Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 1 of 35
`
`
`
`Brian C. Rocca, Bar No. 221576
`brian.rocca@morganlewis.com
`Sujal J. Shah, Bar No. 215230
`sujal.shah@morganlewis.com
`Michelle Park Chiu, Bar No. 248421
`michelle.chiu@morganlewis.com
`Minna Lo Naranjo, Bar No. 259005
`minna.naranjo@morganlewis.com
`Rishi P. Satia, Bar No. 301958
`rishi.satia@morganlewis.com
`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`One Market, Spear Street Tower
`San Francisco, CA 94105-1596
`Telephone: (415) 442-1000
`Facsimile: (415) 442-1001
`
`Richard S. Taffet, pro hac vice
`richard.taffet@morganlewis.com
`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`101 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10178-0060
`Telephone: (212) 309-6000
`Facsimile: (212) 309-6001
`
`Daniel M. Petrocelli, Bar No. 97802
`dpetrocelli@omm.com
`Stephen J. McIntyre, Bar No. 274481
`smcintyre@omm.com
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`1999 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Fl.
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-6035
`Telephone: (310) 553-6700
`
`Ian Simmons, pro hac vice
`isimmons@omm.com
`Benjamin G. Bradshaw, Bar No. 189925
`bbradshaw@omm.com
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`1625 Eye Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006-4001
`Telephone: (202) 383-5106
`Facsimile: (202) 383-5414
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`
`
`
`Glenn D. Pomerantz, Bar No. 112503
`glenn.pomerantz@mto.com
`Kuruvilla Olasa, Bar No. 281509
`kuruvilla.olasa@mto.com
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`350 South Grand Avenue, Fiftieth Floor
`Los Angeles, California 90071
`Telephone: (213) 683-9100
`
`Kyle W. Mach, Bar No. 282090
`kyle.mach@mto.com
`Justin P. Raphael, Bar No. 292380
`justin.raphael@mto.com
`Emily C. Curran-Huberty, Bar No. 293065
`emily.curran-huberty@mto.com
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`560 Mission Street, Twenty Seventh Fl.
`San Francisco, California 94105
`Telephone: (415) 512-4000
`
`Jonathan I. Kravis, pro hac vice
`jonathan.kravis@mto.com
`MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
`601 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Ste 500E
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`Telephone: (202) 220-1100
`
`Counsel for Defendants Google LLC et al.
`in In re Google Play Consumer Antitrust
`Litigation; In re Google Play Developer
`Antitrust Litigation; Epic Games, Inc. in
`Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC; State of
`Utah et al. v. Google LLC et al.
`
`Neal Kumar Katyal, pro hac vice
`neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com
`Jessica L. Ellsworth, pro hac vice
`jessica.ellsworth@hoganlovells.com
`HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP
`555 Thirteenth Street NW
`Washington, DC 20004
`Telephone: (202) 637-5600
`Counsel for Defendants
`
`Case Nos. 3:21-md-02981-JD; 3:20-cv-05761-JD
`DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 2 of 35
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`
`IN RE GOOGLE PLAY STORE
`ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
`
`
`In re Google Play Consumer Antitrust
`Litigation, Case No. 3:20-cv-05761-JD
`
`
`Case No. 3:21-md-02981-JD
`DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERTIFICATION
`MOTION
`
`Judge James Donato
`
`Case Nos. 3:21-md-02981-JD; 3:20-cv-05761-JD
`DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 3 of 35
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 3
`I.
`FACTS RELEVANT TO CLASS CERTIFICATION ....................................................... 3
`A.
`Google Play ............................................................................................................. 3
`B.
`Google Play’s Business Model ............................................................................... 3
`C.
`The Putative Consumer Classes .............................................................................. 4
`D.
`Fees and Prices ........................................................................................................ 5
`E.
`Play Points ............................................................................................................... 5
`EXPERT ANALYSIS OF DR. MICHELLE BURTIS ....................................................... 6
`II.
`LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 6
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 8
`I.
`PLAINTIFFS CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THAT ALL OR NEARLY ALL
`CLASS MEMBERS SUFFERED ANTITRUST IMPACT USING COMMON
`PROOF. ............................................................................................................................... 8
`A.
`Plaintiffs Have No Common Proof of Pass-Through. ............................................ 9
`1.
`Individual Issues Predominate Because Pass-Through Requires An
`App-By-App Analysis Not Susceptible To Common Proof. ...................... 9
`Dr. Singer’s Pass-Through Model Is Based On Theoretical
`Assumptions Instead Of Analyses Typically Relied Upon By Other
`Courts. ....................................................................................................... 13
`Individual Issues Predominate Because Not All Developers Would Be
`Subject To Lower Service Fees In The But-For World. ....................................... 16
`Plaintiffs’ Play Points Model Is Not Common Proof Of Impact. ......................... 18
`C.
`Many Class Members May Be Worse Off In Plaintiffs’ But-For World. ............. 19
`D.
`Plaintiffs Have No Common Method Of Calculating Damages. .......................... 21
`E.
`PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL ARE NOT ADEQUATE BECAUSE THEIR JOINT
`PROSECUTION AGREEMENT CREATES CONFLICTS. ........................................... 22
`THE COURT CANNOT CERTIFY AN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CLASS. ..................... 23
`III.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 25
`
`
`2.
`
`B.
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`II.
`
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 4 of 35
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc.,
`279 F.R.D. 257 (D. Vt. 2011) ................................................................................................. 25
`
`Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp. L.P.,
`247 F.R.D. 156 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ................................................................................ 19, 20, 21
`
`Apple Inc. v. Pepper,
`139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) .............................................................................................................. 9
`
`In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig.,
`2022 WL 1284104 (N.D. Cal. 2022)................................................................................. 11, 12
`
`In re Asacol Antitrust Litig.,
`907 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................... 13
`
`Berni v. Barilla S.p.A.,
`964 F.3d 141 & 148 (2d Cir. 2020) ......................................................................................... 25
`
`Burkhalter Travel Agency v. MacFarms Int’l, Inc.,
`141 F.R.D. 144 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ............................................................................................ 13
`
`In re Capacitors III,
`2018 WL 5980139 (N.D. Cal. 2008)................................................................................... 8, 14
`
`Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
`569 U.S. 27 (2013) .................................................................................................................. 21
`
`D&M Farms v. Birdsong Corp.,
`2020 WL 7074140 (E.D. Va. 2020) ........................................................................................ 18
`
`In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig.,
`321 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) .................................................................................. 15, 20, 25
`
`In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig.,
`329 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Fla. 2018) ............................................................................................ 14
`
`Dry Cleaning & Laundry Inst. of Detroit, Inc. v. Flom’s Corp.,
`1993 WL 527928 (E.D. Mich. 1993) ...................................................................................... 13
`
`In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.,
`2013 WL 12387371 (N.D. Cal. 2013)..................................................................................... 23
`
`Earl v. Boeing Co.,
`21 F.4th 895 (5th Cir. 2021).................................................................................................... 22
`
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 5 of 35
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`
`Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
`657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................. 15, 24
`
`Exhaust Unlimited, Inc. v. Cintas Corp.,
`223 F.R.D. 506 (S.D. Ill. 2004) ............................................................................................... 13
`
`In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig.,
`2010 WL 2332081 (N.D. Cal. 2010)..................................................................... 15, 16, 17, 18
`
`In re Florida Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig.,
`278 F.R.D. 674 (S.D. Fla. 2012) ............................................................................................. 15
`
`In re Glumetza Antitrust Litig.,
`336 F.R.D. 468 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ............................................................................................ 14
`
`Grace v. Apple, Inc.,
`328 F.R.D. 320 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ............................................................................................ 24
`
`In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig.,
`253 F.R.D. 478 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ................................................................................ 10, 15, 17
`
`Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
`150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................. 22
`
`In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig.,
`289 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Cal. 2013) .............................................................................................. 7
`
`Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
`431 U.S. 720 (1977) .......................................................................................................... 10, 16
`
`Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co.,
`51 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................... 22
`
`Kottaras v. Whole Foods Market, Inc.,
`281 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2012) .................................................................................................. 20
`
`Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.,
`716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................... 21
`
`In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig.,
`2018 WL 1156797 (N.D. Cal. 2018)................................................................................. 11, 12
`
`Lou v. Ma Labs., Inc.,
`2014 WL 68605 (N.D. Cal. 2014)........................................................................................... 23
`
`In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig.,
`213 F.R.D. 180 (D.N.J. 2003) ................................................................................................. 14
`
`In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
`2013 WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. 2013)....................................................................................... 25
`
`
`
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 6 of 35
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`Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC,
`31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc)............................................................................. passim
`
`In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig.,
`303 F.R.D. 311 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ...................................................................................... 12, 14
`
`Orr v. Shicker,
`953 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2020) ................................................................................................... 23
`
`In re Paxil Litig.,
`218 F.R.D. 242 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ...................................................................................... 24, 25
`
`Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors,
`209 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................... 25
`
`In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig.,
`2021 WL 5632089 (W.D. Mo. 2021) ...................................................................................... 15
`
`In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-MDL No. 1869 (Rail Freight II),
`934 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ................................................................................................ 13
`
`Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.,
`563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 23
`
`In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig.,
`264 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ............................................................................................ 18
`
`In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Nalaxone) Antitrust Litig.,
`421 F. Supp. 3d 12 (E.D. Pa. 2019) ............................................................................ 14, 24, 25
`
`In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig.,
`267 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................................................................ 14
`
`B.K. by next friend Tinsley v. Snyder,
`922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................... 7, 24
`
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) .............................................................................................................. 7
`
`Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
`577 U.S. 442 (2016) ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`United States v. Tobias,
`935 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1991) ................................................................................................... 23
`
`In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.,
`768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................... 14
`
`Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc.,
`557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977) ................................................................................................... 23
`
`
`
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`
`
`In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
`209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002) ................................................................................................ 14
`
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
`564 U.S. 338 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 6, 7
`
`Williams v. Apple, Inc.,
`338 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ............................................................................................ 24
`
`
`
`Other Authority
`
`F.R.C.P. Rule 23 .................................................................................................................... passim
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 8 of 35
`
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Class certification should be denied here for a simple reason: real-world data show that
`the vast majority of putative class members suffered no antitrust impact, which means individual
`“mini-trials” would be necessary to identify any consumers who may have been injured.
`Plaintiffs spend the bulk of their motion (ECF No. 280 (“Mot.”)) attacking Google’s business
`practices by misconstruing evidence and brushing aside competitive realities. Contrary to
`Plaintiffs’ claims, Google’s business practices with respect to Android and Google Play (“Play”)
`have increased competition, expanded access to mobile devices, and facilitated an explosion of
`app development that has benefited consumers and developers. Plaintiffs ignore these benefits,
`and instead argue that Play is akin to a “payment processor,” failing to account for the incredible
`value it provides to billions of users. But even accepting Plaintiffs’ liability theory, the focus at
`class certification is whether Plaintiffs have common evidence that can identify which (if any)
`class members suffered antitrust impact as a result of Google’s conduct. They do not.
`Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of consumers that purchased software applications
`(“apps”), subscriptions, and in-app purchases (“IAPs”) from developers. They claim Google’s
`conduct resulted in higher service fees, and that developers passed through those fees by raising
`prices for all consumers. Plaintiffs rest this theory entirely on their expert, Dr. Hal Singer, who
`opines that the laws of economics predict that all developers would change prices in response to
`changes in Google’s service fee. But Dr. Singer cannot reconcile his theoretical formulas with
`real-world evidence showing that pass-through of the service fee is a rare exception, not the rule.
`When Google has lowered its service fees in the past,
`
`Dr. Singer has no sound explanation for why the data resoundingly contradict his theory.
`These data show that Plaintiffs cannot assume that the developer of each app would set
`lower prices if Google charged lower service fees. Plaintiffs must prove whether developers
`would have reduced prices for each of the approximately
` unique apps involved in
`purchases by more than
` putative class members. After all, roughly
` of those
`consumers, or
`, only made purchases from one app. If that app’s developer did not pass
`through any service fees, then those millions of consumers were not injured. That is why pass-
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`through must be proven for each app to identify whether each consumer was injured.
`Pass-through depends on facts that vary by app: e.g., the developer’s marginal costs,
`pricing strategy, and competitive conditions. Dr. Singer concedes he has no model to estimate or
`account for these variables, meaning Plaintiffs would have to conduct app-by-app analyses for
`hundreds of thousands of different apps to identify any consumers who were injured. Courts
`regularly deny certification where impact depends on such an individualized question. And that
`would not be the only one. Because Google has responded to competition by reducing service
`fees for some developers but not others, a “mini-trial” also would be necessary to determine
`whether a developer would have been subject to a lower service fee in the but-for world.
`Plaintiffs’ alternative Play Points theory fares no better. Plaintiffs claim that, in the but-
`for world, Google would have increased rewards in its Play Points loyalty program. However,
` Thus, to prove which consumers suffered
`antitrust impact under this Play Points theory, Plaintiffs must prove which consumers would have
`made a different decision to enroll and use points in the but-for world. Dr. Singer concedes that
`he has no model to determine what each consumer would have done regarding Play Points, which
`means Plaintiffs would need to prove that fact consumer by consumer.
`Plaintiffs’ motion fails for additional reasons. First, many consumers benefit from the
`business model Plaintiffs have challenged, and Plaintiffs have no common method of proving
`whether a particular consumer would have been better off with or without that model. Second, an
`agreement between Plaintiffs’ counsel and the State AGs creates financial conflicts and dual
`loyalties that prevent Plaintiffs’ counsel from adequately representing the proposed class.
`Finally, Plaintiffs have not met the standards to certify an injunctive relief class that includes
`consumers who never made any purchases in Play because they cannot show that an injunction
`would be appropriate for all class members. They have not specified the injunction they seek, nor
`shown that an injunction is needed to remedy any harm to consumers who have benefited from
`Play without paying a cent. If anything, issuing an injunction requiring Google to change its
`business model would harm consumers who benefit from Play without paying anything.
`The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
`
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 10 of 35
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`
`
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`FACTS RELEVANT TO CLASS CERTIFICATION
`A.
`Google Play
`Play is a platform that facilitates transactions between consumers and developers.
`Declaration of Sujal Shah, Ex. A (Expert Report of Dr. Michelle Burtis (“Burtis”)) ¶ 59.
`Developers offer, and consumers find and download, apps for Android devices through Play. Id.
`As of May 5, 2021, there were over 4 million apps listed in Play with widely differentiated
`functions, from games to productivity to entertainment to dating to tools. Games are also highly
`differentiated, ranging from casual puzzle games to complex role-playing games that demand
`considerable memory and graphics capabilities. Id. ¶ 157. Developers choose the category in
`which to list their apps on Play, and apps in each category are highly varied. Id. ¶ 158.
`Developers have many options for monetizing apps distributed on Play, including selling
`the app (“paid app”), selling a subscription to access content in the app (“subscription app”),
`selling digital content in the app (“IAP app”), or showing ads in the app. Id. ¶ 53. Roughly 90%
`of apps are completely free, meaning they are free to download and do not offer IAP or
`subscriptions (though they may display ads). Id. Ex. 1.
` Id. Ex. 22. Most developers that offer
`IAPs or subscriptions adopt a “freemium” model in which consumers can download and use an
`app for free, with the option to purchase a subscription or IAP for additional functionality. Id.
`¶¶ 54–56. During the class period,
`
`
`
`
`
` See id. Ex. 22.
`
`B.
`Google Play’s Business Model
`Besides a one-time $25 fee, which Plaintiffs do not challenge, Google does not charge
`developers anything to list or distribute apps on Play. Id. ¶ 60 & n.39. Instead, Google monetizes
`Play in part by charging a service fee on sales of paid apps, subscriptions, and IAPs. Google does
`not charge the developer a service fee unless the developer makes money; Google’s service fee is
`a percentage of the revenue (“consumer spend”) generated by these sales. Id. ¶ 62. This is a
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 11 of 35
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`common business model employed by a number of Google’s competitors including, for example,
`Apple, Samsung, Amazon, Steam, and Microsoft Xbox. Id. Ex. 28.
`Nearly all consumer spend by U.S. consumers— —is on subscriptions and IAP, not
`paid apps. Id. Ex. 4. Play’s Payments Policy requires developers selling subscriptions and/or
`IAPs in apps distributed through Play to use Google Play’s billing system. This ensures that
`consumers have a safe, trusted, and secure billing system and that Google can efficiently collect
`fees for the value Play provides, which includes distribution to nearly 3 billion users; protection
`from malware and other unwanted apps; developer tools to launch and grow apps; and user tools
`to manage purchases, subscriptions, and parental controls. Shah Decl., Ex. J (“Feng Dep.”), at
`62:11–21, 113:18–114:24.
`Google’s service fees have changed over time, and it has “moved beyond a ‘one size fits
`all’ service fee model.” Burtis n.131. Some developers pay a 30% fee, which for a long time was
`industry standard. Id. n.55. Certain developers are eligible for programs that have service fees at
`. Id. ¶ 84.
`
`
`
`
` In January
`2018, Google reduced its service fee for subscriptions after the first year to 15%, and in January
`2022, reduced the service fee for all subscriptions to 15%. Id. ¶ 71. In July 2021, Google
`reduced its service fee for the first $1 million in annual developer earnings to 15%. Id.
`C.
`The Putative Consumer Classes
`During the class period,1 over
` putative class members purchased a paid app,
`subscription, and/or IAP from over
` unique apps. Declaration of Michelle Burtis, Ex. A
`(Burtis Rev. Ex. 20).2 Roughly
` putative class members only made purchases
`from one app during the class period, and
` only made a single purchase during
`the class period. Id., Ex. B (Burtis Rev. Ex. 21); id., Ex. D (Burtis Rev. Ex. 24). More than
`
`
`1 Although Plaintiffs’ class period goes to the present, Google’s data production only goes
`through July 2021. Unless otherwise noted, “class period” refers to August 2016 to July 3, 2021.
`2 These numbers may be overstated because they refer to distinct consumer IDs in Google’s
`databases, and a consumer may have more than one consumer ID. Burtis n.102.
`
`4
`Case Nos. 3:21-md-02981-JD; 3:20-cv-05761-JD
`DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 12 of 35
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` spent less than $5 during the class period, and more than
` putative class members
`. Id., Ex. C (Burtis Rev. Ex. 23).
`half the putative class spent less than
`There are also millions of Android device users that do not purchase any paid apps,
`subscriptions, or IAPs. From 2016 to 2021, there were an estimated 108 to 131 million Android
`smartphone users in the United States.3 During that time, only approximately
` U.S.
`consumers purchased a paid app, subscription, and/or IAP through Play. Burtis Ex. 20.4
`D.
`Fees and Prices
`Developers, not Google, set the prices for paid apps, subscriptions, and IAP they sell
`through Play.5 As explained in more detail below, whether a developer would choose to lower its
`price in response to a lower service fee depends on a number of factors, including the developer’s
`marginal costs, focal point pricing, the competition faced by the developer, and other
`idiosyncratic factors. See Burtis ¶¶ 142–56. Google’s service fee may not affect how a developer
`sets prices. For example, a number of named Developer Plaintiffs testified that
`
` E.g., Shah Decl., Ex. B (“Ellis Dep.”) at
`256:9–22 (LittleHoots); id., Ex. C (“Scalise Dep.”) at 212:9–214:11 (Rescue Pets); id., Ex. D
`(“Czeslawski Dep.”) at 306:4–307:3 (PSB).
`Notably, real-world data show that when Google reduced service fees for certain
`developers,
` For individual items (SKUs) sold by developers
`subject to a reduction in the service fee,
`
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`Burtis ¶ 176. Executives of several Developer Plaintiffs’ class representatives testified
`. Scalise Dep. at 214:12–24 (Rescue Pets);
`Czeslawski Dep. at 315:17–316:6 (PSB); Ellis Dep. at 265:21–266:4 (LittleHoots).
`E.
`Play Points
`Google introduced a rewards program, Play Points, in the U.S. in November 2019. Burtis
`
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`
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`3 https://www.statista.com/statistics/232786/forecast-of-andrioid-users-in-the-us/.
`4 This figure overstates the number of consumers that made a purchase because it is based on distinct
`consumer IDs and not individual consumers. See n.2, above.
`5 For most of the class period, prices ranged from a minimum $0.99 to a maximum $400 price. Play
`recently changed the minimum price allowed to $0.05. Burtis n.33.
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`Case Nos. 3:21-md-02981-JD; 3:20-cv-05761-JD
`DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 273 Filed 06/23/22 Page 13 of 35
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`¶ 352. Consumers must register for the program and earn “loyalty points” based on purchases.
`Id. ¶¶ 352–53. Play Points can be redeemed for Play Credits, to purchase items in Play, or
`redeemed for special IAPs. Id. ¶ 352. From November 2019 through 2021,
` of U.S.
`consumers registered for Play Points. Id. ¶ 354. From the launch of the program through July 3,
`2021, no more than
` of U.S. consumers have redeemed Play Points, either by
`using points to purchase an item or exchanging points for Play Credits. Id. ¶ 355.
`II.
`EXPERT ANALYSIS OF DR. MICHELLE BURTIS
`Accounting for these and other facts explained below, Google’s expert, Dr. Michelle
`Burtis, opines that individual analysis of impact is necessary for the following reasons:
`● Whether any developer would lower prices to consumers in response to a lower service
`fee requires an individualized analysis considering a host of factors. Id. ¶¶ 23–25.
`● Dr. Singer’s opinion that pass-through would be universal is “verifiably wrong” because
`when Google reduced service fees,
` Id. ¶ 29.
`● Google would not uniformly reduce service fees in the but-for world, and determining
`which apps would be subject to lower rates requires an individual analysis. Id. ¶¶ 11–20.
`● Not all consumers sign up for Play Points, and
`
`, so proof of an injury from a reduction in Play Points requires individual
`proof of whether each consumer would have signed up and used those points. Id. ¶¶ 36.
`● Many putative class members benefited from the challenged conduct by obtaining free
`apps and secure devices; an individualized analysis would be required to determine
`whether each consumer would have been better off in the but-for world. Id. ¶¶ 37, 40.
`
`Based on this evidence, Dr. Burtis concludes that Plaintiffs cannot rely on common evidence to
`show that all or nearly all class members were impacted.
`LEGAL STANDARD
`Plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their proposed classes
`satisfy Rule 23(a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, as well as
`Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3). Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31
`F.4th 651, 663–65 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). This “rigorous analysis” will “[f]requently . . .
`overlap with the merits.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011). “[W]here
`necessary,” courts may “resolv[e] expert disputes” to determine whether Rule 23’s requirements
`are met. Olean, 31 F.4th at 666 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
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