Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 1 of 19
`
`
`
`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`Eric Meckley, Bar No. 168181
`eric.meckley@morganlewis.com
`Brian D. Berry, Bar No. 229893
`brian.berry@morganlewis.com
`One Market, Spear Street Tower
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Tel:
`+1.415.442.1000
`Fax: +1.415.442.1001
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`TWITTER, INC.
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`EMMANUEL CORNET, JUSTINE DE
`CAIRES, GRAE KINDEL, ALEXIS
`CAMACHO, AND JESSICA PAN, on behalf
`of themselves and all others similarly situated,
`
`v.
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 3:22-cv-06857-JD
`
`DEFENDANT TWITTER, INC.’S
`OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
`MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`
`Date:
`Time:
`Judge:
`
`January 23, 2023
`9:30 a.m.
`Hon. James Donato
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`MORGAN, LEWIS &
`BOCKIUS LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`Case No. 3:22-cv-06857-JD
`TWITTER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
`
`

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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 2 of 19
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`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`RELEVANT FACTS .......................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Procedural History and Current Schedule of Hearings. .......................................... 2
`
`Pertinent Factual Allegations in the Proposed SAC. .............................................. 3
`
`III.
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`A.
`
`The Court Should Decide Twitter’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Prior to
`Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend. .................................................................. 4
`
`B.
`
`Leave to Amend Should Be Denied Under Rule 15. .............................................. 6
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Amendment Should Be Denied Based on Prejudice to Twitter. ................. 7
`
`Amendment Should Be Denied Based on Futility. ..................................... 8
`
`The Cases Cited by Plaintiffs’ Are Inapposite. ......................................... 12
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 13
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`MORGAN, LEWIS &
`BOCKIUS UK LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`LONDON
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`Case No. 3:22-cv-06857-JD
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`TWITTER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 3 of 19
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adema Techs. Inc. v. Wacker Chemie AG,
`657 Fed. Appx. 661 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ..................................................................................... 11
`
`AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc.,
`465 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................. 2, 6
`
`Amparan v. Plaza Home Mortg., Inc.,
`No. C 07-4498 JF (RS), 2009 WL 2776486 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009) ................................ 12
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 8
`
`Atlantic Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas,
`134 S. Ct. 568 (2013) .............................................................................................................. 10
`
`Barren v. Harrington,
`152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 8
`
`Bonin v. Calderon,
`59 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995) ....................................................................................................... 8
`
`Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.,
`637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,
`499 U.S. 585 (1991) ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd.,
`709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................... 10
`
`Comer v. Micor, Inc.,
`436 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................. 10
`
`Crispo v. Musk,
`CA No. 2022-0666-KSJM, 2022 WL 6693660 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2022) .............................. 12
`
`Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court,
`19 Cal.4th 1036 (1999) ............................................................................................................. 9
`
`E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.,
`446 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................................... 11
`
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`

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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 4 of 19
`
`
`
`Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,
`316 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................... 7
`
`In re Exodus Communications, Inc. Securities Litigation,
`No. C-01-2661 MMC, 2006 WL 2355071 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006) ................................. 4, 5
`
`Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank,
`79 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) ..................................................................................................... 6
`
`Foman v. Davis,
`371 U.S. 178 (1962) .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Franczak v. Suntrust Mortgage Inc.,
`No. 5:12-01453, 2013 WL 4764327 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013) ................................................ 5
`
`Fresno Unified School Dist. V. K.U. ex rel. A.D.U.,
`980 F.Supp.2d 1160 ............................................................................................................ 4, 12
`
`Frost v. Diocese of San Bernardino Educ. & Welfare Corp.,
`302 Fed. App’x 729 (9th Cir. 2008) .......................................................................................... 8
`
`Ginoyan v. Barclays Bank Delaware,
`2020 WL 1974030 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) .......................................................................... 5
`
`Ho v. Ernst & Young LLP,
`No. C05-04867 JF, 2007 WL 2070216 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2007) ......................................... 12
`
`Johnson v. Buckley,
`356 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 8
`
`Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
`705 F.3d 1122 ......................................................................................................................... 10
`
`Lentini v. Kelly Services, Inc.,
`No. C17-03911 WHA, 2017 WL 4354910 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) ..................................... 11
`
`M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
`407 U.S. 1 (1972) .............................................................................................................. 10, 11
`
`McClune v. Shamah,
`593 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1979) ...................................................................................................... 5
`
`Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton,
`845 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................................................... 8
`
`Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP,
`834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................... 13
`
`Myers v. Intuit, Inc.,
`2018 WL 2287425 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2018) ........................................................................... 6
`
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`National Security Counselors v. Central Intelligence Agency,
`960 F.Supp.2d 101 (D.D.C. 2013) ............................................................................................ 7
`
`Nordyke v. King,
`644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................................... 8
`
`Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court,
`72 Cal.App.4th 214 (1999)........................................................................................................ 9
`
`O’Connor v. Uber Tech., Inc.,
`Case No. 13-cv-3826 (N.D. Cal.) ............................................................................................ 13
`
`O’Connor, et al. v. Uber Technologies, et al.,
`No. 3:13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) (ECF 193) ............................................. 13
`
`Osakan v. Apple Am. Grp.,
`2010 WL 1838701 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) ............................................................................ 8
`
`Palmer v. Stassinos,
`236 F.R.D. 460 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006) .............................................................................. 12
`
`Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
`472 U.S. 797 .............................................................................................................................. 9
`
`Sanchez v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc.,
`2009 WL 2971553 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009) .......................................................................... 7
`
`Soto v. Castlerock Farming and Transport, Inc.,
`No. 1:09-cv-00701-AWI-JLT, 2011 WL 3489876 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011)........................... 6
`
`Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co.,
`864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................................................... 5
`
`Union Pac. Railroad Co. v. Nev. Power Co.,
`950 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1991) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`Warden v. Crown American Realty Trust,
`1998 WL 725946 (W.D. Pa. 1998) ....................................................................................... 1, 5
`
`Wixon v. Wyndham Resort Development Corp.,
`No. C 07-02361 JSW, 2010 WL 424603 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2010) ....................................... 12
`
`Yucesoy v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al.,
`No. 3:15-cv-00262 EMC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018) (ECF 287) .............................................. 12
`
`Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Pirelli Tyre S.P.A.,
`802 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rev’d and remanded on other grounds,
`517 F. App'x 589, 590 (9th Cir. 2013)) ..................................................................................... 8
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`MORGAN, LEWIS &
`BOCKIUS LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`
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`- iv -
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 6 of 19
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`
`
`Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,
`552 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 6
`
`Statutes
`
`United States Constitution 14th Amendment .................................................................................. 9
`
`United States Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; §§ 201-208; §§ 301-307 ....................... 2
`
`29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5), (6) ............................................................................................................. 4
`
`United States Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988,
`29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (the “WARN Act”) ............................................................... 2, 3, 4, 9
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11 ........................................................................................ 1
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) ............................................................................... 8
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15 ................................................................................ 1, 6, 7
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) ........................................................................................ 2, 7
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`California Labor Code §§ 1400-1408 (the “California WARN Act”) ....................................... 3, 9
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`Rules
`
`California Civil Local Rule 6-3....................................................................................................... 3
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`Other Authorities
`
`https://dol.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2022/11/warn-twitter-nyc-2022-0050-
`11-8-2022_0.pdf ........................................................................................................................ 4
`
`https://fortress.wa.gov/esd/file/warn/Public/SearchWARN.aspx ................................................... 4
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 7 of 19
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint in direct
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`response to Twitter’s motion to compel the five named Plaintiffs into arbitration and to dismiss
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`this lawsuit. In requesting leave to add three new named plaintiffs, the current Plaintiffs
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`admittedly seek some way to keep this lawsuit alive even after the Court compels them to
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`arbitrate their claims. However, even under the general liberal standards of Rule 15, the Court
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`should deny the motion for multiple independent reasons.
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`First, the Court should not entertain Plaintiffs’ repeated attempts during the short life of
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`this case to litigate various “emergency” issues before the Court has even decided whether
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`Plaintiffs’ claims belong in court in the first place. The Court should resolve Twitter’s motion to
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`compel arbitration first, as it is scheduled to be heard on January 12, 2023. Plaintiffs’ motion for
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`leave to amend is scheduled to be heard later, on January 23, 2023. If the Court grants the
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`motion to compel and dismisses the operative First Amended Complaint (as it should), then there
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`will be no pending actionable pleading to be amended and Plaintiffs’ motion to amend will be
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`moot. Resolving the motions in this sequence is also appropriate because the Court has not yet
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`ruled on class certification. Warden v. Crown American Realty Trust, 1998 WL 725946 (W.D.
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`Pa. 1998). Ultimately, because the current Plaintiffs are contractually bound to arbitrate their
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`claims, they have no genuine stake in the disposition of this motion. And the three new proposed
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`Plaintiffs – none of whom reside in California – face no harm or prejudice whatsoever because
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`they may simply file a new action asserting whatever claims they choose (consistent with their
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`obligations under Rule 11).
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`Second, where a plaintiff has previously amended a complaint, the Court has more broad
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`discretion to deny leave to amend. In addition, amendments seeking to add parties should be
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`granted less freely than amendments adding new claims. These limitations on the generally
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`liberal interpretation of Rule 15 clearly apply here, because Plaintiffs already have amended their
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`complaint once (see ECF No 6) and are seeking to add three new proposed plaintiffs (to replace
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`the five Plaintiffs whose claims will be compelled to arbitration resulting in the dismissal of the
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`MORGAN, LEWIS &
`BOCKIUS LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`lawsuit).
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 8 of 19
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`Third, the Court may deny leave to amend where, as here, allowing the proposed
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`amendment would prejudice the opposing party or be futile. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v.
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`Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs here want to use the soon-to-be
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`dismissed lawsuit as a platform for sending pre-certification notice to putative class members via
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`their motion for a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d), a result that
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`would unfairly prejudice Twitter’s interests in the orderly administration of its pre-planned
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`reduction in force. In addition, the proposed claims of the three new plaintiffs outlined in the
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`proposed Second Amended Complaint would be futile because (a) none of these Washington and
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`New York state residents can assert claims for violation of the California Labor Code, (b) none of
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`them can assert claims for federal WARN Act violations as they concededly received sufficient
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`advance notice of their terminations, and (c) their contract-based claims are premised upon them
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`suing to enforce the Merger Agreement, which contains a forum-selection provision requiring
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`them to sue in a Delaware court, not this Court. The futility of amending the complaint to include
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`these three new persons – who cannot prosecute and state any viable claims before this Court –
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`further justifies denying Plaintiffs’ motion.
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`II.
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`RELEVANT FACTS
`
`A.
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`Procedural History and Current Schedule of Hearings.
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`Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on November 3, 2022. ECF No. 1. This pleading
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`alleged claims under the federal and California WARN Acts. On November 8, 2022, Plaintiffs
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`filed their FAC that alleged additional claims for alleged breach of contract and promissory
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`estoppel. ECF No. 6.
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`On November 21, 2022, Twitter filed a motion to compel arbitration as to the five named
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`Plaintiffs, each of whom signed a valid and enforceable Dispute Resolution Agreement subject
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`to the Federal Arbitration Act, and to dismiss the putative class action claims. ECF No. 18.
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`Twitter’s motion is scheduled for hearing on January 12, 2023. If the Court grants Twitter’s
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`motion, the FAC should be dismissed because no plaintiffs or class claims will remain.
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 9 of 19
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`On November 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the present motion for leave to amend to file a
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`SAC to add three new proposed plaintiffs and additional claims under the California Labor
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`Code. ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs concededly filed the motion for leave to amend in direct response
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`to Twitter’s motion to compel and dismiss, admitting they did so to “ensure this case remains
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`before this Court.” Mot. 1:17-18. Plaintiffs’ motion is scheduled for hearing on January 23,
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`2023. Plaintiffs moved under California Civil Local Rule 6-3 to shorten time on the hearing of
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`their motion; Twitter opposed that request. To date, the Court has not ruled on Plaintiffs’
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`administrative motion.
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`B.
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`Pertinent Factual Allegations in the Proposed SAC.
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`According to the proposed SAC, none of the three proposed new plaintiffs are residents
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`of California and none of them worked for Twitter in California; specifically: Emily Kim is a
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`resident of Washington and works for Twitter in Washington. SAC ¶ 14. Miguel Barreto is a
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`resident of New York and works for Twitter in New York. Id. ¶ 15. Brett Folkins is a resident
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`of Washington and works for Twitter in Washington. Id. ¶ 16.
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`In addition, the allegations of the proposed SAC demonstrate that each of the three
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`proposed new plaintiffs received advance notice of their terminations that fully complied with
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`applicable WARN Act notice requirements: specifically: Twitter notified Emily Kim on
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`November 4, 2022 that her employment would terminate on January 4, 2023, which is a period
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`of 61 days’ notice. Id. ¶ 14. Twitter notified Miguel Barreto on November 4, 2022 that his
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`employment would terminate on February 4, 2023, which is a period of 91 days’ notice. Id. ¶
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`15. Brett Folkins communicated to Twitter that he did not intend to continue working at Twitter
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`when he chose not to click “Yes” on November 17, 2022; Twitter notified Folkins that his
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`employment would terminate on January 20, 2023, which is a period of approximately 63 days’
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`notice. Id. ¶¶ 16 52.
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`Twitter was, at all times, mindful of and in compliance with its obligations under the
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`WARN Act and all similar state laws, including the California WARN Act. See ECF No. 20-1,
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`Decl. of Fix Conti, at ¶ 5. On November 4, 2022, Twitter notified approximately 2,600
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`MORGAN, LEWIS &
`BOCKIUS LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 10 of 19
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`employees that they were being involuntarily discharged as part of a reduction in force and that
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`their last day of employment with Twitter would be January 4, 2023 – more than 60 days after
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`such notice.1 Id., at ¶ 4. Consistent with its obligations under the WARN Act and applicable
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`state law, Twitter also timely notified all applicable state and local authorities of the November
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`4 reduction in force. Id., at ¶ 5. These included the government authorities in Seattle (see
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`https://fortress.wa.gov/esd/file/warn/Public/SearchWARN.aspx) and New York (see
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`https://dol.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2022/11/warn-twitter-nyc-2022-0050-11-8-
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`2022_0.pdf). Similarly, although employees who voluntarily chose not to continue working for
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`Twitter by not clicking “Yes” on November 17, 2022 were not involuntarily terminated by
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`Twitter and not required to receive any WARN Notice (see 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5), (6)), Twitter
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`nonetheless still provided such persons advance notice of termination that was sufficient to
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`comply with WARN.
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`The Court Should Decide Twitter’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Prior to
`Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend.
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`Where, as here, there is no certified class and a pending motion would dispose of the
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`case, the Court should rule on the merits of the pending motion before considering a proposed
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`amendment to add a class representative. Otherwise, if the proposed amendment is granted and
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`the case is subsequently dismissed because the lawsuit is defunct, the amendment becomes
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`moot. In re Exodus Communications, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. C-01-2661 MMC, 2006
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`WL 2355071, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006) (citations omitted) (granting motion to dismiss
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`and denying motions to intervene because “where the named plaintiffs in a class action lack
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`standing, the action must be dismissed and new named plaintiffs with standing may not
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`intervene” because “intervention will not be permitted to breathe life into a nonexistent
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`lawsuit”); see also Fresno Unified School Dist. V. K.U. ex rel. A.D.U., 980 F.Supp.2d 1160,
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`1 Impacted employees in states with longer notice requirements were given a different end-date of
`employment consistent with all requirements of applicable state law, including specifically
`proposed plaintiff Barreto who resided in New York and was given more than 90 days’ notice.
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`Case No. 3:22-cv-06857-JD
`TWITTER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 11 of 19
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`1177 (“Courts have been particularly critical of proposed amendments that appear to ‘game’ the
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`system”); see also Warden, 1998 WL 725946 (W.D. Pa. 1998). Exodus is instructive here. In
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`that case, the two named plaintiffs had been dismissed for failure to prosecute (the “Fox
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`Plaintiff”) and for lack of standing (the “Welch Plaintiff”). An individual and an entity filed
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`separate motions to intervene in the action, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on
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`lack of subject matter jurisdiction after the motions to intervene had been filed. The court
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`granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motions to intervene because “intervention will not
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`be permitted to breathe life into a nonexistent lawsuit.” Exodus, 2006 WL 2355071, at *1-2
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`(citing McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d 482, 486 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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`Similarly, in Warden, the plaintiffs moved to add an additional class representative in
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`response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The case was still in the pre-
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`certification stage when the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the defendants’ motion to
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`dismiss and denied intervention of an additional class representative into “an otherwise defunct
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`claim.” The court reasoned that “intervention will not be permitted to breathe life into a
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`nonexistent lawsuit.” Warden, 1998 WL 725946 at 5-7; see also McClune v. Shamah, 593 F.2d
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`482, 486 (3d Cir. 1979).
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`This Court is presented with a similar situation and should draw a similar conclusion here.
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`Twitter’s motion to compel arbitration will eliminate the five named Plaintiffs from this lawsuit
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`and result in the dismissal of all other claims. See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635,
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`638 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding district court acted within its discretion in dismissing action when all
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`claims are barred by an arbitration provision); Ginoyan v. Barclays Bank Delaware, 2020 WL
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`1974030, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (“[I]n the Ninth Circuit, district courts have discretion
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`to dismiss a party’s complaint if an arbitration clause ensnares all of the party’s claims.”). The
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`Court will hear Twitter’s motion on January 12 – prior to Plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Plaintiffs
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`should not be allowed to “breathe life into a nonexistent lawsuit.” Where, as here, the “true
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`purpose” of the motion to amend is to prevent a ruling on a pending motion that will eliminate the
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`case, the Court can deny leave to amend as prejudicial to the defendant. See, e.g., Franczak v.
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`Suntrust Mortgage Inc., No. 5:12-01453, 2013 WL 4764327, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013)
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`Case No. 3:22-cv-06857-JD
`TWITTER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 12 of 19
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`(finding the proposed amendment prejudicial to the defendant). In contrast, the proposed three
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`new plaintiffs will not be prejudiced, because they can choose to file a new separate action.
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`/ / /
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`B.
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`Leave to Amend Should Be Denied Under Rule 15.
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`The liberality of Rule 15 is greatly diminished because (1) the complaint has already
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`been amended once, (2) the amendment seeks to add new parties, and (3) no class has been
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`certified. The Court must view the factors relevant to amendment through that lens.
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`Specifically, in deciding whether to allow an amendment, district courts in the Ninth Circuit
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`consider four factors: (1) bad faith of the moving party; (2) undue delay in litigation; (3)
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`prejudice to the opposing party; and (4) futility of amendment. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 465
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`F.3d at 951; see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Zucco Partners, LLC v.
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`Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009); Soto v. Castlerock Farming and
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`Transport, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00701-AWI-JLT, 2011 WL 3489876, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9,
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`2011); Loehr v. Ventura County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1319 (9th Cir. 1984)). While
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`leave to amend under Rule 15 should be freely given “when justice so requires,” the Ninth
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`Circuit has cautioned that “liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several
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`limitations,” which include “undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics
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`C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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`The Ninth Circuit also has advised that a “district court’s discretion to deny leave to
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`amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Id. at 1058;
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`see also Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 79 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986). In
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`addition, under Rule 15(c), the paramount consideration for the Court here is the clear rule that
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`pleadings which seek to amend claims must be differentiated from those seeking to amend to
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`add parties. Union Pac. Railroad Co. v. Nev. Power Co., 950 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991)
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`(amendments seeking to add parties should be granted less freely than amendments adding
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`claims). The appropriateness of substituting in a new class representative “is primarily
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`applicable to cases in which a class has been certified[.]” See also Myers v. Intuit, Inc., 2018
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`Case No. 3:22-cv-06857-JD
`TWITTER’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
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`Case 3:22-cv-06857-JD Document 38 Filed 12/07/22 Page 13 of 19
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`WL 2287425 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2018); Sanchez v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 WL 2971553, at
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`*3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009) (“[L]eave to substitute a different class representative may be
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`granted when there is a certified class already in place.”). The prejudice and futility factors that
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`exist here weigh strongly and decidedly against the Court allowing the proposed amendments.
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`1.
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`Amendment Should Be Denied Based on Prejudice to Twitter.
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`The proposed amendment would prejudice Twitter. Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon,
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`Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Prejudice is the touchstone of the inquiry under rule
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`15(a).”). The proposed three new plaintiffs have no basis to assert any law claims under
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`California law or WARN claims, and they have no basis to litigate any contract-based claims in a
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`California court. Against this background, allowing them to join this litigation would unfairly
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`and unduly prejudice Twitter’s ability to proceed with its previously planned RIF administration
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`process because the sole purpose of the amendment is to maintain a vehicle for Plaintiffs’ counsel
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`to seek an order requiring Twitter to provide notice of the claims in this putative class action
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`under Rule 23(d), despite the fact that these three new plaintiffs cannot pursue those claims in
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`this action.
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`Courts routinely deny motions for leave to amend, even under the Rule 15 standard, where
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`the purpose of the amendment is to evade an earlier case-dispositive ruling or to create a “moving
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`target” in the hope of avoiding dismissal. See National Security Counselors v. Central
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`Intelligence Agency, 960 F.Supp.2d 101, 133-34 (D.D.C. 2013) (a court may “‘properly deny a
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`motion to amend when it appears that the plaintiff is using Rule 15 to make the complaint a
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`moving target, to salvage a lost case by untimely suggestion of new theories of recovery, [or] to
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`present theories seriatim in an effort to avoid dismissal.’”) (citing Minter v. Prime Equip. Co.,
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`4