Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 1 of 39
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`RANDY E. KLEINMAN (CA SBN 320061)
`GERSTMAN SCHWARTZ LLP
`1399 Franklin Avenue, Suite 200
`Garden City, New York 11530
`Telephone:
`(516)880-8170
`Facsimile:
`(516) 880-8171
`Email:
`rkleinman@gerstmanschwartz.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`ALI AL-AHMED
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`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`
`
`ALI AL-AHMED,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`TWITTER, INC.,
`ALI HAMAD A ALZABARAH, and
`AHMAD ABOUAMMO,
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`
`Defendants.
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`CASE NO.:
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
`FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CASE NO.___
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 2 of 39
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`For his complaint, Plaintiff Ali Al-Ahmed (“Mr. Ahmed”), by and through its attorneys
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`Gerstman Schwartz LLP, avers as follows:
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`THE PARTIES
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`1.
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`Plaintiff Ali Al-Ahmed (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Mr. Al-Ahmed”) is one of the
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`leading critics to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (hereinafter “KSA”) who resides, and has been
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`granted asylum in, the United States, because as a political dissident and human rights
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`advocate, he faced imminent persecution were he to return to his native country, Saudi Arabia.
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`2.
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`Defendant Twitter, Inc., (hereinafter “Twitter”) is incorporated in Delaware with
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`its headquarters in San Francisco, California.1
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`3.
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`In 2011, Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal (hereinafter “Bin Talal”) purchased $300
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`million worth of stock in Twitter. In 2015, Bin Talal made an additional investment, owning
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`5.2% of the company, more than Twitter’s founder and CEO2. A January 29, 2018 article in
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`the British newspaper, The Daily Mail, reported that after being imprisoned and perhaps
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`tortured by KSA, Bin Talal signed over many of his assets to Crown Prince Mohammed Bin
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`Salman (hereinafter “MBS”). According to The Daily Mail, a deal was allegedly made with
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`MBS allowing MBS to seize control of these assets and those of other princes, so long as the
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`assets remained in the United States.
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`1 The term “Twitter” shall hereinafter refer to Twitter, Inc., its agents, employees, and assigns.
`2 Twitter’s April 20, 2016 Annual Proxy Statement, on page 56, confirms that HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talel
`Abudulziz Alsaud beneficially owned 4.99% of the company. A second amendment to a 13G filed with the Securities
`Exchange Commission on or about December 31, 2016 states that “based…on the [third quarter 10Q] percentage of
`class was reduced to 4.9%.” This auspicious reduction permitted the Kingdom to avoid future filing and disclosure
`requirements. A BBC report dated October of 2015 noted that “Prince Alwaleed bin Talal and his investment firm
`now owns just over 5%, which is more than Twitter's new chief executive Jack Dorsey. His cash injection comes at
`a critical time for Twitter, which is struggling to attract new followers. Saudi Arabia is said to be home to 40% of
`all active Twitter users in the Middle East.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34474798/meet-twitters-second-
`biggest-shareholder-saudi-prince-alwaleed-bin-talal.
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 3 of 39
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`4.
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`Based on news reports indicating that 40% of all active Twitter users in the Middle
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`East reside in the Kingdom, and this highly influential stake made in Twitter by a Saudi prince,
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`Twitter’s hiring of Saudi Nationals, who turned out to be Saudi agents, and its abject failure to
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`properly safeguard Plaintiff’s account takes on a new light. Plaintiff’s personal and highly
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`sensitive information, including confidential information provided by his followers and
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`journalistic sources, was disclosed to third parties including, but not limited to, the KSA and
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`its agents as a result of Defendants’ recklessness, negligence, and, at times, intentional acts or
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`omissions that appear to have been designed to appease a critical investor, MBS.
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`5.
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`Defendant Ahmad Abouammo (hereinafter “Abouammo”) is a dual citizen of the
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`United States and Lebanon and resided in Walnut Creek, California, in the Northern District
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`of California, from at least November 4, 2013, until May 22, 2015, and thereafter resided in
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`Seattle, Washington. Abouammo was an employee of Twitter from on or about November 4,
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`2013, to on or about May 22, 2015. Abouammo was a Media Partnerships Manager responsible
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`for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region at Twitter. As a Media Partnerships
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`Manager, Abouammo was involved in providing assistance for notable accounts, including
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`accounts of public interest or belonging to brands, journalists, and celebrities in the MENA
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`region, with content and Twitter strategy, and with sharing best practices.
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`6.
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`Defendant Ali Hamad A Alzabarah (hereinafter “Alzabarah”) is a citizen of Saudi
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`Arabia and resided in San Bruno, California in the Northern District of California from at least
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`August 12, 2013, until December 3, 2015. Alzabarah was an employee of Twitter from on or
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`about August 12, 2013, to on or about December 4, 2015. While employed at Twitter,
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`Alzabarah was a Site Reliability Engineer whose responsibility was maintaining Twitter’s
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`hardware and software to ensure uninterrupted service.
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 4 of 39
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`7.
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`On November 19, 2019, Abouammo and Alzabarah were indicted for acting as
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`agents for the government of Saudi Arabia who, while employed at Twitter, accessed user
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`information without authorization and provided it to Saudi Arabian government officials.3
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`Abouammo and Alzabarah gained access to dissidents and critics of the Saudi government
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`including, upon information and belief, Mr. Al-Ahmed.
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`8.
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`Defendants Twitter, Abouammo, and Alzabarah shall hereinafter be referred to
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`collectively as “Defendants.”
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`VENUE AND JURISDICTION
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`9.
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`Jurisdiction is proper in this Court because this litigation arises under federal law,
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`namely 18 U.S.C. §2701 et seq. (“Stored Communications Act”). Jurisdiction is also proper
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`because this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action and each Defendant under 28
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`U.S.C. § 1331.
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`10.
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`The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims asserted in this
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`case under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and 28 U.S.C. § 1362 because there is diversity of citizenship
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`between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
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`11.
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`12.
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`Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1391(c).
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Twitter because Twitter, on information
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`and belief, conducts business in the State of California and within this district.
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`13.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Abouammo and Alzabarah because they
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`resided, and were present in, the State of California and within this district when the acts
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`alleged occurred.
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`3 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/united-states-v-ahmad-abouammo.
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 5 of 39
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`14.
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`GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
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`“Twitter being abused to instill fear, to silence your voice,
`or to undermine individual safety, is unacceptable.”
`-- @TwitterSafety, October 3, 20204
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`Defendants have engaged in outrageous, irresponsible, and despicable conduct
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`that should be punished to the maximum extent under the law.
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`15.
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`This is an action to vindicate the rights of Mr. Al-Ahmed, a political refugee who
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`has been granted political asylum in the United States from the despotic regime in the KSA.
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`Because of the tremendous wealth of key figures in KSA, major corporations, including
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`Twitter, have enabled, collaborated, colluded, conspired with, aided and abetted, and/or
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`otherwise turned a blind eye to KSA’s efforts to suppress, torture, falsely imprison, terrorize,
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`and murder dissenters both within Saudi Arabia and around the world.
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`A. Allegations Relevant To All Causes Of Action
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`16. Mr. Al-Ahmed is a leading voice of dissent casting an evidently unwanted
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`magnifying glass upon the acts and omissions, policies and, at times, alleged crimes
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`conducted on behalf of, or with the knowledge and consent of, the KSA or elements within
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`the KSA. Mr. Al-Ahmed is also one of the most active and courageous journalists within the
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`United States covering the KSA. Through his prominent social media presence, and persistent
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`critique of the KSA, Mr. Al-Ahmed has brought broad awareness to issues of social and
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`political concern including allegations of KSA human rights violations, KSA links to
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`international terrorism, and KSA corruption within the Kingdom.
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`17.
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`It is not an overstatement to suggest that Mr. Al-Ahmed has become a thorn in the
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`side of the KSA. Indeed, he would not dispute that he has made it his life’s work to counter
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`KSA propaganda and expose systemic corruption, violence, and police state tactics within
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`the KSA, and to counter the KSA’s efforts to masquerade itself as a modern nation. As a
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`4Twitter Safety (@TwitterSafety), Twitter (Oct. 3, 2020),
`https://twitter.com/TwitterSafety/status/1312498519094091779 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasis
`added).
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 6 of 39
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`result, Mr. Al-Ahmed attests that the KSA has consistently attempted to—quite literally—
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`silence his voice, even going so far as to attempt to kidnap and kill him on multiple occasions.
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`The KSA has also formally stripped Mr. Al-Ahmed of his Saudi nationality and has kept him
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`under vigilant surveillance.
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`18.
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`He has been invited to speak by institutions including Princeton University,
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`Amnesty International, the Hudson Institute, American Enterprise Institute, and Meridian
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`International Center, and has testified before Congress on several occasions on the issue of
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`civil rights and religious freedom in the Middle East. Additionally, he has authored reports
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`on Saudi Arabia regarding religious freedom, torture, press freedom, and religious
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`curriculum.
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`19.
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`Although Mr. Al-Ahmed usually disseminates information via social media, Al-
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`Ahmed is a frequent consultant to major international broadcast media outlets on issues
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`including Saudi political affairs, terrorism, Sunni-Shi’a relations, Wahhabi Islam, political
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`and religious oppression, human and women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi-U.S.
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`relationship. He has been a regular guest on CBS News, CNN, PBS, Fox News, and Al-
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`Jazeera. He has written for, and has been quoted in, the Washington Post, Associated Press,
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`The Times, Reuters, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and the Boston Globe. In short, he
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`is a leading Saudi voice for KSA reform and democratization.
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`20. With the passage of time, Mr. Al-Ahmed has become such an influential voice
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`that multiple prominent Saudi officials have followed his Arabic Twitter, his largest
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`verifiable social media account, which has over 36,000 followers worldwide (although, as
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`will be described in further detail herein, it has since been suspended).
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`B. Twitter’s Unauthorized and Unlawful Hacking of Mr. Al-Ahmed’s Private
`Information
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`21.
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`In or around August 2013, until in or around December 2015, Alzabarah and
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`Abouammo– Twitter employees charged and indicted by the United States government in
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 7 of 39
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`November 2019 for being KSA spies5 – accessed the company’s information on an array of
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`Saudi dissidents including Mr. Al-Ahmed6.
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`22.
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`Through use of both Alzabarah and Abouammo, the KSA was successful in using
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`Twitter’s internal resources to identify Mr. Al-Ahmed as a critic of the government and
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`ultimately silence him.
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`23.
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`On numerous occasions, Alzabarah and Abouammo mined Twitter’s internal
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`systems for, inter alia, personal information regarding Mr. Al-Ahmed, email addresses,
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`contacts, phone numbers, birth dates, and internet protocol (“IP”) addresses.
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`24.
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`Although Alzabarah and Abouammo’s conduct was ostensibly outside the scope of
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`their job duties, Twitter surreptitiously aided and abetted Alzabarah and Abouammo by, among
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`other things, 1) providing them with unfettered access to Twitter’s vast resources and
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`infrastructure at the behest of the KSA and with the full knowledge that they would exploit
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`these privileges by improperly gaining access to the accounts of Twitter users, such as Mr. Al-
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`Ahmed, who were adverse to the Saudi regime; 2) helping Alzabarah and Abouammo operate
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`their clandestine operation undetected until they were no longer of use to Twitter and/or the
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`KSA; 3) helping Alzabarah and Abouammo provide the ill-gained information to the KSA; 4)
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`and covering up their malfeasance by purging its internal database of any incriminating
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`evidence and thereafter publicly renouncing Alzabarah and Abouammo’s conduct.
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`25.
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`A superseding indictment filed by the United States Attorneys’ Office makes clear
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`that Twitter failed to detect these breaches over a period of time spanning over a year7. While
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`5 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/press-release/file/1215976/download, United States v. Ahmed Almutairi, a/k/a
`Ahmed Aljbreen; and Ali Alzabarah, November 2019.
`6 Superseding Indictment, July 28, 2020, 19-CR-621 EMC, “After ALZABARAH returned to San Francisco, from
`May 21, 2015, through November 18, 2015, he accessed without authorization through Twitter’s computer system
`certain nonpublic account information of dozens of Twitter users, including accounts that had posted critical or
`embarrassing information about the government of KSA and Saudi Royal Family Member-1.”
`7 See id.
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 8 of 39
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`Twitter has since ostensibly attempted to remedy their indefensible security practices, the
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`damage to Mr. Al-Ahmed and his followers had already been done. Twitters’ subsequent
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`efforts to enhance their security protocols does not undo the damage done to Mr. Al-Ahmed
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`and his followers as a result of Twitter’s slip shot practices which have made Mr. Al-Ahmed,
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`and many of his followers, targets for the brutal KSA, jeopardizing the very lives of his
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`followers living within the confines of the KSA and its surrounding environs.
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`26.
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`Indeed, several Twitter users, who either followed Mr. Al-Ahmed’s Twitter
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`account and/or had direct contact with him through the use of Twitter’s private messaging
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`feature, have disappeared, been arrested, or have been executed. One such example is Abdullah
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`al-Hamid, a Saudi Dissident and follower of Mr. Al-Ahmed’s Twitter account, who was jailed
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`and ultimately died in custody8.
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`27.
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`On the heels of all this death and skullduggery, in or about May 2018, the KSA
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`managed to fully silence Mr. Al-Ahmed when they had their embedded Twitter agents, or
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`others within Twitter, suspend Mr. Al-Ahmed’s Arabic Twitter account, “@AliAlahmed,”
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`without explanation, warning, or justification. Despite the above-noted Justice Department
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`criminal complaint exposing these Twitter KSA agents’ activities in November of 2019, Mr.
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`Al-Ahmed’s repeated attempts to appeal his suspension have been to no avail. While Twitter
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`may wish to play the victim of state-sponsored espionage, Twitter’s conduct in punishing the
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`victims of this intrigue, including Mr. Al-Ahmed, tells a far different story: one of ratification,
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`8 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/middleeast/abdullah-al-hamid-saudi-dissident-dies-in-detention-at-
`69.html.
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 9 of 39
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`complicity, and/or adoption tailored to appease a neigh beneficial owner and preserve access
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`to a key market, the KSA9.
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`28.
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`This helps explain why Twitter has upheld Mr. Al-Ahmed’s suspension and kept
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`his account inaccessible including Mr. Al-Ahmed’s access to his approximately 36,000
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`followers’ contact information. The genesis of this suspension having been clearly exposed,
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`Twitter continues to bar Mr. Al-Ahmed from access or use, corroborating his claims that
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`Twitter is continuing to do the KSA’s bidding; preferring access to the KSA and funding from
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`the KSA over human rights, freedom, and to abiding by the terms of its owner agreements
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`made with Twitter subscribers, and in contravention of its public representation that Twitter is
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`committed to protecting Twitter uses.
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`29.
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`Twitter’s Privacy Policy states, in pertinent part, that:
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`About public and protected Tweets – Should you choose to protect
`your Tweets, you can do so through your account settings…If you
`protect your Tweets, you’ll receive a request when new people want
`to follow you, which you can approve or deny…Protected Tweets:
`Only visible to your Twitter followers. Please keep in mind, your
`followers may still capture images of your Tweets and share
`them.”10
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`9 Authorities have evidently failed to recognize how beholden Twitter is to the KSA, particularly during the
`timeframe in question, which supports an allegation of willful blindness and complicity. Additionally, by punishing
`the victim of this conduct, i.e., by continuing to withhold the above-referenced followers’ contacts of a known critic
`of the KSA, Twitter has ratified the actions of its supposedly errant employees and shown its continuing allegiance
`to the KSA. C.R. v Tenet Healthcare Corp., informs us that “an employer may be liable for the employer either
`authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort.”169 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1110
`(2009) (citations omitted). Discovery will likely establish that Twitter knew about, and was complicit in, this
`espionage. At the very least, Twitter’s course of conduct since—notwithstanding its assertions of federal
`cooperation—amounts to ratification because Twitter continues to punish the KSA’s enemies by withholding their
`followers’ contact information and banning them from the platform.
`10https://help.Twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/public-and-protected-tweets, “About public and protected Tweets
`– Should you choose to protect your Tweets, you can do so through your account settings…If you protect your
`Tweets, you’ll receive a request when new people want to follow you, which you can approve or deny…Protected
`Tweets: Only visible to your Twitter followers. Please keep in mind, your followers may still capture images of your
`Tweets and share them.”
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CASE NO.___
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 10 of 39
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`30.
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`Twitter thus created an illusion of security and safety relied upon by Plaintiff, and,
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`according to Plaintiff, by those who were disappeared, arrested, or murdered.
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`31. Mr. Al-Ahmed spent many years of time and effort cultivating and curating his
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`expansive list of Twitter followers and business contacts, which effectively amounts to
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`valuable intellectual and proprietary property—particularly insofar as it has earned him
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`credibility, career nods, and, significantly, income—reflecting a huge number of persons
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`interested in unvarnished coverage of the KSA’s activities provided from a pro-democracy and
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`pro-human rights vantage point.11 Upon information and belief, some of Mr. Al-Ahmed’s
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`followers’ accounts have also been shut down as a result of protesting his account suspension.
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`This is not only immoral, but also undemocratic.
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`32.
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`In pertinent part, Twitter, in its “Twitter Rules,” states that:
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`Twitter’s purpose is to serve the public conversation. Violence,
`harassment and other similar types of behavior discourage people
`from expressing themselves, and ultimately diminish the value of
`global public conversation. Our rules are to ensure all people can
`participate in the public conversation freely and safely…Safety -
`Violence: You may not threaten violence against an individual or a
`group of people. We also prohibit the glorification of violence.
`Learn more about our violent threat and glorification of violence
`policies…
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`
`
`Terrorism/violent extremism: You may not threaten or promote
`terrorism or violent extremism. There is no place on Twitter for
`terrorist organizations or violent extremist groups and individuals
`who affiliate with and promote their illicit activities. The violence
`that these groups engage in and/or promote jeopardizes the physical
`safety and well-being of those targeted. Our assessments in this
`context are informed by national and international terrorism
`designations. We also assess organizations under our violent
`extremist group criteria. Violent extremist groups are those that
`meet all of the below criteria: identify through their stated purpose,
`publications, or actions as an extremist group; have engaged in, or
`currently engage in, violence and/or the promotion of violence as a
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`11 Indeed, the United States Attorneys Office’s Indictment defines nonpublic information about Twitter users as
`“valuable property.” https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/page/file/1299331/download
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`CASE NO.___
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`-10-
`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 11 of 39
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`means to further their cause; and target civilians in their acts and/or
`promotion of violence. We examine a group’s activities both on and
`off Twitter to determine whether they engage in and/or promote
`violence against civilians to advance a political, religious and/or
`social cause.
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`What is in violation of this policy? Under this policy, you can’t
`affiliate with and promote the illicit activities of a terrorist
`organization or violent extremist group. Examples of the types of
`content that violate this policy include, but are not limited to:
`engaging in or promoting acts on behalf of a terrorist organization
`or violent extremist group; recruiting for a terrorist organization or
`violent extremist group; providing or distributing services (e.g.,
`financial, media/propaganda) to further a terrorist organization’s or
`violent extremist group’s stated goals; and using the insignia or
`symbols of terrorist organizations or violent extremist groups to
`promote them. What is not a violation of this policy? We may make
`limited exceptions for groups that have reformed or are currently
`engaging in a peaceful resolution process, as well as groups with
`representatives who have been elected to public office through
`democratic elections. We may also make exceptions related to the
`discussion of terrorism or extremism for clearly educational or
`documentary purposes. This policy also doesn’t apply to military or
`government entities12.
`
`
`33.
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`Between Twitter’s holding out that one can protect their Tweets, the above-
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`referenced affirmative corporate and global commitment to “serve the public conversation,”
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`and Twitter’s supposed opposition to violence and terrorism, Twitter’s failure to screen and
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`supervise its employees, thereby allowing KSA spies to locate KSA critics and disseminate
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`their information so that they could be silenced, makes a mockery of this so-called
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`“commitment.” It is unfortunate that individuals like the Plaintiff have detrimentally relied on
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`Twitter’s purported commitment to their undying personal prejudice, particularly in the face
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`of those who how have been disappeared, arrested, or otherwise subject to KSA extreme
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`12 https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
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`-11-
`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CASE NO.___
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`

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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 12 of 39
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`prejudice or sanction—perhaps for having followed Plaintiff or “liking” one of his posts, while
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`believing that their identity was “protected.”
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`34.
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`Now, Plaintiff cannot even access his list of over 36,000 pro-democracy leaning
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`followers who have had enough of the KSA’s police state antics, perversely turning Twitter’s
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`“commitment” on its head by silencing critics of terrorism and violence, and positioning
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`Twitter to carry out the KSA’s mission by doing violence to truth and free speech, and by
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`denying Plaintiff access to his proprietary list of followers, contacts, research, and other
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`intellectual property, even after Twitter’s slip shod adherence to its protocols, and negligence
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`in its hiring and supervising of embedded spies was roundly exposed by the Department of
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`Justice’s November 2019 Criminal Complaint13.
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`35.
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`Despite its alleged commitment to “serve the public conversation”, Twitter’s
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`conduct is equivalent to Poland’s silencing of Lech Walęsa to preserve its reach, market share,
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`and funding from the USSR. To make matters worse, Twitter did so after hiring KSA agents
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`and recruits to oversee internal operations. The ramifications of this kind of continuous and
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`willful blindness cannot be overstated.
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`36.
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`In Twitter’s 2020 10Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Twitter
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`“disclosed that on July 28, 2020, the Company received a draft complaint from the Federal
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`Trade Commission (FTC) alleging violations…[r]elate[d] to the Company’s use of phone
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`number and/or email address data provided for safety and security purposes [ostensibly for
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`targeted advertising] during periods between 2013 and 2019 [and reserving for]…probable loss
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`in this matter is $150.0 million to $250.0 million.”14 Twitter has clearly failed to safeguard
`
`
`13 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/press-release/file/1215976/download
`1410Q dated June 30, 2020,
`https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1418091/000141809120000158/twtr-20200630.htm
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`-12-
`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CASE NO.___
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 13 of 39
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`data as it promised and as its users, such as Mr. Al-Ahmed, would expect. Therefore, Twitter
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`must be held accountable.
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`C. Jack Dorsey’s Relationship With The Twitter Spy Ring
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`37.
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`Further demonstrating Twitter’s complicity in the Twitter spy campaign is Twitter
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`CEO, Jack Dorsey’s (“Dorsey”) relationship to Bader al-Asaker (“Asaker”), head of MBS’
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`affairs and operator of the Misk Foundation, who has also been dubbed the “Saudi mastermind”
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`behind the Twitter spy scandal.15
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`38.
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`The Twitter scandal, together with Asaker’s reported links to the murder of Saudi
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`journalist Jamal Khashoggi, raises tough questions about Asaker and the KSA. “Scratch
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`beneath the surface of Asaker’s Misk and you quickly realize that it's not really what it claims
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`to be,” Sunjeev Bery, director of the United States-based anti-autocrat campaign group
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`Freedom Forward, told The New Arab.16 “The crown prince and his henchmen keep trying to
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`present themselves in a positive light, yet behind the scenes they spy on dissidents’ Twitter
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`accounts and are willing to take a bone saw to anyone who disagrees with them.”17
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`39.
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`The United States Attorneys Offices’ superseding indictment (the “Indictment”)
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`against Abouammo and Alzabarah substantiates Asaker’s participation in the spy ring,
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`referring to him (upon information and belief) as “Foreign Official-1,” whom provided
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`Abouammo and Alzabarah with “gifts, cash payments, and promises of future employment in
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`exchange for nonpublic information about Twitter uses, which constituted valuable
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`property…”18
`
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`15 https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/meet-saudi-mastermind-behind-twitter-spy-scandal
`16 Id.
`17 Id.
`18 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/page/file/1299331/download
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`-13-
`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CASE NO.___
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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 14 of 39
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`40.
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`According to the Indictment, Abouammo and Alzabarah were also responsible for
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`removing (i.e., suspending) certain users’ accounts including, upon information and belief, Mr.
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`Al-Ahmed’s account.19
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`41.
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`Despite Asaker’s alleged connections to both the Twitter spy campaign and murder
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`of dissident journalists, Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey (“Dorsey”) met with both Asaker and MBS
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`well after Dorsey learned about the KSA spy campaign; once at Twitter’s headquarters on June
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`25, 2016, and at least one additional time in Riyadh thereafter.
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`42.
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`Notably, Dorsey follows Asakar’s Twitter account (and vice versa) to this very day.
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`D. Mr. Al-Ahmed Did Not Learn About Twitter’s Involvement Until November
`2019.
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`
`43.
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`On or about December 11, 2015, Twitter purportedly sent a notice (the “Twitter
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`Notice”) containing the following message to a “small group” of its users:
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`
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`Dear @{{screen_name}},
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`As a precaution, we are alerting you that your Twitter account is one
`of a small group of accounts that may have been targeted by state-
`sponsored actors. We believe that these actors (possibly
`associated with a government) may have been trying to obtain
`information such as email addresses, IP addresses, and/or phone
`numbers.
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`At this time, we have no evidence they obtained your account
`information, but we’re actively investigating this matter. We wish
`we had more we could share, but we don’t have any additional
`information we can provide at this time.
`
`It’s possible your account may not have been an intended target of
`the suspected activity, but we wanted to alert you as soon as
`possible. We recognize that this may be of particular concern if you
`choose to Tweet using a pseudonym. For tips on protecting your
`identity online, you may want to visit the Tor Project or EFF’s
`Protecting Yourself on Social Networks.
`
`19 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/page/file/1299331/download
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`
`-14-
`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CASE NO.___
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`

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`Case 4:21-cv-08017-KAW Document 1 Filed 10/13/21 Page 15 of 39
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`- Twitter
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`44.
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`Conspicuously absent from the Twitter Notice is any indication that these so-called
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`“state-sponsored actors…possibly associated with a government” committed these data
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`breaches while they were located on Twitter’s premises and/or employed by Twitter and/or
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`while using Twitter’s resources and/or at the direction of Twitter (or with Twitter’s tacit
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`permission).
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`45.
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`This is critical, because at this time, Mr. Al-Ahmed had no re