Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 204 Filed 04/15/25 Page 1 of 4
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`ASHLEY M GJOVIK,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`Case No. 23-cv-04597-EMC
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`ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
`MOTION FOR PARTIAL FINAL
`JUDGMENT
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`Defendant.
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`Docket No. 189
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`Pending before the Court is Ms. Gjovik’s motion for partial final judgment pursuant to
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Having considered the papers submitted, the Court finds
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`the matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. The hearing on the motion is therefore
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`VACATED. Ms. Gjovik’s motion for relief is DENIED.
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`Rule 54(b) provides as follows:
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`When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when
`multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
`judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties
`only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
`delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated,
`that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
`of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the
`claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of
`a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and
`liabilities.
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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`The Supreme Court has instructed that,
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`in deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay . . . , a district
`court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well
`as the equities involved. Consideration of the former is necessary to
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 204 Filed 04/15/25 Page 2 of 4
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`ensure that application of the Rule effectively "preserves the history
`federal policy against piecemeal appeals."
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`Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (emphasis added). Thus, “if the
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`unadjudicated claims are closely related to those [already] decided, the district court should
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`generally refuse to enter a judgment under Rule 54(b)” but, if “the claims are sufficiently distinct
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`so that duplicative appellate review will be avoided, the court of appeals will generally find that
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`entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment was not an abuse of discretion.” Moore's Fed. Prac. – Civ. §
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`54.23[1][b]; see also Curtiss-Wright, 466 U.S. at 10 (indicating that a court should consider the
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`“interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be
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`reviewed only as single units”).
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`In the instant case, Ms. Gjovik asks that the Court enter a partial final judgment on all
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`claims that the Court has dismissed with prejudice and/or all claims for which the Court has
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`denied her leave to amend. See Docket Nos. 112, 179 (orders filed on 10/1/2024 and 2/27/2025).
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`Included among these claims are claims related to alleged environmentally unsafe conditions,
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`either at an Apple office or at Ms. Gjovik’s former residence (close to an Apple factory).1 Ms.
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`Gjovik’s main contentions in her motion are as follows:
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`(1) allowing an early appeal on these already-decided claims does not raise the
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`prospect of duplicative appellate review because the claims are factually and
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`legally distinct from her retaliation claims that survived Apple’s 12(b)(6)
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`challenges, see Mot. at 7 (contending that Apple has also characterized the claims
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`as distinct from the retaliation claims);
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`(2) the claims should be adjudicated by the Ninth Circuit now since they affect the
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`public interest (e.g., because they concern environmental safety), see Mot. at 17;
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`and
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`(3) Ms. Gjovik has a strong interest in having the claims adjudicated by the Ninth
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`Circuit now because, otherwise, she would not be able to tell the full narrative of
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`what transpired between her and Apple at trial. See Mot. at 10 (arguing that “[a]n
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`1 Other claims include: violation of RICO; violation of SOX; violation of the Dodd-Frank Act;
`violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act; and violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act.
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 204 Filed 04/15/25 Page 3 of 4
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`appellate ruling restoring these claims would allow the jury to consider, in one
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`proceeding, whether Apple engaged in dangerous and unlawful conduct, concealed
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`its wrongdoing, and then retaliated against an employee who came close to
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`uncovering it”); Mot. at 16 (arguing that “[t]he surviving retaliation claims cannot
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`fill the evidentiary or narrative gap left by the dismissed tort and statutory claims”
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`as “[t]he jury will not hear the details of Plaintiff’s toxic exposures, emotional
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`trauma, or Apple’s concealment unless those claims are reinstated [by the Ninth
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`Circuit]”).
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`The Court has considered Ms. Gjovik’s main contentions as well as the other contentions
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`in her papers. It concludes that entry of a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) is not
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`appropriate for a number of reasons, including the following.
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`First, as Apple correctly points out, several of the already-decided claims do involve
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`allegations of retaliation, and thus they are not distinct from the retaliation claims that the Court is
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`allowing to proceed. See, e.g., Opp’n at 10-12.
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`Second, entry of a partial final judgment does not require that factual and legal issues
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`between adjudicated and unadjudicated claims be identical; similarity is sufficient. See Morrison-
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`Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) (asking whether “the appellate court
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`will be required to address legal or factual issues that are similar to those contained in the claims
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`still pending before the trial court[;] [a] similarity of legal or factual issues will weigh heavily
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`against entry of judgment under [Rule 54(b)]”) (emphasis added). Here, there are at the very least
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`similar factual issues. For example, for the retaliation claim brought under California Labor Code
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`§ 1102.5(b), Ms. Gjovik maintains that Apple retaliated against her because she complained about,
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`inter alia, environmental safety violations. Although Ms. Gjovik will not have to prove that
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`Apple actually violated an environmental safety law for this retaliation claim, she will still have to
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`show that she reasonably believed there was such a violation. See Killgore v. SpecPro Pro. Servs.,
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`LLC, 51 F.4th 973, 988 (9th Cir. 2022). Typically, a reasonable belief has a factual basis of some
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`kind. Thus, there will be similar factual issues raised in both the claims already adjudicated and
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`the unadjudicated § 1102.5 retaliation claim.
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`3
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 3:23-cv-04597-EMC Document 204 Filed 04/15/25 Page 4 of 4
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`Third, allowing an appeal of the adjudicated claims now does give rise to the threat of
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`duplicative appeals. Ms. Gjovik suggests that duplicative appeals could be avoided if the Ninth
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`Circuit were to rule in her favor before the trial on her retaliation claims. But this assumes that the
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`Ninth Circuit would rule in her favor and that it would do so prior to the trial on the retaliation
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`claims. Neither assumption is a guarantee – especially the latter since Ms. Gjovik has not asked
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`for a stay of proceedings on the retaliation claims pending appeal (which the Court would not be
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`inclined to grant if sought). And if she were to seek such a stay, that would, if anything,
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`underscore that there is factual overlap among her various claims since that would be the likely
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`basis for any stay request.
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`Fourth, that the claims at issue include claims related to environmental safety does not, in
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`and of itself, weigh in favor of “expedited” appellate review through Rule 54(b). Certainly, Ms.
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`Gjovik has not cited any authority to support this proposition.
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`Accordingly, the Court hereby denies Ms. Gjovik’s Rule 54(b) motion. The Court shall
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`not enter a partial final judgment on claims that have been dismissed or otherwise not permitted to
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`proceed. The Court also denies Ms. Gjovik’s alternative request for leave to amend.
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`This order disposes of Docket No. 189.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: April 15, 2025
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`______________________________________
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`EDWARD M. CHEN
`United States District Judge
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