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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 23 Filed 08/29/22 Page 1 of 18
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`
`Rafey S. Balabanian (SBN 315962)
`rbalabanian@edelson.com
`Yaman Salahi (SBN 288752)
`ysalahi@edelson.com
`P. Solange Hilfinger-Pardo (SBN 320055)
`shilfingerpardo@edelson.com
`EDELSON PC
`150 California Street, 18th Floor
`San Francisco, California 94111
`Tel: 415.212.9300
`Fax: 415.373.9435
`
`Rachel Dempsey (SBN 310424)
`rachel@towardsjustice.org
`TOWARDS JUSTICE
`2840 Fairfax Street, Suite 200
`Denver, Colorado 80207
`Tel: 720.295.8846
`Fax: 303.957.2289
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`
`TAJE GILL, ESTERPHANIE ST. JUSTE, and
`BENJAMIN VALDEZ, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
` Case No.: 4:22-cv-04379-JSW
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF MOTION
`AND MOTION TO REMAND AND
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Date: November 4, 2022
`Time: 9:00am
`Location: Courtroom 5 – 2nd Floor
`
`Judge: Honorable Jeffrey S. White
`
`
`
`
`v.
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`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware
`corporation, and LYFT, INC., a Delaware
`corporation,
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`
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`Defendants.
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`PLFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 23 Filed 08/29/22 Page 2 of 18
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND STATEMENT OF REQUESTED RELIEF
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, on November 4, 2022, at 9:00 am in Courtroom 5, 2nd
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`Floor of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, at 1301
`Clay St., Oakland, CA 94612, this Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiffs in the above-captioned
`action will be heard.
`
`Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court remand this case to San Francisco Superior
`Court because Defendant Uber, Inc.’s Notice of Removal fails to establish the existence of a federal
`question imparting federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ Motion is based on this Notice of
`Motion and the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
`
`
`Dated: August 29, 2022
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`TAJE GILL, ESTERPHANIE ST. JUSTE, and
`BENJAMIN VALDEZ, individually and on behalf of
`all others similarly situated,
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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` By: /s/ Yaman Salahi
` One of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
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`
`
`
`Rafey S. Balabanian (SBN 315962)
`rbalabanian@edelson.com
`Yaman Salahi (SBN 288752)
`ysalahi@edelson.com
`P. Solange Hilfinger-Pardo (SBN 320055)
`shilfingerpardo@edelson.com
`EDELSON PC
`150 California Street, 18th Floor
`San Francisco, California 94111
`Tel: 415.212.9300
`Fax: 415.373.9435
`
`Rachel Dempsey (SBN 310424)
`rachel@towardsjustice.org
`TOWARDS JUSTICE
`2840 Fairfax Street, Suite 200
`Denver, Colorado 80207
`Tel: 720.295.8846
`Fax: 303.957.2289
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
`
`
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`i
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 23 Filed 08/29/22 Page 3 of 18
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`
`INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
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`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ............................................... 1
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`III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 2
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`
`I.
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`II.
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`A.
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`B.
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`No Federal Question Appears on the Face of the Complaint ...................... 3
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`No Exception to the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Permits the Court
`to Exercise Federal Question Jurisdiction over this State Law Case ......... 4
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`1.
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`2.
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`The Artful Pleading Doctrine Does Not Apply .............................. 4
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`Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Were Not Brought Under
`Federal Law ...................................................................................... 4
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`
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`3.
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`District Court Decisions that Permit Federal Question
`Jurisdiction Over State Law Antitrust Claims Are Inapplicable
`or Incorrect ....................................................................................... 7
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`IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 11
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`
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`CASE NO. 4:22-CV-04379-JSW
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`United States Supreme Court Cases
`
`California v. ARC Am. Corp.,
`490 U.S. 93 (1989) .......................................................................................................... 4, 8
`
`Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
`482 U.S. 386 (1987) ............................................................................................................ 3
`
`Gunn v. Minton,
`568 U.S. 251 (2013) ............................................................................................................ 5
`
`Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson,
`478 U.S. 804 (1986) ............................................................................................................ 5
`
`Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning,
`578 U.S. 374 (2016) ........................................................................................................ 8, 9
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`Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Del. In & For New Castle Cty.,
`366 U.S. 656 (1961) ............................................................................................................ 5
`
`United States Circuit Court of Appeals Cases
`
`Balser v. Dep’t of Just., Off. of U.S. Tr.,
`327 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................... 5
`
`City of Oakland v. BP PLC,
`969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,
`32 F.4th 733 (9th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................ 4
`
`Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell,
`803 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1986) ......................................................................................... 6, 9
`
`Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,
`980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................................... 2, 10
`
`Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop.,
`902 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) ......................................................................................... 2, 4
`
`Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc.,
`340 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................... 5, 6, 10
`
`Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co.,
`319 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................................. 2
`
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`CASE NO. 4:22-CV-04379-JSW
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`Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc.,
`80 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................. 6
`
`Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc.,
`908 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1990) ........................................................................................... 3, 4
`
`United States District Court Cases
`
`Aguayo v. Wachovia,
`No. 10-cv-01178-JSW, 2010 WL 1221810 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2010) .............................. 6
`
`Cent. Valley Med. Grp., Inc. v. Indep. Physician Assocs. Med. Grp., Inc.,
`No. 19-CV-00404-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL 2491328 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) .................... 7
`
`City of Livingston v. Dow Chem., Co.,
`No. 05-cv-03262-JSW, 2005 WL 2463916 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2005) ............................... 11
`
`Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co.,
`561 F. Supp. 3d 869 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ................................................................................. 7
`
`In re Nat’l Football Leagues Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 15-cv-09996-BRO-JEMX, 2016 WL 1192642 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016) .................. 8
`
`Marquez v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc.,
`No. 20-CV-07759-JSW, 2021 WL 6200337 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021) ............................ 2
`
`Molina Healthcare, Inc. v. Celgene Corp.,
`No. 21-cv-05483-JCS, 2022 WL 161894 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022) ................................ 10
`
`Nat’l Credit Reporting Ass’n, Inc. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc.,
`No. 04-cv-01661 WHA, 2004 WL 1888769 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2004) ......................... 3, 7
`
`PeopleBrowsr, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc.,
`No. C-12-6120 EMC, 2013 WL 843032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013) .................................... 7
`
`Rosenman v. Facebook Inc.,
`No. 21-cv-02108-LHK, 2021 WL 3829549 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021) ......................... 7, 8
`
`Schumacher v. J.R. Simplot Co.,
`No. 6:21-CV-00489-MC, 2021 WL 3604836 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2021) ............................... 1
`
`California Supreme Court Cases
`
`Burdell v. Grandi,
`152 Cal. 376 (1907) ........................................................................................................... 10
`
`In re Cipro Cases I & II,
`61 Cal. 4th 116 (2015) ....................................................................................................... 10
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 23 Filed 08/29/22 Page 6 of 18
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`California Appellate Court Cases
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`Exxon Corp. v. Sup. Ct.,
`51 Cal. App. 4th 1672 (1997) ............................................................................................ 10
`
`Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors,
`77 Cal. App. 4th 171 (1999) ................................................................................................ 9
`
`In re Cipro Cases I & II,
`121 Cal. App. 4th 402 (2004) ............................................................................................ 10
`
`Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
`177 Cal. App. 4th 1235 (2009) .......................................................................................... 10
`
`Miscellaneous Authority
`
`15 U.S.C. § 2 ........................................................................................................................... 2, 5, 6
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1441 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1447 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720 et seq. ..................................................................................... 1, 3
`
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17045 .................................................................................................. 2, 3
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`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. ......................................................................................... 2
`
`Kathleen Foote & John F. Cove, Jr., Common Law Monopolization Under California Law,
`Cal. Anti. & Unfair Comp. L. § 6.04 ................................................................................. 10
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`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`In this action, three California-resident rideshare drivers sued two California-based
`
`ridesharing companies in California state court to obtain redress for violations of California’s
`antitrust and other business practice statutes, including damages that they suffered while driving in
`California and an injunction to stop further violations of California law. Defendant Uber, with
`Defendant Lyft’s consent, removed the case to federal court, arguing that Plaintiffs’ six state-law
`claims contain hidden federal claims so substantial that they transform this case into one arising
`under federal law. They do not. When Plaintiffs said that they were bringing claims under
`California law, they meant it. Neither the Court nor Defendants can rewrite Plaintiffs’ complaint to
`include federal claims that Plaintiffs do not wish to pursue. Cf. Schumacher v. J.R. Simplot Co., No.
`6:21-CV-00489-MC, 2021 WL 3604836, at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 13, 2021) (“When it walks like a duck
`and quacks like a duck, calling it a zebra does not change the fact that it’s a duck.”). Because this
`case raises no federal questions, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and is required to
`remand to state court.
`
`II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`Defendants Uber and Lyft are a duopoly that controls the app-based ride hailing industry
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`that has largely replaced traditional taxis in California. (Complaint ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs are current and
`former drivers who used the companies’ apps to pick up passengers and collect fares. (Id. ¶¶ 118-
`145.) They allege that Uber and Lyft forced them to enter into coercive and unfair agreements that
`permit Uber and Lyft to fix the prices for rides, to withhold key information from them (such as
`where the drivers are actually agreeing to go when they accept a ride), and to adopt non-linear
`payment structures and minimum acceptance rates that are designed to limit drivers’ mobility
`between rideshare platforms and suppress competition for the drivers’ services. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35, 78-
`86, 154, 161-63.) In addition, Uber and Lyft use opaque algorithms to make secret payments to
`drivers that commit to working for them. (Id. ¶¶ 72-75.)
`
`To obtain redress for these unfair and anticompetitive practices, Plaintiffs filed a six-count
`complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco. Counts one and two were
`brought under the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720, et seq., which is California’s
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`antitrust statute, challenging price-fixing and other anticompetitive practices imposed through
`vertical agreements between Uber/Lyft and their drivers. Count three alleges a violation of the
`Unfair Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17045, which prohibits secret payments to destroy
`competition. The final three counts allege violations of each of the three prongs of California’s
`Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.: unlawful conduct that
`violates the Cartwright Act, unfair conduct that violates the public policy of the State of California,
`and fraudulent conduct that deceives drivers. Plaintiffs plead no federal causes of action, and do not
`allege any theory of recovery under state law that turns on an alleged violation of federal law.
`
`Defendants have removed this action to federal court on the claim that the case arises under
`the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, which is the federal antitrust statute. According to them,
`California’s Cartwright Act does not provide a remedy for the conduct alleged in the complaint.
`(Dkt. 1 ¶ 13.) Based on that premise, they conclude that Plaintiffs’ six state-law counts must
`secretly be claims under the federal Sherman Act—which they contend criminalizes their alleged
`conduct—and ask the Court to exercise federal question jurisdiction. Because they do not bring any
`claim that turns on a question of federal law, Plaintiffs now seek remand as required by 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1447(c).
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, “[t]he removing defendant bears the burden of
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`overcoming the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction.” Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop.,
`902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Federal jurisdiction must
`be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Marquez v. DSW
`Shoe Warehouse, Inc., No. 20-CV-07759-JSW, 2021 WL 6200337, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021)
`(White, J.) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). Doubts about
`removability should be resolved in favor of remand because of the “strong presumption against
`removal.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see also Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d
`1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003).
`
`Defendants here have not met that burden. They allege federal jurisdiction solely under 28
`U.S.C. § 1441(a), which provides for jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. As a general
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`matter, § 1441 extends only to cases where a federal claim appears on the face of the complaint,
`which is not the case here. While exceptions to this rule exist, they are extremely limited, extending
`only to areas where federal law has occupied an entire subject area or a very small number of cases
`where a substantial and disputed federal question is legitimately and necessarily raised by a state
`law claim in a manner that requires a federal court to exercise jurisdiction. Because Defendants
`have not met their burden to demonstrate that this case cannot be resolved solely by reference to
`California law, federal subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. Remand to state court is required.
`
`A.
`No Federal Question Appears on the Face of the Complaint
`“In general, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is improper unless a federal
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`claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.” Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival
`Enterprises, Inc., 908 F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 1990); accord City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d
`895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020). “Therefore, as the ‘master of the claim,’ the plaintiff can generally ‘avoid
`federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.’” City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904 (quoting
`Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
`
`Here, Defendants concede that “Plaintiffs label their causes of action as state law claims[.]”
`(Dkt. 1 at 3.) Plaintiffs labeled their causes of action as state law claims because their causes of
`action are state law claims. Each claim is brought under a California statute, and Plaintiffs very
`clearly limited those claims that may depend on violations of other statutes, such as their Unfair
`Competition Law claims, to violations of state law. (Compare Complaint ¶ 177 (“Defendants’
`conduct is unlawful because it violates California’s Cartwright Act, Bus. & Profs. Code § 16720, et
`seq., and Bus. & Prof. Code § 17045, as set forth in this complaint.”) with Nat’l Credit Reporting
`Ass’n, Inc. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 04-cv-01661 WHA, 2004 WL 1888769, at *3 (N.D.
`Cal. July 21, 2004) (“Plaintiff has alleged that ‘[d]efendants’ wrongful conduct described above (i)
`violate[d] state and federal antitrust laws’ . . . . As the master of its complaint, plaintiff could have
`avoided any issue of federal question and, instead, could have simply borrowed state antitrust laws.
`But it did not.”).)
`
`In fact, federal law is mentioned exactly one time in Plaintiffs’ complaint, in an allegation
`that describes an admission by Uber in an unrelated arbitration. (Complaint ¶ 35.) That does not
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`transform this into a federal case. Because there is no federal question on the face of the complaint,
`removal is presumptively improper, and the case should be remanded.
`
`B.
`
`No Exception to the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Permits the Court to
`Exercise Federal Question Jurisdiction over this State Law Case.
`
`There are several exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule, some of which Defendants
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`appear to raise in their removal papers. To be clear, Plaintiffs have no obligation to demonstrate to
`the Court that this case falls outside those exceptions. See Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1057. Rather, it is
`Defendants’ burden to show that one applies. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, Plaintiffs
`explain below why neither the “artful pleading doctrine” nor the exception for state-law claims that
`arise under federal law permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction over this action.
`
`1.
`The Artful Pleading Doctrine Does Not Apply.
`Defendants first attempt to rely on what they term the “artful pleading doctrine.” (Dkt. 1 at
`
`3.) However, that doctrine only applies when “a federal statute’s preemptive force is so
`extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal
`claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.” Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32
`F.4th 733, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Supreme Court has
`recognized only three statutes for which complete preemption applies,” and the Sherman Act is not
`one of them. Id. To the contrary, “federal antitrust laws do not pre-empt state law,” California v.
`ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989), and antitrust claims under the Cartwright Act do not
`permit removal under the artful pleading doctrine. Redwood Theatres, 908 F.2d at 480.
`Accordingly, that doctrine cannot apply here.
`
`2.
`Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Were Not Brought Under Federal Law.
`Separately from the artful pleading doctrine, there is one more “special and small category
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`of state-law claims that arise under federal law for purposes of § 1331 because federal law is a
`necessary element of the claim for relief.” City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904 (internal quotation
`marks omitted). These are cases where “a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
`disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
`federal-state balance approved by Congress.’” San Mateo, 32 F.4th at 746 (quoting Gunn v. Minton,
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 23 Filed 08/29/22 Page 11 of 18
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`568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013)). “Only a few cases have ever fallen into this narrow category.” Id.
`(internal quotation marks omitted). To meet their burden to justify the exercise of federal
`jurisdiction, Defendants will need to demonstrate that this case satisfies all four of these factors.
`Because this case raises no federal issue at all, it meets none of them.
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`The main thrust of Defendants’ argument is that the Cartwright Act does not permit
`recovery for the conduct Plaintiffs are alleging. According to Defendants, that means even though
`Plaintiffs have expressly pleaded two claims under California’s Cartwright Act and a UCL claim
`premised solely on violations of the Cartwright Act, their claims are really secret federal Sherman
`Act claims. That’s nonsense. It is black-letter law that “jurisdiction may not be sustained on a
`theory that the plaintiff has not advanced.” Balser v. Dep’t of Just., Off. of U.S. Tr., 327 F.3d 903,
`908 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 n.6
`(1986)). Federal jurisdiction depends on the legal theory that the plaintiff is actually advancing, not
`the legal theory Defendants wish the plaintiffs would advance. See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v.
`Superior Ct. of Del. In & For New Castle Cty., 366 U.S. 656, 662 (1961) (“[Q]uestions of exclusive
`federal jurisdiction and ouster of jurisdiction of state courts are, under existing jurisdictional
`legislation, not determined by ultimate substantive issues of federal law. The answers depend on the
`particular claims a suitor makes in a state court—on how he casts his action.”).
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` Regardless of whether Defendants can imagine ways that they have violated federal law,
`see 15 U.S.C. § 2, Plaintiffs do not even come close to necessarily relying on federal law in any
`portion of their complaint. Plaintiffs plainly state that they are suing the Defendants under the
`Cartwright Act and other California statutes (some of which rely on the Cartwright Act, others of
`which do not). Without an actual federal claim to point to, Defendants’ removal papers list a
`number of allegations that they argue “reflect the unilateral—and thus federal—character of
`[Plaintiffs’] claims.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 17.) In fact, Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims are not premised on
`“unilateral” conduct. They are premised on vertical agreements to fix prices and restrain trade
`through anticompetitive practices like minimum acceptance rates and non-linear pricing structures
`that are designed to limit the ability of drivers to switch between rideshare platforms, and thus
`suppressing competition for their services. (Complaint ¶¶ 154-55, 160-63.)
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`But the Court need not get into the details of antitrust law here, because even if Plaintiffs
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`had alleged solely unilateral conduct in their complaint, federal jurisdiction would not automatically
`follow. A federal court can’t exercise jurisdiction just because some allegations feel like they could
`be federal in character. See Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043-44 (9th
`Cir. 2003) (holding that claims for an unfair or fraudulent business practice under California’s UCL
`do not confer federal jurisdiction, even if the UCL’s goals “comport with the broader regulatory
`goals” of a federal regime, and even if the plaintiff’s “complaint reads somewhat like” a matter
`covered by a federal statute or regulation). Federal law has to be necessarily implicated.
`Accordingly, “[w]hen a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories—one of
`which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory—federal question jurisdiction
`does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim.” Rains v. Criterion Sys.,
`Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1043; see also Aguayo v.
`Wachovia, No. 10-cv-01178-JSW, 2010 WL 1221810, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2010) (White, J.)
`(granting motion to remand because “it is not evident that [plaintiff’s] claim to rescind the loan
`agreement is premised on [the federal] TILA, rather than under general provisions of California
`law”). Here, Plaintiffs have only plead a state law claim, but even if an alternate federal law theory
`of recovery could be read into the complaint, federal question jurisdiction would not attach because
`such a theory of recovery is not being advanced by Plaintiffs and is unnecessary to their claims.
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`If Defendants are right that Plaintiffs have no claim under the Cartwright Act, Plaintiffs’
`claims will not spontaneously morph into Sherman Act claims. Rather, as the Ninth Circuit has
`explained, Plaintiffs would simply lose on the merits under state law. See Dimidowich v. Bell &
`Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Dimidowich’s complaint did not allege a violation of
`the Sherman Act, section 2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Since Dimidowich’s monopoly arguments fail to
`state a cognizable claim under California law, and since California law is all he pleaded, we affirm
`the district court’s dismissal of his monopolization and attempted monopolization claims.”)
`(diversity jurisdiction). And if Plaintiffs lose on the merits, they can then appeal, and California
`courts can decide what California law means. There is also no danger that hidden federal claims will
`spring forth after remand, because Plaintiffs will be judicially estopped from making them. See
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`Lippitt, at 340 F.3d at 1046 (noting that judicial estoppel prevents a party from taking inconsistent
`positions within the same litigation).
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`Defendants’ argument is really one that goes to the merits of Plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act
`claims, not the existence of a federal question. That means the remand analysis should stop here.
`There is no reason to consider whether Plaintiffs’ complaint will “survive in state court a demurrer
`or motion on the pleadings[.]” Id. at 1043 (declining to express an opinion on that matter). Indeed,
`the Court has no power to do so. Guthrie v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 3d 869, 873
`(N.D. Cal. 2021) (“The boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction are unshakeable and unwaivable; a
`federal court may not pass on the merits of a suit unless it has assured itself of subject matter
`jurisdiction.”). Remand of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims is the only option permitted by 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1447(c).
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`3.
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`District Court Decisions that Permit Federal Question Jurisdiction Over
`State Law Antitrust Claims Are Inapplicable or Incorrect.
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`Nevertheless, Defendants point out that courts in this district have exercised federal question
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`jurisdiction over what appear to be antitrust-related state-law claims. These cases are all either
`distinguishable or mistaken. Binding authority requires remand.
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`In most of the cases cited by Defendants, the plaintiffs derived their state law claims “from
`violation of federal law” and specifically invoked it. PeopleBrowsr, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. C-12-
`6120-EMC, 2013 WL 843032, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013); see also Nat’l Credit Reporting
`Ass’n, 2004 WL 1888769, at *4 (“The complaint alleged unlawful business practices which rested
`on federal law.”); Rosenman v. Facebook Inc., No. 21-CV-02108-LHK, 2021 WL 3829549, at *5
`(N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2021) (“Plaintiff does not allege in her Complaint that Facebook’s conduct
`violated California-specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions.”); Cent. Valley Med.
`Grp., Inc. v. Indep. Physician Assocs. Med. Grp., Inc., No. 19-CV-00404-LJO-SKO, 2019 WL
`2491328, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2019) (denying remand without prejudice where Plaintiff alleged
`that “Defendant’s conduct . . . offends the policies of free competition and free trade and commerce
`set forth in, inter alia, the federal Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act’”).
`Plaintiffs here do not do anything like that. Every one of their claims is clearly and expressly
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`PLFS’ MOT. TO REMAND
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`premised solely on violations of California law. The Court can safely disregard these inapposite
`cases.
`Defendants identify one case, In re: Nat’l Football Leagues Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.,
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`No. 15-cv-09996-BRO-JEMX, 2016 WL 1192642 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016), that appears to find a
`federal question even where the plaintiff wasn’t relying on federal law. That case ignores the basic
`principle that a plaintiff is permitted to decide how to advance her own case and is therefore
`wrongly decided. Specifically, Sunday Ticket assumes that because monopolistic conduct is
`regulated by the Sherman Act, all complaints that allege monopolistic conduct must also
`automatically be alleging violations of the Sherman Act