Case 4:19-cv-03042-SBA Document 270 Filed 03/05/20 Page 1 of 14
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`OAKLAND DIVISION
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`JAMAL ADAMS, et al.
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`Petitioners,
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`vs.
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`POSTMATES, INC.,
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`Respondent.
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`Case No: 19-3042 SBA
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`ORDER DENYING POSTMATES’
`MOTION TO STAY PENDING
`APPEAL
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`Dkt. 261
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`This matter is presently before the Court on Respondent Postmates, Inc.’s
`(“Postmates”) Motion to Stay Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions
`Pending Appeal (“Motion to Stay”). Dkt. 261. Having read and considered the papers filed
`in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES the
`Motion to Stay for the reasons set forth below.1
`I.
`BACKGROUND
`Petitioners are 5,257 individuals who work as “couriers” (i.e., delivery drivers) for
`Postmates, an entity that operates a food delivery platform and mobile app. To work for
`Postmates, all couriers must sign Postmates’ Fleet Agreement, which classifies them as
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`1 The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral
`argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).
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`independent contractors, not employees. The agreement contains a Mutual Arbitration
`Provision, which requires that all disputes between couriers and Postmates be resolved
`“through final and binding arbitration instead of filing a lawsuit in court.” Fleet Agt.
`§ 10A.2 To initiate an arbitration, either party to the Fleet Agreement must notify the other
`party by certified mail or by hand delivery of the arbitration demand. The demand must
`include: “(1) the name and address of the Party seeking arbitration, (2) a statement of the
`legal and factual basis of the claim, and (3) a description of the remedy sought.” Id.
`§ 10B.i.
`Within the Mutual Arbitration Provision are a Class Action Waiver and
`Representative Action Waiver. See id. § 10B.ii (Class Action Waiver); id. § 10B.iii
`(Representative Action Waiver). The Class Action Waiver bars couriers from bringing
`“any dispute or claim … as a class and/or collective action” or “participat[ing] in any class
`and/or collective action….” Id. § 10B.ii. The Representative Action Waiver similarly bars
`couriers from bringing “any dispute or claim … as a representative action, … including but
`not limited to, claims brought under any state’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA)….”
`Id. § 10B.iii.3 The net effect of these waivers is that any courier with a legal claim against
`Postmates is limited to filing an individual arbitration demand with the designated
`arbitrator, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).
`In March and April 2019, Petitioners tendered a total of 5,274 individual arbitration
`demands to the AAA, alleging that they have been misclassified as independent contractors,
`in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. Petitioners’
`submission of these demands triggered Postmates’ obligation to tender its share of
`arbitration filing fees, approximately in the sum of $10 million. Postmates refused to pay
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`2 Both the 2018 and 2019 versions of the Fleet Agreement are relevant to this action
`and contain the same Mutual Arbitration Provision and Class Action Waiver, albeit in
`different sections. For simplicity, citations in this Order are to the 2018 Agreement. See
`Keller Decl. Ex. C, Dkt. 5-3.
`3 Unless otherwise indicated, further reference to the “Class Action Waiver” shall
`encompass both the Class Action Waiver and the Representative Action Waiver.
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`any fees, claiming that the arbitration demands were insufficient under the terms of the
`Mutual Arbitration Provision and therefore the arbitrations had not been properly
`commenced. The AAA disagreed and continued to demand payment of the fees.
`On June 3, 2019, Petitioners filed a Petition to Compel Arbitration in this Court
`pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, 4. Dkt. 1. Thereafter, the parties
`filed cross-motions to compel arbitration. Dkt. 4, 228. Petitioners and Postmates both
`agreed that the Mutual Arbitration Provision is valid and binding and moved for an order
`compelling arbitration. Each side also requested that the order include specific, additional
`conditions. Petitioners requested that the Court direct Postmates to tender its share of the
`arbitration fees to the arbitrator so that the arbitrations may proceed. Postmates countered
`that it is not yet obligated to tender its share of the filing fees on the ground that the
`arbitration demands are “generic” and lack the specific information articulated in the
`Mutual Arbitration Provision. Thus, Postmates asserted that the Court should compel
`arbitration and “enter an order: (1) requiring each Petitioner to refile his or her demand as
`an individual arbitration demand that sets forth the facts and legal theories of relief
`applicable to the particular Petitioner; and (2) requiring each Petitioner, after refiling, to
`proceed to arbitration on an individual basis….” Dkt. 228 at 20.
`In its cross-motion, Postmates argued that by submitting allegedly “generic”
`arbitration demands with the arbitrator, Petitioners are attempting to proceed with a de facto
`classwide arbitration, in contravention to the Class Action Waiver. Dkt. 228 at 10, 11, 15.
`To that end, Postmates argued that this Court, as opposed to the arbitrator, must “determine
`the threshold issue of whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate on a de facto classwide
`basis.” Id. at 15. The Court rejected Postmates’ contention, finding that the Mutual
`Arbitration Provision contained a delegation clause that vests the arbitrator with the
`exclusive authority to decide “gateway” questions of arbitrability. Fleet Agt. § 10A.ii. The
`delegation clause states, in relevant part:
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`ii.
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`Only an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local
`court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to
`resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
`applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Mutual
`Arbitration Provision, including without limitation any
`dispute concerning arbitrability. However, as stated in
`Section 10B.iv below, the preceding clause shall not
`apply to any dispute relating to or arising out of the Class
`Action Waiver and Representative Action Waiver, which
`must proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction and
`cannot be heard or arbitrated by an arbitrator.
`Fleet Agt. § 10A.ii (emphasis added).
`Relying on the second sentence of the delegation clause quoted above, Postmates
`argued that any issues pertaining to the Class Action Waiver, including whether Petitioners
`were attempting to arbitrate on a classwide basis, are excluded from the scope of the
`delegation clause—meaning that the Court must decide the issue. To support its position,
`Postmates argued that Sections 10A.ii and 10B.iv in tandem create two independent
`exceptions to the delegation clause applicable to: (1) any claim “relating to or arising out
`of” the Class Action Waiver; and (2) any claim that the Class Action Waiver is
`“unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable.” Dkt. 253 at 9. The Court rejected
`Postmates’ interpretation of the Fleet Agreement. Applying well settled rules of contract
`interpretation, the Court concluded that Section 10A.ii expressly incorporates Section
`10B.iv, which only excludes claims that the Class Action Waiver is unenforceable,
`unconscionable, void or voidable from the scope of the delegation clause. Id. at 10. Since
`there is no claim by Petitioners that the Class Action Waiver is unenforceable,
`unconscionable, void or voidable, the Court concluded that the carve out was inapplicable.
`Alternatively, the Court found that even if Postmates’ construction of the Fleet
`Agreement were correct, the outcome of the cross-motions would be the same. Id. at 11.
`As noted, Postmates’ position is that no arbitration filing fees are due because Petitioners’
`individual arbitration demands fail to provide the requisite information specified by the
`Mutual Arbitration Provision. Id. In Postmates’ view, Petitioners’ omission of such
`information demonstrates that they are attempting to arbitrate their claims on a de facto
`classwide basis. Id. But the Court found that Petitioners’ purported motivations for
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`submitting allegedly generalized claims are inapposite. Rather, at its core, the salient issue
`raised by Postmates is whether Petitioners’ arbitration demands comport with the Mutual
`Arbitration Provision. Under the terms of the Fleet Agreement, any dispute regarding a
`claimant’s compliance with the Mutual Arbitration Provision is reserved exclusively for the
`arbitrator. Order at 11 (citing Fleet Agt. § 10A.ii).
`The Court ultimately granted the parties’ motions to compel arbitration but denied
`their respective requests for the imposition of additional conditions. As to the issue of
`whether Petitioners’ arbitration demands complied with the terms of the Mutual Arbitration
`Provision, the Court ruled that issue was for the arbitrator to decide. Dissatisfied with the
`Court’s ruling, Postmates has appealed the Court’s ruling and filed the instant motion to
`stay the Court’s Order compelling arbitration.4
`II.
`LEGAL STANDARD
`A stay is “an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is
`dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
`433 (2009) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). There is no right to a stay;
`rather, it is “an exercise of judicial discretion” that “is dependent upon the circumstances of
`the particular case.” Id. (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The party seeking
`a stay bears the burden of demonstrating that a stay is warranted. City and Cty. of S.F. v.
`USCIS, 944 F.3d 773, 789 (9th Cir. 2019).
`In deciding whether to grant a stay pending appellate proceedings, the court
`considers four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
`likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent
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`4 On the day the Court’s issued its ruling, Petitioner’s counsel refiled 5,255 demands
`and requested the AAA to invoice Postmates for its share of the arbitration fees, which
`Postmates has not yet paid in full. However, the parties have agreed to commence
`proceedings on 50 of the demands, for which Postmates claims it has paid its share of the
`filing fees. Separately, the Court notes that, subsequent to the Court’s Order compelling
`arbitration, Petitioners sought, and the Court issued, an Order to Show Cause directing
`Postmates to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for refusing to proceed with
`the arbitrations. Dkt. 258. The Court will address that matter in a separate Order.
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`a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injur[e] the other parties interested
`in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at
`433-34). “The first two factors are the most critical and the last two steps are reached once
`an applicant satisfies the first two factors.” Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164
`(9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
`III. DISCUSSION
`A.
`LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
`To satisfy the first factor, the movant “must make a strong showing that success on
`the merits is likely.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). This means
`that, “‘at a minimum,’ a petitioner must show that there is a ‘substantial case for relief on
`the merits.’” Id. (quoting Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.2011) (per
`curiam)). However, “[t]he standard does not require the petitioners to show that ‘it is more
`likely than not that they will win on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at
`966).
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`1.
`Class Action Waiver
`Postmates first contends that the Court erred in declining to address whether
`Petitioners are attempting to circumvent the Class Action Waiver. Dkt. 261 at 14.
`According to Postmates, Petitioners’ arbitration demands are “generic” and lack the
`requisite information specified in the Mutual Arbitration Provision. Due to this alleged
`lack of specificity, Postmates asserts that Petitioners are, in effect, proceeding on a
`classwide basis in violation of the Class Action Waiver. Postmates asserts that, on appeal,
`it will argue that this Court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether such a violation
`occurred in the first instance. Id.
`Postmates’ contention regarding the Class Action Waiver is meritless. As noted, the
`salient question presented by Postmates’ cross-motion to compel arbitration is simply
`whether Petitioners’ arbitration demands contain the information specified in the Fleet
`Agreement. See Fleet Agt. § 10B.i (setting forth required contents of an arbitration
`demand). The Fleet Agreement unequivocally delegates to the arbitrator the exclusive
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`authority to determine compliance with the Mutual Arbitration Provision, including any
`dispute concerning the arbitrability of a claim. See Fleet Agt. § 10A.ii (“Only an arbitrator,
`and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to
`resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation
`of this Mutual Arbitration Provision, including without limitation any dispute concerning
`arbitrability.”). As the Court explained in its prior Order, the arbitrator can determine
`whether the arbitration demands comply with the Mutual Arbitration Provision simply by
`comparing its requirements alongside each individual arbitration demand. Dkt. 253 at 11.
`The question of whether Petitioners are attempting to circumvent the Class Action Waiver
`ultimately has no bearing on whether each demand contains the requisite information to
`comport with Section 10A.ii of the Fleet Agreement. Stated another way, the arbitration
`demands either comport with the Mutual Arbitration Provision—or they do not. It is as
`simple as that.5
`Postmates cites Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.Ct. 1407 (2019) for the
`proposition that, when a party has waived class arbitration, a court must decide whether an
`order compelling arbitration would contravene the parties’ agreement. Dkt. 261 at 15. In
`Lamps Plus, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement that is ambiguous on the
`question of whether class arbitration is permissible cannot support an order compelling
`class arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. 139 S.Ct. at 1418-19. Despite
`Postmates’ suggestion to the contrary, the Supreme Court did not hold that a court, as
`opposed to an arbitrator, must always decide whether an arbitration demand violates a class
`action waiver. Nor did Lamps Plus address whether the availability of class arbitration
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`5 A determination of whether Petitioners are attempting to circumvent the Class
`Action Waiver in no way informs the sufficiency of the arbitration demands nor the remedy
`to the extent that the demands are found to be deficient. If the arbitrator finds that the
`demands are non-compliant, the solution would be for the arbitrator to require Petitioners to
`submit more detailed arbitration demands. Indeed, that is the relief Postmates sought in its
`cross-motion. See Dkt. 228 at 7 (seeking an Order requiring “each Petitioner to refile his or
`her demand as an individual arbitration demand that sets forth the facts and legal theories of
`relief applicable to the particular Petitioner”).
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`constitutes a “question of arbitrability” because the arbitration agreement did not contain a
`delegation clause. Lamps Plus, 139 S.Ct. at 1417 n.4 (noting that “the parties [had] agreed
`that a court, not an arbitrator, should resolve the question about class arbitration”). For the
`same reason, the other cases cited by Postmates are inapt. As in Lamps Plus, the
`agreements in those cases assigned the question of arbitrability to the court, see AT&T
`Mobility LLC v. Bernardi, Nos. C 11-03992 CRB, C 11-04412 CRB, 2011 WL 5079549 at
`*2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Smith, No. 11-CV-5157, 2011 WL
`5924460 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2011)—which is not the case here.6
`2.
`The Delegation Clause
`Postmates’ second argument in relation to its likelihood of success on appeal rests
`on the notion that the Court’s construction of the delegation clause set forth in Section
`10A.ii of the Fleet Agreement is incorrect. Dkt. 261 at 16-17. The Court ruled that the
`carve out from the delegation clause only applies to claims that the Class Action Waiver is
`unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable. Here, Postmates renews its contention
`that Section 10A.ii must be read more broadly to exclude any claims relating to the Class
`Action Waiver from the purview of the arbitrator. Dkt. 261 at 14-16. However, the mere
`fact that Postmates disagrees with the Court’s analysis and ruling does not establish a
`serious legal question. See In re Pac. Fertility Ctr. Litig., No. 18-CV-01586-JSC, 2019 WL
`2635539, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2019) (“Defendants’ rehash of arguments the Court
`previously considered and rejected at length fails to raise a serious legal question;
`otherwise, every time a party disagreed with a court’s ruling, a serious question would
`exist.”).
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`6 As an ancillary matter, Postmates also suggests that this Court erred “because
`Supreme Court precedent establishes that a court cannot compel parties to class arbitration
`when they have not explicitly agreed to do so.” Dkt. 261 at 8. Postmates cited Lamps Plus
`for that proposition in its prior cross-motion briefing as well. Dkt. 112 at 14; Dkt. 228 at 16
`n.7. The flaw in this contention is that the Court did not “compel [Postmates] to class
`arbitration.” Dkt. 261 at 8. Rather, the Court compelled Postmates to arbitrate the
`demands as it had agreed to do under the Fleet Agreement—which all parties agree requires
`individual arbitration—and to raise any objections about whether Petitioners had met the
`requirements for individual arbitration with the arbitrator. Dkt. 253 at 12.
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`The above notwithstanding, the Court is unpersuaded that Postmates has any chance
`of succeeding on its interpretation of the delegation clause. The operative language of
`Section 10A.ii recites: as stated in Section 10B.iv below, the preceding clause shall not
`apply to any dispute relating to or arising out of the Class Action Waiver and
`Representative Action Waiver….” Fleet Agt. § 10A.ii (emphasis added). Under the rules
`of contract construction, the phrase “any dispute relating to or arising out of the Class
`Action Waiver” must be read in context with Section 10B.iv. See Zalkind v. Ceradyne,
`Inc., 194 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 1027 (2011) (“[T]he meaning of a contract must be derived
`from reading the whole of the contract, with individual provisions interpreted together, in
`order to give effect to all provisions and to avoid rendering some meaningless.”); Elijahjuan
`v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. App. 4th 15, 28 (2012) (“Contract terms must be interpreted as
`a whole and in context, rather than in isolation.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1641. Thus, the carve
`out for “any dispute relating to or arising out of the Class Action Waiver” necessarily is
`subject to Section 10B.iv, which plainly states that only a judge may decide claims that the
`Class Action Waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable, void or voidable. If the carve out
`were construed in the manner advocated by Postmates, Section 10B.iv would be swallowed
`by Section 10A.ii, since a claim challenging the enforceability of the Class Action Waiver
`is, by definition, a “dispute relating to or arising out of the [Class Action Waiver],” id.
`§ 10A.ii.
`The Court finds that Postmates has neither met its burden of showing that success on
`the merits is likely nor set forth a substantial case for relief on the merits. Lair, 697 F.3d at
`1204. Thus, Postmates has failed to satisfy the first factor of the four-part test.
`B.
`IRREPARABLE HARM
`To satisfy the second factor for a stay pending appeal, the movant must show that
`“there is a probability of irreparable injury if the stay is not granted.” Id. at 1214. “Simply
`showing some possibility of irreparable injury” is insufficient. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35.
`In the instant case, Postmates contends that, absent a stay, it will be required to pay
`substantial filing fees to the AAA that it has “no way to recover even if it prevails on
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`appeal.” Dkt. 261 at 18. While acknowledging that monetary harm generally does not
`constitute irreparable injury, see L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League,
`634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980), Postmates argues that the “threat of unrecoverable
`economic loss” qualifies as irreparable harm, Dkt. 261 at 18 (quoting in part Iowa Utilities
`Bd. v. F.C.C., 109 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996)).
`The Court is unpersuaded by Postmates’ showing of irreparable harm. First, “[m]ere
`litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable
`injury.” Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co. Inc., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); accord
`Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 736 n.25 (9th Cir. 2017).7
`Second, being compelled “to arbitrate disputes that may not be arbitrable” is not irreparable
`injury. See Camping Constr. Co. v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers, 915 F.2d 1333, 1349
`(9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court’s principal error lies in its assumption that unnecessarily
`undergoing arbitration proceedings constitutes irreparable injury. That is simply not the
`case.”). Third, a favorable resolution on appeal will not, as Postmates suggests, render the
`arbitrations unnecessary. As discussed, Postmates agrees that Petitioners’ misclassification
`claims are arbitrable but that Petitioners should be required to refile their demands with
`more specific information. Thus, even if Postmates prevails on appeal, Petitioners will
`have the opportunity to resubmit their demands. Unless Petitioners abandon their claims,
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`7 The cases cited by Postmates for the proposition that unrecoverable monetary loss
`constitutes irreparable harm are distinguishable. Each of those cases involved situations
`where a party was challenging a government agency’s proposed rule that would cause the
`party to incur expenses that could not later be recouped from the agency. See California v.
`U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.3d 410, 431 (9th Cir. 2019) (proposed rule
`modification to the Affordable Care Act would cause States to suffer monetary damages
`that could not be recouped from the government); Texas v. United States E.P.A., 829 F.3d
`405, 434 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that power companies would be unable to recover
`compliance costs incurred if the Environmental Protection Agency’s Final Rule is
`invalidated on the merits); Iowa Utilities Bd., 109 F.3d at 426 (finding irreparable harm
`where Federal Communication Commission’s pricing rules required telephone carriers to
`offer their services at prices that are below actual costs). None of these cases have any
`bearing on nor has any case extended their reasoning cases involving motions to compel
`arbitration based on a private arbitration agreement.
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`which seems unlikely, Postmates will be required at some point to pay its share of the filing
`fee for each demand submitted to the arbitrator.8
`Postmates attempts to distinguish the above cases on the ground that they involved
`individual arbitration proceedings, as opposed to this case in “which Postmates risks
`immediately paying over $10 million in nonrefundable fees [for arbitrations] that will not
`commence for months or years, if ever.” Dkt. 266 at 10. As noted, however, the prospect
`of substantial arbitration fees does not establish irreparable harm. See Renegotiation Bd.,
`415 U.S. at 24. Nor can Postmates demonstrate irreparable harm, given that both sides
`agree that Petitioners’ wage and hour claims are subject to arbitration. Postmates also is
`hard-pressed to complain about the amount of filing fees due. Under the Mutual
`Arbitration Provision, a courier cannot sue Postmates in court; rather, the courier has no
`choice other than to submit a demand to the arbitrator to adjudicate his or her grievance.
`Because of the Class Action Waiver, each courier cannot proceed on a class basis but must
`instead submit an individual demand. As a result, Petitioners did what they are
`contractually required to do: submit individual arbitration demands to the arbitrator. The
`mere fact that Petitioners filed over 5,000 demands within a short span of time does not
`transform those individual demands into a de facto class arbitration, as Postmates posits.
`But more fundamentally, Postmates’ obligation to tender $10 million in filing fees as a
`result of those arbitration demands is a direct result of the Fleet Agreement—which
`Postmates drafted and which Postmates required each courier to sign as a condition of
`
`
`8 Postmates disputes that it will eventually have to arbitrate all 5,255 demands,
`asserting that because some claimants, if forced to resubmit their demands after the
`conclusion of the appeal, may instead opt to participate in the pending settlement in the
`state court class action, Rimler v. Postmates, Inc., Case No. CGC-18-567878 (San
`Francisco Super. Ct.). Dkt. 266 at 13. However, as Postmates itself recognizes, it is
`entirely speculative whether any claimants will choose to abandon their arbitration
`demands in favor of the state court class action settlement.
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`working for Postmates. It strains credulity for Postmates to argue that the amount of filing
`fees due constitute irreparable harm when that “harm” is entirely of its own making.9
`The Court finds that Postmates has failed to carry its burden of showing a
`probability of irreparable injury if the stay is not granted. Lair, 697 F.3d at 1204. As
`Postmates has failed to meet the first two factors, the court need not reach the last two
`factors, except as discussed below. See Washington, 847 F.3d at 1164.
`C.
`ALTERNATIVE REQUEST
`Postmates also argues that, if this Court denies its request for a stay pending appeal,
`the Court should nevertheless stay its Order for “sixty days while Postmates seeks a stay
`from the Ninth Circuit.” Dkt. 261 at 15. Postmates asserts that that it would “suffer
`irreparable harm” in the absence of a temporary stay. Id. However, as discussed above,
`Postmates fails to demonstrate how a successful appeal would relieve it of its obligation to
`pay its share of the arbitration fees—an obligation that emanates from an agreement that
`Postmates drafted and compelled its couriers to sign.
`Moreover, further delay weighs against the public interest and inures to Petitioners’
`detriment. It is beyond cavil that the goal of arbitration is to provide an expeditious and
`efficient alternative to litigation. See Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 360 F.3d 1149,
`1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The Federal Arbitration Act represents Congress’s intent ‘to move
`the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as
`possible.’”) (citation omitted); see PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam, 843 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th
`Cir. 1988) (noting that arbitration “is supposed to be a speedy and inexpensive alternative
`to litigation”). As such, a stay is contrary to and undermines those goals. See In re Cintas
`Corp. Overtime Pay Arbitration Litig., No. C 06-1781 SBA, 2009 WL 1766595, at *5
`
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`9 In this respect, Postmates’ alleged injury and the relief it seeks are fundamentally
`at odds. Is it precisely because the couriers must file individual arbitration demands that
`Postmates must pay $10 million. That will not change, even if the couriers are required to
`refile their demands. The only way that Postmates would not be required to pay $10
`million is if the couriers were able to proceed with a class arbitration, which all parties and
`the Court agree they cannot do.
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`(N.D. Cal. June 22, 2009) (“Imposing a stay of the arbitration would serve only to delay
`conclusion of the dispute further, which is antithetical to the spirit and intent of the
`arbitration process.”).
`Here, Petitioners filed their arbitration demands over eight months ago but no
`arbitrations have commenced, due largely to Postmates’ litigation strategy, which is based
`on its untenable assertion that Petitioners are attempting to arbitrate on a classwide basis.
`Postmates dispute Petitioners’ will not be harmed from a stay since they “never explained
`how all 5,255 arbitrations could proceed at the same time.” Dkt. 266 at 13. This argument
`misses the point. The process of how the arbitrator should adjudicate those demands is a
`matter beyond the purview of the Court. Tellingly, Postmates cites no authority holding
`that potential logistical challenges in managing a large number of arbitration demands
`justifies a stay pending appeal.
`Petitioners have a right to have each of their demands heard expeditiously, even if
`that means all demands are not heard simultaneously. The Court therefore finds that further
`delay both undermines the public interest and harms Petitioners. E.g., Dakota, Minn. & E.
`R.R. Corp. v. Schieffer, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064 (D.S.D. 2010) (noting that staying
`arbitration pending appeal would “significantly prejudice” the nonmovant because “it
`would protract this dispute by considerably delaying resolution of [his] claim in the arbitral
`forum”); Gillette v. Uber Techs., No. C-14-5241 EMC, 2015 WL 4481706, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
`July 22, 2015) (denying alternative request for a temporary stay pending appeal “because
`the Ninth Circuit would be obligated to perform the same analysis this Court just engaged
`in if Uber asks the Circuit for a stay pending appeal”). Postmates’ alternative request for a
`temporary stay is therefore denied.
`//
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`

`Case 4:19-cv-03