Case 4:18-cv-00754-HSG Document 51 Filed 05/29/18 Page 1 of 4
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`AKIKO KIJIMOTO,
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`YOUTUBE LLC, et al.,
`Defendants.
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`Case No.18-cv-00754-HSG
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`Re: Dkt. No. 38
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`Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendants YouTube, LLC
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`(“YouTube”) and Google, LLC (“Google”). Dkt. No. 38. For the reasons set forth below, the
`Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion with LEAVE TO AMEND.1
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
`A.
`Factual Allegations
`In its current form, Plaintiff Akiko Kijimoto’s Complaint is disorganized and difficult to
`follow.2 Plaintiff seems to allege that an unnamed third party uploaded content on YouTube that
`has caused “defamation and harassment.” Dkt. No. 1-1 (Complaint, or “Compl.”) at 11. She
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`describes the video as a recording of her and a high school boyfriend performing karaoke. Id. at
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`11. Plaintiff mentions “Cyberbullying” and “Cybercrime,” as well as more than 10 years of “net
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`stalking.” Id. She appears to allege that the content posted by the third party is copyrighted
`material.3 Id. at 10. She also confusingly claims that the third party’s content “causes defamation
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`1 The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is
`deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b).
`2 Excerpts from the Complaint are reproduced verbatim.
`3 For this reason, Defendants removed this action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See
`28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(b).
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`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
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`Case 4:18-cv-00754-HSG Document 51 Filed 05/29/18 Page 2 of 4
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`and harassment to official artists and music record Company.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff further appears
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`to state “life insurance,” “copyright,” and “life liability insurance” as additional causes of action.
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`Id. at 9.
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`As to relief sought, Plaintiff apparently seeks $2 billion in damages and requests the
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`disclosure of the third party’s IP address information and the deletion of the third party’s video.
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`Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff also requests that YouTube more closely monitor what content is publicly
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`published. Id. at 10.
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`B.
`Procedural Posture
`Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November, 9, 2017.4 Defendants filed this motion to
`dismiss on February 21, 2018. Dkt. No. 38. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.5 Defendant filed
`a reply on March 14, 2018. Dkt. No. 41.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
`The complaint must include a “short and plain statement,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and
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`“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
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`Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff must provide the
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`grounds that entitle her to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
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`“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
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`than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
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`quotation marks and citations omitted). However, even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint
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`may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of
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`Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the
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`rules of procedure,” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require “a short and
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`plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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`4 On June 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a nearly identical complaint in the Central District of California
`against another company, and that complaint was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Akiko
`Kijimoto v. Dwango Co., Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-06448-PSG-MRW; Dkt. No. 38-2 (Declaration of
`Samuel J. Dippo), Ex. 1.
`5 Plaintiff did, however, file a letter with the Court on February 20, 2018, in which she states that
`she “would like to delete youtube contents in anyway” even if her “case is going to dismiss in
`trial.” Dkt. No. 40 at 1.
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`2
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`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
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`Case 4:18-cv-00754-HSG Document 51 Filed 05/29/18 Page 3 of 4
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`“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitlement to relief requires more than
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`labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted).
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`III. DISCUSSION
`A.
`Plaintiff Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts to Plausibly State a Claim.
`A complaint that is “highly repetitious” or “confused,” or that “consist[s] of
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`incomprehensible rambling” violates Rule 8(a). Cafasso, U.S. ex rel v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys,
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`Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011). Both the content and structure of the Complaint, which
`consists primarily of sentence fragments, are unclear.6 See, e.g., Compl. at 11 (“I thought why but
`i got the same damage and understood the meaning.”). It is comprised mostly of irrelevant facts.
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`Plaintiff includes information about credit card fraud and her divorce without articulating how
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`those facts relate to her causes of action or the relief sought. Plaintiff’s Complaint similarly does
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`not clearly identify any causes of action. It presents no unifying theme or clear factual pattern
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`from which a claim could be identified, instead jumping from accusations that YouTube is
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`engaged in “trafficking in persons and act of killing people because the human voice is included in
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`the copyrighted work” to asserting that all the third-party content is “stolen.” Compl. at 9-10. As
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`such, the Complaint violates Rule 8’s directive that each allegation be “simple, concise, and
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`direct.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
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`Because of its disjointed nature, the Complaint fails to “put the defendant[s] on notice as to
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`the nature of the claim against [them] and the relief sought.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 574.
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`Without notice of the claims asserted against them, Defendants cannot adequately prepare an
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`answer or prepare a defense. Even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s assertions are unclear, and
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`insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “Although a pro se litigant . . . may
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`be entitled to great leeway when the court construes [her] pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless
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`must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant notice of what it is that it allegedly
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`did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). That threshold is not
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`6 Defendants suggest that this may be due to a language barrier, but the Court cannot draw this
`conclusion based on the current record. See Dkt. No. 38 at 3.
`3
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`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
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`Case 4:18-cv-00754-HSG Document 51 Filed 05/29/18 Page 4 of 4
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`cloose to being mmet here. AAccordingly, the Court finnds that the
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`Plaintiff faills to satisfy tthe
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`reqquirements oof Rule 8.
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`B.
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`Plaintiff WWill Be Grannted Leave t
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`o Amend HHer Complaiint.
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`Pro se llitigants are “entitled to nnotice of thee complaint’
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`s deficienciees and an oppportunity to
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`ammend prior to dismissal off the action.”” Lucas v. DDep’t of Corrr., 66 F.3d 2245, 248 (9thh Cir. 1995).
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`The Court will grant leave to amend “uunless it deteermines that
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`the pleadingg could not ppossibly be
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`curred by the allegation of oother facts.” Lopez v. Smmith, 203 F.33d 1122, 11330 (9th Cir. 22000)
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`(cittation omitteed). The serrious deficienncies in the CComplaint nnotwithstandding, the Couurt cannot
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`sayy at this stage that amenddment wouldd be futile ass a matter of f law.
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`Accorddingly, the Court finds thhat leave to aamend is prooper. Shouldd she choosee to file a
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`Firrst Amendedd Complaint, Plaintiff shoould clearly
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`identify: (1)) each legal
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`claim; (2) thhe facts
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`suppporting eachh claim; andd (3) the defeendant againnst whom thee claim is allleged. Failuure to file a
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`Firrst Amendedd Complaint by the deadlline may resuult in dismisssal of the acction in its enntirety
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`witthout furtherr leave to ammend. Additiionally, Plainntiff’s First
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`Amended CComplaint wiill be
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`dissmissed if shhe does not correct the deeficiencies thhe Court hass identified iin this order..
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`IV. CONC
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`LUSION
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`For the
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`foregoing reeasons, Defeendants’ mottion to dismmiss is GRANNTED. Plaiintiff’s
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`cla
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`aims are DISSMISSED WWITH LEAVVE TO AMMEND. Shouuld Plaintiff
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`wish to file
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`a First
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`no later thann
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`Ammended Commplaint, she iis directed too do so in acccordance wiith the discusssion above
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`28 days from thhe date of thhis Order.
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`IT IS SSO ORDERRED.
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`Daated: May 299, 2018
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`HAAYWOOD SS. GILLIAMM, JR.
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`Unnited States DDistrict Judgge
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