Case 3:25-cv-03357-LJC Document 1 Filed 04/15/25 Page 1 of 12
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`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
`Michael D. Weil, Bar No. 209056
`michael.weil@morganlewis.com
`Curie Lee, Bar No. 317476
`curie.lee@morganlewis.com
`1400 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1124
`Tel:
`+1.650.843.4000
`Fax: +1.650.843.4001
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`Attorneys for Defendant
`TESLA, INC.
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`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`NATALIA CASA,
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`Case No.
`
`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
`TESLA, INC., a s corporation; and DOES 1
`through 50, inclusive,
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANT TESLA, INC.’S NOTICE
`OF REMOVAL OF COMPLAINT
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`Complaint Filed: February 28, 2025
`Trial Date:
`N/A
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`TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
`OF CALIFORNIA, AND TO PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446,
`Defendant Tesla, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Tesla”) hereby removes the above-entitled action originally
`filed from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, to the United States
`District Court for the Northern District of California.
`I.
`PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`1.
`On February 28, 2025, Plaintiff Natalia Casa (“Plaintiff”) filed an unverified
`complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, titled Natalia Casa
`v. Tesla, Inc., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 to 50, Case No. 25CV113662. The Complaint
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`NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:25-cv-03357-LJC Document 1 Filed 04/15/25 Page 2 of 12
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`alleges twelve causes of action arising under the Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”),
`California Labor Code, California Code of Civil Procedure, and California Business and
`Professions Code for (1) failure to provide meal periods; (2) failure to provide rest periods; (3)
`failure to provide accurate wage statements; (4) failure to reimburse employee for necessary
`expenditures; (5) waiting time penalty for nonpayment of wages; (6) failure to pay earned vacation
`upon termination; (7) wrongful discharge – public policy; (8) disability discrimination – disparate
`treatment; (9) disability discrimination – reasonable accommodation; (10) disability discrimination
`– failure to engage in interactive process; (11) retaliation under FEHA; and (12) violation of
`Business and Professions Code section 17200.
`2.
`On March 17, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendant personally with the Summons,
`Complaint, Notice of Case Assignment, Civil Case Cover Sheet, Alternative Dispute Resolution
`(ADR) Information Packet, Notice of Case Management Conference, and Certificate of Mailing.
`A true and correct copy of the Summons and Complaint is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated
`by reference. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Case Assignment, Civil Case Cover Sheet,
`Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information Packet, Notice of Case Management
`Conference, and Certificate of Mailing are attached as Exhibit B and incorporated by reference.
`3.
`On April 14, 2025, Tesla filed and served its Answer to the Complaint. A true and
`correct copy of Tesla’s Answer is attached as Exhibit C and incorporated by reference.
`4.
`The Summons, Complaint, Notice of Case Assignment, Civil Case Cover Sheet,
`Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information Packet, Notice of Case Management
`Conference, and Certificate of Mailing, and Answer (attached as Exhibits A – C) constitute the
`entirety of the process, pleadings, and orders that have been filed and served in this case to date.
`II.
`REMOVAL IS TIMELY
`5.
`Tesla has timely filed this Notice of Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because it
`is filed within thirty days of the March 17, 2025 service of the Summons and Complaint on Tesla.
`Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 354 (1999) (explaining that thirty-
`day removal period begins to run on the date of service).
`III. THIS COURT HAS ORIGINAL SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
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`6.
`Removal to this Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because (i) Plaintiff’s
`individual claims place more than $75,000 in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs; (ii) the
`action involves citizens of different states; and (iii) no properly joined defendant is a citizen of
`California.1
`A.
`Complete Diversity of Citizenship Exists.
`7.
`The complete diversity requirement merely means that all plaintiffs must be of
`different citizenship than all defendants, and any instance of common citizenship “deprives the
`district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
`Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). A party’s citizenship is determined at the time
`the lawsuit was filed. In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008)
`(“[T]he jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action [was]
`brought.”). In the present case, the parties had complete diversity of citizenship at the time the
`lawsuit was filed because Plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse from Tesla’s.
`i.
`Plaintiff is a Citizen of California.
`Plaintiff “is domiciled in California.” Ex. A, ¶ 2. Plaintiff does not allege any
`8.
`alternate state citizenship. Therefore, Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of California for purposes of
`removal. Boon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (C.D. Cal 2002) (“An individual is
`a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled.”); Lew v. Moss, 797 F. 2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986)
`(holding that for purposes of diversity, citizenship is determined by the individual’s domicile when
`the lawsuit is filed).
`ii.
`Tesla is Not a Citizen of California.
`9.
`For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a
`citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
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`1 Tesla reserves the right to supplement or provide the Court with additional briefing or
`information necessary to appropriately assess diversity requirements. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert
`Co., 265 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a party may “cure[] its defective allegations
`… by amending its notice of removal.”).
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`place of business.” 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1); see also Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. (9th Cir.
`2009) 557 F.3d 1026, 1028 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)).
`10.
`The Supreme Court of the United States in The Hertz Corp. v. Friend held that a
`corporate entity’s “principal place of business” for determining its citizenship is its “nerve center”:
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`We conclude that “principal place of business” is best read as referring to the place where
`a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities. It is the
`place that Courts of Appeals have called the corporation’s “nerve center.” And in
`practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its
`headquarters -- provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction,
`control, and coordination, i.e., the “nerve center” ....
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`(2010) 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (emphasis added).
`11.
`Tesla is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Texas, with its
`principal place of business and headquarters in Austin, Texas.2 Tesla is now, and was at the time
`of the filing of this action, a citizen of Texas.
`12.
`Therefore, at all times since Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit, Tesla is and has been
`a citizen of a state other than California within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1).
`iii.
`Doe Defendants Are Irrelevant for Purposes of Removal.
`13.
`The citizenship of Does 1 through 20 named in the Complaint is immaterial to the
`jurisdiction inquiry. For purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1332, courts disregard
`the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (“In determining
`whether a civil action is removable on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this
`title, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.”).
`14.
`The Ninth Circuit and this Court have upheld the statutory rule disregarding
`citizenship of Doe defendants. For example, this Court has recognized that “[i]t is black-letter law
`that the citizenship of Doe defendants ‘shall be disregarded’ for the purposes of removal and
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`2 Tesla’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2024, which is a public
`document and publicly accessible through the United States Securities and Exchange
`Commission’s website, lists Texas as Tesla’s State of Incorporation and 1 Tesla Road, Austin,
`Texas as Tesla’s principal executive offices:
`https://ir.tesla.com/_flysystem/s3/sec/000162828024043486/tsla-20240930-gen.pdf
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`diversity jurisdiction.” Munsey v. FCA US LLC, 2020 WL 12863658, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
`2020); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 690-91 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that for
`removal purposes, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded);
`Soliman v. Philip Morris, Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The citizenship of fictitious
`defendants is disregarded for removal purposes and becomes relevant only if and when the plaintiff
`seeks leave to substitute a named defendant.”); Sanders v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2022 WL
`6271879, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2022) (denying remand and recognizing the court “cannot
`consider Lynette Doe for purposes of diversity” as “Lynette Doe is a fictitious defendant”); Valdez
`v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2022 WL 4137691, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2022) (denying remand
`and holding that “the removal statute’s plain language, legislative history, and Ninth Circuit law
`militate against remand at this stage while keeping the door open for potential remand at a later
`time. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(b)(1) obligates courts to disregard Doe defendant’s citizenship at the time
`of removal.”); Wuerfel v. Lathrum, 2010 WL 3894198, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (“Although
`Plaintiff has sued several defendants (i.e., ‘Does 1 through 20’) under fictitious names, the
`citizenship of such defendants is disregarded when determining the propriety of removal.”).
`B.
`The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000.
`15.
`The removing party’s initial burden is to “file a notice of removal that includes ‘a
`plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’” Ibarra
`v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin
`Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014)). “By design, § 1446(a) tracks the general
`pleading requirement stated in Rule 8(a)” which requires only that the grounds for removal be stated
`in a “short and plain statement.” Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 553.
`16.
`Generally, a federal district court will first “consider whether it is ‘facially apparent’
`from the complaint that the jurisdictional amount is in controversy.” Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co.,
`443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). But a defendant may remove a suit
`to federal court notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiff to plead the required amount. Absent
`the facial showing from the complaint, the court may consider facts averred in the removal petition.
`Id. Next, if the defendant’s allegation(s) regarding the amount in controversy is challenged, then
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`“both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the
`amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1195. At that time, “it
`may be appropriate to allow discovery relevant to [the] jurisdictional amount prior to remanding.”
`Abrego, 443 F.3d at 691 (internal citation omitted).
`17.
`Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her by terminating her
`employment based on her disability and her “history of a physical or mental condition that limited
`a major life activity.” Ex. A, ¶¶ 11, 39-54. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant retaliated against
`Plaintiff based on her “engagement in protected activities.” Id., ¶¶ 55-57. Plaintiff also alleges that
`Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations and engage in an interactive process with
`Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10-11, 44-54. In addition to her FEHA claims, Plaintiff alleges wrongful
`terminated in violation of public policy. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed
`to provide meal periods, failed to provide rest periods, failed to furnish accurate wage statements,
`and failed to reimburse for necessary expenditures. Id. ¶¶ 1, 17-28, 32-35. Plaintiff also alleges
`waiting-time penalties for nonpayment of wages. Id., ¶¶ 29-31. Plaintiff further alleges that
`Defendant engaged in unfair business practices. Id. ¶¶ 58-61. In addition, Plaintiff seeks
`compensatory damages; general and compensatory damages; statutory damages and penalties;
`temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction; attorneys’ fees and costs; punitive and
`exemplary damages; and liquidated damages. Id., prayer for relief.
`18. While Tesla denies any and all liability to Plaintiff, based on a conservative, good-
`faith estimate of the value of the alleged damages in this action as further described below, the
`amount in controversy in this case well exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See Singer
`v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376–77 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that where a
`complaint does not allege a specific dollar amount, the case is removable if the removing defendant
`shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional amount is present); see also
`Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–35 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that Plaintiff’s
`damages claim, including lost wages, medical expenses, emotional distress and attorneys’ fees, was
`enough to put the amount in controversy above $75,000).
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`i.
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`Plaintiff’s Claim for Special Damages Alone Places Approximately
`$114,367.50 in Controversy.
`19.
`In the context of a wrongful termination case, special damages are often measured
`by an employee’s backpay and anticipated front pay. According to Tesla’s records, Plaintiff was
`employed as a non-exempt employee of Tesla, initially earning an hourly rate of $23 per hour.
`Plaintiff’s hourly rate increased over the course of her employment pursuant to Tesla’s Pay
`Progression Program, and by the time her employment with Tesla ended, Plaintiff was earning an
`hourly rate of $28.75. Plaintiff alleges that her standard work schedule consisted of twelve-hour
`shifts from 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM. Ex. A, ¶ 6. Per Tesla’s records, Plaintiff typically worked three
`or four days per week.
`20.
`Based on this, and conservatively assuming Plaintiff only worked three days a week,
`Plaintiff’s annual base salary equates to approximately $53,820 ($28.75 per hour x 12-hour shift x
`3 days a week x 52 weeks), or $4,485 per month, exclusive of overtime, double time, and holiday
`pay.
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`21.
`According to the most recent case-management statistics for U.S. District Courts, a
`jury trial in this case likely would not occur until March 2027. See United States District Court –
`Judicial Caseload Profile for the Northern District of California (stating median time from filing
`date to trial was 34.7 months for civil cases in this district).3 Plaintiff was terminated on January
`10, 2025. Ex. A, ¶ 11. Based on her estimated pay of $4,485 per month, by the time of trial,
`Plaintiff’s claim for lost wages alone from her termination on January 10, 2025 until trial is at least
`$114,367.50, if not more.4 See, e.g., Melendez v. HMS Host Family Rest., Inc., No. CV 11-3842,
`2011 WL 3760058, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011) (including projected lost wages from alleged
`adverse employment action to anticipated date of judgment in amount-in-controversy calculation);
`Rivera v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. C 08-02202, 2008 WL 2740399, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11,
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`3 Available at
`https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2022/CAN_District_Court_Caseload_Profile_June
`2022.pdf.
`4 Taking the lower and more conservative estimate of Plaintiff’s weekly base salary at $1,035
`(based on her working 12 hour shifts, three days a week) x (approximately 25.5 months from
`termination to date of trial) = $114,367.50.
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`2008) (considering “lost wages and benefits [that] may accrue” after removal); Celestino v. Renal
`Advantage Inc., No. C 06-07788, 2007 WL 1223699, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2007) (including
`future lost income in amount-in-controversy calculation).
`Thus, the amount in controversy from lost wages alone amounts to $114,367.50.
`22.
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`ii.
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`Plaintiff’s Meal Period and Rest Break Claims Place Approximately
`$18,975 in Controversy
`23.
`Plaintiff alleges that Tesla failed to provide her with uninterrupted duty-free meal
`periods and rest breaks. Ex. A, ¶¶ 17-22. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she “was required to,
`and actually did forgo” the “30-minute meal break and three 15-minute rest breaks during her
`twelve-hour shift.” Ex. A, ¶ 12, 19, 22.
`24.
`California Labor Code Section 226.7 provides that if an employer fails to provide
`meal or rest periods as required by law, the employer shall pay “one additional hour of pay at the
`employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period was not
`provided.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; see also Brinker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1039
`(2012). Assuming Tesla was lawfully required to provide such meal periods and rest breaks to
`Plaintiff, as is alleged in the Complaint, then Plaintiff could recover potentially a premium equal to
`one hour of pay for each meal period and rest break that purportedly was not provided. See Labor
`Code § 226.7; Brinker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1039 (2012).
`25.
`Plaintiff’s employment began on November 28, 2022. Ex. A, ¶ 6. Plaintiff was
`employed with Tesla for approximately 110 workweeks from November 28, 2022 to January 10,
`2025. Id. As set forth above, Plaintiff’s hourly rate upon hire was $23 per hour and increased to
`$28.75 per hour by the end of her employment with Tesla.
`26.
`Conservatively assuming Plaintiff only worked three days a week, and applying
`Plaintiff’s lowest hourly wage of $23 per hour, Plaintiff could potentially recover $14,522.50 for
`her meal period claim.5 Further, conservatively assuming a 50% violation rate for rest breaks,
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`5 Taking the lower and more conservative estimate of three meal period hours per week x 110
`workweeks x $23 hourly rate = $7,590.
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`Plaintiff could potentially recover $14,522.50 for her rest period claim.6 The total potential meal
`and rest period premiums thus equal approximately $18,975.
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`iii.
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`Plaintiff’s Claim for Wage Statement Penalties Places Approximately
`$8,950 in Controversy.
`27.
`Plaintiff alleges that Tesla failed to provide her with accurate, itemized wage
`statements “each and every pay period during Plaintiff’s employment.” Ex. A, ¶ 25. Plaintiff also
`alleges that, “[a]t all times relevant herein,” Tesla failed to maintain records of hours worked by
`Plaintiff as required under Labor Code §1174(d). Id., ¶ 24. Plaintiff seeks penalties under Labor
`Code section 226(e) for fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a wage statement
`violation occurred and one hundred dollars ($100) for each subsequent pay period in which a
`violation occurred, not to exceed four thousand dollars ($4,000).
`28.
`A one-year statutory period applies to Plaintiff’s claim for wage statement penalties.
`Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a); Falk v. Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, 237 Cal.App.4th 1454,
`1469 (2015). Plaintiff filed her Complaint on February 28, 2025. The liability period for this claim
`therefore extends from February 28, 2024 through the present. According to Tesla’s records,
`Plaintiff was paid on a bi-weekly basis and received approximately 90 wage statements over the
`course of the liability period. The amount in controversy for her wage statement claim is therefore
`$8,950.7
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`i.
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`Plaintiff’s Claim for General and Compensatory Damages Alone Likely
`Exceed $75,000.
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`Plaintiff also alleges compensatory damages and general damages. Ex. A, prayer
`29.
`for relief, ¶¶ 1,2. In determining whether the jurisdictional minimum is met, courts consider all
`recoverable damages, including emotional distress damages. “Emotional distress awards in
`California for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and discrimination under [FEHA]
`… can be large relative to the underlying economic damages.” Simpson v. Off. Depot, Inc., 2010
`WL 11597950, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2010). Because emotional distress damages frequently
`
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`6 Taking the lower and more conservative estimate of 4.5 rest period hours per week x 110
`workweeks x $23 hourly rate = $11,385.
`7 90 wage statement x $100 penalty - $50 penalty for initial violation = $8,950.
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`exceed $75,000, it is reasonable to assume that Plaintiff seeks in excess of $75,000 for alleged
`general and compensatory damages alone. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.
`333, 347–48 (1977), superseded by statute on other grounds; Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142
`F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1998). Indeed, numerous California Courts have awarded more than
`$75,000 in emotional distress damages alone. See, e.g., Keiffer v. Bechtel Corp., 65 Cal. App. 4th
`893, 895 (1998) (California Court of Appeal upheld jury award in excess of $75,000 for emotional
`distress damages); Satrap v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 42 Cal. App. 4th 72, 76 (1996) (jury award in
`excess of $75,000 in non-economic damages was upheld); Ward v. Cadbury Schweppes Bottling
`Grp., 2011 WL 7447633 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2011) (awarding a total of $7,550,000 in compensatory
`damages for emotional distress and physical injuries to six plaintiffs in age discrimination and
`wrongful termination case); Welch v. Ivy Hill Corp., No. BC414667, 2011 WL 3293268 (Los
`Angeles Sup. Ct. March 8, 2011) (awarding $1,270,000 in pain and suffering to employee in age
`discrimination action).8
`ii.
`Punitive Damages Further Increase the Amount in Controversy.
`30.
`Plaintiff also alleges an unspecified amount in punitive damages, based on actions
`she alleges were malicious, fraudulent, and/or oppressive, and/or done with a willful and conscious
`disregard for her rights. Ex. A, prayer for relief ¶ 6. Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages are
`part of the amount in controversy when determining diversity jurisdiction. Gibson v. Chrysler
`Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001).
`iii.
`Attorneys’ Fees Further Increase the Amount in Controversy.
`Plaintiff also seeks to recover an unspecified amount of attorneys’ fees. Ex. A,
`31.
`prayer for relief ¶ 5; see also Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b) (allowing “prevailing party” to recover
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`8 See also, e.g., EEOC v. Harris Farms, Inc., Docket No. 02-CV-06199-AW1-LJ0 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
`24, 2005) (jury verdict included damages for $53,000 in past earnings and $350,000 in emotional
`distress damages); Francies v. Kapla, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1381 (2005) (finding that wrongfully
`terminated plaintiff suffered $425,000 in non-economic damages, 607% of his $70,000 in
`economic damages); Campbell v. Nat’l Passenger R.R. Corp., 2010 WL 625362, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
`Feb. 18, 2010) (awarding $120,000 in non-economic damages); Astor v. Rent-A-Center, Docket
`No: 03AS048644 (Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2005) (jury verdict included $250,000 in
`non-economic damages).
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`reasonable attorneys’ fees). Courts have held that an award of attorneys’ fees may be considered
`for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Galt G/S, 142 F.3d at 1155–56
`(“We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with
`mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”);
`Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 2007) (attorneys’ fees are
`included in the calculation of the amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); Sanchez v.
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. S-06-cv-2573, 2007 WL 1345706, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 2007)
`(“Attorney’s fees, if authorized by statute or contract, are also part of the calculation.”). The total
`amount of attorneys’ fees that could accrue during the course of litigation are considered. Lippold
`v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., No. C 10–00421, 2010 WL 1526441, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010)
`(“a reasonable estimate of attorneys fees likely to be expended” should be included in calculating
`the amount in controversy); accord Pulera v. F & B, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00275 – MCEDAD,
`2008WL 3863489, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2008); Celestino, 2007 WL 1223699 at *4;
`Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Brady v. Mercedes-Benz, 243 F. Supp. 2d
`1004, 1010–11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2002).
`32.
`Conservatively assuming that Plaintiff’s counsel charges $300 per hour, attorneys’
`fees would total $75,000 after just 250 hours of work. See Sasso v. Noble Utah Long Beach, LLC,
`No. CV 14–09154–AB, 2015 WL 898468, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) (finding $300 per hour
`to be a “reasonable rate” for attorneys’ fees in employment cases and 100 hours to take a case to
`trial to be a “conservative” estimate; therefore, attorneys’ fees in employment cases “may
`reasonably be expected to equal at least $30,000 (100 hours x $300 per hour)”). Plaintiff’s counsel
`would likely exceed this amount during just the pretrial phase of litigation. Accordingly, the
`amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection with prosecuting this action would
`further increase the above estimates of the amount in controversy.
`IV. OTHER PREREQUISITES FOR REMOVAL HAVE BEEN SATISFIED
`33.
`This action was originally filed in the Superior Court for the County of Alameda.
`Initial venue is therefore proper in this district, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), because it
`encompasses the county in which this action has been pending.
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`34.
`Tesla will promptly serve this Notice of Removal on Plaintiff and will promptly file
`and serve a copy of this Notice of Removal with the Clerk of the Superior Court of the State of
`California, County of Alameda, in which the action is pending, as required under 28 U.S.C. §
`1446(d).
`35.
`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), true and correct copies of all “process, pleadings,
`and orders served” upon Tesla, as well as other documents filed in the state-court action, are filed
`concurrently with this Notice of Removal as exhibits.
`V.
`CONCLUSION
`36.
`Based on the foregoing, Tesla requests that this action be removed from the Superior
`Court of the State of California for the County of Alameda to the United States District Court for
`the Northern District of California, and that all future proceedings in this matter take place in the
`United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
`37.
`If any question arises as to the propriety of the removal of this action, Tesla requests
`the opportunity to present a brief and oral argument in support of its position that this case is subject
`to removal.
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`Dated: April 15, 2025
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`MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
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`By /s/Michael D. Weil
`Michael D. Weil
`Curie Lee
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`Attorneys for Defendant
`TESLA, INC.
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