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`Case 4:14-cv-04480-YGR Document 1 Filed 10/07/14 Page 1 of 19
`
`Eric D. Miller, Bar No. 218416
`EMiller@perkinscoie.com
`Michael A. Sussmann, D.C. Bar No. 433100
`(pro hac vice to follow)
`MSussmann@perkinscoie.com
`James G. Snell, Bar No. 173070
`JSnell@perkinscoie.com
`Hayley L. Berlin, D.C. Bar No. 1011549
`(pro hac vice to follow)
`HBerlin@perkinscoie.com
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`3150 Porter Drive
`Palo Alto, CA 94304-1212
`Tel: 650-838-4300
`Fax: 650-838-4350
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Twitter, Inc.
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`
`Case No. 14-cv-4480
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
`JUDGMENT, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202
`
`ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General of the
`United States,
`
`THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
`OF JUSTICE,
`
`JAMES COMEY, Director of the Federal
`Bureau of Investigation, and
`
`THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
`INVESTIGATION,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
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`
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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`Case 4:14-cv-04480-YGR Document 1 Filed 10/07/14 Page 2 of 19
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`
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`I.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`Twitter brings this action for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201
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`and 2202, requesting relief from prohibitions on its speech in violation of the First Amendment.
`2.
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`The U.S. government engages in extensive but incomplete speech about the scope
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`of its national security surveillance activities as they pertain to U.S. communications providers,
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`while at the same time prohibiting service providers such as Twitter from providing their own
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`informed perspective as potential recipients of various national security-related requests.
`3.
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`Twitter seeks to lawfully publish information contained in a draft Transparency
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`Report submitted to the Defendants on or about April 1, 2014. After five months, Defendants
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`informed Twitter on September 9, 2014 that “information contained in the [transparency] report is
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`classified and cannot be publicly released” because it does not comply with their framework for
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`reporting data about government requests under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
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`(“FISA”) and the National Security Letter statutes. This framework was set forth in a January 27,
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`2014 letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to five Internet companies (not
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`including Twitter) in settlement of prior claims brought by those companies (also not including
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`Twitter) (the “DAG Letter”).
`4.
`
`The Defendants’ position forces Twitter either to engage in speech that has been
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`preapproved by government officials or else to refrain from speaking altogether. Defendants
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`provided no authority for their ability to establish the preapproved disclosure formats or to
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`impose those speech restrictions on other service providers that were not party to the lawsuit or
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`settlement.
`5.
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`Twitter’s ability to respond to government statements about national security
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`surveillance activities and to discuss the actual surveillance of Twitter users is being
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`unconstitutionally restricted by statutes that prohibit and even criminalize a service provider’s
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`disclosure of the number of national security letters (“NSLs”) and court orders issued pursuant to
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`FISA that it has received, if any. In fact, the U.S. government has taken the position that service
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`
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`providers like Twitter are even prohibited from saying that they have received zero national
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`security requests, or zero of a particular type of national security request.
`6.
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`These restrictions constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint and content-based
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`restriction on, and government viewpoint discrimination against, Twitter’s right to speak about
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`information of national and global public concern. Twitter is entitled under the First Amendment
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`to respond to its users’ concerns and to the statements of U.S. government officials by providing
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`more complete information about the limited scope of U.S. government surveillance of Twitter
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`user accounts—including what types of legal process have not been received by Twitter—and the
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`DAG Letter is not a lawful means by which Defendants can seek to enforce their unconstitutional
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`speech restrictions.
`
`II.
`
`PARTIES
`
`7.
`
`Plaintiff Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) is a corporation with its principal place of
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`business located at 1355 Market Street, Suite 900, San Francisco, California. Twitter is a global
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`information sharing and distribution network serving over 271 million monthly active users
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`around the world. People using Twitter write short messages, called “Tweets,” of 140 characters
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`or less, which are public by default and may be viewed all around the world instantly. As such,
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`Twitter gives a public voice to anyone in the world—people who inform and educate others, who
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`express their individuality, who engage in all manner of political speech, and who seek positive
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`change.
`8.
`
`Defendant Eric Holder is the Attorney General of the United States and heads the
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`United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”). He is sued in his official capacity only.
`9.
`
`Defendant DOJ is an agency of the United States. Its headquarters are located at
`
`950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
`10.
`
`Defendant James Comey is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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`(“FBI”). He is sued in his official capacity only.
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`11.
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`Defendant FBI is an agency of the United States. Its headquarters are located at
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`935 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C.
`III.
`JURISDICTION
`
`12.
`
`This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this
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`matter arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. More specifically, this
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`Court is authorized to provide declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
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`§§ 2201–2202, relating to, among other things, Twitter’s contention that certain nondisclosure
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`requirements and related penalties concerning the receipt of NSLs and court orders issued under
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`FISA, as described below, are unconstitutionally restrictive of Twitter’s First Amendment rights,
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`either on their face or as applied to Twitter, and Twitter’s contention that Defendants’ conduct
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`violates the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq.
`
`IV. VENUE
`
`13.
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`Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part
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`of the events giving rise to the action occurred in this judicial district, Twitter resides in this
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`district, Twitter’s speech is being unconstitutionally restricted in this district, and the Defendants
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`are officers and employees of the United States or its agencies operating under the color of law.
`
`V.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`NSL and FISA Provisions Include Nondisclosure Obligations
`
`i.
`14.
`
`The NSL Statute
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`Section 2709 of the federal Stored Communications Act authorizes the FBI to
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`issue NSLs to electronic communication service (“ECS”) providers, such as Twitter, compelling
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`them to disclose “subscriber information and toll billing records information” upon a certification
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`by the FBI that the information sought is “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect
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`against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a), (b).
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`15.
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`Section 2709(c)(1) provides that, following certification by the FBI, the recipient
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`of the NSL shall not disclose “to any person (other than those to whom such disclosure is
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`necessary to comply with the request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with
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`respect to the request) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to
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`information or records.” 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1). This nondisclosure obligation is imposed upon
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`an ECS by the FBI unilaterally, without prior judicial review. At least two United States district
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`courts have found the nondisclosure provision of § 2709 unconstitutional under the First
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`Amendment. In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Doe v. Gonzales,
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`500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by Doe,
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`Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
`16.
`
`Any person or entity that violates a NSL nondisclosure order may be subject to
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`criminal penalties. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 1510(e).
`
`ii.
`17.
`
`The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
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`Five subsections (“Titles”) of FISA permit the government to seek court-ordered
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`real-time surveillance or disclosure of stored records from an ECS: Title I (electronic surveillance
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`of the content of communications and all communications metadata); Title III (disclosure of
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`stored content and noncontent records); Title IV (provisioning of pen register and trap and trace
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`devices to obtain dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information); Title V (disclosure of
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`“business records”) (also referred to as “Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act”); and Title VII
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`(surveillance of non-U.S. persons located beyond U.S. borders).
`18.
`
`A number of authorities restrict the recipient of a FISA order from disclosing
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`information about that order. These include requirements in FISA that recipients of court orders
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`provide the government with “all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
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`accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy,” 50 U.S.C. §
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`1805(c)(2)(B); the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (criminalizing unauthorized disclosures of
`
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`
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`national defense information under certain circumstances); nondisclosure agreements signed by
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`representatives of communications providers who receive FISA orders; and court-imposed
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`nondisclosure obligations in FISA court orders themselves.
`
`B.
`
`The Government’s Restrictions on Other Communication Providers’ Ability to
`Discuss Their Receipt of National Security Legal Process
`
`19.
`
`On June 5, 2013, the British newspaper The Guardian reported the first of several
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`“leaks” of classified material from Edward Snowden, a former government contractor, which
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`have revealed—and continue to reveal—multiple U.S. government intelligence collection and
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`surveillance programs.
`20.
`
`The Snowden disclosures have deepened public concern regarding the scope of
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`governmental national security surveillance. This concern is shared by members of Congress,
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`industry leaders, world leaders, and the media. In response to this concern, a number of executive
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`branch officials have made public statements about the Snowden disclosures and revealed select
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`details regarding specific U.S. surveillance programs. For example, the Director of National
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`Intelligence has selectively declassified and publicly released information about U.S. government
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`surveillance programs.
`21. While engaging in their own carefully crafted speech on the issue of U.S.
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`government surveillance, U.S. government officials have relied on statutory and other authorities
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`to preclude communication providers from responding to leaks, inaccurate information reported
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`in the media, statements of public officials, and related public concerns regarding the providers’
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`involvement with and exposure to U.S. surveillance efforts. These authorities—and the
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`government’s interpretation of and reliance on them—constitute facial and as-applied violations
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`of the First Amendment right to engage in speech regarding a matter of extensively debated and
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`significant public concern.
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`22.
`
`In response to these restrictions on speech, on June 18, 2013, Google filed in the
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`Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) a Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google’s
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`First Amendment Right to Publish Aggregate Data About FISA Orders. Google then filed an
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`Amended Motion on September 9, 2013. Google’s Amended Motion sought a declaratory
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`judgment that it had a right under the First Amendment to publish, and that no applicable law or
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`regulation prohibited it from publishing, two aggregate unclassified numbers: (1) the total number
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`of requests it receives under various national security authorities, if any, and (2) the total number
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`of users or accounts encompassed within such requests. Similar motions were subsequently filed
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`by four other U.S. communications providers: Microsoft (June 19, 2013), Facebook (September
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`9, 2013), Yahoo! (September 9, 2013), and LinkedIn (September 17, 2013). Apple also
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`submitted an amicus brief in support of the motions (November 5, 2013).
`23.
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`In January 2014, the DOJ and the five petitioner companies reached an agreement
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`that the companies would dismiss the FISC actions without prejudice in return for the DOJ’s
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`agreement that the companies could publish information about U.S. government surveillance of
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`their networks in one of two preapproved disclosure formats. President Obama previewed this
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`agreement in a public speech that he delivered at the DOJ on January 17, 2014, saying, “We will
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`also enable communications providers to make public more information than ever before about
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`the orders that they have received to provide data to the government.” President Barack Obama,
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`Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, The White House Blog (Jan. 17,
`
`2014, 11:15 AM), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-
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`president-review-signals-intelligence.
`24.
`
`The two preapproved disclosure formats were set forth in a letter dated January 27,
`
`2014, from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to the General Counsels for Facebook,
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`Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft and Yahoo!. A copy of the DAG Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit
`
`1. Under Option One in the DAG Letter,
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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`
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`A provider may report aggregate data in the following separate categories:
`1.
`Criminal process, subject to no restrictions.
`
`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
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`7.
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`The number of NSLs received, reported in bands of 1000 starting
`with 0-999.
`The number of customer accounts affected by NSLs, reported in
`bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
`The number of FISA orders for content, reported in bands of 1000
`starting with 0-999.
`The number of customer selectors targeted under FISA content
`orders, in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
`The number of FISA orders for non-content, reported in bands of
`1000 starting with 0-999.
`The number of customer selectors targeted under FISA non-
`content orders, in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
`
`Exhibit 1 at 2.
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`25.
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`For FISA-related information, the DOJ imposed a six-month delay between the
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`publication date and the period covered by the report. In addition, it imposed
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`a delay of two years for data relating to the first order that is served on a company
`for a platform, product, or service (whether developed or acquired) for which the
`company has not previously received such an order, and that is designated by the
`government as a “New Capability Order” because disclosing it would reveal that
`the platform, product, or service is subject to previously undisclosed collection
`through FISA orders.
`
`Id. at 3.
`26.
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`Under Option Two,
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`[A] provider may report aggregate data in the following separate categories:
`
`1.
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Criminal process, subject to no restrictions.
`The total number of all national security process received,
`including all NSLs and FISA orders, reported as a single number in
`the following bands: 0-249 and thereafter in bands of 250.
`The total number of customer selectors targeted under all national
`security process, including all NSLs and FISA orders, reported as a
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`single number in the following bands, 0-249, and thereafter in
`bands of 250.”
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`Id.
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`27.
`
`Under either option, since the permitted ranges begin with zero, service providers
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`who have never received an NSL or FISA order apparently are prohibited from reporting that
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`fact. Likewise, a communications provider that, for example, has received FISA orders under
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`Titles I, III, V and VII of FISA, but not under Title IV, may not reveal that it has never received a
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`Title IV FISC order.
`28.
`
`The DAG Letter cites to no authority for these restrictions on service providers’
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`speech.
`29.
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`In a Notice filed with the FISC simultaneously with transmission of the DAG
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`Letter, the DOJ informed the court of the agreement, the new disclosure options detailed in the
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`DAG Letter, and the stipulated dismissal of the FISC action by all parties. A copy of the Notice
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`is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. The Notice concluded by stating: “It is the Government’s position
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`that the terms outlined in the Deputy Attorney General’s letter define the limits of permissible
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`reporting for the parties and other similarly situated companies.” Exhibit 2 at 2 (emphasis
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`added). In other words, according to the DOJ, the negotiated agreement reached to end litigation
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`by five petitioner companies is not limited to the five petitioner companies as a settlement of
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`private litigation, but instead serves as a disclosure format imposed on a much broader—yet
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`undefined—group of companies. No further guidance has been offered by the DOJ regarding
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`what it considers to be a “similarly situated” company. Further, the Notice cites no authority for
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`extending these restrictions on speech to companies that were not party to the negotiated
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`agreement.
`30.
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`Notwithstanding the fact that the DAG Letter purportedly prohibits a provider
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`from disclosing that it has received “zero” NSLs or FISA orders, or “zero” of a certain kind of
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`FISA order, subsequent to January 27, 2014, certain communications providers have publicly
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`disclosed either that they have never received any FISA orders or NSLs, or any of a certain kind
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`of FISA order.
`C.
`The DOJ and FBI Deny Twitter’s Request to Be More Transparent
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`31.
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`Twitter is a unique service built on trust and transparency. Twitter users are
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`permitted to post under their real names or pseudonymously. Twitter is used by world leaders,
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`political activists, journalists, and millions of other people to disseminate information and ideas,
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`engage in public debate about matters of national and global concern, seek justice, and reveal
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`government corruption and other wrongdoing. The ability of Twitter users to share information
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`depends, in part, on their ability to do so without undue fear of government surveillance.
`32.
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`Twitter is an ECS as that term is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) since it provides
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`its users the ability to send and receive electronic communications. As an ECS and, more
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`generally, as a third-party provider of communications to the public, Twitter is subject to the
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`receipt of civil, criminal, and national security legal process, including administrative, grand jury,
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`and trial subpoenas; NSLs; court orders under the federal Wiretap Act, Stored Communications
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`Act, Pen Register and Trap and Trace Act, and FISA; and search warrants. Compliance with such
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`legal process can be compelled through the aid of a court.
`33.
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`The ability to engage in speech concerning the nature and extent of government
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`surveillance of Twitter users’ activities is critical to Twitter. In July 2012, Twitter released its
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`first Transparency Report. Release of this Transparency Report was motivated by Twitter’s
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`recognition that citizens must “hold governments accountable, especially on behalf of those who
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`may not have a chance to do so themselves.” Jeremy Kessel, Twitter Transparency Report,
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`Twitter Blog (July 2, 2012 20:17 UTC), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/twitter-transparency-report.
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`This Transparency Report listed the number of civil and criminal government requests for
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`account information and content removal, broken down by country, and takedown notices
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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`pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act received from third parties. The report also
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`provided information about how Twitter responded to these requests. The report did not contain
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`information regarding government national security requests Twitter may have received.
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`Subsequent biennial transparency reports have been released since then, including the most recent
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`on July 31, 2014.
`34.
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`In January 2014, Twitter requested to meet with DOJ and FBI officials to discuss
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`Twitter’s desire to provide greater transparency into the extent of U.S. government surveillance of
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`Twitter’s users through NSLs and court orders issued under FISA.
`35.
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`On January 29, 2014, representatives of the DOJ, FBI, and Twitter met at the
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`Department of Justice. At the meeting, Twitter explained why its services are unique and distinct
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`from the services provided by the companies who were recipients of the DAG Letter and why the
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`DAG Letter should not apply to Twitter, which was not a party to the proceedings that resulted in
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`the DAG Letter. Twitter also sought confirmation that it is not “similarly situated” to those
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`companies and that the limits imposed in the DAG Letter should not apply to Twitter. In
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`response, the DOJ and FBI told Twitter that the DAG Letter sets forth the limits of permissible
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`transparency-related speech for Twitter and that the letter would not be amended or supplemented
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`with additional options of preapproved speech.
`36.
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`In February 2014, Twitter released its Transparency Report for the second half of
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`2013, which included two years of data covering global government requests for account
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`information. In light of the government’s admonition regarding more expansive transparency
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`reporting than that set forth in the DAG Letter, Twitter’s February 2014 Transparency Report did
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`not include information about U.S. government national security requests at the level of
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`granularity Twitter wished to disclose.
`37.
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`In a blog post, Twitter explained the importance of reporting more specific
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`information to users about government surveillance. Twitter also explained how the U.S.
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`government was unconstitutionally prohibiting Twitter from providing a meaningful level of
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`detail regarding U.S. government national security requests Twitter had or may have received:
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`We think the government’s restriction on our speech not only unfairly
`impacts our users’ privacy, but also violates our First Amendment right to
`free expression and open discussion of government affairs. We believe
`there are far less restrictive ways to permit discussion in this area while
`also respecting national security concerns. Therefore, we have pressed the
`U.S. Department of Justice to allow greater transparency, and proposed
`future disclosures concerning national security requests that would be
`more meaningful to Twitter’s users.
`Jeremy Kessel, Fighting for more #transparency, Twitter Blog (Feb. 6, 2014 14:58
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`UTC), https://blog.twitter.com/2014/fighting-for-more-transparency.
`38.
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`On or about April 1, 2014, Twitter submitted a draft July 2014 Transparency
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`Report to the FBI, seeking prepublication review. In its transmittal letter to the FBI, Twitter
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`explained:
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`We are sending this to you so that Twitter may receive a
`determination as to exactly which, if any, parts of its Transparency
`Report are classified or, in the Department’s view, otherwise may
`not lawfully be published online.
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`A copy of Twitter’s letter dated April 1, 2014 is attached as Exhibit 3. Twitter’s draft
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`Transparency Report, which will be submitted separately, is Exhibit 4.
`39.
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`Through its draft Transparency Report, Twitter seeks to disclose certain categories
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`of information to its users, for the period July 1 to December 31, 2013, including:
`a. The number of NSLs and FISA orders Twitter received, if any, in actual
`aggregate numbers (including “zero,” to the extent that that number was
`applicable to an aggregate number of NSLs or FISA orders, or to specific
`kinds of FISA orders that Twitter may have received);
`b. The number of NSLs and FISA orders received, if any, reported
`separately, in ranges of one hundred, beginning with 1–99;
`c. The combined number of NSLs and FISA orders received, if any, in
`ranges of twenty-five, beginning with 1–24;
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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`Case 4:14-cv-04480-YGR Document 1 Filed 10/07/14 Page 13 of 19
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`d. A comparison of Twitter’s proposed (i.e., smaller) ranges with those
`authorized by the DAG Letter;
`e. A comparison of the aggregate numbers of NSLs and FISA orders
`received, if any, by Twitter and the five providers to whom the DAG
`Letter was addressed; and
`f. A descriptive statement about Twitter’s exposure to national security
`surveillance, if any, to express the overall degree of government
`surveillance it is or may be subject to.
`For five months, the FBI considered Twitter’s written request for review of the
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`40.
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`draft Transparency Report. By letter dated September 9, 2014, the FBI denied Twitter’s request.
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`A copy of the FBI’s letter dated September 9, 2014 is attached as Exhibit 5. The FBI’s letter did
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`not, as requested, identify exactly which parts of the draft Transparency Report may not lawfully
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`be published. Instead, the letter stated vaguely that “information contained in the report” cannot
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`be publicly released; it provided examples of such information in the draft Transparency Report;
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`and it relied on a general assertion of national security classification and on the pronouncements
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`in the DAG Letter as its bases for denying publication:
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`We have carefully reviewed Twitter’s proposed transparency report
`and have concluded that information contained in the report is
`classified and cannot be publicly released.
`. . . Twitter’s proposed transparency report seeks to publish data . . .
`in ways that would reveal classified details about [government
`surveillance] that go beyond what the government has permitted
`other companies to report. . . . This is inconsistent with the January
`27th framework [set forth in the DAG Letter] and discloses
`properly classified information.
`Exhibit 5 at 1. The FBI reiterated that Twitter could engage only in speech that did not exceed
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`the preapproved speech set forth in the DAG Letter. It noted, for example, that Twitter could
`explain that only an infinitesimally small percentage of its total
`number of active users was affected by [government surveillance
`by] highlighting that less than 250 accounts were subject to all
`combined national security legal process. . . . That would allow
`Twitter to explain that all national security legal process received
`from the United States affected, at maximum, only 0.0000919
`percent (calculated by dividing 249 by 271 million) of Twitter’s
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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`total users. In other words, Twitter is permitted to qualify its
`description of the total number of accounts affected by all national
`security legal process it has received but it cannot quantify that
`description with the specific detail that goes well beyond what is
`allowed under the January 27th framework and that discloses
`properly classified information.
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`Id. at 1–2.
`41.
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`Since the FBI’s response does not identify the exact information in the draft
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`Transparency Report that can and cannot be published, Twitter cannot at this time publish any
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`part of the report. When the government intrudes on speech, the First Amendment requires that it
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`do so in the most limited way possible. The government has failed to meet this obligation.
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`Instead, Defendants simply impose the DAG Letter framework upon Twitter as Twitter’s sole
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`means of communicating with the public about national security surveillance.
`COUNT I
`(Request for Declaratory Judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Injunctive Relief)
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`42.
`43.
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`Twitter incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 41, above.
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`Defendants have impermissibly infringed upon Twitter’s right to publish
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`information contained in Twitter’s draft Transparency Report, and Twitter therefore seeks a
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`declaration that Defendants have violated Twitter’s First Amendment rights. A case of actual
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`controversy exists regarding Twitter’s right to engage in First Amendment protected speech
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`following Defendants’ refusal to allow Twitter to publish information about its exposure to
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`national security surveillance that does not conform to either of the two preapproved formats set
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`forth in the DAG Letter. The fact that Defendants have prohibited Twitter from publishing facts
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`that reveal whether and the extent to which it may have received either one or more NSLs or
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`court orders pursuant to FISA, along with the other facts alleged herein, establish that a
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`substantial controversy exists between the adverse parties of sufficient immediacy and reality as
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`to warrant a declaratory judgment in Twitter’s favor. Twitter has suffered actual adverse and
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`harmful effects, including but not limited to, a prohibition on publishing information in the draft
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
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`Transparency Report to make it available to the public and Twitter’s users, the chilling effect
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`from Defendants’ failure to address specific content, and the threat of possible civil or criminal
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`penalties for publication.
`44.
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`The imposition of t