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`wh LAW
`David Slade
`slade@wh.law
`Brandon Haubert
`brandon@wh.law
`Jessica Hall
`jessica@wh.law
`1 Riverfront Place, Suite 745
`North Little Rock, AR 72114
`Telephone: 501.891.6000
`Facsimile: 501.222.3027
`
`
`
`MILSTEIN JACKSON
`
`FAIRCHILD & WADE, LLP
`
`Gillian L. Wade, State Bar No. 229124
`gwade@mjfwlaw.com
`
`
`Sara D. Avila, State Bar No. 263213
`savila@mjfwlaw.com
`Marc A. Castaneda, State Bar No. 299001
`mcastaneda@mjfwlaw.com
`10990 Wilshire Blvd., 8th Floor
`Los Angeles, California 90024
`Tel: (310) 396-9600
`Fax: (310) 396-9635
`
`LYNCH CARPENTER, LLP
`Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr.
`Elizabeth Pollock-Avery
`Kenneth A. Held
`1133 Penn Ave, 5th Floor
`Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
`Tel: (412) 322-9243
`Fax: (412) 231-0246
`ekilpela@lcllp.com
`elizabeth@lcllp.com
`ken@lcllp.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs individually and
`on behalf of all others similarly situated
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`LAUREN HUGHES and JANE DOE,
`individually and on behalf of all others
`similarly situated,
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`v.
`
`APPLE, INC.
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
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`
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`Case No.:
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`1. Negligence
`Strict Liability- Design Defect
`2.
`(Consumer Expectation Test)
`3.
`Strict Liability-Design Defect (Risk-
`Benefit Test)
`4. Unjust Enrichment
`Intrusion Upon Seclusion
`5.
`6. Violations of California’s Constitutional
`Right to Privacy
`7. Violations of CIPA, Cal. Pen. C. §§630,
`et seq.
`8. Negligence Per Se
`9. Violations of UCL’s Unlawful Prong,
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Cal. Bus. & Prof. C. §§17200, et seq.
`10. Violations of UCL’s Unfair Prong, Cal.
`Bus. & Prof. C. §§17200, et seq.
`11. Violations of UCL’s Fraudulent Prong,
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. C. §§17200, et seq.
`12. Violations of N.Y. Bus. Law §349
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`INTRODUCTION
`Each year, an estimated 13.5 million people are victims of stalking in the United
`1.
`States, with nearly one in three women and one in six men experiencing stalking at some point in
`their lifetime.1
`Stalking can manifest in a host of ways, most often through unwanted and
`2.
`repeated behaviors such as phone calls, texts, visits, gifts, internet posts, or any other series of
`acts that would cause fear in a reasonable person. Regardless of the acts the stalker employs, the
`common theme of stalking behavior is the fear elicited in the victim.
`This fear undermines and erodes a victim’s autonomy and drastically disrupts
`3.
`their day-to-day life. One in eight employed stalking victims miss time from work because of
`their victimization and more than half lose more than five days of work.2 One in seven stalking
`victims move as a result of their victimization.3 Unsurprisingly, stalking victims suffer much
`higher rates of depression, anxiety, insomnia, and social dysfunction than people in the general
`population.4
`Technology has increased the tools available to a stalker, with burner phones or
`4.
`call blocking software providing anonymity, and free email services and social media platforms
`providing a limitless vector for harassing electronic messages and posts.
`One of the most dangerous and frightening technologies employed by stalkers is
`5.
`the use of real-time location information to track victims. These technologies allow stalkers to
`follow their victims’ movements in real time and to undo any attempt on the part of the victim to
`
`
`1 Stalking Prevention Awareness and Resource Center (SPARC), Stalking Fact Sheet (available
`at https://www.stalkingawareness.org/wp-
`content/uploads/2019/01/SPARC_StalkngFactSheet_2018_FINAL.pdf)
`2 Baum, K., Catalano, S., & Rand, M. (2009). Stalking Victimization in the United States.
`Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics
`3 Id.
`4 Blaauw, E., Arensman, E., Winkel, F.W., Freeve, A., & Sheridan, L. (2002). The Toll of
`Stalking. Journal of Interpersonal Violence 17(1): 50-63
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`evade or hide from the stalker. If one’s location is constantly being transmitted to an abuser,
`there is no place to run.
`One of the products that has revolutionized the scope, breadth, and ease of
`6.
`location-based stalking is the Apple AirTag. Introduced in April 2021, this device is roughly the
`size of a quarter, and its sole purpose is to transmit its location to its owner.
`What separates the AirTag from any competitor product is its unparalleled
`7.
`accuracy, ease of use (it fits seamlessly into Apple’s existing suite of products), and
`affordability. With a price point of just $29, it has become the weapon of choice of stalkers and
`abusers.
`The AirTag works by emitting signals that are detected by Bluetooth sensors on
`8.
`the hundreds of millions of Apple products across the United States. These sensors comprise
`Apple’s “FindMy” network. When a device on the network detects a signal from the missing
`device, it reports that missing device’s location back to Apple, which in turn reports it to the
`owner.
`
`The ubiquity of Apple products, and their constituency in the FindMy network,
`9.
`means that an AirTag can more reliably transmit location data than any competitor. Indeed, in
`all metropolitan areas, and even many rural areas, one is never more than 100 yards away from
`an Apple device. Thus, one is never more than 100 yards away from having location data
`transmitted back to Apple.
`None of this came as a surprise to Apple. Prior to and upon the AirTag’s release,
`10.
`advocates and technologists urged the company to rethink the product and to consider its
`inevitable use in stalking. In response, Apple heedlessly forged ahead, dismissing concerns and
`pointing to mitigation features that it claimed rendered the devices “stalker proof.”
`The concerns were well founded. Immediately after the AirTag’s release, and
`11.
`consistently since, reports have proliferated of people finding AirTags placed in their purses, in
`or on their cars, and even sewn into the lining of their clothes, by stalkers in order to track their
`whereabouts. The consequences have been as severe as possible: at least two reported murders
`have occurred in which the murderer used an AirTag to track the victim.
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`Its “stalker proof” protections exposed as totally inadequate, Apple spent the rest
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`of 2021 and 2022 scrambling to address its failures in protecting people from unwanted,
`dangerous tracking. To date, most if not all, of these failures persist.
`Plaintiffs, each of whom are victims of stalking through the use of an AirTag,
`13.
`bring this action on behalf of themselves and a class and subclasses of individuals who have been
`and who are at risk of stalking via this dangerous product.
`Apple’s acts and practices, as detailed further herein, amount to acts of
`14.
`negligence, negligence per se, intrusion-upon-seclusion, and product liability, constitute unjust
`enrichment, and violate California’s constitutional right to privacy, California's Invasion of
`Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code § 630, et seq. (“CIPA”), California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal.
`Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (“UCL”), and New York General Business Law § 349
`(“GBL”). Plaintiffs, in a representative capacity, seek statutory damages, actual damages, and
`punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief against Apple, correcting Apple’s
`practice of releasing an unreasonably dangerous product into the stream of commerce,
`misrepresenting the harms associated therewith, and facilitating the unwanted and unconsented
`to location tracking of Plaintiffs and Class members.
`PARTIES
`Plaintiff Lauren Hughes is a citizen of Travis County, Texas.
`15.
`Plaintiff Jane Doe is a citizen of Kings County, New York.
`16.
`Defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) is an American multinational technology
`17.
`company headquartered in Cupertino, California. Among Apple’s flagship items of consumer
`electronics is the AirTag, and Apple generally oversees all aspects of this device, including but
`not limited to its design, manufacture, marketing, and technical support and maintenance.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of
`18.
`2005 (“CAFA”), this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this putative nationwide class
`action because the matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs,
`
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`and is a class action in which some members of the Class are citizens of states different than
`Defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because its worldwide
`19.
`headquarters are in California, and because it conducts in California substantial business from
`which the claims in this case arise.
`INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
`Venue properly lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because
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`Apple is headquartered in this district and a substantial part of the events or omissions which
`give rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in in this district.
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`A. Apple AirTags, Generally
`The AirTag was introduced in April 2021 as a standalone product. Roughly the
`21.
`size of a US quarter, it is a tracking beacon, meant to help consumers locate other objects, such
`as keys or purses.5
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`Fig. 1
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`5 Apple, “Apple introduces AirTag” Press Release (Apr. 20, 2021) (available at
`https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2021/04/apple-introduces-airtag/).
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`Fig. 2
`AirTags are not themselves connected to the Internet. Instead, they utilize
`22.
`Bluetooth technology, emitting Bluetooth signals to any Apple device that is nearby. In turn,
`those Apple devices report where an AirTag has last been seen.6 Once an AirTag is identified as
`being near an Apple device or multiple Apple devices, the devices act as crowdsourced beacons,
`pinging with the AirTag to locate it for the AirTag’s owner. The owner sees the AirTag on a
`map, and as they get closer to the AirTag, the owner switches interfaces and is directed with an
`arrow, sending them right to the AirTag. E.g.
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`Fig. 3
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`6 Ryan Mac and Kashmir Hill, “Are Apple AirTags Being Used to Track People and Steal
`Cars?” New York Times (Dec. 30, 2021) (available at
`https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/30/technology/apple-airtags-tracking-stalking.html)
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`Bluetooth range is approximately 30 feet. Thus, for an AirTag to be identified by
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`an Apple device, it must come within 30 feet of that device, at which time, the AirTag will have
`been located on Apple’s network of iPhones, iPads, iPods, etc. that are owned and used by
`consumers in the United States.7 This network is vast: as of 2017, 64% of Americans owned an
`Apple product.8
`Because of this technology and because of the ubiquity of Apple products, it is
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`virtually impossible to hide from an AirTag in most, if not all, populated areas. As one
`commentator challenged his readers: “try getting through the day without coming within 30 feet
`of an iPhone or iPad.”9
`Eva Galperin, the director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
`25.
`points out that this ubiquity of Apple products makes AirTags “uniquely harmful,” explaining
`“Apple automatically turned every iOS device into part of the network that AirTags use to report
`the location of an AirTag….The network that Apple has access to is larger and more powerful
`than that used by the other trackers. It’s more powerful for tracking and more dangerous for
`stalking.”10
`B. Within Days of the Release of the AirTag, Technologists and Advocates Urged
`Apple to Consider the Risk Inherent in the Product
`
`Immediately after Apple announced the release of the AirTag, prominent voices
`26.
`in the tech and domestic violence advocacy spaces began warning Apple of the risks inherent in
`its new product.
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`7 Albert Fox Cahn, “Apple’s AirTags Are A Gift to Stalkers,” Wired (May 13, 2021) (available at
`https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-apples-air-tags-are-a-gift-to-stalkers/)
`8 Steve Leisman, “America loves its Apple. Poll finds that the average household owns more
`than two Apple products” CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017) (available at
`https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/09/the-average-american-household-owns-more-than-two-apple-
`products.html)
`9 “Apple’s AirTags Are A Gift to Stalkers,” note 7, supra.
`10 “Are Apple AirTags Being Used to Track People and Steal Cars?” note 6, supra.
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`27. Within roughly a week of the product’s announcement, representatives from the
`National Network to End Domestic Violence spoke out about the serious harms that AirTags
`pose. Erica Olsen, the Safety Net Project Director at NNEDV, explained: “When somebody tries
`to leave an abusive person, or they are planning to leave, that can be one of the most dangerous
`times that stalking and assault can escalate. So it’s extremely important if people are planning to
`leave an abusive person, they’re able to do so without the person tracking them down and finding
`them. It’s definitely a concern that people will be using any type of [tracking] product they
`can.”11
`Corbin Streett, a Technology Safety Specialist at NNEDV, elaborated further that
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`individuals being abused by domestic partners were particularly susceptible to being victimized
`by AirTags: “[Apple] is thinking about the threat model where it’s a stalker who is walking by
`someone on the street they don’t know—that stranger danger model—but what about when it is
`the person you come home to every day?...[H]ow do you build it in a way that those folks who
`are in relationships, so that this can’t be used against them? I hope Apple keeps their learning hat
`on and works to figure out that piece of the puzzle.”12
`As another example, on May 5, 2021, Geoffrey Fowler, the prominent tech
`29.
`reporter for the Washington Post, published a story titled Apple’s AirTag trackers made it
`frighteningly easy to ‘stalk’ me in a test—Apple knows its tiny new lost-item gadgets could
`empower domestic abuse but doesn’t do enough to stop it,” in which he cautioned:
`Along with helping you find lost items, AirTags are a new means
`of inexpensive, effective stalking. I know because I tested AirTags
`by letting a Washington Post colleague pretend to stalk me. And
`Apple’s efforts to stop the misuse of its trackers just aren’t
`sufficient.
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`11 Mark Wilson, “Apple AirTags could enable domestic abuse in terrifying ways,” Fast Company
`(Apr. 29, 2021) (available at https://www.fastcompany.com/90630404/apple-airtags-could-
`enable-domestic-abuse-in-terrifying-ways)
`12 Id.
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`AirTags show how even Apple, a company known for emphasizing
`security and privacy, can struggle to understand all the risks
`involved in creating tech that puts everyday things online.
`
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`For most people, AirTags will be a useful convenience that offers
`precise tracking and a replaceable battery. So why focus on these
`problems? Because personal tech is no longer just about you. My
`job as a consumer advocate is to consider the people technology
`helps — and those it hurts…. Digital stalking is remarkably
`common, experts say, and it’s strongly linked to physical abuse,
`including murder.13
`
`Eva Galperin, the director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
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`expressed her concerns even before the product's launch last spring: “I was concerned ahead of
`their release as soon as I figured out how they worked. I was concerned very shortly after they
`were released when I started seeing reports of stalking and being contacted by people who were
`being stalked using these devices.” While acknowledging that Apple subsequently engaged in
`mitigation efforts—see, Section E, infra—Galperin went on to state that “[t]he mitigations that
`Apple had in place at the time that the AirTag came out were woefully insufficient,” and “the
`fact that they chose to bring the product to market in the state that it was in last year, is
`shameful.”14
`31. Wired released a story on the issue in a May 13, 2021 titled “Apple’s AirTags Are
`a Gift to Stalkers,” in which the author, Albert Fox Cahn, warned:
`Apple needs to take domestic abuse and stalking seriously. More
`than 10 million Americans have likely faced stalking in their
`lifetimes, with more than a million facing this threat every
`year. The rates for intimate partner violence is even starker,
`with more than a quarter of women and 10 percent of men
`reporting abuse. These are not outliers, this is an epidemic of
`
`13 Geoffrey Fowler, “Apple’s AirTag trackers made it frighteningly easy to ‘stalk’ me in a test—
`Apple knows its tiny new lost-item gadgets could empower domestic abuse but doesn’t do enough
`to stop it,” Washington Post (May 5, 2021) (available at
`https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/05/apple-airtags-stalking/)
`14 Michael Levitt, “AirTags are being used to track people and cars. Here's what is being done
`about it” NPR (Feb. 18, 2022) (available at https://www.npr.org/2022/02/18/1080944193/apple-
`airtags-theft-stalking-privacy-tech).
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`violence touching nearly every corner of our globe. When Apple
`fails to protect survivors, the consequences can be fatal. Apple
`leadership needs to give abuse survivors and experts a central place
`in its development process, incorporating their feedback from the
`start. Otherwise, the company will continue to make products that
`endanger people more than they help.15
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`C. Apple Affirmatively Sought to Dismiss and Minimize Concerns About the Threats
`Surrounding AirTags, Going So Far As to Call the Product “Stalker-Proof”
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`Upon the release of AirTags, rather than heed the concerns of outside groups and
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`commentators, Apple proactively sought to minimize and dismiss those concerns, arranging for
`interviews with high-level executive16 touting the safety of the product. Apple went so far as to
`represent, in multiple media outlets, that AirTags are “Stalker-Proof”:
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`Fig. 417
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`15 “Apple’s AirTags Are A Gift to Stalkers,” note 7, supra.
`16 The principal interviewees appear to be Kaiann Drance, Apple’s VP of worldwide iPhone
`product marketing, and Ron Huang, the Apple’s senior director of sensing and connectivity.
`17 José Adorno, “Apple execs explain how AirTag is ‘stalker-proof’ and whether you should use
`it to track pets,” 9to5 Mac (Apr. 22, 2021) (available at https://9to5mac.com/2021/04/22/apple-
`execs-explain-how-airtag-is-stalker-proof-and-whether-you-should-use-it-to-track-pets/)
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`18 Michael Grothaus, “How Apple designed AirTags to be privacy-first and stalker-proof,” Fast
`Company (Apr. 22, 2021) (available at https://www.fastcompany.com/90628073/apple-airtag-
`privacy-security) (interviewing Drance and Huang)
`19 “AirTag is stalker-proof even with Android users,” Telegraph (Apr. 22, 2021) (available at
`https://techtelegraph.co.uk/airtag-is-stalker-proof-even-with-android-users/)
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`Fig. 720
`These representations, and others, were part of an intentional, coordinated press
`33.
`campaign on the part of Apple, in which its executives and its publicists actively sought to
`portray the AirTag as a harmless—indeed “stalker-proof”—product. Thus, not only did Apple
`fail to adequately disclose the risks associated with the AirTag, it affirmatively misled the public
`and the press as to those risks.
`D. Following Its Release, Reports Proliferated of People Being Stalked Via AirTags
`
`34. Within months of the release of AirTags, reports began to abound of people being
`stalked by the product. A recent article in The Verge explained
`There’s no question that AirTags can be — and have been —
`abused. Sports Illustrated model Brooks Nader recently reported
`finding a stranger’s AirTag in her coat. One Connecticut man was
`arrested for placing an AirTag on his ex-girlfriend’s car; a Texas
`man admitted to doing the same to his estranged wife last month.
`
`
`20 Dave LeClair, “Apple Says AirTags Are Stalker-Proof, Not For Tracking Kids and Pets,” (Apr.
`22, 2021) (available at https://www.makeuseof.com/airtags-stalker-proof-not-kids-pets/)
`
`
`11
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-07668 Document 1 Filed 12/05/22 Page 14 of 43
`
`
`
`A New York Times reporter successfully used them to track her
`husband’s every move (for a story).21
`
`A December 2021 New York Times article (different from the one mentioned in
`35.
`The Verge piece above) noted individuals reporting abuse on TikTok, Twitter, and Reddit,
`stating that “There is growing concern that the devices may be abetting a new form of stalking,
`which privacy groups predicted could happen when Apple introduced the devices in April.”22
`The anecdotal reports are often chilling, as illustrated by one commenter on
`36.
`Reddit who cautioned
`Check EVERYTHING. I have a friend who had this exact
`problem, traveling alone, AirTag notifications even though she
`didn’t have one. She went to the police and they searched
`everything and found one hidden with extra sticky tape underneath
`a flap in her backpack. They told her they’ve seen these in
`trafficking circles. They kept the tag to investigate and gave her
`stuff back and told her to be extra vigilant[.]23
`
`Victims have been stalked across the country, in places like New York,24
`37.
`California,25 Pennsylvania,26 Mississippi,27 and even at Disney World,28 but the abuse is
`
`
`21 Monica Chin and Victoria Song “AirTags Are Dangerous — Here’s How Apple Could Fix
`Them” The Verge (Mar. 1, 2022) (available at
`https://www.theverge.com/2022/3/1/22947917/airtags-privacy-security-stalking-solutions)
`22 “Are Apple AirTags Being Used to Track People and Steal Cars?” note 6, supra.
`23
`https://www.reddit.com/r/applehelp/comments/rkfxnr/unsettling_notification_re_detected_airtag
`_cause/
`24 Sara Boboltz “AirTags Are A Growing Headache For Apple Amid Disturbing Reports Of
`Tracking,” Huffington Post (Dec. 2, 2022) (available at
`https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/apple-airtags-tracking_n_61f425ade4b067cbfa1cb2b8)
`25 “Are Apple AirTags Being Used to Track People and Steal Cars?” note 6, supra.
`26 Zahriah Balentine, “2 women believe Apple Airtag was used to stalk them after leaving Central
`Pa. restaurant,” Williamsport Sun-Gazette (Jan. 21, 2022) (available at
`https://www.sungazette.com/news/2022/01/2-women-believe-apple-airtag-was-used-to-stalk-
`them-after-leaving-central-pa-restaurant/)
`27 Sara Boboltz AirTags Are A Growing Headache For Apple Amid Disturbing Reports Of
`Tracking, Huffington Post (Dec. 2, 2022) (available at
`https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/apple-airtags-tracking_n_61f425ade4b067cbfa1cb2b8)
`
`
`12
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
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`

`Case 3:22-cv-07668 Document 1 Filed 12/05/22 Page 15 of 43
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`
`
`international in scope, with one woman reporting a harrowing experience in Paris following a
`flight from the US.29
`Tragically, in multiple instances, AirTag tracking led directly to a murder.
`38.
`39.
`In January 2022, an Akron, Ohio woman was stalked by her ex-boyfriend, who
`buried an AirTag in the back pocket of the passenger seat in her car. The stalker used the AirTag
`to follow the woman and shoot her.30
`In June of 2022, an Indianapolis woman hid an AirTag in her boyfriend’s car,
`40.
`followed him to a bar, and ran him over with her car, killing him at the scene.31
`E. Individuals Have Few, If Any, Meaningful Remedies When They Are Tracked
`
`41. While Apple has built safeguards into the AirTag product, they are woefully
`inadequate, and do little, if anything, to promptly warn individuals if they are being tracked.
`Moreover, there is a gross imbalance between the protections available to iOS/Apple users,
`versus those available to individuals with Android devices—rendering Android users nearly
`defenseless to tracking/stalking using an AirTag.
`Remedies for iOS Users (and Their Limitations)
`Apple has attempted to mitigate the potential danger of being unwantedly tracked
`42.
`with an AirTag by introducing several features into its operating (iOS) architecture.
`Device-based text notifications: if an individual has an iPhone, iPad, or iPod
`43.
`Touch with iOS 14.5 or later, their phone is programmed to display an alert if the phone detects
`
`
`
`
`28 Caitlyn Shelton, AirTag tracks family through Disney World, ABC News 10 (May 3, 2022)
`(available at https://www.news10.com/news/crime/airtag-tracks-family-through-disney-world/)
`29 Maggie Kim, I Was Stalked with an Apple AirTag—Here’s What I Wish I’d Known, Reader’s
`Digest (Feb. 11. 2022) (available at https://www.rd.com/article/apple-airtag-stalking/)
`30 Family Believes Akron Mother Was Chased Before Murder, Ohio News (March 2, 2022)
`(available
`at
`https://darik.news/ohio/family-believes-akron-mother-was-chased-before-
`murder/532936.html)
`31 Alexis McAdams, Apple AirTags, meant to help you track your stuff, have become tools of
`criminals,
`Fox
`News
`(June
`14,
`2022)
`(available
`at
`stalkers
`and
`https://www.foxnews.com/tech/apple-airtag-stalking-dangerous-crime)
`
`
`13
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-07668 Document 1 Filed 12/05/22 Page 16 of 43
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`an unknown AirTag moving with the device. The warning in question states: “AirTag Found
`Moving With You. The location of this AirTag can be seen by the owner.”
`
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`Fig. 832
`This alert, however, is not immediate. Originally, Apple’s algorithm would wait
`44.
`72 hours before notifying an individual that they had been in the proximity of an unknown
`AirTag. Put another way, a victim could have been stalked for three days before Apple alerted
`them of the potential danger.33 Recently, Apple reduced the time period for the notification, but
`individuals still report not receiving an alert after as much as a day of being tracked—
`“[a]ccording to Apple, the timing of the alerts can vary depending on the iPhone’s operating
`system and location settings,”34 but users have no control over this. As a report by an industry
`
`
`32 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212227
`33 “AirTags Are Dangerous — Here’s How Apple Could Fix Them,” note 21, supra.
`34 “Are Apple AirTags Being Used to Track People and Steal Cars?” note 6, supra.
`
`
`14
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`

`

`Case 3:22-cv-07668 Document 1 Filed 12/05/22 Page 17 of 43
`
`
`
`expert noted, “Apple estimates it takes between four and eight hours to send an alert, which
`could be a potentially fatal span of time.”35
`Further, the notification only gets sent to individuals who have (1) iPhones, iPads,
`45.
`or iPod Touches that (2) run iOS version 14.5 or later. This means that the notifications do not
`appear for owners of older iPhones running older software.36
`Remedies for Android Users (and Their Limitations)
`46. While an iPhone owner might get a timely alert that then makes them aware of the
`potential danger of being tracked by an AirTag, users of Android phones and devices do not have
`that protection, as their devices run on the Android operating system, which is outside of the
`control of Apple. To date, Apple has not worked in conjunction with Google to provide
`automated alerts when Android users are being stalked.
`Thus, individuals who do not own iPhones, iPads, or iPod Touches are thus more
`47.
`vulnerable to being tracked using an AirTag. Android mobile devices have a 41.9% market
`share in the United States,37 meaning that almost half of America’s population would not receive
`any notification if they were being stalked by an AirTag.
`Apple recently developed an app (“Tracker Detect”) for Android devices, but it is
`48.
`inadequate for multiple reasons.
`
`
`35 Michael Simon, “Apple has an AirTag Problem—here’s how to solve it.” Macworld (Jan. 21,
`2022)
`(available
`at
`https://www.macworld.com/article/606934/apple-airtag-problem-
`notifications-android-sound.html)
`36 The notification also purportedly enables the iPhone, iPad, or iPod Touch user to have the
`AirTag emit a beep so that it can be located. As discussed in paragraphs 53-58, infra, the sound
`the AirTag emits is hard to hear and easily confused with other gadgets. More importantly,
`however, this feature appears not to work reliably. One reporter who tested it stated: “The
`AirTag was literally inches away from [the test] phone, but it wouldn’t connect. We tried
`multiple times. Nada. The same thing happened to me when I was trying to find which pocket of
`my bag my husband had stashed his AirTag in. My phone was in my hand. My bag was in my
`other hand. Nothing. This is obviously an issue, as it’s hard to get rid of an unknown AirTag if
`you can’t find it. Another problem is that sound alerts may not be helpful if a victim is trying to
`find the tracker discreetly without tipping off their abuser.” See, “AirTags Are Dangerous —
`Here’s How Apple Could Fix Them,” note 21, supra.
`37 https://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/united-states-of-america
`
`
`15
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`

`Case 3:22-cv-07668 Document 1 Filed 12/05/22 Page 18 of 43
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`First, the Android device owner would have to be alerted to, or suspect, the
`49.
`potential of AirTag stalking in the first instance, and would then have to search the Google App
`Store to find Apple’s app. Apple has not taken meaningful steps to alert Android users of the
`threat posed by AirTags, and to date, Tracker Detect has only (ro

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