Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 175 Filed 02/24/25 Page 1 of 3
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`ASHLEY M GJOVIK,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 23-cv-04597-EMC
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`ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
`MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
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`Docket Nos. 156
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`Currently pending before the Court is Ms. Gjovik’s motion to disqualify defense counsel,
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`the Orrick law firm. Having considered the papers submitted, the Court finds the matter suitable
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`for disposition on the papers. The hearing on the motion is therefore VACATED. Ms. Gjovik’s
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`motion to disqualify is DENIED.
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`I.
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`DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Legal Standard
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`"The right to disqualify counsel is a discretionary exercise of the
`trial court's inherent powers." Under the Civil Local Rules of the
`Northern District of California, all attorneys who practice in the
`Northern District must comply with the standards of professional
`conduct required of members of the State Bar of California. Thus,
`motions to disqualify counsel are decided under state law. . . . Under
`California law, the issue of disqualification "ultimately involves a
`conflict between the clients' right to counsel of their choice and the
`need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility."
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`Del Campo v. Mealing, C 01-21151 JW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158019, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
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`29, 2011). In considering a motion to disqualify, a court must bear in mind “‘the preservation of
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`public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar.’” Id. at *8. On
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`the other hand, a court must also take into account that motions to disqualify are often tactically
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 175 Filed 02/24/25 Page 2 of 3
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`motivated; thus, in and of themselves, they can be a threat to the integrity of the judicial process
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`they purport to protect. See Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1103-
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`1104 (N.D. Cal. 2003). For this reason, motions to disqualify are often considered a drastic
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`measure, are disfavored, and are subject to close scrutiny. See id.
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`B.
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`Basis for Disqualification
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`In her motion, Ms. Gjovik identifies multiple grounds on which to disqualify Orrick. They
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`include the following: (1) Orrick has repeatedly harassed her online; (2) Orrick is a fact witness
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`because its harassment was part of Apple’s retaliation against her; (3) Orrick is also a fact witness
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`because Apple knowingly misrepresented to Ms. Gjovik that there were no other complaints
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`lodged against one of her supervisors but Orrick knew this was not true based on its representation
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`of Apple in a different lawsuit; (3) Orrick has either conspired with or coerced Cher Scarlett,
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`another former Apple employee, to harass Ms. Gjovik (e.g., when Ms. Scarlett filed a restraining
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`order suit against Ms. Gjovik); (4) Orrick advised Apple on her termination and further has
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`concealed that Ms. Scarlett played a role in the retaliation against and/or termination of Ms.
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`Gjovik; (5) Orrick has engaged in additional conduct that has obstructed discovery (e.g., through
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`blanket assertions of privilege); (6) Orrick lacks competence in environmental and privacy law
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`and is improperly trying to dismiss her environmental and privacy claims; and (7) there was a data
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`breach at Orrick that may have compromised Ms. Gjovik’s private information.
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`None of the grounds, whether considered individually or collectively, warrants
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`disqualification. For example, it is sheer speculation on the part of Ms. Gjovik that Orrick has
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`been part of the online harassment and/or that Orrick has conspired with or coerced Ms. Scarlett.
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`See, e.g., Mot. at 5-7 (arguing that Orrick must have been part of the online harassment because
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`online attacks increased after Orrick first made an appearance in her whistleblower retaliation case
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`with the U.S. Department of Labor and after Orrick suffered legal setbacks in other employment
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`cases where they represented Apple); Mot. at 6, 11 (suggesting that Orrick and Ms. Scarlett were
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`colluding because Orrick obtained a copy of Ms. Scarlett’s restraining order against Ms. Gjovik
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`“on the same day [it] filed Apple’s position statement with the Department of Labor” and because
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`Orrick used an email from Ms. Scarlett to justify Ms. Gjovik’s termination).
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 175 Filed 02/24/25 Page 3 of 3
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`To the extent Ms. Gjovik argues that Orrick has engaged in discovery misconduct (e.g.,
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`concealing the role of Ms. Scarlett and making blanket assertions of privilege), that is a matter that
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`should first be raised in the first instance with the magistrate judge presiding over discovery
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`matters. There has been no finding by the magistrate judge assigned to handle discovery in this
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`case that Orrick has engaged in abusive conduct in the handling of discovery.1
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`Ms. Gjovik’s contention that Orrick is a fact witness lacks merit. As noted above, her
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`assertion that Orrick has been part of the harassment against her is entirely unfounded. As for
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`Apple’s allegedly false statement that no complaints had ever been made against one of her
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`supervisors, that is something that Ms. Gjovik should be able to prove, if untrue, through an Apple
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`employee, not its counsel. Furthermore, as Orrick points out, the fact that it purportedly learned
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`information through its representation of Apple does not make it a fact witness.
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`Finally, Ms. Gjovik’s arguments of Orrick incompetence and a data breach at the firm as a
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`basis for disqualification have no support.
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`II.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the motion to disqualify is denied.
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`This order disposes of Docket No. 156.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: February 24, 2025
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`______________________________________
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`EDWARD M. CHEN
`United States District Judge
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`1 At the time Ms. Gjovik filed her motion to disqualify, she had not filed any motion for relief with
`the magistrate judge. Ms. Gjovik did not file any motions with the magistrate judge until some ten
`days later.
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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