The “Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy” signed into
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`law by President Biden last week specifically tasks the FTC to use its statutory
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`rulemaking authority to address “unfair competition in Major internet marketplaces.” At
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 4 of 84
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`last, the anticompetitive practices alleged by Plaintiffs for nearly a year have become the
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`direct subject of a Presidential Executive order.
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`7. During the last week of the Epic trial, various questions were raised by this Court as to
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`the best marketplace definition to apply to Apple’s monopoly. If a leading litigation-
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`prosecutor like Quinn Emmanuel struggles with the marketplace definitions of Sherman
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`into the final days of trial, it is reasonable to be concerned that a small developer with
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`independent counsel, as is the case here, faces an uphill battle trying to prosecute Apple’s
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`violations of the law. For these reasons, including the new executive order, Plaintiffs seek
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`the assistance of the Federal Trade Commission.
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`8. In consideration, this Complaint draws on the Sherman claim theory presented in Epic
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`and Cameron, both familiar to this Court. Notably, this Complaint also elucidates a
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`monopsony theory that Plaintiffs believe is the most far-reaching, and importantly,
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`simplest claim theory to protect independent developers. To date, no claim theory against
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`Apple has sufficiently protected free apps – which represent a large proportion of the
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`iPhone software bundle ecosystem. By expanding the claim theory to include free apps,
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`our monopsony-based theory of hardware & software bundling presents straightforward
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`definitions of product interchangeability, lost cost & quality competition, and other
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`Sherman elements. With this theory, it is easier to “pigeonhole” Apple’s conduct in terms
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`of obvious civil and criminal antitrust liability.
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`9. The largest component of this class action is that of free apps that were denied
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`distribution, or effectively denied through ranking suppression.
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`10. As the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust recently exposed, Apple,
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`when it suited them with Chinese developer Baidu, appointed two Apple employees to
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`help them navigate the murky waters of the Apple App Store. The Plaintiffs in this case,
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`however, weren’t so lucky to obtain such hand-holding– their thousands of person-hours
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`of work were tossed away by Apple, with improper rejections that, according to the same
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`US House report, even astonished many Apple employees.
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`11. This is a rapidly evolving legal matter. Apple has become the richest corporate entity in
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`the world, thriving from 30% commissions and deeply curated – and restricted – trade
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`outputs in the App Store that launched over a decade ago. Apple wants the public to
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`believe it is all in the name of safety and consumer privacy. Recently, the New York
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`Times asked Apple CEO Mr. Tim Cook for his statement regarding growing concerns
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`over Apple’s unyielding power and absolute control over the App Store. His response –
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`“somebody has to be in charge, why not Apple?” – certainly sounds more like the divine
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`right of kings than a new age technology company.
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`12. Mr. Cook’s logic is deeply flawed. For over forty years, and still today, the Apple Mac
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`ecosystem healthfully thrived without such policing. Mac users simply aren’t demanding
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`that Apple police their computer software due to an imaginary flood of privacy violations
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`and other ills. Interestingly, at their June WWDC Apple started to weave the narrative
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`that the Mac is a dangerous platform, and that app control à la App Store must be
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`implemented to protect the general public.
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`13. Representing a class of developers who directly suffer from Apple’s ever-expanding
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`power grab is Coronavirus Reporter and CALID. Between these two case studies, counsel
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`in the class action endeavors to represent the best interests of, and provide a voice to,
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`other developers that have thus far been silenced.
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`14. In February 2020, the Coronavirus Reporter Plaintiff formed an emergency ad hoc group
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`of health care and computer science experts to develop a smartphone application named
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`“Coronavirus Reporter.” The COVID-19 pandemic was named on February 11, 2020.
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`The first death in France on February 14 was followed by an outbreak in Italy, and the
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`United States reported its first death on February 29. The Coronavirus Reporter app was
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`completed on March 3, 2020, at which time there was not a single Coronavirus app on the
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`Apple iOS App Store. While some debate existed, most of the United States population,
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`government scientists, and healthcare experts did not predict the rapid extent to which
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`COVID would spread nationally and globally. Within a month, the United States led the
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`world in confirmed cases, social distancing became a familiar term, and millions lost
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`their jobs.
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`15. The Coronavirus Reporter application (“the app”) was developed to capture and obtain
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`critical biostatistical and epidemiological data as it happened. For the first time in the
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`history of pandemics, social media could provide new insights of an entire population
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`that simply could not be obtained from traditional doctor office visits and other screening
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`methods. The app’s operation was a simple and familiar “geolocation” map where users
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`would self-identify disease symptoms such as cough, fever, or other yet to be discovered
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`symptoms.
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`16. In response to the emerging crisis, on March 3 2020, the same day the app was complete,
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`Apple announced that applications dealing with coronavirus would only be allowed from
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`“recognized institutions such as government, hospital, insurance company, NGO, or a
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`university.” The app was rejected on these grounds. On appeal, the development team
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`requested that Apple expand the rule to allow corporations other than insurance
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`companies, such as biotechnology or bioinformatics firms. Apple agreed, and added
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`“deeply credentialed” health care corporations to the list of permissible entities. Apple
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`was then provided with supporting and sponsorship documentation, including the
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`curriculum vitae of Coronavirus Reporter’s Chief Medical Officer, Robert Roberts M.D.,
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`FRCPC, FRSM, FACP, FESC, FAHA, FISHR, MACC, LLD (Hon.), FRSC. Dr Roberts
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`invented the MBCK assay, the gold-standard test for detecting myocardial infarction (i.e.
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`heart attack) used for three decades and regarded as one of the most effective screening
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`tools in medical history. The MBCK test vastly reduced MI associated morbidity and
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`mortality; in other words, Dr Roberts’ invention saved a very large number of lives.
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`17. As NASA Head Cardiologist during the Space Race, Dr Roberts personally signed off on
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`John Glenn’s historic mission. Dr Roberts spent five years as a Board Director for the
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`Nobel prize in mathematics, the Fields Medal.
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`18. After a very long twenty days of waiting, Apple issued a final command that the
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`Coronavirus Reporter app would not be permitted on the App Store. Apple made the
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`appalling determination that Coronavirus Reporter lacked “deeply rooted medical
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`credentials.” Apple also stated that the “user-generated data has not been vetted for
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`accuracy by a reputable source.” In other words, Apple told Dr. Roberts that he, and his
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`self-reported symptoms app model, were not “deeply rooted” in the world of medical
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`credentials.
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`19. About one month after rejecting the app, Apple permitted several employees at a London
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`teaching hospital to distribute a COVID app on the App Store that functioned nearly
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`identically to Coronavirus Reporter. That competing app obtained the so-called first
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`mover advantage, and is currently used by five million individuals daily.
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`20. In the following months, Apple formed a partnership with their chief rival and several
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`other universities to create a contact-tracing COVID app. After much delay, the contact-
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`tracing App launched in Summer 2020. Although contact tracing has worked in some
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`limited scope, much resistance in this country exists. The Apple contact tracing app
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`generally underperformed expectations and failed to obtain a user base in the United
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`States. Nonetheless, research by a Turing/Oxford team into the epidemiological impact of
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`the app suggests the UK version of the app has prevented 600,000 coronavirus cases
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`since it was launched.
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`21. Coronavirus Reporter was ready months before other world-class COVID app products,
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`and would likewise have prevented deaths in the US and other countries where the
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`NHS/Apple app did not succeed. Deaths would have been prevented through both the
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`informal contact tracing geolocation functionality, as well as “situational awareness”
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`offered by the app that does not exist in the UK/Apple app. Apple’s denial of the
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`Coronavirus Reporter app resulted in unnecessary deaths.
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`22. The Sherman Act prohibits monopolization of any part of the trade or commerce among
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`several States, or with foreign nations. Likewise, the Sherman Act prohibits every
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`contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade among several States, or with foreign nations.
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`23. The internet was developed by DARPA, a research and development division of the
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`United States Department of Defense. ARPANET was the first packet switched
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`distributed TCP/IP network, the backbone foundation of what we today call the internet.
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`This military research endeavor aimed
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`to provide resilient data
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`transmission
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`infrastructure linking persons around the country and the globe. Considerable taxpayer
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`dollars funded DARPA, and continue to fund urban and rural infrastructure rollout of
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`TCP/IP (internet) data services through fiber optics, wireless spectrum allocations, and
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`other ongoing network infrastructure deployments.
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`24. The COVID pandemic serves as a prime example of how ARPANET and its subsequent
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`implementations is particularly well-suited for communication during a national
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`emergency.
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`25. As ARPANET and the internet developed over time, many of its characteristic distributed
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`networking features have become compromised by the growth of corporate entities that
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`control vast access points. Of particular concern is that unfettered growth of a
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`monopolistic trust, as defined by the Sherman Act, could seriously restrict interstate
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`commerce, and the free exchange of information. A computer scientist who writes
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`software applications that rely upon a free and open internet may be encumbered, should
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`one of these monopolistic trusts destroy access to the internet’s free markets and
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`information exchanges.
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`26. Defendant Apple Inc. did just that, denying millions of citizens the benefit of
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`communicating in a pandemic emergency using an app designed by a world renowned
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`physician. Indeed, that physician had particular experience in dealing with novel medical
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`situations as exemplified by the fact that he personally gave astronauts the green light to
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`explore unchartered territory.
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`27. Nearly 60% of users and 80% of paid internet commerce access the national internet
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`backbone using Apple devices, in what we refer to as smartphone enhanced internet
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`information and commerce. For many millions of these users, their de facto access to the
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`internet relies upon using an iOS device. Consider, for example, children or elderly who
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`have been taught to access the internet using a relative’s Apple device and have
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`absolutely no reasonable alternative. As such, Apple operates a de facto monopoly for
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`access to the national internet communication backbone.
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`28. Apple has restricted trade, communication, and free information exchange, all in
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`violation of the Sherman Act, when it disallowed Plaintiff’s reasonable application.
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`CLAIM THEORY OVERVIEW
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`29. Plaintiffs and their counsel have worked tirelessly to analyze the various claim theories
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`currently under litigation against Apple, and have structured the “smartphone enhanced
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`internet commerce and information access device” abstraction. Using the definitions
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`identified in the following diagram, it becomes evident how the Sherman marketplace
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`definitions apply to the iPhone ecosystem:
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`30.
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`Smartphone Enhanced Internet Information
` and Commerce Device Marketplace
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`Amalgamation of Hardware
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`(Camera, GPS, etc)
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`Consumers purchase hardware
`and software bundle from Apple
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`Bundle of Software Apps
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`(Free, Paid, Apple Brand)
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`Interchangeable
`Devices
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`Apple iPhone Ecosystem
`(Represents 80% of
`US smartphone
` commerce)
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`Microsoft Phone (obsolete)
`Blackberry (obsolete)
`Android (20% US Market)
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`A smartphone is an ecosystem
`of hardware AND software
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`Monopsony Theory for iPhone
`The iPhone exists within the marketplace for smartphones.
`•Apple bundles its own apps with the iPhone, e.g. FaceTime.
`•Apple bundles free apps with the iPhone,
`usually purchased at a price of $0 from developer.
`Developer rewarded with advertising stream revenue.
`•Apple bundles (at IAP price) 3rd Party paid apps, e.g. MS Word.
`Apple conveys 66.6% commission to 3rd Party.
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`Anti-Competitive App Distribution (Sherman Violation)
`•Apple buys some free apps at substantial prices(e.g. weather prediction).
`•Apple disallows or ranking suppresses competitor apps.
`•Apple assists some developers (e.g. Chinese Government),
`blacklists others (Class Action Plaintiffs)
`•Apple retains 33% off all paid app IAPs.
`•Developer and consumer are at a full disconnect-
`only way to get an iPhone app is "bundled" with the iPhone,
`i.e. approved by Apple.
`A disallowed or suppressed app is underpaid by the Apple monopsony
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`31. In this schematic, free apps are represented just like their paid counterparts. The
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`marketplace here
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`is
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`the smartphone
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`internet access device, and
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`reasonable
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`interchangeability is easily achieved by noting the existence of Windows Phone,
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`Blackberry, and Android. Apple controls nearly 80% of the commerce transactions that
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`occur over this device group. In this model, Apple sells to the consumer a bundle of
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`hardware and software. The consumer is unaware of the existence of developers, if they
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`aren’t approved and promoted by Apple. The merchant of record for all iPhone app
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`purchases is indeed Apple. Counsels’ review of other pending antitrust claims in this
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`Court, and others nationally, neglect to formulate Sherman definitions that equally apply
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`to free apps – a major component of the ecosystem and a significant source of lost
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`“person-years” of work.
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`32. After applying these definitions, we then proceed to specification of the institutional App
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`marketplace:
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 13 of 84
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`Smartphone Enhanced Internet Application
`OEM Software Marketplace (App Distribution Rights)
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`Distributors buy apps, like film studios buy movie rights.
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`Severely constrained marketplace
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`Low stated volume
`High theoretical volume
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`Largely Theoretical Marketplace
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`Venture Capitalists & Private Equity firms routinely purchase apps
`at the OEM/institutional/wholesale level. Their only effective "exit" is placement
`on the Apple App Store or Google Play Store.
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`Apple does not recognize this as a legitimate market in their DPLA agreement.
`Nonetheless, Apple monopsony "buys" millions of apps at a price of zero.
`Apple does occasionally acknowledge institutional purchase of apps.
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`Interchangeable
`Applications
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`Apple iPhone Applications
`amount to 80% of USA
` smartphone
`software sales.
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`Microsoft Phone (obsolete)
`Blackberry (obsolete)
`Android versions may exist
` (20% US Market)
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`Anticompetitive App Marketplace Dominated by Apple
`•Apple buys most free apps at a price of $0 from developer.
`Developer rewarded with advertising stream assignment.
`•Apple buys 3rd Party paid apps, e.g. MS Word.
`Price paid equals volume * 66.6% * IAP price
`•Apple occasionally purchases free apps for
`own-brand portfolio. Dark Sky weather app bought
`for undisclosed sum, removed from Android.
`•Apple frequently copies apps (i.e. Flashlight) eliminating rivals.
`•Preferred partners (China Baidu, Stanford, etc) offered valuable chaperoning.
`•Apple adds SDK functions permitting new classes
`of apps , favoring own (Tile / AirTag).
`•Cronyism by App Store employees obtains kick-backs from friends' apps.
`Not officially sanctioned by Apple shareholders
`•Rejects 40,000 apps a week; developers work
`millions of person-hours for no pay or benefits.
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`Competition would vastly increase app quality & developer fairness
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`33. Apple, of course, does not acknowledge this marketplace in their DPLA agreements. The
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`company has spent a decade writing consumer and developer “agreements” which use
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`wholly different terms, shield Apple of vast liability from third-party apps, while
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`simultaneously collecting the bulk of profits. The DPLA and App Store employ language
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`that a free app is “For Sale” or “Available” through the App Store, after gaining
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`“approval” by Apple for “adherence to iOS standards.” Herein lies the confusion, thus
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`far, with other claim theories. In fact, developers do not sell apps. The only marketplace,
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`the only seller of apps, is Apple itself. Understanding this key fact makes the rest of the
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`antitrust theory flow logically. If Apple is the only seller of apps, just like they sell a
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`proprietary bundle of hardware (GPS, camera, accelerometers, battery, screen, etc), then
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`we understand that Apple is a monopsony buyer of apps. The vast majority of apps are
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`purchased through coercion for a zero-dollar ($0) price from Apple. In other words, vast
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`amounts of labor – millions of person years of developers – compete to sell their apps for
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`free to Apple1.
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`34. The reward is an assignment of advertising identifier code to the developer. This is a
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`wholly separate marketplace from the purchase of the app, and thus far, has confounded
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`legal theorists from correctly defining Apple’s monopsony, with respect to free apps.
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`35. Apple might claim they never purchase apps, because their DPLA agreement doesn’t use
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`this terminology. Again, Plaintiffs assert the DPLA is a legally void, monopolistic
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`contract, in large part because it uses false terms and definitions to purport the existence
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`of an “independent, voluntary developer” base. The reality is, developers are told how to
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`1 The actual terms of an app sale from an independent developer to Apple are rather complex. Apple receives a
`license to distribute a particular version of an app’s source code, in a bundle that is free to purchasers of the iOS
`ecosystem. It would appear patents, trademarks, advertising assignments and other intellectual property are retained
`by the developer. Expert opinions on the true nature of these transactions – which almost certainly differ from
`Apple’s terms specified in the DPLA – will be forthcoming in discovery.
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`run their business, and labor to sell their apps for free to Apple – hence increasing the
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`value of the Apple ecosystem at their expense.
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`36. It should also be noted that Apple does purchase apps for non-zero prices, and routinely
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`so. In the above diagram, it is noted the Dark Sky weather prediction app was purchased
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`by Apple at an undisclosed price estimated between $100million and $1billion to bring
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`the app to Apple’s ecosystem, and exclude it from Android. Apple also finances the
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`development of apps to assist other countries (Chinese government Baidu) and other
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`“partners” it feel deserve direct reimbursement for helping improve the iPhone.
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`37. In short, our theory says Apple sells the “iPhone” as a bundle of software and hardware.
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`This results in a disturbance to both the enhanced smartphone device marketplace, and
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`equally, the institutional app distribution marketplace. Both of these markets will be
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`referred to interchangeably throughout this Complaint. In these markets, Apple controls
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`all the software, and there are no “independent” developer-vendors. By using crafty
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`DPLA agreements, henchmen law firms, and other political lobbying tactics, Apple has
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`thus far pulled off what is the greatest business model in history – albeit an illegal one
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`under Sherman.
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`
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`VENUE
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`38. Venue in the California District is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 22, which states that any suit
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`proceeding under antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought in any district
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`where it transacts business. Apple transacts business in California. Apple’s developer
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`agreement assigns venue to CAND, and this case was transferred to this Court at Apple’s
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`request from the New Hampshire district. The forum selection clause is itself subject to
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`Sherman analysis.
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`39. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of
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`2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d), because the proposed classes consist of 100 or more members,
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`the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and at least one member of the class of
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`plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from Defendant Apple, a California corporation.
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`Jurisdiction in this Court for a permanent injunction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, for
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`federal questions presented pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26 (Clayton Antitrust Act). Diversity
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`jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties reside in different
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`districts and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
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`40. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, grants jurisdiction to this District
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`Court for matters pertaining to the Federal Trade Commission.
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`II.
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`PARTIES
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`41. Plaintiff Coronavirus Reporter is a Wyoming Corporation with officers based in New
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`Hampshire, Vermont, and Upstate NY. Coronavirus Reporter is also the name of the
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`Plaintiff’s iOS application, which uses the national internet background to allow citizens
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`to self-report and geolocate emerging pandemic trends. As such, it belonged to the entire
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`group of “COVID startups” banned by Apple. Plaintiff asserts standing as both a
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`corporation, and additionally as the collective individual persons comprising the
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`corporation, who have no contractual relationship with the Defendant and never signed
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`the Apple Developer Agreement. Dr Roberts never signed any waiver or contract with
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`Apple pertaining to the distribution and access to his medical scientific work product.
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 17 of 84
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`42. CALID is a Wyoming corporation that was founded to develop the CALID iOS App.
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`CALID is an abbreviation for CALendar IDentifier. The CALID platform allows
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`scheduling of any entity – ranging from an expert for videoconferencing, to a house for
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`rent. Apple denied the CALID app originally because it sought to use credit card
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`payments for the rentals, which have a 2% transaction fee. Apple demanded CALID use
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`their IAP system, which has a 33% inefficient transaction fee. CALID was forced to
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`abandon work on the platform because of these inefficiencies. CALID paid nearly a
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`decade of $99 developer fees, to participate in the Apple ecosystem. CALID was subject
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`to ranking suppression. Despite offering a sophisticated platform for free, the app was
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`typically invisible on App Store searches.
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`43. Defendant Apple Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of business in
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`Cupertino. Apple is the largest public company in the world, with a current market
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`capitalization of approximately $3 trillion. Apple designs, markets, and sells smartphones
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`(the iPhone) and computers (the Mac), which functionally rely upon and profit
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`immensely from access to the taxpayer-funded national internet backbone. Apple owns
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`and operates the App Store, which serves as a distribution gateway to the national
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`internet backbone for third-party developers. Pending related litigation against Apple
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`alleges that Apple violates antitrust law by disallowing competing app stores designed by
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`third parties. Notably, this lawsuit does not seek remedy in the form of additional “app
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`stores,” rather it seeks an injunction preventing the Apple App Store from disallowing
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`applications of reasonable intention, of adequately functionality, and of legal subject
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`matter. It proposes doing so through the due process afforded by an independent App
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`Court, the first law enforcement body of its kind devoted solely to computer code and
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 18 of 84
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`applications, search rankings, and even IAP payment processor fairness. In other words,
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`the Apple App Store violates antitrust law by disallowing third-party applications using
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`arbitrary and capricious standards meant to camouflage Apple’s own self-interest and
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`growth of their monopolistic trust.
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`44. Apple has shown ill-will towards Plaintiff Coronavirus Reporter which resulted in at least
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`five news articles being published this year quoting Apple’s false pleading remarks that
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`this present action was filed with “disregard for the law.” Plaintiff, who sought to save
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`lives with its app, and whose medical director has saved countless lives with the MBCK
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`invention, had and has full regard for the law in bringing this Complaint.
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`45. Defendant Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is an agency of the United States
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`government. FTC Headquarters is located at 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington,
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`DC, 20580. FTC’s mission is “Protecting consumers and competition by preventing
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`anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law enforcement,
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`advocacy, and education without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”
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`
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`III.
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`FACTUAL HISTORY
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`46. Introductory paragraphs preceding this paragraph are asserted herein and responsive
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`pleading is hereby noticed as necessary.
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`47. Apple operates the App Store, and has exclusive control over iOS applications and their
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`ability to access that national internet backbone.
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`48. The national TCP/IP internet backbone was built, at least in part, using taxpayer dollars
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`for ARPANET.
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`49. Apple has profited immensely from the existence of the national internet backbone.
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`Case 3:21-cv-05567-EMC Document 1 Filed 07/20/21 Page 19 of 84
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`50. Without the internet, and the taxpayer dollars that built it, Apple would not enjoy the $2
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`trillion valuation it has amassed.
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`51. The Apple smartphone ecosystem is primarily a graphical user interface software (iOS)
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`and hardware configuration, connecting users to the national internet backbone.
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`52. Apple initially developed the App Store to serve as a quality control gateway, ensuring
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`apps functioned to a satisfactory standard and didn’t contain software bugs or illegal
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`content.
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`53. Over the years, Apple has taken a more authoritarian approach to the App Store and has
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`rejected and/or disallowed significant numbers of third-party applications.
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`Emerging Antitrust Proceedings
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`54. Antitrust regulation of Big Tech is a rapidly emerging matter of global public interest.
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`55. The global population rapidly adopted smartphone internet connectivity over the past
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`decade. This has lead to vast implications which we are in the very e