Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 1 of 25
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`POMERANTZ LLP
`Jennifer Pafiti (SBN 282790)
`1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th Floor
`Los Angeles, California 90024
`Telephone: (310) 405-7190
`jpafiti@pomlaw.com
`
`Attorney for Plaintiff
`
`[Additional Counsel on Signature Page]
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`
`DONGPING CAO, Individually and on Behalf
`of All Others Similarly Situated,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`Case No.
`
`
`CLASS ACTION
`
`COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
`FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
`
`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., DARA
`KHOSROWSHAHI, and NELSON CHAI,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff Dongping Cao (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly
`
`
`
`situated, by Plaintiff’s undersigned attorneys, for Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants, alleges
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`the following based upon personal knowledge as to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s own acts, and
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`information and belief as to all other matters, based upon, inter alia, the investigation conducted
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`by and through Plaintiff’s attorneys, which included, among other things, a review of the
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`Defendants’ public documents, conference calls and announcements made by Defendants, United
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`States (“U.S.”) Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings, wire and press releases
`
`published by and regarding Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber” or the “Company”), analysts’ reports
`
`and advisories about the Company, and information readily obtainable on the Internet. Plaintiff
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 2 of 25
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`believes that substantial, additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth
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`herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`This is a federal securities class action on behalf of a class consisting of all persons
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`and entities other than Defendants that purchased or otherwise acquired Uber common stock
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`between May 31, 2019 and July 8, 2022, both dates inclusive (the “Class Period”), seeking to
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`recover damages caused by Defendants’ violations of the federal securities laws and to pursue
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`remedies under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
`
`Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, against the Company and certain of its top
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`officials.
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`2.
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`Uber develops and operates proprietary technology applications in the U.S.,
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`Canada, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific. The Company
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`connects consumers with providers of ride services, and connects riders and other consumers with
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`restaurants, grocers, and other stores with delivery service providers for meal preparation,
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`grocery, and other delivery services.
`
`3.
`
`Uber has long been plagued by scandal. As the Company’s Senior Vice President
`
`of Marketing and Public Affairs recently stated: “There has been no shortage of reporting on
`
`Uber’s mistakes prior to 2017. Thousands of stories have been published, multiple books have
`
`been written—there’s even been a TV series.” These “mistakes” ranged from allegations of Uber
`
`executives knowingly concealing incidents of violence and sexual assault by its drivers, operating
`
`illegally in various jurisdictions, and utilizing software to evade authorities and block their access
`
`to the Company’s databases.
`
`4.
`
`Following years of negative publicity, Uber made changes to its top management,
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`purportedly reformed its corporate culture, and touted itself as a new company that had atoned
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 3 of 25
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`for its prior compliance and cultural issues. However, unbeknownst to investors, the Company
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`and its top management had still not transparently divulged and accounted for the full scope of
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`the Company’s prior misconduct.
`
`5.
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`Throughout the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading
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`statements regarding Uber’s business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically,
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`Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Uber had
`
`defective disclosure controls and procedures; (ii) Uber concealed and/or downplayed the full
`
`scope and severity of its prior misconduct, including, inter alia, the extent to which it secretly
`
`lobbied government officials and politicians to bypass legal and regulatory requirements, as well
`
`as knowingly risked the safety of Uber drivers, to fuel the Company’s global growth; (iii) as a
`
`result, Uber’s present global footprint and market share is in significant part the byproduct of
`
`previously undisclosed, unsustainable, and illegal business practices; (iv) all the foregoing, once
`
`revealed, was likely to negatively impact Uber’s reputation, as well as subject the Company to a
`
`heightened risk of governmental and regulatory scrutiny and enforcement action; and (v) as a
`
`result, the Company’s public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.
`
`6.
`
`On Sunday, July 10, 2022, news reports emerged regarding a cache of 124,000
`
`internal Uber records, dubbed the “Uber Files” by media outlets, spanning from 2013 to 2017,
`
`that were leaked to The Guardian and subsequently shared with the International Consortium of
`
`Investigative Journalists (“ICIJ”) and other news outlets. These files revealed, among other
`
`things, how Uber secretly met with various government officials and politicians to skirt laws and
`
`regulations around the world, as well as risked Uber drivers’ safety, to advance the Company’s
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`growth, and how all the foregoing conduct was known to, and in fact encouraged by, the
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`Company’s top management.
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 4 of 25
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`7.
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`On this news, Uber’s stock price fell $1.15 per share, or 5.15%, to close at $21.19
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`per share on July 11, 2022.
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`8.
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`As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and omissions, and the precipitous
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`decline in the market value of the Company’s common stock, Plaintiff and other Class members
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`have suffered significant losses and damages.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`9.
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`The claims asserted herein arise under and pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
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`the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a)) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by
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`the SEC (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
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`10.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28
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`U.S.C. § 1331 and Section 27 of the Exchange Act.
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`11.
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`Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to Section 27 of the Exchange
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`Act (15 U.S.C. § 78aa) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Uber is headquartered in this Judicial District,
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`Defendants conduct business in this Judicial District, and a significant portion of Defendants’
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`activities took place within this Judicial District.
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`12.
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`In connection with the acts alleged in this complaint, Defendants, directly or
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`indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited
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`to, the mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of the national securities
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`markets.
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`PARTIES
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`13.
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`Plaintiff, as set forth in the attached Certification, acquired Uber common stock at
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`artificially inflated prices during the Class Period and was damaged upon the revelation of the
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`alleged corrective disclosures.
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 5 of 25
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`14.
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`Defendant Uber is a Delaware corporation with principal executive offices located
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`at 1515 3rd Street, San Francisco, California 94158. Uber’s common stock trades in an efficient
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`market on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) under the trading symbol “UBER”.
`
`15.
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`Defendant Dara Khosrowshahi (“Khosrowshahi”) has served as Uber’s Chief
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`Executive Officer (“CEO”) and a Director of the Company at all relevant times.
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`16.
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`Defendant Nelson Chai (“Chai”) has served as Uber’s Chief Financial Officer at
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`all relevant times.
`
`17.
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`Defendants Khosrowshahi and Chai are sometimes referred to herein as the
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`“Individual Defendants.”
`
`18.
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`The Individual Defendants possessed the power and authority to control the
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`contents of Uber’s SEC filings, press releases, and other market communications. The Individual
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`Defendants were provided with copies of Uber’s SEC filings and press releases alleged herein to
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`be misleading prior to or shortly after their issuance and had the ability and opportunity to prevent
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`their issuance or to cause them to be corrected. Because of their positions with Uber, and their
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`access to material information available to them but not to the public, the Individual Defendants
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`knew that the adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed to and were being concealed
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`from the public, and that the positive representations being made were then materially false and
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`misleading. The Individual Defendants are liable for the false statements and omissions pleaded
`
`herein.
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`SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
`
`Background
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`19.
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`Uber develops and operates proprietary technology applications in the U.S.,
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`Canada, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Asia Pacific. The Company
`
`connects consumers with independent providers of ride services, and connects riders and other
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 6 of 25
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`consumers with restaurants, grocers, and other stores with delivery service providers for meal
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`preparation, grocery, and other delivery services.
`
`20.
`
`Uber has long been plagued by scandal. As the Company’s Senior Vice President
`
`of Marketing and Public Affairs recently stated: “There has been no shortage of reporting on
`
`Uber’s mistakes prior to 2017. Thousands of stories have been published, multiple books have
`
`been written—there’s even been a TV series.” These “mistakes” ranged from allegations of Uber
`
`executives knowingly concealing incidents of violence and sexual assault by its drivers, operating
`
`illegally in various jurisdictions, and utilizing software to evade authorities and block their access
`
`to the Company’s databases.
`
`21.
`
`Following years of negative publicity, Uber made changes to its top management,
`
`purportedly reformed its corporate culture, and touted itself as a new company that had atoned
`
`for its prior compliance and cultural issues. However, unbeknownst to investors, the Company
`
`and its top management had still not transparently divulged and accounted for the full scope of
`
`the Company’s prior misconduct.
`
`Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period
`
`22.
`
`The Class Period begins on May 31, 2019, the day after Uber issued a press release
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`announcing the Company’s first quarter 2019 results—the Company’s first financial results as a
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`publicly traded company. That press release quoted the Individual Defendants, each of whom
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`touted Uber’s global market position as a key competitive advantage, as well as the Company’s
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`growth realized through that market position. For example, Defendant Khosrowshahi stated, in
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`relevant part, that “[o]ur global reach continues to be an important differentiator, and we
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`maintained leadership of the ridesharing category in every region we serve”; and Defendant Chai
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`stated, in relevant part, that “[o]ur investments remain focused on global platform expansion and
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`long-term product and technology differentiation,” and “[w]e maintained stable regional
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 7 of 25
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`ridesharing category position in the quarter and started to see signs of less aggressive pricing by
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`some ridesharing competitors, which has continued into Q2 2019.”
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`23.
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`On March 2, 2020, Uber filed an annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC,
`
`reporting the Company’s financial and operational results for the quarter and year ended
`
`December 31, 2019 (the “2019 10-K”). With respect to Uber’s disclosure controls and
`
`procedures, the 2019 10-K stated, in relevant part:
`
`We maintain disclosure controls and procedures that are designed to provide
`reasonable assurance that information required to be disclosed in our [Exchange
`Act] reports is recorded, processed, summarized and reported within the time
`periods specified in the [SEC]’s rules and forms and that such information is
`accumulated and communicated to our management, including [the Individual
`Defendants], as appropriate, to allow for timely decisions regarding required
`disclosure . . . . [O]ur management, including [the Individual Defendants],
`evaluated the effectiveness of our disclosure controls and procedures as of the end
`of the period covered by th[e 2019 10-K]. Based upon that evaluation, [the
`Individual Defendants] concluded that, as of the end of the period covered by th[e
`2019 10-K], our disclosure controls and procedures are effective at a reasonable
`assurance level.
`
`24.
`
`The 2019 10-K also provided generic, boilerplate, and downplayed risk warnings
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`
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`regarding Uber’s historically problematic workplace culture and related compliance issues,
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`stating, in relevant part, that “[o]ur workplace culture and forward-leaning approach created
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`significant operational and cultural challenges that have in the past harmed, and may in the future
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`continue to harm, our business results and financial condition”; that “[o]ur focus on aggressive
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`growth and intense competition, and our prior failure to prioritize compliance, has led to increased
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`regulatory scrutiny globally”; and that “[o]ur workplace culture also created a lack of
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`transparency internally”; while simultaneously assuring investors of “our ongoing commitment
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`to address and resolve our historical cultural and compliance problems and promote transparency
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`and collaboration” and “embraced . . . culture of enhanced transparency under our new
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`management[.]”
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 8 of 25
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`25. With respect to allegations of prior misconduct by Uber, the 2019 10-K stated,
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`inter alia, that “we had a number of highly publicized events and allegations, including
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`investigations related to a software tool allegedly designed to evade and deceive authorities”; that
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`“[i]n certain jurisdictions, including key markets such as Argentina, Germany, Italy, Japan, South
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`Korea, and Spain, our ridesharing business model has been blocked, capped, or suspended, or we
`
`have been required to change our business model, due primarily to laws and significant regulatory
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`restrictions in such jurisdictions”; that “[w]e received requests from the [U.S. Department of
`
`Justice] in May 2017 and August 2017 with respect to an investigation into allegations of small
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`payments to police in Indonesia and other potential improper payments in other countries in which
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`we operate or have operated, including Malaysia, China, and India”; and that “[t]he Company has
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`been subject to various government inquiries and investigations surrounding the legality of certain
`
`of the Company’s business practices, [and] compliance with . . . other global regulatory
`
`requirements”; while assuring investors that “[t]he Company has investigated many of these
`
`matters and is implementing a number of recommendations to its managerial, operational and
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`compliance practices, as well as seeking to strengthen its overall governance structure.”
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`26. With respect to the benefits Uber enjoyed as a result of its global growth, the 2019
`
`10-K stated, in relevant part:
`
`Revenue increased $2.9 billion, or 26%, primarily attributable to an increase in
`Gross Bookings of 31% which was made up of a 20% increase in Rides, an 83%
`increase in Eats, and a 121% increase in other offerings including Freight and Other
`Bets. The overall increase in Gross Bookings was driven by a 22% increase in
`[Monthly Active Platform Consumers (“MAPCs”)] due to global expansion of our
`Eats product offerings combined with wider market adoption of our Rides product,
`and overall growth in our other offerings.
`
`27.
`
`Appended as exhibits to the 2019 10-K were signed certifications pursuant to the
`
`Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), wherein the Individual Defendants certified that the 2019
`
`10-K “fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the [Exchange Act]” and
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 9 of 25
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`that the “information contained in [2019 10-K] fairly presents, in all material respects, the
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`financial condition and results of operations of Uber[.]”
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`28.
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`On March 1, 2021, Uber filed an annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC,
`
`reporting the Company’s financial and operational results for the quarter and year ended
`
`December 31, 2020 (the “2020 10-K”). That filing contained substantively the same statements
`
`as referenced in ¶¶ 23-24, supra, regarding the design and effectiveness of Uber’s disclosure
`
`controls and procedures, as well as the Company’s historically problematic workplace culture and
`
`related compliance issues, while continuing to assure investors of the Company’s new culture of
`
`purportedly enhanced transparency.
`
`29. With respect to allegations of prior misconduct by Uber, the 2020 10-K stated,
`
`inter alia, that “[p]revious negative publicity, particularly as a result of cultural issues in 2017,
`
`has adversely affected our brand and reputation, which [inter alia] . . . invites legislative and
`
`regulatory scrutiny, and results in litigation and governmental investigations”; and that “[i]n
`
`certain jurisdictions, including expansion markets such as Argentina, Germany, Italy, Japan,
`
`South Korea, and Spain, our ridesharing business model has been blocked, capped, or suspended,
`
`or we have been required to change our business model, due primarily to laws and significant
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`regulatory restrictions in such jurisdictions.”
`
`30. With respect to the benefits Uber enjoyed as a result of its global growth, the 2020
`
`10-K stated, in relevant part: “Delivery Gross Bookings grew 110% from 2019, on a constant
`
`currency basis, outpacing Delivery Trip growth driven by a 32% increase in basket sizes globally
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`driven by stay-at-home order demand related to COVID-19.”
`
`31.
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`Appended as exhibits to the 2020 10-K were substantively the same SOX
`
`certifications as referenced in ¶ 27, supra, signed by the Individual Defendants.
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 10 of 25
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`32.
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`On February 24, 2022, Uber filed an annual report on Form 10-K with the SEC,
`
`reporting the Company’s financial and operational results for the quarter and year ended
`
`December 31, 2021 (the “2021 10-K”). That filing contained substantively the same statements
`
`as referenced in ¶¶ 23-24 and 29, supra, regarding the design and effectiveness of Uber’s
`
`disclosure controls and procedures, as well as the Company’s historically problematic workplace
`
`culture and related compliance issues and allegations of prior misconduct, while continuing to
`
`assure investors of the Company’s new culture of purportedly enhanced transparency.
`
`33. With respect to the benefits Uber enjoyed as a result of its global growth, the 2021
`
`10-K stated, in relevant part:
`
`Revenue increased $6.3 billion, or 57%, primarily attributable to an increase in
`Gross Bookings of 56%, or 53% on a constant currency basis. The increase in Gross
`Bookings was primarily driven by an increase in Delivery Gross Bookings of 71%,
`or 66% on a constant currency basis, due to an increase in food delivery orders and
`higher basket sizes as a result of [inter alia] . . . continued expansion across U.S.
`and international markets.
`
`34.
`
`Appended as exhibits to the 2021 10-K were substantively the same SOX
`
`
`
`certifications as referenced in ¶ 27, supra, signed by the Individual Defendants.
`
`35.
`
`The statements referenced in ¶¶ 22-34 were materially false and misleading
`
`because Defendants made false and/or misleading statements, as well as failed to disclose material
`
`adverse facts about Uber’s business, operations, and compliance policies. Specifically,
`
`Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) Uber had
`
`defective disclosure controls and procedures; (ii) Uber concealed and/or downplayed the full
`
`scope and severity of its prior misconduct, including, inter alia, the extent to which it secretly
`
`lobbied government officials and politicians to bypass legal and regulatory requirements, as well
`
`as knowingly risked the safety of Uber drivers, to fuel the Company’s global growth; (iii) as a
`
`result, Uber’s present global footprint and market share is in significant part the byproduct of
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 11 of 25
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`previously undisclosed, unsustainable, and illegal business practices; (iv) all the foregoing, once
`
`revealed, was likely to negatively impact Uber’s reputation, as well as subject the Company to a
`
`heightened risk of governmental and regulatory scrutiny and enforcement action; and (v) as a
`
`result, the Company’s public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.
`
`The Truth Emerges
`
`36.
`
`On Sunday, July 10, 2022, news reports emerged regarding a cache of 124,000
`
`internal Uber records, dubbed the “Uber Files” by media outlets, spanning from 2013 to 2017,
`
`that were leaked to The Guardian and subsequently shared with the ICIJ and other news outlets.
`
`These files revealed, among other things, how Uber secretly met with various government
`
`officials and politicians to skirt laws and regulations around the world, as well as risked Uber
`
`drivers’ safety, to advance the Company’s growth, and how all the foregoing conduct was known
`
`to, and in fact encouraged by, the Company’s top management.
`
`37.
`
`For example, between July 10 and July 11, 2022, The Guardian published a series
`
`of exposé articles on Uber based on the Uber Files, citing “more than 83,000 emails, iMessages
`
`and WhatsApp messages, including often frank and unvarnished communications” by and
`
`between Uber’s top management, which “revealed the inside story of how the tech giant Uber
`
`louted laws, duped police, exploited violence against drivers and secretly lobbied governments
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`during its aggressive global expansion.” The Guardian reported that “Mark MacGann, Uber’s
`
`former chief lobbyist for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, came forward to identify himself
`
`as the source of the leaked data[,]” stating: “It is my duty to speak up and help governments and
`
`parliamentarians right some fundamental wrongs . . . . Morally, I had no choice in the matter.”
`
`38.
`
`The Guardian reported that the Uber Files “show[] how Uber tried to shore up
`
`support by discreetly courting prime ministers, presidents, billionaires, oligarchs and media
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`barons” with a “strategy [that] often involved going over the heads of city mayors and transport
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 12 of 25
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`authorities and straight to the seat of power.” According to The Guardian, “[t]he [leaked]
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`documents indicate Uber was adept at finding unofficial routes to power, applying influence
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`through friends or intermediaries, or seeking out encounters with politicians at which aides and
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`officials were not present.” Uber reportedly “enlisted the backing of powerful figures in places
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`such as Russia, Italy and Germany by offering them prized financial stakes in the startup and
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`turning them into ‘strategic investors’” and, in some jurisdictions, “succeeded in persuading
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`governments to rewrite laws, with lasting effects.”
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`39.
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`For example, The Guardian cited “texts between [Uber’s co-founder and former
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`CEO, Travis] Kalanick and [French President] Emmanuel Macron, who secretly helped the
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`company in France when he was economy minister, allowing Uber frequent and direct access to
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`him and his staff[,]” and who “appears to have gone to extraordinary lengths to help Uber, even
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`telling the company he had brokered a secret ‘deal’ with its opponents in the French cabinet.”
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`While The Guardian acknowledged that “[i]t was not a secret that Macron was enthusiastic about
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`US tech companies,” it also noted that “his closeness to the cab-hailing firm has never been fully
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`revealed[,]” that “Macron . . . failed to record at least three of four meetings with [Kalanick] that
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`were detailed in the files[,]” and that “Macron is facing calls for a parliamentary inquiry, after the
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`Uber files exposed his extraordinary efforts as French economy minister . . . to help [Uber] lobby
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`against the closed-shop taxi industry.”
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`40.
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`Likewise, The Guardian reported that “[t]he European Commission is facing calls
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`to launch an inquiry into its former vice-president Neelie Kroes, after leaked files suggested she
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`secretly helped Uber lobby the Netherlands prime minister, Mark Rutte, and a string of other
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`national Dutch politicians.” As reported by The Guardian, “Uber considered its relationship with
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`Kroes so sensitive that the company’s top European lobbyist repeatedly instructed colleagues to
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`keep it hidden, warning in 2015 that it was ‘highly confidential and should not be discussed
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 13 of 25
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`outside this group’.” The Guardian cited “transparency experts [who] said the covert help Kroes
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`seemingly provided the cab-hailing app – which was under criminal investigation in the
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`Netherlands at that time – may have breached EU ethics rules.” Specifically, “[t]he data appears
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`to show Kroes . . . offering to arrange a series of meetings for Uber during her 18-month ‘cooling-
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`off period’ after leaving the commission” even though “[t]he cooling-off period aims to reduce
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`conflicts of interest by restricting the jobs commissioners can take once they have stepped down.”
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`According to The Guardian, “[i]n Kroes’s case [the cooling-off period] ran from November 2014
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`until May 2016, when it was announced she was joining Uber’s public policy advisory board[,]”
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`for which “she was paid $200,000 a year, the documents suggest.” As reported by The Guardian,
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`“[d]espite a commission ban on taking that role before May 2016, Kroes spoke to Dutch
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`government ministers about Uber and offered to set up talks with senior EU officials, according
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`to the leaked files[,]” and “when Uber’s Amsterdam headquarters were raided by police in the
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`spring of 2015, Kroes called Dutch government ministers to get regulators to ‘back off’ as she
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`‘harassed’ a top civil servant, internal Uber emails claim.”
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`41.
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`Similarly, The Guardian reported how the Uber Files laid bare “Uber’s previously
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`unknown lobbying campaign in Russia[,]” including, among other things, how “Uber secretly
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`hired a political operative linked to Russian oligarchs in an attempt to buy influence in the
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`country, despite concerns that paying the lobbyist risked bribes being paid to ‘grease the skids’.”
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`The Guardian cited “[f]ormer US prosecutors and corruption experts [that] said the circumstances
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`in which Uber hired [Vladimir] Senin”—“an influential lobbyist at the time and now a pro-
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`Kremlin member of the State Duma”—“in 2016 should have raised ‘red flags’ and risked
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`breaching US anti-bribery laws.” According to The Guardian, these experts agreed that “[a]mong
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`the red flags Uber should have identified . . . was Senin’s position in the pro-Kremlin political
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 14 of 25
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`party.”1 The Guardian stated that “[b]emused at the notion of making a large side payment to a
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`political fixer, executives balked when Senin quoted $800,000 to influence the taxi legislation
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`and lobby government officials.” According to The Guardian, “[e]mails suggest[ed] Uber’s
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`lawyers raised concerns that paying Senin risked breaching US anti-bribery laws” and “[a] senior
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`executive told colleagues that lawyers were ‘rightly concerned about bribes being paid to grease
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`the skids’.” As reported by The Guardian, “[d]espite the risks, Uber pressed forward and in May
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`2016 initially agreed to pay Senin as much as $650,000.” The Guardian also cited “Jessica
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`Tillipman, an FCPA expert at George Washington University, [who] described Uber’s deal with
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`Senin as a ‘super high-risk transaction’ and a ‘blazing red flag’.” The Guardian reported that
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`although “taxi legislation ran into trouble and did not pass[,]” which “prompted doubts about
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`Senin,” the Company nonetheless “paid [Senin] a reduced sum of $300,000 for his work.”
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`According to The Guardian, “[w]hen Senin emailed Uber his invoice in July 2016, he asked for
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`the funds to be wired via a New York bank to an account in Russia for a company created on the
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`day he had signed the Uber contract months earlier” and, “[i]n the email, sent to a senior Uber
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`executive, Senin used a pseudonym: ‘Alter ego.’”
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`42.
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`The Uber Files also reportedly “show[ed] that between 2015 and 2016 Uber’s
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`objective was to enlist [Russian] business magnates as ‘strategic allies’, offering their companies
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`coveted shares in the Silicon Valley company before a widely anticipated stock market flotation”
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`in return for political support. For example, Uber approached “[Alisher] Usmanov, the Uzbek-
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`born metals and technology magnate” and “secured a $20m investment from the billionaire’s
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`holding company USM months later.” The Guardian reported that “[a] spokesperson for
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`Usmanov said the deal was brokered by an investment bank and was a ‘purely financial
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`1 As noted by The Guardian, “[u]nder the FCPA, a US company is prohibited from corruptly
`paying – or offering to pay – a foreign political party official to induce them to use their influence.”
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`Case 4:22-cv-04688-YGR Document 1 Filed 08/16/22 Page 15 of 25
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`investment’ with ‘nothing to do with politics or the Russian government’” and said that “USM
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`made ‘no promises or commitments’ to Uber regarding government relations[.]” However, The
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`Guardian noted that “Kalanick . . . met two of Usmanov’s top executives at Davos in January
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`2016 in an effort to raise more money” and “[a] briefing prepared for the meeting described
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`Uber’s messaging: invest and ‘give us government relations support’.” According to The
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`Guardian, “[t]he Russians were receptive, an internal note suggests[,]” stating “USM made the
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`pitch as to what they could do to move the needle on the policy front.” Likewise, “[o]n the