Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 1 of 36
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`Karma M. Giulianelli (SBN 184175)
`BARTLIT BECK LLP
`1801 Wewatta St., Suite 1200
`Denver, CO 80202
`Telephone: (303) 592-3100
`Facsimile: (303) 592-3140
`karma.giulianelli@bartlitbeck.com
`
`Hae Sung Nam (pro hac vice)
`KAPLAN FOX & KILSHEIMER LLP
`850 Third Avenue
`New York, NY 10022
`Telephone: (212) 687-1980
`Facsimile: (212) 687-7715
`hnam@kaplanfox.com
`
`Interim Co-Lead Counsel for the Proposed Clas-
`ses
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`[Additional Counsel on Signature Page]
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`IN RE GOOGLE PLAY CONSUMER
`ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`RELATED ACTIONS:
`
`Epic Games Inc. v. Google LLC et al.,
`Case No. 3:20-cv-05671-JD
`
`In re Google Play Developer Antitrust
`Litigation, Case No. 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`State of Utah, et al., v. Google LLC, et al.,
`Case No. 3:21-cv-05227-JD
`Match Group, LLC, et al. v. Google LLC, et
`al., Case No. 3:22-cv-02746-JD
`
`
`No. 3:20-CV-05761-JD
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`CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE
`OF MOTION, MOTION FOR CLASS
`CERTIFICATION, AND
`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
`
`Hearing Date: August 4, 2022
`Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
`Courtroom: Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`Judge: The Honorable James Donato
`
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`CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 3:20-CV-05761-JD
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 2 of 36
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR CLASS CERITIFICATION
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 4, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable
`James Donato, of the United States District Court of the Northern District of California, San Fran-
`cisco Division, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, Courtroom 11, 19th Floor,
`Plaintiffs Mary Carr, Daniel Egerter, Zack Palmer, Serina Moglia, Matthew Atkinson, and Alex
`Iwamoto, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, will and do now move the Court
`for an order granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
`Procedure 23.
`Plaintiffs seek entry of an order: (1) certifying a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class; (2) certifying
`a proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class; (3) appointing Plaintiffs Mary Carr, Daniel Egerter, Zack Palmer,
`Serina Moglia, Matthew Atkinson, and Alex Iwamoto as representatives of the classes; and (4) ap-
`pointing Karma M. Giulianelli of Bartlit Beck LLP and Hae Sung Nam of Kaplan Fox & Kil-
`sheimer LLP as Co-Lead Class Counsel for the classes. Plaintiffs propose that the classes for their
`Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 claims (Counts 1-6) as well as their Cartwright Act (Counts 7-10)
`and Unfair Competition (Count 11) claims, be defined as follows:
`RULE 23(b)(3) MULTISTATE DAMAGES CLASS:
`All persons in the following U.S. states and territories:
`Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Penn-
`sylvania, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming, American Samoa, Guam,
`Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
`who paid for an app through the Google Play Store1 or paid for in-app digital content
`(including subscriptions or ad-free versions of apps) through Google Play Billing on
`or after August 16, 2016, to the present.
`RULE 23(b)(2) MULTISTATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS:
`All persons in the following U.S. states and territories:
`Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Penn-
`sylvania, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Wyoming, American Samoa, Guam,
`Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands
`who currently own a mobile phone or tablet with an authorized and preinstalled ver-
`sion of Google’s Android OS capable of accessing the Google Play Store.
`
`
`1 Capitalized terms “Google Play Store,” “Google Play Billing,” and “Defendants” are used in the
`same sense as defined in the operative consumer Complaint. ECF No. 241.
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`Excluded from both Classes are Defendants and their officers, directors, employees,
`and successors; any person or entity who has (or had during the class period) a con-
`trolling interest in any Defendant; any affiliate, legal representative, heir, or assign of
`any Defendant and any person acting on behalf of any Defendant; any judicial officer
`presiding over this action and the members of those officers’ immediate families and
`judicial staffs; all governments and their agencies; and any juror assigned to this ac-
`tion.
`
`This motion is based upon this Notice of Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of
`Points and Authorities, all filed supportive declarations and exhibits, the expert reports of Dr. Hal
`Singer and Dr. Douglas Schmidt, the records on file in this action, and any argument that may be
`presented at or before the hearing on this Motion.
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 4 of 36
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`II. 
`III. 
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`IV. 
`
`B. 
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... i 
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................................1 
`STATEMENT OF COMMON FACTS ...........................................................................................3 
`THE PROPOSED CLASSES AND THE JOINT PROSECUTION
`I. 
`AGREEMENT WITH THE STATES .................................................................................3 
`COMMON CLASSWIDE EVIDENCE OF THE RELEVANT MARKET .......................4 
`COMMON CLASSWIDE EVIDENCE OF GOOGLE’S UNLAWFUL
`CONDUCT ..........................................................................................................................4 
`COMMON EVIDENCE OF CLASSWIDE ANTITRUST IMPACT ...............................10 
`Common Evidence Establishes that Google’s Take Rate Is Supra-
`A. 
`Competitive ............................................................................................................10 
`Common Economic Evidence Shows that All or Virtually All Class
`Members Are Injured by Google’s Conduct ..........................................................12 
`Aggregate Damages Are Calculated on a Classwide Basis ...................................13 
`C. 
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................14 
`I. 
`THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(a) ARE MET IN THIS CASE ............................14 
`A. 
`Rule 23(a)(1)’s Numerosity Requirement Is Satisfied ...........................................14 
`B. 
`Rule 23(a)(2)’s Commonality Requirement Is Satisfied .......................................14 
`C. 
`Rule 23(a)(3)’s Typicality Requirement Is Satisfied .............................................15 
`D. 
`The Rule 23(a)(4) and 23(g) Adequacy Requirements Are Satisfied ....................16 
`RULE 23(b)(3)’S REQUIREMENTS ARE SATISFIED IN THIS CASE .......................17 
`A. 
`The Predominance Requirement Is Met ................................................................17 
`Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act Claims Present Common Questions
`1. 
`That Will Predominate .............................................................................. 18 
`Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Present Common Questions
`That Will Predominate .............................................................................. 20 
`Common Questions Predominate on Impact and Damages ...................... 20 
`3. 
`The Superiority Requirement Is Met .....................................................................24 
`B. 
`THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(b)(2) ARE SATISFIED IN THIS CASE ............24 
`III. 
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................25 
`
`II. 
`
`2. 
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases 
`Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines,
`948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) .................................................................................................... 18
`Alcantar v. Hobart Serv.,
`800 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................................. 14
`Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
`521 U.S. 591 (1997) .................................................................................................................. 17
`Apple Inc. v. Pepper,
`139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) ................................................................................................................ 1
`B.K., by her next friend Tinsley v. Snyder,
`922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... 15
`Castellar v. Mayorkas,
`No. 17-cv-00491-BAS-AHG, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170342 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) .......... 3
`D&M Farms v. Birdsong Corp.,
`Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-463, 2020 WL 7074140 (E.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2020) ............................ 23
`Ellis v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,
`24 F.4th 1262 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................................... 2, 19
`Flagship Theatres of Palm Desert, LLC v. Century Theatres, Inc.,
`55 Cal. App. 5th 381 (2020) ..................................................................................................... 20
`Giuliano v. Sandisk Corp.,
`No. C 10-02787 SBA, 2015 WL 10890654 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2015) ................................... 19
`Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.,
`222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................... 20
`Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
`150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................. 16
`In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 4:11-cv-06714-YGR, 2022 WL 1284104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2022) ......................... 18, 23
`
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`In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.,
`686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................... 16
`In re Capacitors III,
`No. 17-md-02801-JD, 2018 WL 5980139 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .................................................... 19
`In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig.,
`329 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Fla. 2018).............................................................................................. 21
`In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 11-MD-2293 (DLC), 2014 WL 1282293 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) ................................ 12
`In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig.,
`82 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1979) .................................................................................................. 22
`In re Glumetza Antitrust Litig.,
`336 F.R.D. 468 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ........................................................................................ 18, 24
`In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig.,
`985 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2013) .................................................................................... 15
`In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.,
`926 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... 17
`In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig.,
`247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ................................................................................................ 19
`In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig.,
`213 F.R.D. 180 (D. N.J. 2003) .................................................................................................. 22
`In re Microcrystalline Antitrust Litig.,
`218 F.R.D. 79 (E.D. Pa. 2003) .................................................................................................. 24
`In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
`No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013) .......................................... 25
`In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig.,
`264 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. Cal. 2009) .............................................................................................. 23
`In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Nalaxone) Antitrust Litig.,
`MDL No. 2445, 13-md-2445, 2019 WL 4735520 (E.D Pa. Sep. 27, 2019) ............................. 21
`
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`In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.,
`267 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Cal. 2010) .............................................................................................. 16
`In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.,
`267 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Cal. 2010) .......................................................................................... 3, 21
`In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.,
`768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 22
`In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
`209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002) .................................................................................................. 22
`J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
`451 U.S. 557 (1981) .................................................................................................................. 12
`Kamm v. Calif. City Dev. Co.,
`509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975) .................................................................................................... 24
`Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys.,
`669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................... 17
`Ohio v. American Express,
`138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) .............................................................................................................. 11
`Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC,
`31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022) ......................................................................... 2, 17, 21, 22
`Parsons v. Ryan,
`754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................... 25
`Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc.,
`835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................. 15
`Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.,
`934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... 14
`Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal.,
`252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 18
`Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
`577 U.S. 442 (2016) .............................................................................................................. 2, 17
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`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
`564 U.S. 338 (2011) ........................................................................................................... passim
`Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC,
`617 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 24
`
`Other Authorities 
`6 W. RUBENSTEIN, Newberg on Class Actions § 20:28. (5th ed.) ................................................. 18
`Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,
`1 J. EUR. ECON. ASSN. 990 (2003) ............................................................................................ 11
`
`Rules 
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)................................................................................................................. 14
`Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) ....................................................................................................... 2, 25
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`For years, Google has engaged in exclusionary practices that have allowed it to obtain a dom-
`inant position in the market for distributing Android mobile device applications (apps) and to
`thwart rival app stores from emerging. Google uses its power to inflate the prices of Android apps
`by taking, with limited exceptions, a 30% slice of every app sale through the Google Play Store.
`Google has also unlawfully extended its monopoly power in the Android App Distribution Market
`to the In-App Aftermarket through its requirement that developers use Google’s billing services
`for all in-app sales and its prohibition on steering to alternate providers—allowing Google to take
`a cut in perpetuity of every subsequent purchase of digital content in each app.2
`Internal Google documents reveal that its meteoric rise against such titans as Amazon,
`Samsung, AT&T, T-Mobile, Motorola, and Verizon was the product of a calculated, multifaceted
`strategy to eliminate competition. That strategy included an array of conduct that courts have long
`found to be exclusionary—bribes, deception, contractual restrictions, and pretextual technological
`barriers—which secured and maintain the Play Store’s insurmountable lead over potential com-
`petitors.
`The Consumer Plaintiffs purchased apps from the Play Store or made in-app purchases
`through Google Play Billing. Consumers paid Google directly for these purchases, and, accord-
`ingly, are direct purchasers who may sue Google under federal antitrust laws. Apple Inc. v. Pepper,
`139 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2019). But for Google’s anticompetitive conduct, Plaintiffs and class mem-
`bers would have paid lower prices for apps and in-app purchases and would have benefitted from
`expanded choice. Plaintiffs seek damages from and injunctive relief against Google, and therefore
`seek certification of both a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class of consumers and a (b)(2) injunctive relief
`class of current owners of devices operating with an authorized version of Google’s Android OS.3
`
`
`2 “Android App Distribution Market” and “In-App Aftermarket” are defined in the Class Certifi-
`cation Report of Hal J. Singer, Ph.D. Ex. 2 (Singer Rpt.) ¶¶ 2, 22-32. All exhibit citations are
`citations to the exhibits to the Giulianelli Declaration, filed herewith.
`3 As used in this memorandum, “Android OS” refers to Google’s licensed version of Android, as
`opposed to other versions of the freely available “open-source” version. See Ex. 4 (Expert Report
`of D. Schmidt) at 8-9.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims depend upon central, common questions of fact and law, each of which
`focuses on Google’s conduct and is capable of classwide resolution. They include: (1) whether
`Google has monopoly power in the Android App Distribution Market and the In-App Aftermarket;
`(2) whether Google’s contractual restrictions on manufacturers, carriers, and developers are un-
`reasonable restraints of trade; and (3) whether Google’s practices impacted class members and
`resulted in supra-competitive prices paid by consumers. With respect to the last issue, Plaintiffs
`have developed expert economic evidence capable of demonstrating that Google did indeed cause
`classwide antitrust injury. That evidence will show that virtually all members of the proposed class
`were injured by Google’s “coercive activity,” “prevent[ing] its victims from making free choices
`between market alternatives,” which constitutes cognizable antitrust injury. Ellis v. Salt River Pro-
`ject Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 24 F.4th 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2022). That evidence also
`includes a methodology for calculating aggregate damages to the class, as well as class members’
`individual damages.
`Because common questions about Google’s conduct will be the focus at trial, Plaintiffs
`satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common questions “predominate over any questions af-
`fecting only individual members.” None of the differences among class members (for example,
`which specific purchases were made) are of the kind that defeat class certification. Olean Whole-
`sale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 678 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022) (en
`banc) (common impact can be found “even when the market involves diversity in products, mar-
`keting, and prices”); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (certification is
`proper where common issues predominate even where “other important matters will have to be
`tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class
`members”). Certification of an injunctive relief class is appropriate because Google “has acted or
`refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
`As explained in further detail below, the Court should certify classes under both Rule
`23(b)(3) and (b)(2), appoint Plaintiffs as class representatives, and appoint Karma M. Giulianelli
`of Bartlit Beck LLP and Hae Sung Nam of Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP as co-lead class counsel.
`
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`I.
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`STATEMENT OF COMMON FACTS
`
`THE PROPOSED CLASSES AND THE JOINT PROSECUTION AGREEMENT
`WITH THE STATES
`
`The classes Plaintiffs propose differ from those pleaded.4 The proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class
`is limited to seventeen states and territories in lieu of the nationwide class pleaded because Plain-
`tiffs have entered a Cooperation and Joint Prosecution Agreement (the “Joint Prosecution Agree-
`ment”) with Attorneys General who have brought parens patriae claims. See Ex. 1. To pursue
`consumers’ claims against Google most effectively and efficiently, Plaintiffs’ Counsel and the
`thirty-nine Attorneys General asserting parens patriae claims in this case agreed in the Joint Pros-
`ecution Agreement that class certification would be sought only for consumers in states, districts
`and territories that have not asserted a parens patriae claim in this action.5 Plaintiffs’ Counsel and
`the Attorneys General also agreed to continue working jointly for the benefit of all U.S. consumers.
`A second difference in the proposed classes is that Plaintiffs do not seek certification of a
`“repealer states” class. Because Google has consistently included a choice-of-law provision in its
`user agreements designating California law as controlling in litigation brought by users, California
`law governs the state law claims of all class members, regardless of where they reside and regard-
`less of whether a particular state has “repealed” Illinois Brick.
`Plaintiffs have also proposed a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief class in part based on the
`Supreme Court’s recognition that “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3),” while
`“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief
`to each member of the class.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011). The
`proposed (b)(2) class does not completely overlap with the proposed (b)(3) class, in that the former
`is limited to current Android users, while the latter includes anyone who was an Android user who
`purchased an app or in-app digital content using Google Play Billing during the class period.
`
`4 See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 267 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (permit-
`ting adjustments to class definition at the class certification stage); Castellar v. Mayorkas, No. 17-
`cv-00491-BAS-AHG, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170342 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (“The definition
`of the class at the class certification stage may diverge from that set forth in the Complaint ....”).
`5 If for any reason a State cannot or does not pursue its parens patriae claims, Rule 23 provides
`the necessary flexibility to expand a class to include residents of that State, as Rule 23 permits the
`Court to modify a certified class.
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 12 of 36
`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 12 of 36
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`II.
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`COMMON CLASSWIDE EVIDENCE OF THE RELEVANT MARKET
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`The relevant antitrust markets in this case will be defined by commonevidence. Virtually
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`all mobile devices throughout the world (more than 99%) use either Apple’s 10S, exclusive to
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`Apple devices, or Google’s Android OS, licensed to multiple Original Equipment Manufacturers
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`(“OEMs”), giving it over 99% of the smartphone market for licensed mobile operating systems.
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`Ex. 2 (Singer Rpt.) at § 37. Once a consumer buys an Apple or Android device, she has no choice
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`but to use the app stores that are available for that device, meaning there is no direct competition
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`between Apple and Google for a consumer’s app or in-app business. Ex. 4 (Schmidt Rpt.) at 5-6
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`(explaining incompatibility of mobile operating systems). Google maintains near complete control
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`overthe relevant Android App Distribution Market, and, because ofits restrictions, over the In-
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`App Aftermarket for services used to transact the sale of in-app content. Google’s expert accepts
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`these market definitions for class certification purposes. See Ex. 5 (Burtis Rpt.) § 43.
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`Il.
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`COMMON CLASSWIDE EVIDENCE OF GOOGLE’S UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
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`Commonevidence related to Google’s anticompetitive conduct will be the main focus of
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`any trial. Plaintiffs will prove through commonevidence that Google’s dominance was acquired
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`in both the Android App Distribution Market and In-App Aftermarket by anticompetitive means.
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`Commonevidence will show Google unlawfully: (1) paid carriers rents too high for a competitor
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`to profitably enter; (2) imposed contractual restrictions on OEMs; (3) prohibited developers from
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`steering their customers to competitors; (4) bribed major developers; (5) erected overly restrictive
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`and pretextual technological barriers and misleading warnings to deter consumers from download-
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`ing apps outside the Play Store; (6)
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`and (7) leveraged its power
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`into the separate in-app services market by tying its separate Google Play Billing product to every
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`in-app sale of digital content.
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` First, Google paid
` compete with Google’s app store. Initially, Google
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`to mobile carriers, making it unpalatable for them to
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`
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`pushing out carriers and third parties from profitably participating in carrier distribution chan-
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`CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 3:20-CV-05761-JD
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 13 of 36
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`(GOOG-PLAY-001423609). Google’s solution
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`gave 70%of revenue to
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`d. To enactthis plan, G
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`nd kept only the remaining
`See, e.g., Ex. 7(GOOG-
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`app developers,
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`
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`
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`GOOG-PLAY-005564421); Ex. 9 (GOOG-PLAY-001075142) at -143. Google recognized that
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`Ex. 10, (GOOG-PLAY-001547487) at -488 (
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`By 2013,
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`incentivize building their ownstores and fragmenting the ecosystem.
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`Ex. 11
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`(GOOG-
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`PLAY-000439987.R) at -012.R.
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`Wecut carriers into dis-
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`Ex. 12
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`(GOOG-PLAY-005559390.R) at -395.R. With its monopoly
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`solidified.
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`Ex. 13 (GOOG-PLAY- 001337211) at -226.
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`onsistent with its public promise that “Google does not take a percentage” of the
`revenues fromapp distribution, but,Ss Byincreasingits take
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`
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`Ex. 14 (GP MDL-
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`
`-
`at -838;
`Ex.
`Le
`-
`at -094;
`Ex. 16 (GOOG-
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`PLAY-003604601) at -603;
`. Ex. 17 (GOOG-PLAY-
`at -910; Ex. 18
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`19 (GOOG-PLAY4-002178046) at -049.
`(GOOG-PLAY-003605 103) at
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`x.
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`7 Ex. 21, (“Android Market: Now available for users”, published on October 22, 2008,
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`).
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`5
`CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 3:20-CV-05761-JD
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 14 of 36
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`a. 30%ofeach transaction, Google quickly began enjoying supra-competitive margins.
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`Ex. 20 (GOOG-PLAY-000445443.R) at -461.R.
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`Second, Google has imposed a variety of exclusionary contractual restraints on OEMs of
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`mobile devices. Although Google offers many of its own apps for“free,” Google requires any
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`Nn
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`OowonyNn
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`OEMthat wishesto install even a single Google app to preinstall a bundle of Google apps called
`Google Mobile Services (“GMS”), including Search, Maps, Chrome, Gma
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`Play Store. Ex. 22 (GOOG-PLAY-003776161.R) at -177.R (manufacturers‘
`. GMSnotonly contains Google’s most popular apps, but also application programming
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`il, YouTube. andthe
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`interfaces (“APIs”) necessary for the majority of third-party apps to work. Ex. 4 (Schmidt Rpt.) at
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`10-12. OEMstherefore have no commercially viable alternative but to license GMS. To gainac-
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`cess to those critical APIs, however, an OEMmust enter into a Mobile Application Distribution
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`Agreement (““MADA”) in which Google requires the OEMto preinstall the Play Store onits de-
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`%:
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`vices and to prominently display it on the home screen.* Google knowsthe importance of promi- Ex. 25 (GOOG-PLAY-
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`
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`(
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`entered into
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`Google expected
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`Ex. 28 (GOOG-PLAY-000443763.R) at -773.R. Google recently
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`Ex. 2 (Singer Rpt.)
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`§ 117.
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`Ex. 28 (GOOG-PLAY-000443763.R) at -775.R.
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`Ex. 29 (GOOG-PLAY4-
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`8 Tllustrative examples include eesatccoseeue MADAand
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`-PLAY-004552342); see also Ex. 2 (Singer Rpt.) at
`(GOOG-PLAY-000808375); Ex.
`45 ¥ 97 (discussing preinstallation and prominent displacement requirements).
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`MADA.Ex. 23
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`CONSUMER PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION NO. 3:20-CV-05761-JD
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 15 of 36
`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 251 Filed 05/26/22 Page 15 of 36
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` Ex. 30 (GOOG-PLAY-000558461.R) at -465.R, -466.R. These
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`agreements alone substantially foreclose competition.
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`Third, Google erected roadblocks between the software developers who write Android apps
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`and the consumers whobuy them,effectively preventing the two sides from doing business outside
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`the Play Store. In whatit previously called a “non-compete” provision in its agreements with app
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`developers, Google’s DeveloperDistribution Agreements (““DDAs”)—whichdevelopers must ex-
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`ecute to offer their apps on the Play Store—prohibit developers from steering customers to lower-
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`priced app stores or websites to download apps or buy
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`in-app
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`000225435) (
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`
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`content. Ex. 31 (GOOG-PLAY-
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`). They also
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`forbid developers from using the Play Store “to distribute or make available any Product that has
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`a purposethat facilitates the distribution of software applications and games for use on Android
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`devices outside of Google Play.”® Google’s Payments Policy forbids developers from using alter-
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`native
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`payment
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`processors.
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`Ex.
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`34
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`(Google
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`Play
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`Payments
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`Policy,
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`https://sup-
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`port.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/9858738). These contractual provisions,
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`whichare notjustified by any technical or security reason, restrain competition for transacting the
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`purchase of in-app conte