Case 4:21-cv-10001-HSG Document 86 Filed 08/12/22 Page 1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`CALIFORNIA CRANE SCHOOL, INC.,
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`Case No. 21-cv-10001-HSG
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
`DENYING MOTION TO STAY
`PENDING ARBITRATION
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`Re: Dkt. Nos. 32, 34
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`This is an antitrust lawsuit that alleges that Google LLC and Apple Inc. have entered into
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`an anticompetitive agreement not to compete in the internet search business. See Dkt. No. 39
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`(“FAC”) ¶ 2. Before the Court is Google LLC’s, Alphabet Inc.’s, XXVI Holdings Inc.’s, Sundar
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`Pichai’s, and Eric Schmidt’s (collectively, “Google” or “Google Defendants”) motion for an order
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`compelling arbitration and dismissing or staying Plaintiff California Crane School, Inc.’s
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`(“Plaintiff”) claims against the Google Defendants. Dkt. No. 32. (“Mot.”). That motion is fully
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`briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 43 (“Opp.”), 48 (“Reply”), 81 (“Sur-Reply”). Also pending is Apple Inc.’s
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`and Tim Cook’s (collectively, “Apple” or “Apple Defendants”) motion to stay this action in its
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`entirety pending resolution of any arbitration between Plaintiff and the Google Defendants. Dkt.
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`No. 34. The Court held a hearing on both motions on August 11, 2022. For the reasons provided
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`below, the Court GRANTS Google’s motion and DENIES Apple’s motion.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The operative Complaint alleges that Google and Apple violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
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`Sherman Act by engaging in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade in and monopolize the
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`internet search market. See FAC. Specifically, it alleges that Google and Apple entered into an
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`anticompetitive agreement not to compete in the internet search business. See id. ¶ 2. It also
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`Case 4:21-cv-10001-HSG Document 86 Filed 08/12/22 Page 2 of 11
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`alleges that Plaintiff, a crane operator certification company, bought search advertisements on
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`Google and in so doing paid prices that were inflated by the allegedly illegal agreement between
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`Apple and Google. Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff asserts the same claims against Google and Apple, and they
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`arise out of the same underlying facts. See id. ¶¶ 135-42.
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`The following facts have not been contested. When advertisers sign up to use Google’s
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`advertising platforms in the United States, they are shown Google’s Advertising Program Terms
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`(“TOS”) and are asked to expressly agree to the TOS. See Dkt. No. 32-1, Declaration of Courtney
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`Shadd ISO Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Shadd Decl.”) ¶ 3.1 An advertiser will not
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`be able to use Google’s services until after the TOS have been agreed to. Id. Plaintiff accepted
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`the TOS in 2017 and 2018. Id. ¶¶ 13-16.
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`The TOS states in its very first paragraph that it “require[s] the use of binding individual
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`arbitration to resolve disputes rather than jury trials or class actions.” Id., Exs. A & D.
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`Specifically, the TOS’s arbitration clause states that the parties “agree to arbitrate all disputes and
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`claims . . . that arise out of or relate in any way to” Plaintiff’s participation in Google’s advertising
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`programs and services. Id. § 13(A). The provision further states that the agreement to arbitrate “is
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`intended to be broadly interpreted and includes, for example . . . claims brought under any legal
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`theory.” Id. And the provision also expressly states that it applies to claims brought against
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`“Google,” “Google parent companies, and the respective officers [and] directors” of those entities.
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`Id. Google’s records do not reflect any attempts by Plaintiff to opt out of the arbitration provision
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`pursuant to Section 13(F) of the TOS. Shadd Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15-16; see also id., Exs. A & D, §
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`1 The Google Defendants ask the Court take judicial notice of the TOS and related
`documents, including the opt-out website, and the website at which advertisers accepted or
`declined the TOS. Mot. at 2. Plaintiff has not opposed this request. The Court agrees to take
`judicial notice of the existence of these documents, as they are not the subject of reasonable
`dispute and their authenticity is not in question. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Trudeau v. Google LLC,
`349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (taking judicial notice of the “TOS, the opt-out
`website, and the website at which advertisers accepted or declined the TOS,” because, inter alia,
`“they are not the subject of reasonable dispute and their authenticity is not in question” (citing
`FED. R. EVID. 201)), aff’d, 816 F. App’x 68 (9th Cir. 2020). That said, the Court only takes
`judicial notice of the existence of the documents and is not bound by any specific fact findings and
`legal conclusions set forth in them.
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`Case 4:21-cv-10001-HSG Document 86 Filed 08/12/22 Page 3 of 11
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`13(F) (explaining opt out process).
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., sets forth a policy favoring
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`arbitration agreements and establishes that a written arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable,
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`and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (noting
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`federal policy favoring arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
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`U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (same). The FAA allows that a party “aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect,
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`or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
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`States district court . . . for an order directing that . . . arbitration proceed in the manner provided
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`for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. This federal policy is “simply to ensure the enforceability,
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`according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of
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`Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). Courts must resolve any
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`“ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself . . . in favor of arbitration.” Id.
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`When a party moves to compel arbitration, the court must determine (1) “whether a valid
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`arbitration agreement exists” and (2) “whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”
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`Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). The
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`agreement may also delegate gateway issues to an arbitrator, in which case the court’s role is
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`limited to determining whether there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to
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`arbitrate arbitrability. See Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015). In either
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`instance, “before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court determines whether a valid
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`arbitration agreement exists.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524,
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`530 (2019) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A. Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
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`Google moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims against it pursuant to an agreed-
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`upon arbitration clause in Google’s terms of service. On a motion to compel arbitration, this
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`Court’s role is simply to determine (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does,
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`(2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass'n, 718
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`F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s primary argument in response to Google’s motion to
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`compel arbitration is that the so-called “McGill rule” renders the parties’ arbitration agreement
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`unenforceable. The Court will first explain why the arbitration agreement is valid and covers the
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`dispute at issue, and it will then briefly explain why the McGill rule is irrelevant to this case.
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`First, the arbitration agreement is valid. Section 2 of the FAA contains a savings clause,
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`which provides that arbitration agreements are “enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
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`law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This savings clause “preserves
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`generally applicable contract defenses.” Kilgore, 718 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted). Under the
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`FAA savings clause, state law doctrines that “arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
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`revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally” remain applicable to arbitration
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`agreements. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
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`duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
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`contravening § 2. Id. And under California law, a contractual clause is unenforceable if it is both
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`procedurally and substantively unconscionable. See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d
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`1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006).2
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`Google contends, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the arbitration clause in the TOS is
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`neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit has held that “the
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`threshold inquiry in California’s unconscionability analysis is whether the arbitration agreement is
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`adhesive.” Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
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`Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). “[I]f there is an
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`opportunity to opt out,” the arbitration agreement is not adhesive, and thus not procedurally
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`unconscionable. Id.
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`Here, the TOS offers advertisers an opportunity to opt out of arbitration. Specifically,
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`2 There is no dispute that California law governs the interpretation of the TOS and its arbitration
`clause. See Mot. at 3, n.1 (In the TOS, the parties agreed that “ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
`OR RELATING TO THESE TERMS OR THE PROGRAMS WILL BE GOVERNED BY
`CALIFORNIA LAW, . . . EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT CALIFORNIA LAW IS
`CONTRARY TO OR PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.”) (citing Shadd Decl., Exs. A & D, §
`14); Dkt. No. 81 at 2 (“California law governs the interpretation of the contract and the arbitration
`clause.”).
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`Section 13(F) of the TOS provides an advertiser with 30 days to opt out of the arbitration
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`provision, which the advertiser can do by clicking on a hyperlink that leads to a landing webpage
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`containing the “Opt Out Procedure.” See Shadd Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15-16 (discussing the TOS’s opt-
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`out process). Plaintiff has not argued that this procedure fails to afford a meaningful opportunity
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`to opt out of arbitration. So in light of this voluntary opt out procedure, the Court finds that the
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`arbitration provision in the TOS is not procedurally unconscionable and thus not unconscionable.
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`See Trudeau v. Google LLC, 349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“This Court finds that
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`the 2017 TOS provided a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the arbitration provision.”), aff'd,
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`816 F. App'x 68 (9th Cir. 2020); Adtrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-07082-BLF, 2018 WL
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`1876950, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (“[A]n advertiser’s decision to decline the September
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`2017 AdWords Agreement to avoid being subject to the new arbitration provision is a voluntary
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`choice given that he or she can easily opt out from that provision.”). There is thus no need to
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`assess whether the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable. But in any event,
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`Plaintiff does not contend that it is, and the Court finds no reason to conclude otherwise. At
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`bottom, the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable.
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`Second, the arbitration agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff alleges that it
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`overpaid Google for showing advertisements on Google’s search results pages due to an
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`anticompetitive agreement not to compete in the internet search business between Apple and
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`Google. See FAC ¶¶ 45, 48, 139. With exceptions that no one contends are applicable here, the
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`TOS applies to “all disputes and claims” under “any legal theory” that “arise out of or relate in any
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`way” to Google’s advertising programs. Shadd Decl., Exs. A & D, § 13(A). Moreover, the
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`arbitration agreement applies to Plaintiff’s claims against each of the respective Google
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`Defendants, since the TOS also applies to “Google,” “Google parent companies, and the
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`respective officers [and] directors” of those entities. See id. Plaintiff has identified no reason why
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`this broad agreement does not encompass the antitrust claims here, and the Court is aware of none.
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`Thus, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and it encompasses the dispute at issue in this lawsuit.
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`All of that is uncontested. Plaintiff’s main argument in response to Google’s motion is that
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`the “McGill rule”—a California doctrine that protects a plaintiff’s right to seek “public injunctive
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`Case 4:21-cv-10001-HSG Document 86 Filed 08/12/22 Page 6 of 11
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`relief”—renders the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable. The Court disagrees.
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`California courts have interpreted certain California unfair competition and consumer
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`protection statutes to “authorize injunctive relief that is primarily for the benefit of the general
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`public.” Hodges v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 21 F.4th 535, 541 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation
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`omitted); see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (UCL), et seq.; id. § 17500 (FAL), et seq.; Cal.
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`Civ. Code § 1750 (CLRA), et seq. In McGill v. Citibank, N.A., the California Supreme Court
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`reasoned that any contract that purports to waive a party’s right to seek the “the public injunctive
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`relief available under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law” would “seriously
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`compromise the public purposes the statutes were intended to serve.” 2 Cal. 5th 945, 216 Cal.
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`Rptr. 3d 627, 638 393 P.3d 85, 94 (2017). The “McGill rule” is the case’s central holding, which
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`is that an arbitration provision that purports to waive the right to request such public injunctive
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`relief in any forum is invalid and unenforceable under California law. Id.
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`After Google filed its motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff amended its complaint to add
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`a request for “Forward-Looking Public Injunctive Relief for the General Public as a Whole.”
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`Compare Compl. ¶ 156 (g), (k) (omitting any request for such relief) with FAC ¶ 162 (adding that
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`request). The request essentially asks the Court to enjoin Apple and Google from engaging in the
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`alleged anticompetitive conduct. FAC ¶ 162. Since the Complaint now “clearly seeks public
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`injunctive relief,” Plaintiff contends, “the McGill rule is implicated, and the arbitration agreement
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`should not be enforced.” Reply at 3.
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`But Plaintiff’s novel attempt to invoke the McGill rule fails at the threshold because none
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`of Plaintiff’s claims authorize it to seek public injunctive relief in the first place. “The public
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`injunction is a creature of California law,” and, as interpreted by California courts, it is authorized
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`by certain California unfair competition and consumer protection statutes. Rogers v. Lyft, Inc.,
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`452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The McGill rule, in turn, is a state law doctrine that
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`protects public injunctions already available under those statutes. See McGill, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
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`638, 393 P.3d at 94 (reasoning that enforcing a contract to waive a party’s right to seek “the public
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`injunctive relief available under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law” would
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`“seriously compromise the public purposes the statutes were intended to serve”) (emphasis added).
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`Nothing in the California Supreme Court’s decision in McGill purports to extend its reach to
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`claims that arise under the law of other jurisdictions.
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`The Amended Complaint, meanwhile, raises no California state law claims. It instead
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`raises two federal antitrust claims pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15
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`U.S.C. §§ 15, 26). See FAC ¶¶ 1, 44. Plaintiff has not identified a single case where the McGill
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`rule was invoked to protect federal claims, and the Court is aware of none. In short, while the
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`Amended Complaint nominally requests public injunctive relief, it does not premise that request
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`on a California statute that authorizes such relief. The Court accordingly finds no basis in McGill
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`to bar enforcement of the parties’ arbitration agreement. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Football League's
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`Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. ML15-2668-PSG-JEMX, 2021 WL 2350814, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
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`Apr. 20, 2021) (finding the McGill rule “irrelevant” where the complaint does not raise CLRA,
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`UCL, or FAL claims); In re Google Digital Advert. Antitrust Litig., No. 20-CV-03556-BLF, 2021
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`WL 2021990, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2021) (“The Court credits Defendants’ concern that [the
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`plaintiffs] may not seek public injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.”).
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`At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel for the first time suggested that he could remedy this
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`issue by (again) amending the Complaint to add a Cartwright Act claim, which he contends would
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`then authorize Plaintiff to seek public injunctive relief. But any such amendment would not
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`change the Court’s conclusion. See Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2015)
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`(“the general rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings does not extend to cases in
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`which any amendment would be an exercise in futility”) (cleaned up). This is primarily because,
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`to the Court’s knowledge, no court has interpreted the Cartwright Act (or any other law other than
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`the UCL, CLRA, and FAL) to authorize the distinct kind of public injunctive relief addressed in
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`McGill.
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`Even if the Cartwright Act could generally be read to authorize public injunctive relief, the
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`specific claims Plaintiff seeks to raise would still not authorize such relief. Both the California
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`Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have made clear that public injunctive relief cannot be
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`sought in pursuit of representative claims or for the benefit of a discrete subset of similarly
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`situated persons. See McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 959-60, 393 P.3d at 93 (“we also conclude that a
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`request for [public injunctive] relief does not constitute the pursuit of representative claims or
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`relief on behalf of others”); Hodges, 21 F.4th at 548 (“[W]e reaffirm that non-waivable ‘public
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`injunctive relief’ within the meaning of the McGill rule refers to prospective injunctive relief that
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`aims to restrain future violations of law for the benefit of the general public as a whole, rather
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`than a discrete subset of similarly situated persons, and that does so without requiring
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`consideration of the individual claims of non-parties.”). Plaintiff’s antitrust claims here, however,
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`seek relief on behalf of itself and other “consumers and businesses who paid Google to place
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`advertising on Google search in the United States since January 1, 2005,” on the ground that those
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`individuals and entities paid inflated prices for advertising services and therefore are entitled to
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`recoup their past losses. FAC ¶ 65. In the Court’s view, these are paradigmatic “representative
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`claims” that would primarily benefit a discrete set of similarly-situated persons—namely,
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`individuals or entities that have paid to advertise on Google’s services. To the extent the public
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`would benefit from these claims, it would be collaterally, not primarily. See Hodges, 21 F.4th at
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`546 (“[T]he existence of an incidental benefit to the general public is not enough to classify that
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`relief as non-waivable public injunctive relief.”) (citations omitted); see also Magana v.
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`DoorDash, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (concluding that the relief sought was
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`not public injunctive relief because “any benefit to the public would be derivate of and ancillary to
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`the benefit to DoorDash’s employees”). The Court’s conclusion is thus reinforced: Plaintiff
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`cannot evade its plainly valid arbitration agreement by tacking on the label of “public injunctive
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`relief.”
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`In the end, a valid arbitration agreement exists and covers the dispute at issue in this case.
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`The FAA accordingly requires this Court “to compel arbitration in accordance with the terms of
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`the agreement.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748
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`(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Google’s motion is therefore GRANTED. Once an
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`arbitration agreement is found to be valid, enforceable, and applicable, the court shall stay the
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`action pending the outcome of the arbitration or dismiss the action. 9 U.S.C. § 3; Sparkling v.
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`Hoddwan Constr. Co. Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). Having found that the arbitration
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`agreement is valid, enforceable, and Plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of the agreement, the
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`Court STAYS Plaintiff’s claims against Google pending the outcome of arbitration.
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`B. Apple’s Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration
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`Having ordered that Plaintiff’s claims against Google be compelled to arbitration, the
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`Court turns to Apple’s request to stay the claims against it pending arbitration. See Dkt. No. 34.
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`This request is denied.
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`Under Section 3 of the FAA, a stay is mandatory as to the parties to the arbitration
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`agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. As to litigants who are not parties to the arbitration agreement,
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`however, the court may stay the litigation as a matter of discretion to await the outcome of the
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`pending arbitration. When exercising its discretionary power to stay, a court must weigh the
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`“competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay,” among
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`which are “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or
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`inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of
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`justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law
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`which could be expected to result from a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110
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`(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX Inc. v. Hall, 200 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). The Ninth Circuit
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`has noted “a preference for proceeding with the non-arbitrable claims when feasible.” See Gray v.
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`SEIU, No. 20-CV-01980-JSW, 2020 WL 12228937, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (citing United
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`Commc'ns Hub, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns, Inc., 46 Fed. Appx. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 2002)). A court
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`should accordingly stay “only when doing so would serve some legitimate interest of the parties or
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`the court.” Id.
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`Apple contends that a stay of the remaining claims against it is warranted here because (i)
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`the potential damage to Plaintiff from such a stay is minimal if not nonexistent; (ii) there is a real
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`risk of inconsistent rulings if both arbitration and litigation were to proceed in parallel; and (iii) a
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`stay would promote the orderly course of justice. Dkt. No. 34 at 2.
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`Neither party has identified concrete prejudice (beyond simple delay) that would result
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`from either staying or declining to stay this case, so the Court’s decision is premised on concerns
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`of efficiency and judicial economy. On those fronts, the Court agrees with Apple that there is a
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`risk of inconsistent rulings. Since Plaintiff asserts identical conspiracy claims against both Apple
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`Case 4:21-cv-10001-HSG Document 86 Filed 08/12/22 Page 10 of 11
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`and Google, and the claims arise out of the same underlying facts, both an arbitrator and this Court
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`will have to decide similar questions of law and fact to determine whether Google and Apple
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`conspired in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
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`But in a case like this, that redundancy seems inevitable. A stay is generally “appropriate
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`where the arbitrable claims predominate, or where the outcome of the nonarbitrable claims will
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`depend upon the arbitrator’s decision.” United Commc'ns Hub, 46 Fed. Appx. at 415 (quoting
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`Simitar Entm't, Inc. v. Silva Entm't, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997 (D. Minn. 1999)). Here,
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`however, Apple does not contend that the arbitrator’s findings of fact or law in Plaintiff’s
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`arbitration against Google would be binding on this Court or otherwise have any impact on the
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`non-arbitrable claims left here.3 Since Plaintiff and Apple will presumably need to eventually
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`litigate the remaining non-arbitrable claims irrespective of whatever happens in the arbitration,
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`proceeding with this lawsuit would not waste judicial resources. To the contrary, staying the non-
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`arbitrable claims would only serve to needlessly delay their resolution. In these circumstances,
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`where one alleged co-conspirator has an enforceable arbitration agreement and the other does not,
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`the possibility that parallel proceedings could produce inconsistent results is simply inevitable.
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`Without more, that risk does not require granting a stay. As such, Apple has not identified how
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`time and effort could be saved by staying the non-arbitrable claims.
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`Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Apple fails to show that a
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`stay would simplify the legal and factual issues in this lawsuit or otherwise promote the orderly
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`course of justice. Apple’s Motion is DENIED.
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`//
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`//
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`3 See Glob. Live Events v. Ja-Tail Enterprises, LLC, No. CV 13-8293 SVW, 2014 WL 1830998, at
`*6 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014) (“Inconsistent verdicts are possible whether the trial precedes the
`arbitration or vice-versa, and can be avoided only if the second forum gives preclusive effect to
`the judgment of the first forum.”); Chen v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 19-6941-MWF (SK), 2020
`WL 4561658, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020) (“As the arbitration is not binding on the Court, the
`arbitrator's decision will not necessarily impact the outcome of the non-arbitrable claims.”);
`Congdon v. Uber Techs., 226 F. Supp. 3d 983, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (defendant “has not presented
`the Court with any authority indicating that the decision of the arbitrators . . . would in some way
`bind the Court”).
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`Case 4:21-cv-10001-HSG Document 86 Filed 08/12/22 Page 11 of 11
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`IV.
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`CONCLUSION
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`The Court GRANTS Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and STAYS Plaintiff’s
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`claims against Google pending the outcome of arbitration. Plaintiff and Google are further
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`DIRECTED to file a status report with the Court every 120 days from the date of this order and
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`notify the Court within 48 hours of the completion of arbitration. The Court shall retain
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`jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment, if any, for purposes of
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`enforcement.
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`The Court DENIES Apple’s Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. As to Defendants’
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`pending motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff and Apple may file a supplemental
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`brief that addresses whether the Amended Complaint states plausible claims against Apple,
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`specifically. Any supplemental brief may not exceed ten pages and is due on August 25, 2022.
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`Neither party may file a reply brief.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: 8/12/2022
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`______________________________________
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`HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
`United States District Judge
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