Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`No. C 22-01101 WHA
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`ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
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`DAWN DANGAARD, KELLY GILBERT,
`and JENNIFER ALLBAUGH,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`INSTAGRAM, LLC, FACEBOOK
`OPERATIONS, LLC, FENIX INTERNET,
`LLC, FENIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,
`META PLATFORMS, INC., LEONID
`RADVINSKY, and JOHN DOES 1–10.
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`
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`Defendants.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`In this diversity and putative class action, plaintiffs claim that defendants remain engaged
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`in unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts and business relationships.
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`Defendants have filed two separate motions to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the
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`motions are DENIED.
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`STATEMENT
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`Plaintiffs Dawn Dangaard, Kelly Gilbert, and Jennifer Allbaugh are adult entertainment
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`performers who use social media to promote themselves. Plaintiffs place (or “post”) links on
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`social media to adult entertainment websites. Those websites allow users to watch plaintiffs’
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`content for a price. Plaintiffs split the revenue with the website owners. Of importance here,
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`plaintiffs contract with competitors of the adult entertainment website “OnlyFans.”
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`Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 2 of 14
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`Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc., owns and operates defendants Instagram, LLC, and
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`Facebook, LLC (collectively, “Meta defendants”), who operate Instagram and Facebook.
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`John Does One through Ten were employees of Meta defendants when the claims arose.
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`Defendants Fenix International, Ltd., Fenix Internet, LLC, and Leonid Radvinsky (collectively,
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`“Fenix defendants”) are associated with OnlyFans. Defendant Radvinsky owns defendant
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`Fenix International, which operates OnlyFans. Defendant Fenix International owns defendant
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`Fenix Internet — which receives payments from users of OnlyFans and distributes those
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`payments to OnlyFans content creators.
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`Plaintiffs make the following allegations. Fenix defendants paid Doe defendants to
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`demote or delete plaintiffs’ accounts and posts on Instagram and Facebook. That conduct
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`reduced internet traffic to adult entertainment websites with which plaintiffs contract —
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`websites that compete with OnlyFans. Defendants’ actions, thereby, reduced plaintiffs’
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`viewership on adult entertainment platforms and plaintiffs’ revenue from adult content.
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`Defendants’ actions increased internet traffic to OnlyFans and swelled its revenues.
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`Plaintiffs, moreover, allege that Doe defendants demoted or deleted plaintiffs’ accounts
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`and posts in a particular way. They allege Doe defendants caused such demotion or removal
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`by manipulating Facebook and Instagram databases to include plaintiffs in lists of “dangerous
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`individuals or organizations.” Such lists identify terrorists, and Facebook and Instagram’s
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`algorithms use those lists to demote or remove terrorist content. Plaintiffs refer to this conduct
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`as “blacklisting.”
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`Additionally, plaintiffs allege Meta defendants share their lists of terrorists with other
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`social media platforms via the “Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism Shared Hash
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`Database.” For that reason, plaintiffs allege their content was also demoted or removed from
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`other social media platforms.
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`Plaintiffs contend Doe defendants’ actions constitute unfair competition and tortious
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`interference with plaintiffs’ contracts and business relationships (with competitors of
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`OnlyFans). Plaintiffs seek to hold Meta defendants vicariously liable for the actions of Doe
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`Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 3 of 14
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`defendants. And, plaintiffs contend Fenix defendants are liable under a theory of
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`civil conspiracy.
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`Previously, Meta defendants moved to dismiss all claims under FRCP 12(b)(6) and
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`California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Fenix defendants moved to dismiss all claims under
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`FRCP 12(b)(2), FRCP 9(b), and on other grounds. At the hearing on the motions on
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`September 8, 2022, plaintiffs revealed that they had the benefit of information outside the
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`pleadings that may support their claims. For that reason, the district court ordered plaintiffs to
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`file a second amended complaint, pleading as much cure as possible. The district court ordered
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`defendants to re-brief their motions based on the new complaint. Fenix defendants’
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`FRCP 12(b)(2) motion, however, was held in abeyance pending jurisdictional discovery.
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`Now, all defendants move to dismiss the second amended complaint under
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`FRCP 12(b)(6). Meta defendants again move to strike the claims under California’s anti-
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`SLAPP statute. Fenix defendants have not revived their FRCP 9(b) motion. This order
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`follows full briefing and oral argument.
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`ANALYSIS
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`1.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE PLAUSIBLE.
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`To survive a motion to dismiss:
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` a
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` complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
`true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
`A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
`content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
`the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
`standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for
`more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
`Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
`defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility
`and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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`556–57, 570 (2007)).
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`Here, plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. First,
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`plaintiffs provide an email that purports to show several wire transfers from Fenix defendants
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`to Meta defendants (Second Amd. Compl., Exh. D). Specifically, the email lists five bank
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`accounts, account numbers, and physical addresses. It describes a wire transfer from a Fenix
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`International account (in the United Kingdom, where Fenix is headquartered and incorporated)
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`to an intermediary Fenix bank account (in Hong Kong, where Fenix is also incorporated),
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`“Smart Team International.” Underneath that information, it lists the names of several adult
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`entertainment websites that compete with OnlyFans. Plaintiffs allege that the list is a “memo”
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`line, indicating the purpose of the wire transfer. Thereafter, the email details several wire
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`transfers from the Smart Team intermediary account to the trust accounts of three employees of
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`Meta defendants (in the Philippines).
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`Taking the above facts as true, it is reasonable to infer that the money sent from the Fenix
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`International account to the Smart Team intermediary account in October 2018 bore a
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`relationship to the adult entertainment websites listed in the memo line — websites that
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`compete with OnlyFans. Moreover, a wire transfer from the Smart Team intermediary account
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`to one of Meta defendants’ employees occurred on the same day as the initial transfer to the
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`intermediary account, so it is reasonable to infer that some of the money related to the adult
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`entertainment websites benefited that employee. This supports plaintiffs’ allegation that Meta
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`defendants’ employees accepted bribes from Fenix defendants in late 2018 to blacklist
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`competitors of OnlyFans.
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`Second, plaintiffs allege that, starting in late 2018, competitors of OnlyFans experienced
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`significant drops in web traffic while OnlyFans experienced a significant increase in traffic.
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`The complaint contains graphs depicting such changes in traffic for OnlyFans and numerous
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`competitors of OnlyFans (Second Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 94–96 and Exh. B at 31–32). And, a news
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`article incorporated into the complaint states that over 100 Instagram accounts that drove
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`traffic to a competitor of OnlyFans experienced content take downs in late 2018 (id., Exh. A).
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`Coupled with the email above, these facts are strong support for plaintiffs’ allegations.
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`Third, plaintiffs’ second amended complaint refers to a Facebook whistleblower report
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`that corroborates the claims. Plaintiffs did not append the report to the complaint because they
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`did not receive it until after they opposed defendants’ motions. Plaintiffs submitted the report
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`(and a related news article) and filed an administrative motion to supplement the complaint on
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`the due date for defendants’ reply briefs.
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`Nevertheless, this order treats plaintiffs’ motion as a motion for leave to amend under
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`FRCP 15(a)(2), which provides that “[t]he [district] court should freely give leave when justice
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`so requires.” “District courts generally consider four factors in determining whether to deny a
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`motion to amend: ‘bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of
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`amendment.’” In re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 685, 701 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation
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`omitted).
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`Here, amendment would not be futile because the whistleblower report supports
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`plaintiffs’ claims. Specifically, an anonymous Facebook employee posted the report on a
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`Facebook-owned website (albeit a public website) specifically designated to receive
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`whistleblower reports. The report states that “[c]ertain employees are taking bribes to protect
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`OnlyFans on [Facebook].” “They have taken down every OnlyFans competitor . . . .” “[T]he
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`early stages used the GIFCT database . . . .” The scheme “beg[an] in [the] summer of 2018,”
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`and the employee “observed it” in the United Kingdom (Dkt. No. 89, Exh. L).
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`All of these statements corroborate plaintiffs’ allegations. Furthermore, at least Meta
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`defendants have had access to the report since its posting, so it is hard to believe Meta
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`defendants are surprised by the information. Thus, the whistleblower report (and the related
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`news article) shall be added to the complaint.
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`Fourth, plaintiffs have sufficiently pled damages. All of plaintiffs state that they have
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`experienced decreases in revenue since the alleged conduct began. And, one of plaintiffs
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`alleges that her annual revenue decreased by $13,000 from 2020 to 2021.
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`Fifth, plaintiffs have pled actionable harm to competition. Specifically, rather than plead
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`“[i]njury to an individual plaintiff,” plaintiffs have pled that defendants’ actions have had
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`“‘some anticompetitive effect in the larger, interbrand [adult entertainment] market.’” Marsh
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`v. Anesthesia Servs. Med. Grp., Inc., 200 Cal. App. 4th 480, 495 (2011) (citation omitted).
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`Sixth, plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Radvinsky are plausible. Plaintiffs allege that
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`defendant Radvinsky is the sole owner of Fenix International, Fenix Internet, and OnlyFans.
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`Moreover, plaintiffs allege that competitors of OnlyFans experienced significant drops in
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`traffic beginning around the same time that defendant Radvinsky acquired OnlyFans. Taking
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`these facts together with the facts considered above, it is plausible that defendant Radvinsky
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`personally participated in the alleged misconduct.
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`Thus, plaintiffs’ claims are plausible. To the extent defendants argue that plaintiffs’
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`factual allegations are unreliable, that will be tested in discovery. On a motion to dismiss, all
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`well-pled facts are accepted as true.
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`2.
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`THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS
`AGAINST META DEFENDANTS.
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`Meta defendants argue Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act bars the
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`claims against them. This order disagrees.
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`Section 230(c)(1) states: “No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be
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`treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
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`provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). In other words, “subsection (c)(1) only protects from
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`liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to
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`treat . . . as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content
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`provider.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009). A provider of
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`an interactive computer service cannot meet the third element when it is “also an ‘information
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`content provider,’ which is defined as someone who is ‘responsible, in whole or in part, for the
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`creation or development of’ the offending content.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando
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`Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
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`§ 203(f)(3)).
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`A.
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`META DEFENDANTS ARE INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDERS.
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`Here, Meta defendants certainly provide interactive computer services because they
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`“provide[] or enable[] computer access by multiple users to a computer serv[er]” via the
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`Facebook and Instagram social media platforms. Sikhs for Just. “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.,
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`144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Judge Lucy Koh) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
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`§ 230(f)(2)). And, “the [claims] inherently require[] the court to treat [Meta defendants] as the
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`‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another” because “removing content is
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`something publishers do.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102–03.
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`But Meta defendants are alleged to have done more than merely demote or remove
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`information provided by third parties (i.e., plaintiffs’ accounts and posts). Meta defendants are
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`information content providers “who [are] ‘responsible . . . in part, for the creation or
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`development of’ the offending content.” Thus, Section 230(c)(1) does not immunize them.
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`Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1162 (citation omitted).
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`In Roommate, the defendant operated a website designed to match people renting out
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`spare rooms with people looking for places to live. The defendant required subscribers to state
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`their sex, sexual orientation, and number of children in their household before using the
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`website, which is a discriminatory practice prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Section 3604(c). “[The
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`defendant was] not entitled to CDA immunity for the operation of its search system, which
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`filter[ed] listings, or of its email notification system, which direct[ed] emails to subscribers
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`according to discriminatory criteria.” Specifically, “[it] designed its system to use allegedly
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`unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and to force users to participate in its
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`discriminatory process.” “By contrast, ordinary [websites] do not use unlawful criteria to limit
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`the scope of searches conducted on them, nor are they designed to achieve illegal ends.” In
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`that way, Roommate “interpret[ed] the term ‘development’ as referring not merely to
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`augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.”
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`Because the defendant “help[ed] to develop unlawful content,” it was an information content
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`provider “and thus f[ell] within the exception to Section 230.” Id. at 1164–68.
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`Here, similarly, Meta defendants are not entitled to CDA immunity for operation of their
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`filtering system. Like the defendant in Roommate, which was alleged to have purposefully
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`designed its website to filter listings in a discriminatory manner, Meta defendants are alleged
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`to have purposefully designed their platforms to filter posts and accounts in an anticompetitive
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`manner. Although Meta defendants are not alleged to have augmented the posts or accounts
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`themselves, “[their] connection to the [anticompetitive] filtering process is direct and palpable:
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`[They] designed [their] [platforms] to limit the listings available to subscribers based on” ties
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`to competitors of OnlyFans. While providing “neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful
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`or illicit [conduct] does not amount to ‘development,’” Meta defendants are not alleged to have
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`filtered pornographic content in a neutral manner. Plaintiffs allege that Meta defendants’
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`filtration tools are designed to facilitate anticompetitive conduct. Thus, Section 230(c)(1) is
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`inapplicable here. Id. at 1169 (emphasis in original); see Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101 n. 3.
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`Furthermore, contrary to Meta defendants’ suggestion, allowing plaintiffs to pursue their
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`claims would not open the door to others “to recover for the removal of posts whenever
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`automated content-moderation tools [are] used” (Reply Br. 11) (emphasis added). Rather, this
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`order finds only that, when automated content-moderation tools are allegedly designed to
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`facilitate unlawful conduct, the claims survive CDA defenses.
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`B.
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`POLICY WEIGHS AGAINST APPLICATION OF THE CDA.
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`The policy outlined in the CDA itself weighs heavily against application of the Act here.
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`First, the CDA states that “[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the
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`vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
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`computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (emphasis
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`added). Because “[n]othing in [the CDA] shall be construed to prevent any State from
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`enforcing any State law that is consistent with [the CDA],” this order cannot construe the CDA
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`to bar plaintiffs’ claims of unfair competition on the Internet. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
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`Second, “[t]he [CDA] was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”
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`“[The Internet’s] vast reach into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to
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`exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an
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`unfair advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of general
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`applicability.” It follows that Meta defendants cannot help OnlyFans violate laws of general
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`applicability and hide behind the CDA to avoid liability itself. Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1164.
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`True, our court of appeals has affirmed the dismissal of an unfair competition claim on
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`the basis of Section 230(c)(1). Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir.
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`2007). But, more recently, in Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., our court of appeals
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`acknowledged the danger that internet service providers may “abuse [their] immunity [under
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`Section 230(c)(2)] to block content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at [their] malicious
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`whim.” Zango warned of “a web browser configured by its provider to filter third-party search
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`engine results so they would never yield websites critical of the browser company or favorable
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`to its competitors.” That is essentially what Meta defendants are alleged to have done here:
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`configure Facebook and Instagram to filter posts and accounts (and accept bribes from
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`OnlyFans to do so) so that neither platform yields posts favorable to OnlyFans’ competitors.
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`568 F.3d 1169, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2009) (Fisher, J., concurring).
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`In Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., our court of appeals took a
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`step further and held Section 230(c)(2) did not immunize the anticompetitive conduct alleged
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`therein. Specifically, Enigma considered “whether [Section] 230(c)(2) immunizes blocking
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`and filtering decisions that are driven by anticompetitive animus” when the parties are “direct
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`competitors.” The parties in Enigma both sold computer security software, and the plaintiff
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`alleged that the defendant had programmed its software to prevent users from downloading the
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`plaintiff’s software. The claims for deceptive business practices and tortious interference (with
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`contracts and business relationships) survived the motion to dismiss because “[i]mmunity for
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`filtering practices aimed at suppressing competition, rather than protecting internet users,
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`would lessen user control over what information they receive, contrary to Congress’s stated
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`policy.” 946 F.3d 1040, 1048–51 (9th Cir. 2019).
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`While Zango and Enigma applied only to Section 230(c)(2), and the parties in Enigma
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`were direct competitors, the same policy concerns arise here: Meta defendants’ “filtering
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`practices [are] aimed at suppressing competition” in the online adult entertainment business.
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`Id. at 1051. In fact, Meta defendants could have employed Section 230(c)(2) to attempt to
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`defend themselves — they claim to be removing obscene material from their platforms in good
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`faith, which is what Section 230(c)(2) immunizes. But they instead chose Section 230(c)(1) to
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`shield themselves. To approve Meta defendants’ CDA defense would make Section 230(c)(1)
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`a backdoor to CDA immunity — “contrary to the CDA’s history and purpose.” Id. at 1050.
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`Thus, congressional policy weighs heavily against Meta defendants’ CDA defense.
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`Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 10 of 14
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`3.
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`THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST META
`DEFENDANTS.
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`Meta defendants also argue that the First Amendment protects their decisions to remove
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`plaintiffs’ content from their platforms. But the Supreme Court has held that the First
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`Amendment does not immunize anticompetitive conduct:
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`The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against
`application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to
`the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the
`widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
`antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a
`free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that
`the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does
`not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose
`restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom
`to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to
`publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine
`to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press from
`governmental interference under the First Amendment does not
`sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. The First
`Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that
`a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any
`constitutional immunity.
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`Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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`Here, the First Amendment does not shield Meta defendants from liability for
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`anticompetitive suppression of speech. As discussed above, Meta defendants are allegedly
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`removing posts and accounts linked to all adult entertainment websites except for OnlyFans. If
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`that is true, then Meta defendants are helping OnlyFans to achieve an unlawful monopoly in
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`the online adult entertainment business.
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`“It is true that the . . . course of conduct here [was,] as in most instances[,] brought about
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`through speaking or writing.” As Meta defendants argue, removal of certain posts and
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`accounts constitutes speech. “But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of
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`speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
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`initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.
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`Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would
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`make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as
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`well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.” Giboney v.
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`Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 11 of 14
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`Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). Thus, plaintiffs’ claims withstand Meta
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`defendants’ First Amendment defense.
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`4.
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`META DEFENDANTS ARE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF THEIR
`EMPLOYEES.
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`Meta defendants argue they are not liable for the acts of their employees who allegedly
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`participated in the anticompetitive conduct. This order disagrees. It is premature to conclude
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`that those accepting bribes were involved in a frolic of their own so as to immunize Meta itself.
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`First, Meta defendants assert that the second amended complaint does not allege the three
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`individuals named therein took any action to blacklist plaintiffs. But that argument is
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`unavailing. Plaintiffs allege that two of the individuals are high-ranking officers and one is an
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`employee of Meta defendants. Plaintiffs also allege that each individual has means to blacklist
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`plaintiffs via the GIFCT database (Second Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 79–83). Moreover, Exhibit D to
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`the complaint refers to wire transfers that benefited each individual at the expense of
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`OnlyFans’ competitors. And, the whistleblower report states that the bribery “goes all the way
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`to the top” such that “the top executives involved in this [conduct] get a revenue share of
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`[OnlyFans’] growth” (id., Exh. L). Thus, it is reasonable to infer that the two high-ranking
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`officers and the employee took actions to blacklist plaintiffs.
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`Second, Meta defendants assert that they are not vicariously liable for the acts of the Doe
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`defendants (i.e., Meta defendants’ unnamed employees). But that argument is also unavailing.
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`“[A]n employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope
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`of the employment.” “The employment, in other words, must be such as predictably to create
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`the risk [that] employees will commit intentional torts of the type for which liability is sought.”
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`“[T]hat [the] tortious act ‘was not committed in order to further the interests of the principal’
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`does not preclude vicarious liability.” M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 12 Cal. 4th
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`291, 296 (1995) (citation omitted).
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`The employment of individuals within Meta defendants’ content-moderation and security
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`teams predictably and plausibly creates the risk that employees will intentionally and tortiously
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`remove certain content from Meta defendants’ platforms. Such employees have a duty to filter
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`

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`Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 12 of 14
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`content. In the performance of that duty, it is plausibly foreseeable that an employee would
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`abuse his power for his own benefit. See Khraibut v. Chahal, No. 15-CV-04463-CRB, 2021
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`WL 1164940, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) (Judge Charles Breyer) (citing Meester v.
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`Davies, 11 Cal. App. 3d 342, 346 (1970)). And, even if no benefit flows to Meta defendants,
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`that alone would not preclude liability.
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`Third, Meta defendants argue that vicarious liability does not apply to unfair competition
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`claims. But they misstate the law. “[A company] can, of course, be held liable for violations
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`of Section[] 17200 . . . by its employees, [but] [the company owner’s] individual liability must
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`be predicated on his personal participation in the unlawful practices.” Thus, only individual
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`owners of Meta defendants — not Meta defendants themselves — must have personally
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`participated in the unlawful practices to be held liable. People v. Toomey, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1,
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`14 (1984); see People v. Regan, 157 Cal. Rptr. 62, 64 (App. Dep’t Super Ct. 1979).
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`5.
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`THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS AGAINST
`META DEFENDANTS.
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`Meta defendants move to strike plaintiffs’ claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
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`To prevail on their anti-SLAPP motion, Meta defendants must make a prima facie showing
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`that the claims arise from an act specified in California Code of Civil Procedure
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`Section 425.16(e). Thereafter, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to establish a reasonable
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`probability of prevailing on the claims to survive dismissal. Herring Networks, Inc. v.
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`Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2021). “At the second step, if, as here, the ‘anti-SLAPP
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`motion to strike challenges only the legal sufficiency of a claim, a district court should apply
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`the [FRCP] 12(b)(6) standard and consider whether a claim is properly stated.’” CoreCivic,
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`Inc. v. Candide Grp., LLC, No. 20-17285, 2022 WL 3724307, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022)
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`(citations omitted).
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`Regardless of whether Meta defendants can show that the claims arise from protected
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`conduct, the anti-SLAPP motion fails. This order has already found plaintiffs’ claims
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`plausible, and they withstand our defendants’ other defenses. Thus, plaintiffs have established
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`

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`Case 3:22-cv-01101-WHA Document 101 Filed 11/30/22 Page 13 of 14
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`a reasonable probability of prevailing on their claims, so the claims withstand the anti-SLAPP
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`statute.
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`6.
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`ADMINISTRATIVE MOTIONS TO SEAL.
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`The parties move to seal and redact certain portions of the second amended complaint
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`and the briefing. “Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong
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`presumption in favor of access is the starting point. A party seeking to seal a judicial record
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`then bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by . . . articulat[ing] compelling
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`reasons supported by specific factual findings[] that outweigh the general history of access and
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`the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial
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`process.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2006).
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`First, plaintiffs seek to redact the identities of certain individuals whom they allege
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`handled business of OnlyFans in the Philippines (Second Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 74–75). However,
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`plaintiffs’ allegations regarding those individuals derive from public webpages. Thus,
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`redacting the individuals’ identities would serve no purpose. Plaintiffs’ motion is denied as to
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`paragraphs 74 and 75 of the second amended complaint.
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`Second, plaintiffs request to seal Exhibit D and redact other portions of the complaint.
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`As discussed above, Exhibit D contains bank account information, details of wire transfers
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`from Fenix Internationa