Case 4:21-cv-00810-DMR Document 1 Filed 02/02/21 Page 1 of 34
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`Dennis J. Stewart (SBN 99152)
`GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC
`600 B Street
`17th Floor
`San Diego, CA 92101
`Telephone: (619) 595-3299
`dstewart@gustafsongluek.com
`
`Additional Plaintiff’s Counsel Appear on the Signature Page
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`
`
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`MIKULA WEB SOLUTIONS, INC.,
`individually and on behalf of all others
`similarly situated,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`
`Civil Action No.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Defendant.
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`COMPLAINT
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`Plaintiff Mikula Web Solutions, Inc. brings this action against Defendant Google LLC
`(“Google” or “Defendant”) individually and as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal
`Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of similarly situated publishers that sold digital Display Ad
`inventory through Google’s AdSense targeting consumers in the United States since March 11,
`2008. Plaintiff seeks treble damages and injunctive relief for Google’s longstanding and continuing
`violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2. Plaintiff alleges as follows
`based on its personal knowledge, the investigation of Plaintiff’s counsel, and on information and
`belief.
`I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
`1.
`This is a civil antitrust action under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act for treble
`damages and other relief arising out of Google’s exclusionary and anticompetitive campaign to
`obtain and maintain monopolies in several distinct, but closely related, relevant markets, including
`(a) publisher ad server services (“Publisher Ad Servers”); (b) display ad network services (“Ad
`Networks”); (c) display ad exchanges (“Exchanges”); and (d) display ad buying tools (“Ad Buying
`Tools”) (collectively, the “Relevant Markets”). These markets constitute what is referred to as the
`“Display Ad Stack.”
`2.
`While Google got its start in Search, today it is an advertising company. Google
`makes billions of dollars a year by collecting information about individual Internet users and then
`using that information to help advertisers find suitable persons to whom they can send direct,
`targeted ads. Google obtains user information from a number of sources, including through its
`Google Search service and Chrome web browser. Thanks to these and other Google offerings,
`Google knows when individual users log on, the websites they visit, the things they search for, the
`products they buy, and other valuable information.
`3.
`Google has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that created and entrenched its
`market power at all levels of the Display Ad Stack. As described further below, three events in
`particular are key to Google’s dominance in these markets, and the resulting harms to publishers:
`(1) Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick, which allowed Google to be a fully integrated player
`spanning the entire Display Ad Stack; (2) the introduction of “header bidding” in 2015, which
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`allowed Google’s rivals to bid simultaneously against each other for publisher impressions; and
`(3) Google’s subsequent introduction of Open Bidding in 2018, which was Google’s response to
`the competition created by header bidding.
`4.
`Google used each of these events, along with other actions described herein, to
`leverage its monopoly in Search into other markets, to exclude rivals, allocate markets, and
`otherwise extend and defend its dominance in the Relevant Display Ad Markets.
`5.
`As a result, Google has control over a dominant share of the Display Ad inventory
`on which advertisers will bid as well as over which advertisers can participate in the most
`significant auctions and how publishers prioritize and compare different sources to identify the
`advertiser that will ultimately “win” the right to place an ad in a particular ad slot.
`Google’s exclusionary conduct has had substantial anticompetitive effects in the Relevant Markets
`and has harmed publishers. Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class accordingly seek
`compensatory and injunctive relief for violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2.
`II.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`6.
`Plaintiff brings this action under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
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`1, 2.
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`7.
`Plaintiff has been injured, and is likely to continue to be injured, as a direct result
`of Google’s unlawful, anticompetitive conduct.
`8.
`The United States District Court for the Northern District of California has subject
`matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a), and section 4 of
`the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2).
`9.
`The United States District Court for the Northern District of California also has
`subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The amount in
`controversy exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive of interests and costs, and Plaintiff and a significant
`proportion of the members of the proposed Class are citizens of states different from Google.
`10.
`Venue is proper in this District under sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act, 15
`U.S.C. §§ 15, 22. Google is headquartered in this District and its principal business operations are
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`based in this District. Moreover, Google’s anticompetitive conduct was directed and carried out in
`this District. Venue also is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 for the same reasons.
`11.
`Plaintiff and members of the Class also have contracts with Google that contain a
`forum selection clause requiring all claims between the parties to be resolved “exclusively in the
`federal or state courts of Santa Clara County, California,” which includes this District.
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`III.
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`PARTIES
`12.
`Plaintiff Mikula Web Solutions, Inc. is a small business incorporated in
`Pennsylvania with its principal place of business in Doylestown, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff assists
`small and medium sized business with complete website development solutions including website
`design, e-commerce, database applications, online marketing solutions, and website hosting. As
`part of that, Mikula Web Solutions, Inc. sells digital Display Ad inventory through Google. As a
`direct result of Google’s unlawful, exclusionary conduct, Mikula Web Solutions, Inc. has been
`paid lower-than-competitive rates for its digital Display Ad inventory.
`13.
`Defendant Google is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
`Mountain View, California. Google is owned by Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company
`incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware and headquartered in Mountain
`View, California. Google engages in, and its activities substantially affect, interstate trade and
`commerce. Google provides a range of products and services that are marketed, distributed, and
`offered to consumers throughout the United States and internationally.
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`IV. DISPLAY ADVERTISING
`14.
`Display Ads are ads that appear on a website, often in a side window or some other
`designated space on the page. The suppliers of that ad space—usually the owner of the website—
`are generally referred to as “publishers.” Because many publishers rely on Display Ads as an
`important source of funds for their businesses, the price at which they can sell space on their pages
`is critical.
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`15. When an Internet user visits a publisher’s website where ad space is available, a
`process is initiated to solicit and organize bids through various sources of advertiser demand to fill
`that space. Once the winning bid has been identified, in a process that typically takes less than a
`second, the Display Ad is placed on the publisher’s website. The intermediaries providing these
`services receive compensation in a form of a share of the payments from advertisers for their
`Display Ads to appear on the website.
`16.
`The Display Ad intermediation industry has four main layers: Sell-side Tools
`(Publisher Ad Servers and Ad Networks), Exchanges, Ad Buying Tools, and Advertiser Ad
`Servers. Together, these four layers are called the “Display Ad Stack.”
`17.
`Sell-side tools include Publisher Ad Servers and Ad Networks, which are used by
`publishers selling space on their websites (“impressions”) to assist them in choosing which ads to
`place on their sites. Generally, larger publishers use Publisher Ad Servers, and smaller publishers
`use Ad Networks to sell space on their website.
`18.
`Exchanges, or “Supply-Side Platforms” (“SSPs”), run auctions of impressions.
`Bidders in these auctions, who represent advertisers, use Ad Buying Tools, also called “Demand-
`Side Platforms” (“DSPs”). These Ad Buying Tools help advertisers run ad campaigns and manage
`bids on Exchanges. The DSPs also run their own auctions for impressions in which their advertiser
`clients are the bidders.
`19.
`The winner of each DSP auction advances to one or more auctions run by the
`Exchanges. The winner of each Exchange’s auction is then shown to the Publisher Ad Server or
`Ad Network, which then selects and places an ad on the publisher’s site. Figure 1 provides a visual
`representation of the industry.
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`FIGURE 1. DISPLAY AD STACK
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`20.
`To provide an example based on this diagram, assume that Publisher 1 puts an
`impression up for sale through DoubleClick for Publishers (“DCFP”), which is Google’s Publisher
`Ad Server.1 DCFP will alert the three Exchanges, including Google’s AdX, that the impression is
`up for sale. The Exchanges subsequently alert the DSP/Ad Buying Tools that the impression is for
`sale. The advertisers on each of the DSPs then bid for the impression.
`21.
`The winning bids on each DSP will then compete among each other on the
`Exchanges. For example, in the figure above, the advertiser with the highest bid on Buy-Side/Ad
`Buying Tool 1 will compete with the winners from Google Ads and DV360, as well as the
`advertiser that won the auction on Buy-Side/Ad Buying Tool 2 on various Exchanges. Each
`Exchange that received bids will present each Publisher Ad Server its winning bid, which then
`selects the winning bid from the three offered by the Exchanges. Once the winner is selected by
`the publisher ad server, the advertiser sends the ad to be placed on the publisher’s website.
`22.
`Publishers using Google’s sell-side Publisher Ad Server, DCFP, or those that sell
`impressions through AdSense and Google’s Ad Network pay Google a fee for the use of those
`
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`1 Google’s products underwent a rebranding in 2018. Its buy-side Ad Buying Tools, Google
`AdWords (for non-premium advertisers) was rebranded as Google Ads, and DoubleClick Bid
`Manager (“DCBM”) (for premium advertisers) was rebranded as DV360. Google’s sell-side tool
`for non-premium publishers was left as Google AdSense. Its sell-side tool for premium publishers,
`DCFP was rebranded as Google Ad Manager (“GAM”), which also absorbed DoubleClick’s Ad
`Exchange (“AdX”) and integrated it into a single platform.
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`services. In the case of DCFP, the fee is based on a constant “cost-per-mile” or “cost per 1000
`impressions.”
`23.
`Exchanges such as AdX (prior to rebranding) charge on the basis of a revenue share
`with publishers. That is, an Exchange keeps a portion of the closing price of the auction it runs
`related to the sale of the publisher’s inventory.
`24.
`Google’s buy-side tools, Google Ads and DV360, are used by advertisers directly
`and indirectly. Google Ads tends to be used directly by smaller advertisers, whereas DV360 is
`often used indirectly by advertisers that contract with media buying firms to run ad campaigns on
`DV360. DV360 charges a fee to advertisers for its services, while Google Ads makes money by
`keeping the difference between what the advertiser pays for an ad and what Google Ads bids into
`the Exchange.
`25.
`A common metric used in digital advertising is the “take rate,” which is the
`difference (in percentage terms) of the spending incurred by the advertiser and the amount received
`by the publisher as the money flows through the Display Ad Stack. So, for example, if the
`advertiser pays $100 and the publisher receives $60, then the take rate is 40%. Figure 2 provides
`an illustration of take rates for 2019 in the United Kingdom as reported by the Competition &
`Markets Authority (“CMA”).
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`FIGURE 2. TAKE-RATE AT EACH LAYER OF THE DISPLAY AD STACK IN THE UK (2019)
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`26.
`The CMA found that Google has high market shares in all layers of the Display Ad
`Stack, as set forth in Figure 3.
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`FIGURE 3. GOOGLE’S SHARE OF IMPRESSIONS
`AT EACH LAYERS OF AD INTERMEDIATION IN THE UK
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`V. RELEVANT MARKETS
`A.
`Google Has Market Power in the Publisher Ad Server Market in the
`United States
`27.
`Publisher Ad Servers for Display Ad inventory in the United States is a relevant
`antitrust market. Publisher Ad Servers are inventory management systems that publishers use to
`manage their online display ad inventory. They provide features such as: (1) reservation-based
`sales technology to support a publisher’s direct sales efforts; (2) inventory forecasting technology
`to help a publisher determine what inventory will be available to sell; (3) a user interface through
`which a publisher’s sales team can input directly sold campaign requirements; (4) co-management
`of direct and indirect sales channels; (5) report generation of ad inventory performance; (6)
`invoicing capabilities for a publisher's direct campaigns; and (7) yield management technology.
`28. Most publishers “single home” and use one ad server to manage all their web
`display inventory. When a publisher sells more than one type of inventory (e.g., web display, in-
`app, or video), they may then use one ad server product for their display inventory and a second
`ad server for their in-app or video inventory or an ad server that manages more than one format.
`Were a publisher to use multiple ad servers for the same format, they would have to resolve
`conflicts between ad servers, thereby defeating the point of an ad server's inventory management
`functions.
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`29.
`Publisher Ad Servers are unique. They are not interchangeable with Exchange, Ad
`Network, or Ad Buying Tools for large or small advertisers. Those tools do not similarly manage
`a publisher’s direct sales channel or offer the reporting, invoicing, or forecasting functions that
`publishers need to holistically manage inventory and optimize yield.
`30.
`The customers of Publisher Ad Servers are generally large publishers who need to
`manage both direct and indirect sales channels.
`31. With respect to the Publisher Ad Server Market, the relevant geographic market is
`the United States. Publisher ad servers available in other countries are not a reasonable substitute
`for ad servers available in the United States. Therefore, the United States is the relevant geographic
`market.
`32.
`Google’s monopoly power in this market is confirmed by its high market share.
`More than 90 percent of large publishers use Google’s publisher ad server, Google Ad Manager
`(formerly known as “DoubleClick for Publishers”), according to published reports. Google internal
`documents also measured that Google Ad Manager served the vast majority-percent-of all online
`display ad impressions in the United States in the third quarter of 2018.
`33.
`According to a complaint filed by the State of Texas and others, Google’s
`monopoly power in the Publisher Ad Server Market is further confirmed by direct evidence,
`including charged supra-competitive fees and degraded quality in the publisher ad server market,
`defying the existence of any competitive restraints whatsoever.
`34.
`Google’s market power in the publisher ad server market is also protected by
`significant barriers to entry. One barrier to entry is switching costs. Switching online ad servers is
`risky and resource intensive. Some publishers have inventory on hundreds of thousands, or even
`hundreds of millions, of webpages, which makes switching ad servers exceedingly expensive,
`difficult, and time consuming. Moreover, the switching process also entails significant revenue
`risk.
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`B.
`Google Has Monopoly Power in the Ad Networks Market in the United States
`35.
`Ad Networks in the United States constitute a relevant antitrust product market. Ad
`Networks are marketplaces that match small publishers’ ad inventory with advertisers without
`providing impression-by-impression price transparency to the sell or buy sides of the transaction.
`36.
`Ad Networks are not interchangeable with Publisher Ad Servers, Exchanges, or Ad
`Buying Tools. While Ad Networks are marketplaces for advertising inventory, they are not
`interchangeable with Exchanges (discussed below) because they operate in a different manner and
`serve a different type of publisher.
`37.
`Ad Networks do not offer the same type of impression-by-impression price
`transparency to publishers and advertisers that Exchanges do. Ad Networks also typically serve
`much smaller publishers that do not have sufficient traffic to sell their inventory through
`exchanges. Ad Networks require little to no upfront spending by publishers, and publishers can
`join networks to sell their inventory even if they do not have much inventory to sell. For example,
`AdSense publishers on the Google Ad Network do not have monthly page view or impression
`requirements. These types of publishers typically include local newspapers, niche websites, blogs,
`and more.
`38. With respect to Ad Networks, the relevant geographic market is the United States.
`Ad Networks available in other countries are not a reasonable substitute for display ad networks
`available in the United States. Therefore, the United States is a relevant geographic market.
`39.
`Google has monopoly power in the Ad Network Market in the United States.
`Google’s Ad Network, Google Display Network (“GDN”) reaches more user impressions and
`websites than any other display network, including over 2 million small online publishers globally.
`Google has immense scale amongst the long tail of small online publishers.
`40.
`According to the State of Texas, direct evidence also confirms the monopoly power
`of Google’s Display Ad Network, with GDN charging very high double-digit percent commissions
`on advertising transactions. Google reportedly acknowledges that its fees are very high and that
`Google can demand high fees because of its market power.
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`41.
`The market power of Google’s Ad Network is protected by barriers to entry. Google
`imposes a significant barrier to entry by using its Publisher Ad Server to preferentially route
`trading to its Ad Network through a host of anticompetitive conduct addressed below. Google also
`generates a further barrier when its ad buying tool Google Ads preferentially routes trading to
`GDN through a host of anticompetitive conduct discussed below. Finally, Ad Networks need scale
`on both the supply and demand sides; natural network effects make it difficult for any new
`networks to enter and achieve scale.
`C.
`Google Has Monopoly Power in the Exchange Market in the United States
`42.
`Exchanges in the United States constitute a relevant antitrust product market. These
`exchanges are marketplaces that auction multiple publishers’ display inventory to multiple end-
`advertisers through advertisers’ middlemen on an impression-by-impression basis and in real time.
`On the sell side, Exchanges generally interface with publishers through publishers’ ad servers such
`as Google's ad server. On the buy side, they interface with advertisers through ad buying tools,
`including ad buying tools for large advertisers, ad buying tools for small advertisers, such as
`Google Ads, and sometimes, even networks.
`43.
`Exchanges are not interchangeable with Publisher Ad Servers, Ad Networks, or Ad
`Buying Tools. Publishers cannot sell their display ad inventory on an impression-by-impression
`basis or in a real-time marketplace to end-advertisers using publisher ad servers, networks, or ad
`buying tools. Moreover, unlike Ad Networks, Exchanges are designed to integrate with multiple
`ad buying tools so that advertisers can optimize trading across exchanges; networks are more
`restricted. Reflecting the fact that exchanges and networks offer different feature sets, exchanges
`require publishers to commit to a large monthly volume of impressions or revenue, whereas
`networks typically do not. Publishers that use Google’s ad server to sell their display ad inventory
`through ad marketplaces primarily sell their inventory in exchanges, not networks. As an example,
`one major online publisher in the United States sold over 80 percent of their indirect display
`inventory to exchanges, not networks.
`44.
`Exchanges are also not interchangeable with the direct sales channel, for publishers
`and advertisers. For publishers, selling inventory directly requires that they develop expertise
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`around managing, selling, and serving campaigns, which requires a specialized skill set and is
`expensive to do. For advertisers, buying inventory directly from publishers also requires an
`additional skill set and ongoing investment. For direct deals, publishers and advertisers must
`typically hire and maintain internal staff to manage these one-to-one relationships. As a result, the
`direct sales channel tends to be reserved for high-value publisher-advertiser transactions.
`45. With respect to display ad exchanges, the relevant geographic market is the United
`States. Exchanges available in other countries are not a reasonable substitute for display ad
`exchanges available in the United States. Therefore, the United States is a relevant geographic
`market.
`46.
`Google has monopoly power in the United States in the Exchange market. Despite
`an early competitive landscape, Google's Display Ad Exchange, historically called AdX, has been
`the top exchange in the United States since at least 2013. Additionally, publisher and exchange
`data reportedly shows that Google’s share of the Display Ad Exchange Market has substantially
`increased since 2019. Finally, for online publishers reaching high-value users, Google’s Display
`Ad Exchange transacts an even greater share of publishers' exchange impressions.
`47.
`Google’s market power in the Exchange market is also protected by significant
`barriers to entry. New entrants must achieve sufficient scale and network effects to attract
`publishers and advertisers to use their exchange. In addition, Google’s anticompetitive conduct
`has created artificial barriers to entry. One significant Google-created barrier arises due to
`Google’s Publisher Ad Server preferentially routing trading to Google’s exchange through a host
`of anticompetitive conduct addressed below. Google creates another barrier to entry by exclusively
`and preferentially routing the bids of advertisers using DV360 and Google Ads to its ad exchange
`through a host of other anticompetitive conduct discussed below.
`
`D.
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`Google Has Monopoly Power in the Market for Ad Buying Tools for
`Small Advertisers
`48.
`The Market for Ad Buying Tools for Small Advertisers in the United States is a
`relevant antitrust market. These tools provide an interface that smaller advertisers can use to bid
`on and purchase the display ad inventory trading on ad exchanges and in ad networks. In this
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`respect, these tools allow advertisers to optimize for their own interests, including purchasing
`quality display ad inventory for the lowest prices.
`49.
`Ad Buying Tools for Small Advertisers are not interchangeable with ad buying
`tools for large advertisers, which are sometimes called demand-side platforms (or “DSPs”). The
`two sets of tools serve different types of advertisers, exhibit different pricing and entry levels, and
`offer different feature sets.
`50.
`Ad Buying Tools for Small Advertisers are also not interchangeable with Publisher
`Ad Servers, Display Ad Networks, or Ad Exchanges, as none of these provide small advertisers
`with a buying interface to bid on and purchase ad inventory in exchanges or networks.
`51.
`The relevant geographic market for Display Ad Buying Tools for small advertisers
`is the United States. Display Ad Buying Tools for small advertisers available in other countries
`are not a reasonable substitute for the tools available in the United States. Therefore, the United
`States is a relevant geographic market.
`52.
`Google’s ad buying tool, “Google Ads,” has monopoly power in the United States
`in the Display Ad Buying Tool Market for Small Advertisers. The market power of Google Ads is
`evidenced by the fact that Google's exchange charges supra-competitive fees for exclusive access
`to Google Ads advertisers.
`53.
`Google Ads also has market power over the small advertisers it serves because most
`rely on a single ad buying tool for a given advertising format (e.g., display ads) and have switching
`costs. Using multiple ad buying tools imposes additional costs on advertisers because of the
`additional time, effort, training, and expense needed to manage campaigns across tools; Google
`Ads also does not let small advertisers completely export the data they need to easily switch to
`another tool. As a result, while very large advertisers might be able to absorb the costs of using
`more than one tool at a time, small advertisers almost always use just one ad buying tool at a time
`54.
`Google’s market power with Google Ads is protected by various critical barriers to
`
`entry.
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`Case 4:21-cv-00810-DMR Document 1 Filed 02/02/21 Page 14 of 34
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`a. First, Google Ads charges opaque fees and does not let advertisers readily audit the
`ad inventory Google purchases on their behalf, both of which act as a barrier to
`entry because they impede advertisers from switching to a low-cost provider.
`b. Second, Google’s practice of withholding YouTube video inventory from rival ad
`buying tools locks small advertisers who use one tool at a time into Google’s ad
`buying tool.
`c. Third, other providers of buying tools cannot compete with Google Ads for small
`advertisers, because they cannot achieve sufficient scale with smaller advertisers
`who want to buy display, YouTube, and even search ads, through just one tool.
`d. Fourth, advertisers use ad buying tools to keep track of the users they have targeted
`with ads, the users that have made purchases, and the users that they want to keep
`targeting with more ads. Google Ads limits advertisers from accessing and taking
`this data with them to another tool. As a result, advertisers are locked in and have
`high switching costs.
`
`
`VI. GOOGLE’S EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT TO CREATE AND EXTEND ITS
`MARKET POWER IN THE RELEVANT DISPLAY AD MARKETS
`A.
`Google Has Monopoly Power in the Market for Ad Buying Tools for Small
`Advertisers
`55.
`In 2009, Google began a series of acquisitions that allowed it to participate in every
`level of the Display Ad Stack. The most significant of these acquisitions was DoubleClick, which
`was vertically integrated across the entire ad tech supply chain. See Figure 4. DoubleClick offered
`sell-side tools in the Publisher Ad Server Market (DoubleClick for Publishers, or “DCFP”), buy-
`side tools in the Ad Buying Tools Market (DoubleClick Bid Manager, or “DCBM”), and ran an
`exchange between buyers and sellers in the Exchange Market (DoubleClick Ad Exchange, or
`“AdX”).
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`Case 4:21-cv-00810-DMR Document 1 Filed 02/02/21 Page 15 of 34
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`FIGURE 4. DOUBLECLICK’S VERTICAL INTEGRATION
`
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`56.
`Google used the DoubleClick acquisition to exploit cross-side externalities between
`publishers and advertisers (i.e. “network effects”). With the acquisition of DCFP (the dominant
`Publisher Ad Server), Google instantly acquired a large, installed base of publishers to help attract
`advertisers. The DoubleClick acquisition also included a technology called Dynamic Allocation,
`which gave Google’s AdX an advantage over other Exchanges bidding for impressions from
`DCFP.
`
`57.
`In 2010, Google acquired AdMob, which gave Google the ability to efficiently
`serve ads in mobile apps; this allowed Google to extend its monopolistic reach into the mobile
`markets. These, along with other acquisitions, expanded Google’s presence in the Display Ad
`Stack while enabling Google to exclude others, thereby increasing Google’s market power in the
`Relevant Display Ad Markets.
`58.
`After acquiring DoubleClick, Google required small advertisers bidding through
`Google’s buy-side (Ad Buying Tools Market) Google Ads to transact in both Google’s Ad
`Network and AdX in the Display Ad Exchange Market. Google also made it so that large
`publishers who wished to receive bids from the “fire hose” of advertisers who used Google’s Ad
`Buying Tools had to license DCFP in the Publisher Ad Server Market and trade in AdX in the
`Exchange Market.
`59.
`In other words, Google demanded that it represent buyers, sellers, and run the
`exchange in which they traded. This essentially tripled Google’s opportunity to extract fees (one
`fee from the buy side in the Ad Buying Tools Market, another fee from the sell-side in either the
`Publisher Ad Server Market or Display Ad Network Market, and a third for running the exchange
`in the Exchange Market).
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`COMPLAINT
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`Case 4:21-cv-00810-DMR Document 1 Filed 02/02/21 Page 16 of 34
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`B.
`
`Google Leveraged its Market Power in Search to Lure Advertisers to Use
`Google’s Ad Buying Tools
`60.
`Because of its dominance in the Search Market, Google’s Search is considered a
`mandatory advertising channel for most advertisers.
`61.
`Google requires advertisers placing Search Ads to use only Google’s Ad Buying
`Tools, which automatically default to tools for the Google Display Network (a group of publisher
`sites in the Ad Networks Market that are affiliated with Google due to their use of ad
`intermediation tools). This tying of Search and Search Ads with Google’s Ad Buying Tools
`reduces the incentive for advertisers to consider and choose other platforms in the Ad Buying
`Tools Market.
`62.
`In addition, Google does not share data regarding Search Ad campaigns on Google
`Search with riva