Case 5:16-cv-03734-BLF Document 161 Filed 01/10/22 Page 1 of 25
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`GURMINDER SINGH,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Case No. 16-cv-03734-BLF
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
`CLASS CERTIFICATION
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`[Re: ECF No. 134]
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`Defendant.
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`This case concerns the AdWords program1 run by Defendant Google LLC. Through
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`AdWords, Google sells to individuals and businesses of all sizes pay-per-click advertisements that
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`are displayed on the Google Display Network, which consists of Google.com, other Google
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`properties (such as YouTube and Gmail), and third-party sites who enroll in Google’s separate
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`AdSense program. Plaintiff Gurminder Singh, a small business owner, signed up for AdWords in
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`January 2008 and now controls multiple AdWords accounts. Singh alleges that Google deceives
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`advertisers who use AdWords by making false and misleading statements concerning (1) how
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`effectively Google identifies and filters out invalid and fraudulent clicks on advertisements; and
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`(2) the proportion of total AdWords clicks that constitute invalid and fraudulent clicks. These
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`misrepresentations allegedly induced him to sign up for AdWords and then pay for more invalid
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`and fraudulent clicks than Google represented he would pay for.
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`Over five years after filing this lawsuit, Singh seeks to represent an expansive class of all
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`1 As of July 24, 2018, AdWords is known as “Google Ads.” The Court uses “AdWords,” as the
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`Parties do, recognizing that this was the name of the program for much of the putative class
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`period.
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`Case 5:16-cv-03734-BLF Document 161 Filed 01/10/22 Page 2 of 25
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`persons and entities who advertised and paid for clicks through AdWords since June 1, 2012,
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`where the clicks originated from the Google Display Network. See ECF No. 134 (“Motion”); see
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`also ECF No. 150 (“Reply”). Google opposes the Motion, arguing that Singh cannot satisfy the
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`requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. ECF No. 142 (“Opp.”). The Court held a
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`hearing on the Motion on December 2, 2021. ECF No. 160. For the reasons discussed on the
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`record and explained below, Singh’s motion for class certification is DENIED.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`This case has an extensive history that is familiar to the parties and chronicled thoroughly
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`in the Court’s previous orders. See ECF Nos. 64 (dismissing SAC); 85 (dismissing TAC); 104
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`(dismissing Fourth Amended Complaint, ECF No. 86 (“4AC”)). The Court here only recounts the
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`alleged misrepresentations on which Singh’s case is based.
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`Singh’s general theory is that Google misled advertisers participating in its AdWords
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`program by making false and misleading statements concerning (1) how effectively Google
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`identifies and filters out invalid and fraudulent clicks on advertisements; and (2) the proportion of
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`total AdWords clicks that constitute invalid and fraudulent clicks. Singh focuses on statements
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`made on two different pages of Google’s website.
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`The first set of alleged misrepresentations is in the “Ad Traffic Quality Resource Center”
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`(“ATQRC”), which specifies Google’s process for identifying invalid traffic. ECF No. 134-2
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`(“ATQRC”). The ATQRC states:
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`The relationship between Google, advertisers, and publishers is built
`on trust. Advertisers rely on the relevance of our ad placement, our
`reporting statistics, and the quality of clicks their ads receive.
`Publishers in turn count on advertiser participation, relevant ads
`which create a good experience for users, and an accurate and reliable
`source of income which contributes to the success of their websites
`and business. We take this trust seriously and we know that the
`Google advertising networks couldn’t exist without it.
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`Id. The ATQRC explains the difference between what Google terms “click fraud”—“clicks
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`generated with malicious or fraudulent intent”—and “invalid traffic”—“both clicks and
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`Case 5:16-cv-03734-BLF Document 161 Filed 01/10/22 Page 3 of 25
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`impressions on AdWords ads that Google suspects to not be the result of genuine user interest.”2
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`Id. Google does not charge advertisers for invalid traffic. Id. Google then claims:
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`The vast majority of all invalid clicks on AdWords are caught by our
`online filters. These filters are constantly being updated and react to
`a wide variety of traffic patterns and indications of click fraud attacks.
`On average, invalid clicks account for less than 10% of all clicks on
`AdWords ads.”
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`Id.
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`The second set of challenged statements are in a February 28, 2007 post on the AdWords
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`Blog. ECF No. 142-19 (“Blog Post”). The Blog Post contains similar statements as the ATQRC.
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`The Blog Post describes Google’s recent efforts and performance in detecting click fraud,
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`including the same methods explained in the ATQRC. The Blog Post describes how Google’s
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`filters “[a]ccount for the vast majority of invalid click detection” and that “invalid clicks fluctuate
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`constantly but average less than 10% of all clicks.” Id. The Blog Post also states that “the overall
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`invalid clicks rate, as well as its day-to-day fluctuations, has almost no relation to the invalid
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`clicks rate for an individual advertiser.” Id. Individual advertisers should “refer to [their] invalid
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`clicks report for that data,” the Blog Post says. Id.
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`According to Singh, the two pages make claims that are “intended to convince advertisers
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`to sign up for AdWords, impress[] upon the reader that AdWords’ [pay-per-click] system was
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`adequately tackling the scourge of [c]lick [f]raud.” Motion at 4. In fact, Singh says, his expert has
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`found click fraud accounts for 14% of all clicks on the online advertising platforms, including on
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`Google’s platform, which “significantly exceeds” Google’s 10% claim. ECF No. 134-3 ¶ 37.
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`Singh claims that Google knows of this disparity and “conceal[s] the prevalence of [c]lick [f]raud
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`on [its] platform, [which is] material information affecting all consumers.” Id. at 6.
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`On July 13, 2021, Singh moved for class certification. See Motion. Singh seeks to certify
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`and represent the following class:
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`2 The term “invalid traffic” used to be called “invalid clicks” before AdWords impressions were
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`added to the definition of the term. See Opp. at 6. The parties do not dispute that this addition is
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`immaterial for this case.
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`Case 5:16-cv-03734-BLF Document 161 Filed 01/10/22 Page 4 of 25
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`All persons and entities throughout the United States who advertised
`through Google’s AdWords program and paid for clicks on their
`Google AdWords advertisement(s) at any time since June 1, 2012 (the
`“Class Period”), where such clicks originated from Google’s Display
`Network.
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`Id. at Notice of Motion. His request for class certification is based on two claims asserted in the
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`Fourth Amended Complaint for violations of the UCL and FAL. Id. Singh also seeks
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`appointment of Miller Shah LLP and Edgar Law Firm LLC as class counsel. Id. The Court held a
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`hearing on this Motion on December 2, 2021. ECF No. 160.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`A class action is maintainable only if it meets the four threshold requirements of
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`Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are
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`questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
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`parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will
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`fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); Amchem Prods., Inc.
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`v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
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`“In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites, parties seeking class certification must
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`show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614.
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`Certification under Rule 23(b)(1) is proper “where prosecuting separate actions by or against
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`individual class members would create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with
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`respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
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`party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
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`practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
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`individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
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`interests.” Rule 23(b)(2) requires that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
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`grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
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`declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Rule 23(b)(3) requires that
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`“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
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`individual members,” and that “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
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`efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
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`“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with
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`the Rule – that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties,
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`common questions of law or fact, etc.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`Standing
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`Google’s first argument in opposition to class certification is that both Singh and other
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`members of his putative class lack standing. Google says that Singh has not met his burden to
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`demonstrate statutory standing as a potential class representative by showing that he actually paid
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`for any invalid traffic or undetected click fraud. Opp. at 11. Google also says that Singh cannot
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`show that he relied on the alleged misrepresentations and that Singh’s continued use of AdWords
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`forecloses standing. Id. at 12. These problems will also plague members of the putative class,
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`Google says. Id. at 12–13.
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`Singh responds that the Court can defer consideration of standing until after ruling on his
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`motion for class certification. Reply at 1–2. If the Court reaches the issue of standing, Singh
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`argues that he has both statutory and Article III standing. He says Google’s argument to the
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`contrary mischaracterizes his claims, which seek restitution for overpayment for the clicks he
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`bought based on Google’s alleged misrepresentations about the level of average click fraud for
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`AdWords ads. Id. at 3. This overpayment theory also forecloses Google’s argument about
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`continued use of AdWords after seeing the representations and learning that they were misleading.
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`Id.
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`Courts generally must determine whether parties have standing prior to reaching the merits
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`of a case. FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990). In multiple cases,
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`however, the Supreme Court has considered class certification before standing. See Amchem, 521
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`U.S. at 612–13; Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999). There is a “growing
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`consensus” among lower courts that class certification can be decided first “in situations in which
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`the certification decision will itself shed light on the standing question.” 1 Newberg on Class
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`Actions § 2:2 (5th ed. 2021) (“Newberg”) (citing cases); In re Carrier IQ, Inc. Customer Privacy
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`Litig., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (surveying cases and concluding that the court
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`“ha[d] discretion to defer questions of standing until after class certification”). Class certification
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`is usually determined before standing where “it is apparent that class members will have standing
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`even if the named class representative does not.” Svenson v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 8943301, at
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`*4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016). This is “because once a class has been certified, ‘the class of
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`unnamed persons described in the certification acquires a legal status separate from the
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`representative.” Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 906, 922 (N.D. Cal.
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`2014) (quoting In re Carrier IQ, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015)).
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`The Court will exercise its discretion to determine Singh’s individual standing now.
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`Because this order denies class certification, no class will “acquire[] a legal status separate from”
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`Singh, the suit will become an individual lawsuit, and the Court need not consider whether all
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`members of the class would have standing. Senne, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 922. With Singh the only
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`plaintiff left, he must possess standing to proceed, so deferring consideration of his standing
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`would be inappropriate.
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`The Court finds that Singh has standing to pursue this case. The Ninth Circuit reversed
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`this Court’s previous determination that Singh inadequately pled standing in the operative
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`complaint. In the operative complaint, Singh alleges that he purchased clicks through AdWords,
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`that Google has misrepresented the efficacy of its click filters, and that he would not have
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`purchased clicks but for relying on those misrepresentations. 824 F. App’x 512, 513–14 (9th Cir.
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`2020). Singh has produced adequate evidence to support these allegations for standing purposes.
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`“In a false advertising case, plaintiffs meet [the] [standing] requirement if they show that, by
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`relying on a misrepresentation on a product label, they ‘paid more for a product than they
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`otherwise would have paid, or bought it when they otherwise would not have done so.’” Reid v.
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`Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015). Singh has provided evidence to support
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`that argument, even if Google disputes it. Singh has testified that he read alleged
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`misrepresentations about invalid clicks on the AdWords blog and that he relied on those
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`statements before signing up for AdWords. See ECF No. 140-12 at 163:20–164:1. Singh’s
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`position that he would not have paid as much for AdWords clicks if he had known that the average
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`rate of click fraud was higher means that he “lost money” for the purpose of UCL standing, if the
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`statements were in fact misrepresentations. See Pirozzi v. Apple, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 909, 920
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`(N.D. Cal. 2013) (overpayment for a service is “lost money or property” for UCL standing. His
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`continued use of AdWords is not a bar to pursuing this case. Robinson v. Unilever U.S., 2019 WL
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`8012687, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2019). Singh thus has individual standing to pursue his
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`claims.
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`B. Rule 23(a)
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`i. Numerosity
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`The prerequisite of numerosity is discharged if “the class is so large that joinder of all
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`members is impracticable.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998),
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`overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (quoting Fed.
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`R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). “Numerosity is presumed where the plaintiff class contains forty or more
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`members.” Arroyo v. Int’l Paper Co., 2019 WL 1508457, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2019) (brackets
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`and internal quotation marks omitted). There is no dispute here that the putative class is
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`sufficiently numerous, as Google has far more than 40 customers of AdWords.
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`ii. Commonality
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`A class has sufficient commonality “if there are questions of fact and law which are
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`common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Indeed, this requirement has been construed
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`permissibly, and “[a]ll questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.” Hanlon,
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`150 F.3d at 1019. “[P]laintiffs need not show that every question in the case, or even a
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`preponderance of questions, is capable of classwide resolution. So long as there is even a single
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`common question, a would-be class can satisfy the commonality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2).”
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`Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 2013). In other words, the claims
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`“must depend upon a common contention” such that “determination of its truth or falsity will
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`resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Dukes, 564
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`U.S. at 349–50.
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`In his motion, Singh asserts that the common questions—which are “many and
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`predominate”—stem from Google’s “misrepresentations and omissions regarding the general
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`efficacy of its click fraud filters.” Motion at 10. Singh does not specifically identify the common
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`questions for the Court in that section, referring to his discussion of predominance despite the
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`different standard. See id.; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624 (predominance inquiry “far more
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`demanding” than commonality requirement). In opposition, Google identifies the two common
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`questions from Singh’s introduction: (1) “whether the filters’ actual efficacy captured 10% or
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`more invalid traffic”; and (2) “whether that information was material to the reasonable advertiser.”
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`Opp. at 13 (citing Motion at 2, 15).
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`Singh first asserts that the actual efficacy of Google’s filters is a common question among
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`the class members’ claims. Motion at 10; Reply at 4. In reply, he frames the relevant common
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`question as “whether the network average of invalid clicks differed materially from Google’s
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`representations.” Reply at 4. Google asserts that this issue is not subject to classwide proof
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`because “actual efficacy” of Google’s filters varies for each ad campaign and thus each advertiser.
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`Opp. at 13–14. Because each advertiser will experience different rates of click fraud, Google says,
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`the fact-finder would necessarily have to compare the experience of each advertiser to the average
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`rate claimed by Google. Id. at 14.
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`The Court agrees with Singh that—at least for the purpose of commonality—this is a
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`common question subject to classwide proof. Singh is correct that he asserts that Google has
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`misrepresented the average level of invalid clicks on AdWords. On the ATQRC, Google
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`represents that “[o]n average invalid clicks account for less than 10% of all clicks on AdWords
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`ads.” See ATQRC; 4AC ¶ 47. Singh contends that the actual average amount of click fraud on
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`the AdWords platform is 14% of clicks, which “significantly exceeds” Google’s claim, as shown
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`by his proffered expert report. Motion at 4 (citing ECF No. 134-3 (“Cavazos Report”) ¶¶ 37, 40–
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`57). If this is indeed true, then the findings in the expert report would show that Google made a
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`misrepresentation about the average level of click fraud. The answer to whether Google made a
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`misrepresentation would, of course, “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of
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`the claims [of putative class members] in one stroke.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349–50.
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`Google’s arguments revolve around a different framing of the question: determining the
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`actual efficacy of Google’s filters for each advertiser and for each campaign. See Opp. at 13.
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`This, of course, is not a common question. Google’s filters will identify a different amount of
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`invalid traffic for each advertising campaign run by different advertisers. Each advertising
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`campaign will thus experience different rates of undetected click fraud. But this framing of the
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`question is too granular and would defeat a commonality inquiry in every false advertising class
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`action. While the answer to this Singh’s question alone will not fully establish Google’s liability
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`for an alleged misrepresentation to each of the members of the putative class, the answer to that
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`common question would resolve part of each of the class members’ claims. This suffices for a
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`showing of commonality—although Google’s arguments are well-taken later in the Court’s class
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`certification inquiry.
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`This finding is in accord with the finding of commonality in a different advertising class
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`action brought against Facebook in this district and on which Google relies. In
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`IntegrityMessageBoards.com v. Facebook Inc., the plaintiff alleged that Facebook misled
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`advertisers about its ability to accurately deliver advertisements to certain categories of users
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`based on an advertiser’s specifications. 2021 WL 3771785, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021)
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`(“IMB”). Facebook allegedly made the misrepresentations in public remarks, statements on its
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`website, and in the “targeting interface” through which advertisers specified to which categories of
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`users its advertisements should be delivered. Id. The court found the commonality requirement
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`satisfied based on the common question of whether Facebook “had knowledge about the
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`misleading nature of its purported misstatements” because that question was “an element
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`necessary for plaintiff to substantiate its claims.” Id. at *6–7. The court found that the plaintiff’s
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`expert report, which showed that a “key corporate officer appreciated (or should have appreciated)
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`the possibility or existence of material limits on [Facebook’s] ability to target users by Interests,”
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`could provide an answer to that common question. Id. at *7. Thus, there was at least a “single
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`question capable of classwide resolution” and the commonality requirement was satisfied. Id.
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`(citing Wang, 737 F.3d at 544). The same is true here. The common question—whether Google
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`misrepresented the average level of click fraud on AdWords—is “an element necessary for
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`plaintiff to substantiate [his] claims” and “a single question capable of classwide resolution.” Id.
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`at *6–7.
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`Because the Court has found at least one common question among the class members’
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`claims, it need not consider for commonality purposes whether a reasonable advertiser considered
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`Google’s representation about the average efficacy of its filters to be material. Wang, 737 F.3d at
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`544 (only a “single common question” required for commonality). This requirement is thus
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`satisfied.
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`iii. Typicality
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`The typicality requirement looks to whether the claims of the class representative are
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`typical of those of the class. The requirement is satisfied when each class member’s claim arises
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`from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove
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`the defendant’s liability.” Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (brackets and
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`internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement is “permissive and requires only that the
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`representative’s claims are reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need
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`not be substantially identical.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of the
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`typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the named representative aligns with the
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`interests of the class.” In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 593 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal
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`quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has said that that “class certification should not be
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`granted if there is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their representative is
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`preoccupied with defenses unique to [him].” Hanlon, 976 F.2d at 508 (internal quotation marks
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`omitted).
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`Singh argues that he meets the typicality because he has “suffered the same or similar
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`injury as the class members through the same course of conduct by Google.” Motion at 10–11.
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`He says that Google’s misrepresentations about the prevalence of click fraud caused him, like
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`members of the putative class, to pay more for AdWords clicks than he otherwise would have. Id.
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`at 11. Google offers several arguments that Singh does not meet the typicality requirement. The
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`Court focuses on two: first, that Singh is atypical because he opted out of the AdWords arbitration
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`agreement, unlike most advertisers in the putative class; and second, that Singh is atypical because
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`not all advertisers in the putative class were exposed to or had the same understanding of Google’s
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`allegedly misleading statements in the ATQRC or Blog Post. Opp. at 16–18. The Court agrees
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`with Google on both accounts.
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`a. Arbitration Agreement with Class Action Waiver
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`First, Google argues that Singh is atypical because he opted out of the AdWords arbitration
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`agreement, unlike most advertisers in the putative class. See Opp. at 17. Singh himself alleges
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`that the arbitration clause was introduced into the AdWords agreement in September 2017 and
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`admits that he opted out of the arbitration provision. 4AC ¶ 11. Nevertheless, Singh says this is
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`not a typicality problem because Google has not met its burden to make it “clear” that the issue of
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`the arbitration clause would “swamp the litigation.” Reply at 6.
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`The Court agrees with Google that Singh is atypical because he opted out of the arbitration
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`clause to which many or most of the putative class is subject. “[C]lass certification is properly
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`denied based upon the existence of an arbitration agreement and class action waiver appliable to
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`unnamed class members but not the proposed class representative.” Farr v. Acima Credit LLC,
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`2021 WL 2826709, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2021); see also Tan v. Grubhub, Inc., 2016 WL
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`4721439, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2016) (plaintiff who opted out of arbitration clause and class
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`action waiver not typical because he lacked standing to challenge applicability of those provisions,
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`which would affect members of the putative class); Avilez v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., Inc., 596 F.
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`App’x 579, 579 (9th Cir. 2015) (vacating class certification order that certified classes and
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`subclasses that included employees who signed class action waivers but had a class representative
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`who signed an agreement that did not contain a class action waiver). The Court finds that Singh
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`cannot represent a class made up of advertisers who will largely be subject to a mandatory
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`arbitration clause and class action waiver. Signatories to those agreements would have to
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`overcome them to be included in the class, but Singh could not challenge the agreements because
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`he did not sign them. Tan, 2016 WL 4721439, at *3.
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`The Court disagrees with Singh that this issue is not relevant to class certification because
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`it would not “threaten to become the focus of the litigation.” Reply at 6 (citing Rodriguez v.
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`Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010), and Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508
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`(9th Cir. 1992)). Neither Rodriguez nor Hanlon considered the specter of an arbitration clause or
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`class action waiver to which many putative class members but not the named plaintiff are subject.
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`But even applying Hanlon’s standard here, the Court finds that the issue would “threaten to
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`become the focus of the litigation.” Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. Whether the arbitration clause and
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`class action waiver apply here is a necessary condition for many members of the putative class to
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`join this class action. If those provisions apply, those advertisers are precluded from participating
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`in this case. Singh would have to litigate this issue to include those advertisers, but he would lack
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`standing to do so because he opted out of the arbitration clause and class action waiver.3
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`The Court also rejects Singh’s argument that Google has failed to meet its burden to
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`provide the number of opt-outs or produce the terms of the arbitration agreement. Reply at 6.
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`Singh primarily relies on Farr, saying that the court there only found a typicality problem because
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`it considered an “evidentiary submission about the number of opt outs” and “extensively
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`analyz[ed] the terms of the relevant arbitration clause.” Id. That characterization of Farr is
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`inaccurate. In fact, the Farr court expressly noted that the “exact number of [opt outs] is not
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`known,” and that defendant merely indicated that “a number of customers are potentially subject
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`to the arbitration clause and class action waiver.” Farr, 2021 WL 2826709, at *7 n.6. The exact
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`number of opt outs is not known here, but it is very likely that most of the putative class of
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`advertisers did not opt out of the arbitration clause. Additionally, the Farr court only engaged in a
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`lengthy analysis of the arbitration clause because there was a dispute about whether it applied to
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`the claims in the lawsuit. See id. at *4–6 (analyzing plaintiff’s argument that the equitable claims
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`in the lawsuit were not subject to mandatory arbitration). Here, Singh himself recognizes the
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`existence of the arbitration clause and has not disputed its validity or applicability. 4AC ¶ 11; see
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`also Trudeau v. Google, 349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 876–81 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (upholding enforceability
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`of AdWords arbitration clause), aff’d, 816 F. App’x 68 (9th Cir. 2020).
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`3 If Singh declined to litigate this issue, he would have to exclude any advertiser who did not opt
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`out of the arbitration clause and class action waiver from his class definition. The Court will not
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`modify the putative class definition after the conclusion of briefing on this Motion. Because of the
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`other issues the Court identifies in this order, a renewed class certification motion with a narrower
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`class definition may not succeed either.
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`b. Assumptions Underlying Singh’s Injury
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`Second, Google argues that Singh is atypical because his purportedly typical injury, as
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`applied to the putative class, would improperly assume that (1) all AdWords advertisers were
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`exposed to the alleged misrepresentations; and (2) based on that exposure, they all had the same
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`understanding of those statements. Opp. at 16. Google says that there is no evidence favoring the
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`inference that all members of the putative clas