Case 4:22-cv-02314-JSW Document 45 Filed 11/01/22 Page 1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`DREAM BIG MEDIA INC., et al.,
`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`ALPHABET INC., et al.,
`Defendants.
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`Case No. 22-cv-02314-JSW
`
`
`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO
`STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS
`Re: Dkt. Nos. 29, 30
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`Now before the Court for consideration are the motion to dismiss and motion strike filed
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`by Defendants Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. (collectively, “Google”). The Court has considered
`the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in the case, and it finds this matter
`suitable for disposition without oral argument. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following
`reasons, the Court GRANTS Google’s motion to dismiss and DENIES Google’s motion to strike.
`BACKGROUND
`Plaintiffs Dream Big Media, Getify Solutions, Inc. (“Getify”), and Sprinter Supplier LLC
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`(“Sprinter Supplier”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are three businesses that allegedly use Google
`mapping services, including application programming interfaces (“APIs”), to display or use maps
`or maps-related information on their websites or mobile applications. The crux of Plaintiffs’
`complaint is that Google unlawfully ties its Maps, Routes, and Places API services together by
`purportedly refusing to sell one API service unless the purchaser also agrees to purchase another
`Google mapping service or agrees to refrain from purchasing API services from other companies.
`Plaintiffs allege that this conduct, combined with Google’s alleged market power, allows Google
`to charge higher prices for its mapping API services. Plaintiffs allege Google’s actions constitute
`unlawful tying, bundling, exclusive dealing, and monopoly leveraging in violation of the Sherman
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`Act, the Clayton Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law.
`Dream Big Media is a digital-advertising business that has used and paid for Google’s
`digital-mapping APIs. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Dream Big Media has used Google Maps Route APIs to
`determine the distance between two zip codes. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege that Dream Big Media
`could not use competing providers’ digital-mapping APIs and could not mix and combine
`Google’s digital-mapping APIs with competitors’ digital-mapping services. (Id. ¶ 30.)
`Getify developed a mobile web app called RestaurNote that allowed users to make
`notations about experiences related to their physical location. (Id. ¶ 33.) RestaurNote used credits
`offered by Google to utilize Google’s web-based digital-mapping APIs. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.) Plaintiffs
`allege that after Google increased the price of its digital-mapping APIs, use of the services became
`“unworkable” for RestuarNote. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs allege that Getify could not combine the use
`Google’s digital-mapping APIs with APIs from other providers if any of the data interacted with
`Google’s digital-mapping capabilities. (Id. ¶ 38.)
`Sprinter Supplier is an e-commerce automotive parts shop that wanted to use digital-
`mapping APIs to help local customers find its business. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs allege that Sprinter
`Supplier searched for providers to use as an alternative to or in combination with Google’s digital-
`mapping APIs because of the high prices Google charged for its services. (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiffs
`allege, however, that because of Google’s anticompetitive conduct, Sprinter Supplier could not use
`competing providers’ digital-mapping APIs. (Id. ¶ 42.) As a result, Sprinter Supplier used
`Google’s products and services, which depleted the free credits Google had offered. (Id.)
`Plaintiffs allege that the relevant product markets are Maps APIs, Routes APIs, and Places
`APIs. (Id. ¶¶ 73-76.) Plaintiffs assert each market is “global.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also allege that
`other relevant markets include “the market for internet search” and “the market for cloud
`computing.” (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiffs allege Google engages in exclusionary tying to prohibit
`customers from using any competing tools. This theory is based on Google’s Terms of Service for
`its digital-mapping API services, which state:
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`(e) No Use With Non-Google Maps. To avoid quality issues and/or
`brand confusion, Customer will not use the Google Maps Core
`Services with or near a non-Google Map in a Customer Application.
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`Case 4:22-cv-02314-JSW Document 45 Filed 11/01/22 Page 3 of 11
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`For example, Customer will not (i) display or use Places content on a
`non-Google map, (ii) display Street View imagery and non-Google
`maps on the same screen, or (iii) link a Google Map to a non-Google
`Maps content or a non-Google map.
`(Id. ¶ 157.) Plaintiffs allege that the Terms of Services “prohibit developers from using any
`component of the Google Maps Core Service with mapping services provided by non-Google
`firms.” (Id. ¶ 158.) Plaintiffs further allege that if a customer requests a specific digital-mapping
`API, Google will unilaterally add on additional digital-mapping APIs and charge the customer for
`those APIs. (Id. ¶ 164.)
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`The Court will address additional facts as necessary in the analysis.
`ANALYSIS
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`A.
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`Legal Standard Applicable to a Motion to Dismiss.
`A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
`pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[D]etailed factual allegations are not
`required” to survive a motion to dismiss if the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to
`“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
`(citing Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions[] and a
`formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 50 U.S. at 555.
`When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court accepts as true all
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`material facts alleged in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
`Faulkner v. ADT Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). A district court should grant
`leave to amend unless the court determines the pleading could not “possibly be cured by the
`allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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`B.
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`The Court Grants Google’s Motion to Dismiss.
`1.
`Plaintiffs Fail to Allege a Tying Claim.
`Google argues Plaintiffs fail to allege a tying claim.1 To state a valid tying claim, a
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`1 Plaintiffs assert tying claims under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and under section 3 of
`the Clayton Act. Google asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that if Plaintiffs fails to meet the
`requirements under section 1, Plaintiffs claims under the other statutes fail. See Mozart Co v.
`Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1352 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the elements for
`establishing a Sherman Act Section 1 claim and a Clayton Act Section 3 claim are virtually the
`same); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1182 n. 61 (1st Cir.
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`Case 4:22-cv-02314-JSW Document 45 Filed 11/01/22 Page 4 of 11
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`plaintiff must allege: “(1) that [the defendant] tied together the sale of two distinct products or
`services; (2) that [the defendant] possesses enough economic power in the tying product market to
`coerce its customers into purchasing the tied product; and (3) that the tying arrangement affects a
`not insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied product market.” Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v.
`Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Cascade Health Sols. v.
`PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 913 (9th Cir. 2007)). “A tie only exists where ‘the defendant
`improperly imposes conditions that explicitly or practically require buyers to take the second
`product if they want the first one.’” Id. (quoting 10 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
`Antitrust Law ¶ 1752b (3d ed. 2011)). Tying claims can be positive or negative, and “the common
`element in both situations is that a seller explicitly or implicitly imposes conditions linking the
`sale of a tying product with the sale of the tied product.” Id.
`The first element of tying claims requires “an agreement by a party to sell one product but
`only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product.” N. Pac. Ry. Co.
`v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). “It is well settled that there can be no unlawful tying
`arrangement absent proof that there are, in fact, two separate products, the sale of one (i.e., the
`tying product) being conditioned upon the purchase of the other (i.e., the tied product).” Krehl v.
`Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1982). “[W]here the buyer is free
`to take either product by itself there is no tying problem…” N. Pac. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. at 6 n.4.
`Plaintiffs assert positive and negative tying claims, both of which rest on Google’s Terms
`of Service. Plaintiffs assert that Google’s Terms of Service create a tying arrangement because
`they prohibit customers from using any component of Google’s digital-mapping API services with
`mapping services provided by non-Google firms. However, the Terms of Service do not condition
`the sale of one Google product on the purchase of second, separate Google product. Rather, the
`Terms of Service restrict a customers’ use of certain of Google’s content, i.e., a customer cannot
`use a Google mapping service “with or near” a non-Google map. (Compl. ¶ 157.) The Terms of
`Service do not require that a customer purchase any Google mapping API service as a condition of
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`1994).
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`using another Google mapping API service. And Plaintiffs do not allege facts establishing that
`Google’s mapping API services are otherwise unable to be purchased individually. Thus,
`Plaintiffs fail to allege a positive tying claim.
`Plaintiffs also allege that the Google’s practices constitute negative tying, which occurs
`“when the customer promises not to take the tied product from defendant’s competitor.” Aerotec
`Int’l, 836 F.3d at 1178 (citations omitted). Plaintiff again relies on the Terms of Service to
`support the alleged negative tying arrangement. The court in Sambreel Holdings LLC v.
`Facebook, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (S.D. Cal. 2012) addressed a similar situation. In that case,
`the plaintiff alleged that Facebook’s gating campaign constituted unlawful negative tying because
`Facebook agreed to offer its website only to users who would agree not to use the plaintiff’s
`services. The court found there was no viable tying claim where there were no allegations that
`Facebook precluded its users from maintaining Sambreel applications for use on other websites.
`Id. at 1080. In rejecting plaintiff’s negative tying theory, the court explained “[Facebook] has a
`right to dictate the terms on which it will permit its users to take advantage of the Facebook social
`network” and to the extent Facebook’s campaign collaterally prohibited such use, the users could
`choose to opt out and use other social networking sites. Id.
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`As in Sambreel, Google has the right to dictate the terms on which it will permit its
`customers to use and display its mapping services. The Terms of Service do not preclude Google
`customers from using a competitor’s mapping services altogether, and if customers do not want
`restrictions on mapping API services, they can presumably use another mapping service. Thus,
`the Court finds that Google’s restrictions on how customers of its mapping services may use or
`display Google’s content does not create an unlawful tying arrangement.2
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`Google further argues that Plaintiffs’ tying claim fails because they fail to allege coercion.
`To establish coercion, Plaintiffs must show that “the defendant went beyond persuasion and
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`2 Plaintiffs also allege that Google unilaterally adds on its other API services and charges the
`customer for them. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 164.) Because Plaintiffs fail to allege facts to support this
`conclusory allegation and because none of the named Plaintiffs allege that they experienced this
`“unilateral” add-on, this allegation is insufficient to support a tying claim. Plaintiffs also allege
`that Google engaged in tying through its search and Google Cloud Platform products. (See id. ¶
`266.) This conclusory allegation lacking factual support cannot support a tying claim.
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`coerced or forced its customer to buy the tied product in order to obtain the tying product.”
`Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). While an
`express refusal to sell the tying product without the tied product obviously constitutes coercion,
`Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995); see also N. Pac. Ry.
`Co, 356 U.S. at 7 (contractual obligation to purchase tied product is coercive), “tying conditions
`need not be spelled out in express contractual terms to fall within the Sherman Act’s prohibitions,”
`Aerotec Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d at 1179. “A showing of an onerous effect on an appreciable number
`of buyers coupled with a demonstration of sufficient economic power in the tying market is
`sufficient to demonstrate coercion.” Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217
`(9th Cir. 1977); see also Cascade Health, 515 F.3d at 914 (refusing to give a buyer a substantial
`discount on the tying product unless they buy the tied product can be coercive).
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`Here, Plaintiffs allege they could not “mix and combine” Google mapping API services
`with non-Google products and that they were thus forced to use other Google products and
`services. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish coercion. Plaintiffs do not
`allege what Google products they were forced to purchase or what products they were unable to
`purchase because of Google’s Terms of Service. For example, Plaintiffs allege Dream Big Media
`used Routes APIs and was forced to use other Google products or services instead of competitors’
`services, but they do not allege what other Google products Dream Big Media was forced to
`purchase or what competitor products they could not use. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Getify
`and Sprinter Supplier are even more deficient. Plaintiffs have not alleged that either entity paid
`for any Google mapping API services at all; rather, the allegations of the complaint suggest that
`both developers applied free credits offered by Google to use its digital-mapping API services.
`Because they fail to allege they purchased any Google mapping services, Getify and Sprinter
`Supplier fail to allege coercion. See Athos Overseas, Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-21698,
`2022 WL 910272, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2022) (“Acceptance of a free service does not
`constitute an impermissible tie-in.”). The lack of sufficient allegations of coercion is fatal to
`Plaintiffs’ tying claim. Paladin Assocs., Inc., 328 F.3d at1159 (“Essential to the second element
`of a tying claim is proof that the seller coerced a buyer to purchase the tied product.”); Eastman v.
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`Quest Diagnostics Inc., 724 F. App’x 556, 559-60 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of tying
`claim where the plaintiff failed to adequately plead coercion).
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`2.
`Plaintiffs Fail to Adequately Allege Relevant Product Markets.
`Google also argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege relevant product markets. To state a valid
`antitrust claim under the Sherman Act, a “plaintiff must allege both that a ‘relevant market’ exists
`and that the defendant has power within that market.” Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office
`Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). There is no requirement that these elements of an
`antitrust claim be pled with specificity. Id. at 1045 (citing Cost Mgmt. Servs. v. Washington
`Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 1996)). An antitrust complaint therefore survives a
`Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the alleged market
`suffers from a fatal legal defect. Id. Accordingly, because “the validity of the ‘relevant market’ is
`typically a factual element rather than a legal element, alleged markets may survive scrutiny under
`Rule 12(b)(6) subject to factual testing by summary judgment or trial.” Id. (citing High
`Technology Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
`the market definition depends on a “factual inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by
`consumers”) (quotations omitted)). However, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule
`12(b)(6) “if the complaint's ‘relevant market’ definition is facially unsustainable.” Id. (citing
`Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 436-37 (3d Cir. 1997)); see Reilly v.
`Apple Inc., 578 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (“Where a complaint fails to adequately
`allege a relevant market underlying its antitrust claims, those claims must be dismissed.”).
`Plaintiffs allege the relevant product markets are Maps APIs, Routes APIs, and Places
`APIs.3 As an initial matter, Plaintiffs do not allege which product is the tying product and which
`is the tied product. In opposition, they claim that the “main tying product is Google Maps’ Maps
`API, and the tied products are Google Maps’ Routes APIs and Places APIs,” (Opp. at 11), but this
`is not alleged in the complaint.
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`3 Plaintiffs also allege that “[t]here are additional relevant markets salient for this case” including
`“the market for internet search and the market for cloud computing.” (Compl. ¶ 77.) The
`complaint lacks allegations to support these proposed markets.
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`Further, Plaintiffs’ product market allegations are facially unsustainable for other reasons.
`Plaintiffs have simply taken the labels that Google applies to its categories of digital mapping API
`services and alleged, in conclusory fashion, that those categories are the relevant product markets.
`(See Compl. ¶¶ 73-76.) However, defining a relevant market requires reference to the rule of
`reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand. See Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at
`436. The complaint does not sufficiently address these factors. Plaintiffs do not allege facts to
`support a finding that the markets for any of the services “encompass[] the product at issue as well
`as all economic substitutes for the product.” Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1045. For example, Plaintiffs
`allege that the products are not economic substitutes for each other, but this does not establish
`there are no competing products for those distinct products. Indeed, the allegations in the
`complaint are insufficient even to separate the market for the purported tied products from the
`purported tying products. See Rick-Mik Enterprises, Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 532 F.3d
`963, 975 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of antitrust action in absence of allegations that
`demand for tied product was separate from tying product).
`Plaintiffs’ failure to allege facts showing the absence of economic substitutes for the
`products renders the alleged relevant markets “legally insufficient and a motion to dismiss may be
`granted.” Queen City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 436; see also Reilly, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (“[A]
`plausible market requires alleged facts explaining why the products included in the market are
`substitutes for one another as well as alleged facts explaining why seemingly similar products
`excluded from the market are not substitutes for those in the market.”).
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`3.
`Plaintiffs Fail to Adequately Allege Market Power.
`Google also argues Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege market power. “Tying arrangements
`are forbidden on the theory that, if the seller has market power over the tying product, the seller
`can leverage this market power through tying arrangements to exclude other sellers of the tied
`product.” Rick-Mik, 532 F.3d at 971 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, “in all
`cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has market power
`in the tying product.” Id.
`The complaint alleges that Google has a 90% market share of the “business-to-business
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`market.” (Compl. ¶ 130.) However, the “business-to-business market” is undefined, and
`Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts suggesting that it is the same as the alleged relevant product
`markets. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege market power in the relevant market.
`Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately alleged “direct
`demonstrations” of market power, those conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish market
`power, even assuming Plaintiffs had sufficiently defined the relevant market, which they have
`not.4
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`4.
`Plaintiffs’ Other Claims Fail.
`Plaintiffs also allege claims for bundling, exclusive dealing and monopoly leveraging.
`“Bundling is the practice of offering, for a single price, two or more goods or services that could
`be sold separately.” Cascade Health, 515 F.3d at 894. Because Plaintiffs do not sufficiently
`allege that Google offers two or more services for a single price, the bundling claim fails.
`“Exclusive dealing involves an agreement between a vendor and a buyer that prevents the
`buyer from purchasing a given good from any other vendor.” Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v.
`Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs’ exclusive dealing claim
`fails because, as discussed above, Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that Google prevents its
`customers from purchasing competitors’ API services.
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`Plaintiffs also assert a theory of monopoly leveraging. Monopoly leveraging is actionable
`if the plaintiff proves the elements of an attempted monopolization claim, which requires the
`plaintiff to prove the elements of either actual or attempted monopolization, including
`exclusionary conduct. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir.
`1991). Plaintiffs’ monopoly leveraging claim rests on its deficient allegations of tying, exclusive
`dealing, and bundling, and thus, it too fails.
`Finally, because Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is governed by the same standard as Plaintiffs’
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`4 The complaint also alleges that Google has a market share of 80% or more in the relevant
`product markets, relying on a U.S House Report that referred to the “navigation app market.” (See
`Compl. ¶ 122.) In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not respond to Google’s arguments challenging
`this allegation, and in failing to do so they concede these points. See Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros.
`Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (collecting cases holding that failure to
`respond to an argument in an opposition brief may constitute a concession of the argument).
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`antitrust claims, the Court dismisses it for the same reasons as the antitrust claim.5
`For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Google’s motion to dismiss and dismisses all of
`Plaintiffs’ claims. However, because the Court cannot say amendment would be futile, it
`dismisses the complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
`Google has requested the Court take judicial notice of certain documents in connection
`with the motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 31.) The Court has not relied on these documents in
`deciding the instant motion and DENIES Google’s request as MOOT.
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`C.
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`The Court Denies Google’s Motion to Strike.
`Google moves to strike Plaintiffs’ class definition for two reasons: (1) the class definition
`includes persons who lack standing; and (2) the class definition is impermissibly “fail safe.” The
`complaint defines the class as:
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`From April 13, 2018, through the date that the alleged unlawful
`anticompetitive activity ceases, all direct purchasers, app or website
`developers, or other types of users of Maps APIs, Routes APIs, or
`Places APIS, or direct purchasers, app or website developers, or other
`types of users of Maps APIs, Routes APIs, or Places APIs who spent
`money or had their free-tier credits consumed more rapidly because
`of the anticompetitive allegations therein, or other types of users who
`continue to experience anticompetitive harm as a result of the
`allegations herein.
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`(Id. ¶ 46.)
`A court may “strike class allegations prior to discovery if the complaint demonstrates that
`a class action cannot be maintained.” Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1146 (N.D. Cal.
`2010); Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
`23(d)(1)(D) (a court may “require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about
`representation of absent persons and that the action proceed accordingly.”). However, motions to
`strike class allegations are disfavored because a motion for class certification is a more appropriate
`vehicle for arguments pertaining to the class allegations. See Thorpe v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,
`534 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Kazemi v. Payless Shoesource Inc., No. C 09-5142
`MHP, 2010 WL 963225, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2010); see also In re Wal-Mart Stores, 505 F.
`
`
`5 Plaintiffs represent that they do not intend to challenge the Waze acquisition, and thus, the Court
`will not address arguments related to the merits or timeliness of any such claim.
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`Case 4:22-cv-02314-JSW Document 45 Filed 11/01/22 Page 11 of 11
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`Supp. 2d at 614-15 (“Generally, courts review class allegations through a motion for class
`certification.”). The decision whether to strike allegations is a matter within the Court's discretion.
`Biggins v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266 F.R.D. 399, 406 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
`
`The Court declines to strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations at this time. While the Court has
`doubts about the propriety Plaintiffs’ class definition, the Court finds Google’s arguments better
`addressed at the class certification stage. See, e.g., Uschold v. Carriage Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-
`04424-JSW, 2018 WL 8221266, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2018) (finding arguments challenging
`propriety of class allegations better reserved for class certification); Azad v. Tokio Marine HCC-
`Med. Ins. Servs. LLC, No. 17-cv-0618-PJH, 2017 WL 3007040, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2017)
`(“Although the court has doubts as to whether this case can be maintained as a class action, the
`propriety of the class allegations are better addressed at the class certification stage. Motions to
`strike class allegations at the pleading stage are highly disfavored, and for good reason.”).
`
`Thus, the Court DENIES the motion to strike without prejudice.
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Google’s motion to dismiss WITH LEAVE
`
`TO AMEND. Plaintiffs shall file any amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of
`this Order. The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Google’s motion to strike class
`allegations.
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`Dated: November 1, 2022
`
`______________________________________
`JEFFREY S. WHITE
`United States District Judge
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