Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 30 Filed 12/05/22 Page 1 of 4
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`TAJE GILL, ESTEROHANIE ST. JUSTE,
`and BENJAMIN VALDEZ, individually and
`on behalf of all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and LYFT,
`INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`Case No. 22-cv-04379-JSW
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`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`REMAND
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`Re: Dkt. No. 23
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`Now before the Court is the motion to remand this action back to the Superior Court in the
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`County of San Francisco. Defendants Uber and Lyft removed the case the federal court on the
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`basis that Plaintiffs’ six state-law claims necessarily required the resolution of federal claims
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`under the Sherman Act. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
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`BACKGROUND
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`In this action, three resident California rideshare drivers sued Uber and Lyft, two
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`companies based in California, to obtain redress in California state court for violations of
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`California’s antitrust and other business practice statutes, including damages caused while driving
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`in California and an injunction to stop further violations of California law. Defendants removed to
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`this Court arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims turn on a substantial federal question. (Notice of
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`Removal, ¶ 12.) Defendants contend that the complaint addresses alleged unilateral conduct in
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 30 Filed 12/05/22 Page 2 of 4
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`abuse of market power and the California Cartwright Act does not apply to unilateral conduct.
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`(See id. at ¶ 13, citing Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986), opinion
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`modified on denial of reh’g, 810 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).)
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`A.
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`Legal Standard for a Motion to Remand.
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`“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
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`have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United
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`States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Franchise
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`Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 462 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (citation omitted); see also 28
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`U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen
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`v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, the burden of
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`establishing federal jurisdiction for purposes of removal is on the party seeking removal, and the
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`removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372
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`F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
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`“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first
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`instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.
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`“In general, removal based on federal question jurisdiction is improper unless a federal
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`claim appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.” Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival
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`Enterprises, Inc., 908 F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 1990); accord City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d
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`895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020). As the “’master of the claim,’ the plaintiff can generally ‘avoid federal
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`jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.’” City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904 (quoting
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`Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.SW. 386, 392 (1987)).
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`Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising
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`under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case “arises
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`under” federal law if a plaintiff’s “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law
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`creates the cause of action” or that the plaintiff's “right to relief under state law requires resolution
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`of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the parties.” Franchise Tax Bd. v.
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`Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13, 27 (1983). In determining whether
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`removal in a given case is proper, a court should “strictly construe the removal statute against
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 30 Filed 12/05/22 Page 3 of 4
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`removal jurisdiction.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is
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`any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. The removing party therefore bears
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`a heavy burden to rebut the presumption against removal. See id. “The removal statute is strictly
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`construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.”
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`Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus, 980
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`F.2d at 566).
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`B.
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`Requirements of Federal Question Jurisdiction Are Not Met.
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`“[T]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically
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`confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., 340 F.3d
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`1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
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`804, 808 (1986). “Federal question jurisdiction extends only in those cases in which a well-
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`pleaded complaint establishes ‘either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the
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`plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on a resolution of a substantial question of federal
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`law.’” Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
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`Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)). Federal
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`question jurisdiction only lies when “a state-law claim rises or falls on the plaintiff’s ability to
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`prove the violation of a federal duty.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning,
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`578 U.S. 374, 383 (2016). This can happen only when “a state-law action necessarily depends on
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`a showing that the defendant breached [a federal law].” See id.
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`In this matter, Plaintiffs sue Defendants under the Cartwright Act as well as other
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`California statutes. There is no federal claim pled. Instead, Defendants removed this action on the
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`condition that Plaintiffs’ state law claims “reflect the unilateral – and thus federal – character of
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`[Plaintiffs’] claims.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 17.) However, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that their
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`antitrust claims are not premised upon unilateral conduct, but rather are premised upon vertical
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`agreements allegedly to fix prices and restrain trade through anticompetitive practices such as
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`minimum acceptance rates and non-linear pricing structures designed to limit the drivers’ ability to
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`switch between rideshare platforms, consequently suppressing competition for the rideshare
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`services. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 154-55, 160-63.)
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`3
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 4:22-cv-04379-JSW Document 30 Filed 12/05/22 Page 4 of 4
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`Defendants’ argument goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s Cartwright Act claims, not the
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`existence of a federal question. Should Plaintiffs’ state law claims not survive a demurrer or
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`motion on the pleadings in state court, Plaintiffs will simply lose their claims on the merits. See,
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`e.g., Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 2986) (“Dimidowich’s
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`complaint did not allege a violation of the Sherman Act, section 2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Since
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`Dimidowich’s monopoly arguments fail to state a cognizable claim under California law, and
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`since California law is all he pleaded, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his
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`monopolization and attempted monopolization claims.”) (diversity jurisdiction). If Plaintiffs lose
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`on the merits of their California claims, they can appeal in the state court. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch,
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`Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 389 (2016) (“Out of respect for state
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`courts, [the Supreme] Court has time and again declined to construe federal jurisdictional statute
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`more expansively than their language, most fairly read, requires. [The Court] ha[s] reiterated the
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`need to give due regard to the rightful independence of state governments – and more particularly,
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`to the power of the States to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts.”).
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`The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ state law claims do not necessarily turn on any necessary
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`question of federal law. Therefore, the requirements for federal jurisdiction are not met and the
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`Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to remand to the Superior Court of the State of California, San
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`Francisco County.
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`CONCLUSION
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`Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Clerk shall remand
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`this action to the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco and shall
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`close this file.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: December 5, 2022
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`______________________________________
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`JEFFREY S. WHITE
`United States District Judge
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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