Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 1 of 12
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`NICHOLE HUBBARD, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC, et al.,
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`Case No. 19-cv-07016-BLF
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`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
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`[Re: ECF 125]
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`Defendants.
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`For the second time, this Court must decide whether Plaintiffs in this action have alleged
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`illegal behavior on the part of Defendants that goes beyond what Congress has regulated under the
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`Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (“COPPA”). For the second
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`time, this Court finds that they have not.
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`Minor Plaintiffs C.H., by and through their guardian ad litem Nichole Hubbard; E.J., N.J.,
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`A.J., and L.J., by and through their guardian ad litem Cara Jones; J.A.E. and J.R.E., by and
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`through their guardian ad litem Justin Efros; M.W., by and through their guardian ad litem Renee
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`Gilmore; A.G., by and through their guardian ad litem Jay Goodwin; and C.D., by and through
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`their guardian ad litem Bobbi Dishman, (“Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against Defendants Google
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`LLC and YouTube LLC (collectively “Google”) and Cartoon Network, Inc., Cartoon Network
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`Studios, Inc., ChuChu TV Studios, DreamWorks Animation LLC, DreamWorks Animation
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`Television, LLC, Hasbro, Inc., Hasbro Studios LLC, Mattel, Inc., Remka, Inc., RTR Production,
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`LLC, RFR Entertainment, Inc., and Pocketwatch, Inc. (collectively “Channel Owners”). Plaintiffs
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`allege Defendants unlawfully violated the right to privacy and reasonable expectation of privacy
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`of their children, who are all under thirteen years of age and subject to COPPA’s protections. See
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`Third Am. Compl. (“3AC”), ECF 121. Plaintiffs have brought exclusively state law claims against
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 2 of 12
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`Defendants. Id.
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`On December 21, 2020, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that
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`Plaintiffs’ claims were preempted under COPPA. See Order (“Prior Order”) ECF 117. Now,
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`Defendants have filed another motion to dismiss, maintaining that the claims in Plaintiffs’ third
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`amended complaint are still preempted by COPPA. See Mot., ECF 125. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing
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`that they have sufficiently alleged deceptive conduct on the part of Defendants that goes beyond
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`the conduct regulated by COPPA. See Opp’n, ECF 127. The Court agrees with Defendants and
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`finds Plaintiffs’ claims remain preempted by COPPA. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS
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`Defendants’ motion. As further explained below, because Plaintiffs could potentially cure the
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`defects in their complaint with named plaintiffs in the 13-16 age range, the Court dismisses the
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`complaint with leave to amend.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`Google operates the video sharing-platform YouTube (“YouTube platform”). 3AC ¶ 2.
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`The YouTube platform is accessible as a website, mobile application, or via an application on a
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`set-top streaming device that can connect to a television. Id. Any individual or organization
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`registered with YouTube, through a Google account, may upload videos they have created. Id.
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`These videos are uploaded to that individual’s or organization’s “channel.” Id. Individuals do not
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`have to register or sign in to view videos uploaded to the YouTube platform. Id. There is no age
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`verification required to view videos. Id.
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`The YouTube platform is “the #1 website regularly visited by kids.” 3AC ¶ 4. Defendants
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`Mattel and Hasbro, classic toy brands, are among the Channel Owners who maintain and create
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`content aimed at children. Id. Other Channel Owners do the same: for example, Defendant
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`ChuChuTV’s channel features cartoons and nursery rhymes. Id. ¶ 101. Defendants Remka, RTR
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`Production, RFR Entertainment, and Pocketwatch together operate a channel, Ryan’s World,
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`featuring a nine-year-old boy unboxing toys and other children’s products. Id. ¶ 106. This is the
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`second-most popular YouTube channel, with approximately 22.5 million subscribers and over 33
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 3 of 12
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`billion views. Id. ¶ 107. Plaintiffs detail the child-aimed content of the other Channel Owner
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`Defendants as well. Id. ¶¶ 112-13; 119, 122, 126, 130-31.
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`Google and the Channel Owners generate revenue from the YouTube platform through
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`advertising, with Google placing ads on the channels and keeping 45% of the ad revenue. 3AC ¶
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`5. The Channel Owners retain 55% of the ad revenue. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Google, with the
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`authorization and consent of the channel owners, impermissibly “knowingly and purposefully
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`tracked, profiled, and targeted minors on the YouTube Platform for advertising revenue.” Id. ¶ 81.
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`Plaintiffs allege that Google tracked Plaintiffs’ personal data and information, such as internet
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`protocol addresses and device serial numbers, and that allowed Google to develop profiles of
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`individuals over time by tracking their activities across multiple websites. Id. ¶ 9. While Google
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`maintained in the YouTube terms of service and the Google Privacy Policy that the YouTube
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`Platform was not for children under thirteen, id. at ¶ 85, the Channel Owners intentionally created
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`content aimed at children under thirteen so that Google could target and track young children for
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`ad revenue, id. ¶ 99.
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`Through COPPA, Congress has regulated the amount of data Google is legally able to
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`collect from children without parental consent. TAC ¶ 72. COPPA provides, in pertinent part, that,
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`It is unlawful for an operator of a website or online service directed to children, or any
`operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting personal information from a child,
`to collect personal information from a child in a manner that violates the regulations
`prescribed [by the Federal Trade Commission].
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`15 U.S.C. § 6502(a). TAC ¶ 72. COPPA applies to any operator of a commercial website or online
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`service directed to children under thirteen years of age that collects, uses, and/or discloses personal
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`information from children. Id. ¶ 73. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has interpreted
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`COPPA’s definition of “website or online service” to include individual channels on a general
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`audience platform—according to the FTC, “content creators and channel owners” are both
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`“standalone ‘operators’ under COPPA, subject to strict liability for COPPA violations.” Id.;
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`Statement of Joseph J. Simons & Christine S. Wilson, Federal Trade Commission, Regarding FTC
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`and People of the State of New York v. Google LLC and YouTube, LLC (Sept. 4, 2019),
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 4 of 12
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`https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1542922/simons_wilson_google_y
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`outube_statement.pdf. The FTC also considers third parties with actual knowledge that they are
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`collecting personal information from users of a child-directed site or service as operators under
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`COPPA. Id. ¶ 73.
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`In order to determine whether a website or online service is “directed to children” the FTC
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`is to:
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`[C]onsider [the website’s or online service’s] subject matter, visual content, use of
`animated characters or child-oriented activities and incentives, music or other audio
`content, age of models, presence of child celebrities or celebrities who appeal to children,
`language or other characteristics of the Web site or online service, as well as whether
`advertising promoting or appearing on the Web site or online service is directed to
`children.
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`16 CFR § 312.2. TAC ¶ 74. COPPA defines a “child” as an individual under the age of thirteen.
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`15 U.S.C. § 6501(a). TAC ¶ 76. The FTC regulations require an operator to disclose information
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`collection practices and “obtain verifiable parental consent for [any] collection, use, or disclosure
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`of personal information from children.” 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A); 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a); TAC ¶
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`76. Among the types of personal information under COPPA that may only be collected from
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`children with parental consent are “persistent identifier[s] that can be used to recognize a user over
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`time and across different sites, including a cookie number, an IP address, a processor or device
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`serial number, or a unique device identifier.” TAC ¶ 77.
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`Google has been subject to COPPA enforcement previously. TAC ¶ 66. In Fall 2019,
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`Google reached a settlement with the FTC and New York Attorney General, and Google
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`announced it would start treating data from anyone watching children’s content on the YouTube
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`Platform as coming from a child, regardless of the age of the user, which brought it into
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`compliance with COPPA. Id.
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`Plaintiffs allege that Google did its tracking, profiling, and targeting of children while
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`feigning compliance with applicable federal and state laws. 3AC ¶¶ 81, 164. Plaintiffs cite
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`Google’s then-Code of Conduct, which read, in relevant part:
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`“Don’t be evil.” Googlers generally apply those words to how we serve our users. But “Don’t
`be evil” is much more than that. Yes, it’s about providing our users unbiased access to
`information, focusing on their needs and giving them the best products and services that we
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`can. But it’s also about doing the right thing more generally – following the law, acting
`honorably and treating co-workers with courtesy and respect.
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`3AC ¶ 164. Plaintiffs also cite Google’s then-Privacy Policy (“Our goal is to be clear about what
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`information we collect, so that you can make meaningful choices about how it is used”) and Terms
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`of Service (“We want to maintain a respectful environment for everyone, which means you must
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`follow these basic rules of conduct” including “comply[ing] with applicable laws”) and allege that
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`these corporate policies created an expectation of privacy with respect to the YouTube Platform.
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`Id. ¶¶ 161-167. Despite this alleged expectation of privacy, Google tracked and collected the
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`personal information of children under the allegedly false pretense that Google would be
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`“transparent” with parents about what information was being collected from child viewers and
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`compliant with applicable legal requirements and prohibitions, including COPPA. Id. ¶ 166.
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`Plaintiffs further allege that Google’s Privacy Policy deceptively conceals that the purpose of its
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`tracking and assimilating information from the YouTube Platform is to enable it to target the
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`vulnerabilities of children through behavioral advertising for profit. Id. ¶ 9.
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`Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Google’s Privacy Policy discloses that it collects personal
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`information from individuals who access the YouTube Platform, including persistent identifiers
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`such as a user’s IP address. TAC ¶ 55. Plaintiffs also allege that Google discloses that it tracks any
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`individuals’ activity on any webpage that uses Google’s advertising services, and this tracking
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`activity allows Google to deliver more relevant search results and ads to YouTube video viewers.
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`TAC ¶¶ 62-63.
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`Plaintiffs also allege deception on Google’s part through the creation of the YouTube Kids
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`application, which they allege was “guise to generate content for children on the YouTube
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`Platform. TAC ¶ 89. Google did not track users or serve targeted behavior ads on the YouTube
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`Kids app. Id. ¶ 90 Every video available on the YouTube Kids app was also uploaded to the
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`YouTube Platform. Id. ¶ 89. The YouTube Kids app was only available as a mobile application
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`until 2019, so when children searched for their favorite show on a web browser, they would be
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`shown links to child-directed content hosted on the YouTube Platform and not the YouTube Kids
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`app, which allowed Google to employ its tracking and behavioral advertising scheme on the
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`children. Id. ¶ 90.
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 6 of 12
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`In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs, who are all under the age of thirteen, TAC ¶¶ 26-31, purport to
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`represent “all persons . . . who were sixteen or younger when they used YouTube,” TAC ¶¶ 224-
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`231. Plaintiffs allege violations of the following claims: intrusion upon seclusion; California’s
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`Unfair Competition Law; unjust enrichment under the laws of California, Colorado, Indiana,
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`Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee; the consumer protection acts of Massachusetts,
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`Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey, and Tennessee; and the California constitutional right to privacy.
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`SAC ¶¶ 204-356. Defendants bring this motion to dismiss on several grounds, with preemption as
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`a threshold issue. See Mot.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
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`accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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`662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When
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`considering such a motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and
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`construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St.
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`Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the Court need not
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`“accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice” or
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`“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
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`inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
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`marks and citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
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`by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`at 555).
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`III.
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` DISCUSSION
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`Defendants argue that, just as the Court found last time, Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted
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`by COPPA. Mot. 4-10. Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged deceptive conduct that goes beyond
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`what COPPA regulates, just like the Third Circuit found in In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy
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`Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). Opp’n 1-8, ECF 127. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not
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`plausibly alleged deceptive conduct, as Plaintiffs admit they did not view any of the disclosures
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`they allege are deceptive, making allegations that these disclosures created a false expectation of
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`privacy implausible.
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`As the Court detailed in its prior order, COPPA contains the following clause:
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`No State or local government may impose any liability for commercial activities or actions
`by operators in interstate or foreign commerce in connection with an activity or action
`described in this chapter that is inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions
`under this section.
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`15 U.S.C. § 6502(d). (emphasis added). Congress specified the FTC would have enforcement
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`authority, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(c), 6505(d), with certain other federal agencies retaining authority
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`over entities they oversee, id. §§ 6505(a), (b). Congress also gave an enforcement role to states via
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`parens patriae actions brought by their attorneys general, 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1). Before
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`proceeding with any such lawsuits, a state attorney general must give the FTC notice, 15 U.S.C. §
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`6504(a)(2), and the FTC has a statutory right to intervene, id. § 6504(b). If the FTC has already
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`instituted an action, no State may institute a second action against the same Defendants while the
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`first action is pending, 15 U.S.C. § 6504(d). Congress did not include a private right of action in
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`the statute.
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`The Court found that the plain text of the statute clearly indicates Congress’s desire to
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`expressly preempt Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Prior Order 9-12. Allowing private plaintiffs to
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`bring suits for violations of conduct regulated by COPPA, even styled in the form of state law
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`claims, with no obligation to cooperate with the FTC, is inconsistent with the treatment of COPPA
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`violations as outlined in the COPPA statute. Prior Order 10 (citing Howard v. Blue Ridge Bank,
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`371 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (rejecting argument that state law claim is not
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`inconsistent with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and simply provides an additional state
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`remedy for the unlawful conduct giving rise to the FCRA claim)).
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`Plaintiffs core allegations, and state law causes of action, remain the same in the third
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`amended complaint: Google, together with the Channel Owners, knowingly and purposely
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`tracked, profiled, and targeted minors on the YouTube platform for advertising revenue through
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`deceptive collection of personal information; Google did this while feigning compliance with the
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`law; Google did not disclose the full extent of the information it collected from the children;
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`Google used this information to manipulate and exploit children by extending their time on the
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`YouTube platform, which increased the number of targeted advertisements shown to them, which
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`increased the revenue earned by Google and the Channel Owners. See Prior Order 5; TAC ¶¶ 8-9,
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`81-82, 86, 142-43, 158, 164. The Court advised Plaintiffs in its prior order that they had not
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`alleged deceptive behavior beyond what was regulated by COPPA—the allegations failed to
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`“explain what is deceptive about Google’s collecting of data or grapple with whether Google’s
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`data collection policies have been properly disclosed.” Prior Order 13. The Court finds that
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`Plaintiffs have still failed to allege deception beyond what is regulated by COPPA.
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`In attempt to plead deceptive conduct that falls outside of COPPA regulation, Plaintiffs
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`argue that “Google publicly created the impression of adhering with societal expectations
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`regarding children’s privacy as well as with related laws and guidelines such as COPPA through
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`its Privacy Policy for the YouTube platform.” Opp’n 4-5; see also TAC ¶¶ 166-67. Plaintiffs also
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`highlight Google’s previous Code of Conduct, which stated “Don’t be evil” and “Obey the Law:
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`Google takes its responsibilities to comply with laws and regulations very seriously and each of us
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`is expected to comply with applicable legal requirements and prohibitions.” Opp’n 5; see also
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`TAC ¶¶ 168-69. This, according to Plaintiffs, created an expectation of privacy for children
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`viewing of the Channel Owners’ child-directed content on the YouTube Platform. Opp’n 5; see
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`also TAC ¶ 16. According to Plaintiffs, Google tracked and collected personal information from
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`children “under the alleged false pretense that that it would be ‘transparent’ with parents about
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`what information was being collected from child viewers, and would comply with applicable legal
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`requirements and prohibitions—including COPPA—in doing so.” Opp’n 5; see also TAC ¶ 16.
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`Critically, Plaintiffs also allege that Google’s Privacy Policy discloses that it collects the following
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`types of information from YouTube users: videos watched; browsing history; activity on third-
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`party sites and apps that use Google services, which includes Google’s advertising services; GPS;
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`IP address; and unique identifiers such as cookies and device IDs. TAC ¶ 52. Plaintiffs do not
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`allege that they, or their parents, read any of the disclosures in the Privacy Policy or Code of
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`Conduct. See Opp’n 18-19 (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct was deceptive, they do not,
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`as Defendants note, claim that their parents read or saw purported misrepresentations or claim that
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`the Channel Owners made any misrepresentations to them. They also do not allege that their
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`parents would have stopped them from using YouTube with different disclosures.”) (internal
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`citation omitted).
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`With regards to the Plaintiffs in this case—all children under thirteen years old—the Court
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`finds this alleged conduct squarely covered, and preempted, by COPPA and its exclusive remedial
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`scheme that vests enforcement authority in the FTC and state attorneys general. See 15 U.S.C. §§
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`6502(a)-(d), 6505(a)-(d); 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a). Plaintiffs invite the Court to reconsider its prior
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`ruling on preemption, arguing that preemption should only apply in situations where the state law
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`claims are “inconsistent” with COPPA. Opp’n 2. However, as explained previously, the Court
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`must read the rest of that sentence in the statute, which establishes that state laws are preempted if
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`they impose liability “inconsistent with the treatment of those activities or actions under this
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`section.” 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d). The treatment Congress has provided for COPPA violations is
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`enforcement by the FTC and state attorneys general, and Plaintiffs’ attempt to run an end-around
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`the scheme with state law liability is “inconsistent with the treatment” and thus preempted.
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`The only new case Plaintiffs cite in support of their preemption argument is In re Zoom
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`Video Communications Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 20-CV-02155-LHK, 2021 WL 930623, *23-24
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`(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2021).1 Opp’n 1. In re Zoom is a 58-page opinion that references COPPA in
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`one paragraph and does not address preemption at all. 2021 WL 930623 at *23. The Court finds
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`Plaintiffs’ description of In re Zoom as having “declined to dismiss actions based on preemption
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`grounds” a gross mischaracterization.
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`Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged deceptive conduct like the plaintiffs in Nickelodeon.
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`1 The Court reiterates is previous opinion distinguishing New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. Tiny Lab
`Prods., 457 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1121, 1127 (D.N.M. 2020), on reconsideration, 2021 WL 354003
`(D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2021): “The Court finds Tiny Lab distinguishable from this case because Tiny
`Lab was brought by the New Mexico Attorney General, who can enforce violations of COPPA
`under the statute’s remedial scheme. Further, while not the basis of the preemption decision, it
`appears there was deception alleged on the part of the Tiny Lab defendants, who marketed the
`subject applications as ‘suitable and safe for children.’” Prior Order 12.
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 10 of 12
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`Opp’n 1-3. Not so. In Nickelodeon, the registration form for defendants’ child-focused website
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`included the message, “HEY GROWN-UPS: We don’t collect ANY personal information about
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`your kids. Which means we couldn’t share it even if we wanted to!” and this apparently was not
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`true. Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 268-69, 291. The court applied a presumption against preemption
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`under Third Circuit law and found that the plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim was not
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`preempted by COPPA, and the court rested its finding on the fact that “the wrong at the heart of
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`the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim is not that Viacom and Google collected children’s personal
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`information, or even that they disclosed it. Rather, it is that Viacom created an expectation of
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`privacy on its websites and then obtained the plaintiffs’ personal information under false
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`pretenses.” Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 292. “Understood this way,” the Third Circuit stated, “there
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`is no conflict between the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim and COPPA.” Id.
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`The disclosure in this case is quite different. Most notably, while Viacom lied about
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`collecting data, Google disclosed the fact that it collected data from YouTube users. TAC ¶ 52. A
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`user of the Viacom website could not miss the HEY GROWN-UPS disclosure; here, Plaintiffs
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`concede that they did not see the purported misrepresentations. Opp’n 18-19. Statements such as
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`“Don’t do evil” and “Obey the Law” are not actionable. See Veal v. LendingClub Corp., 423 F.
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`Supp. 3d 785, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“The Court agrees with Defendants that the statements
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`touting LendingClub's focus on compliance, building trust with various stakeholders, and
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`transparency are examples of corporate optimism and puffery.”), Allergan USA Inc. v. Imprimis
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`Pharm., Inc., 2018 WL 5919210, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) (statement about “complying
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`with all applicable laws and regulations” not actionable). It is unclear what type of disclosure
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`Plaintiffs would view as adequate—HEY GROWN-UPS: We are collecting personal information
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`about your kids to MANIPULATE them! —but it is clear that Plaintiffs have not adequately
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`alleged deceptive conduct that places Defendants’ behavior outside of what is regulated by
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`COPPA.
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`Plaintiffs attempt to expand their proposed classes to “all persons . . . who were sixteen or
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`younger when they used YouTube,” TAC ¶¶ 224-231. The Court does find adding persons in the
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`13-16 age range was outside the scope of proper amendment. See Order Clarifying Scope of
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 11 of 12
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`Proper Am., ECF 119 (“Plaintiffs have only been granted leave to amend the existing claims of
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`the current parties”). Since all named Plaintiffs are under thirteen, and their claims are thus
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`preempted by COPPA, they cannot seek relief on behalf of a proposed class when they are not
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`eligible to bring the claim in their own right. Sandoval v. Ali, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1039 (N.D.
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`Cal. 2014) (“in short, a predicate to a plaintiff’s right to represent a class is his eligibility to sue in
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`his own right; what he may not achieve himself, he may not accomplish as a representative of a
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`class”). The Court will grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint if they can substitute proper
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`plaintiffs to represent persons in the 13-16 age range. See Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Group,
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`Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding dismissal without leave to amend proper only if
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`it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment”).
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`The Court also notes the following for Plaintiffs’ potentially forthcoming fourth amended
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`complaint. Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims sound in fraud and therefore need to meet the
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`heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard for fraud. See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d
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`1097, 1103 (“Fraud can be averred by specifically alleging fraud, or by alleging facts that
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`necessarily constitute fraud (even if the word ‘fraud’ is not used)). Under the Rule 9(b) pleading
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`standard, claims of fraud must be accompanied by the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the
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`misconduct alleged. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997), superseded by statute
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`on other grounds (internal citation omitted). For the complaint to go forward, these deficiencies
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`must be addressed.
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`The Channel Owners have advanced separate arguments regarding why they should be
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`dismissed from this case, which relate to the underlying merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. Mot. 22-25.
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`Because the Court has found all of Plaintiffs’ claims preempted and granted leave to amend, the
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`Court finds it premature to dismiss the Channel Owners at this time.
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`//
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`//
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`Case 5:19-cv-07016-BLF Document 146 Filed 07/01/21 Page 12 of 12
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`IV. ORDER
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`For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
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`GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint no later than 30 days
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`after the filing of this order
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: July 1, 2021
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`______________________________________
`BETH LABSON FREEMAN
`United States District Judge
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