`
`
`
`Lewis E. Hudnell, III (CASBN 218736)
`lewis@hudnelllaw.com
`Nicolas S. Gikkas (CASBN 189425)
`nick@hudnelllaw.com
`HUDNELL LAW GROUP P.C.
`800 W. El Camino Real Suite 180
`Mountain View, California 94040
`Telephone: 650.564.3698
`Facsimile: 347.772.3034
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
`
`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF
`MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS;
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES
`
`Honorable Lucy H. Koh
`
`Date: November 5, 2020
`Time: 1:30 p.m.
`Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
`
`
`
`TWITTER, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`VOIP-PAL.COM, INC,
`
`Defendant.
`
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`i
`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
`
`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 2 of 16
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS .......................................................................................... 2
`
`A. Prior Litigation .............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`B. The Instant Case ............................................................................................................................ 3
`
`III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................... 3
`
`A. This Court Should Dismiss This Case For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. ........................ 4
`
`B. This Court Should Dismiss This Case For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction. .................................. 7
`
`1. Legal Standard ........................................................................................................................... 7
`
`2. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction because VoIP-Pal has never enforced the ’606 patent in
`
`this District. .................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`C. This Case Should Be Dismissed For Improper Venue. ................................................................. 9
`
`IV. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 10
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 3 of 16
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`3M Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 673 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................. 7
`
`AAB Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ......................................... 5
`
`ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Trans Video Electronics, Ltd., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal.
`
`Sept. 30, 2013 ..................................................................................................................................... 4
`
`Applera Corp. v. Michigan Diagnostics, LLC, 594 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158-60 (D. Mass. 2009) ............ 6
`
`Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) ...................... 4
`
`Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2012) ....................................................................................................................................... 4, 5
`
`Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Technology Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .............. 9
`
`Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)............................... 8
`
`Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 823 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ................................... 5
`
`Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ................ 8
`
`Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., No. C-12-4411 EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446 (N.D. Cal.
`
`Jan. 17, 2013) ................................................................................................................................. 5, 6
`
`Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................. 4
`
`Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) ............................................................................. 8
`
`Dex Products, Inc. v. Barbara Houghteling, No. C 05-05126 SI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45237, at *4
`
`(N.D. Cal. June 23, 2006) ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................. 5
`
`In re Qualcomm Litig., Case No. 17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185481, at *36
`
`(S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) .................................................................................................................... 6
`
`Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............... 6
`
`iii
`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 4 of 16
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`
`
`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ....................................................................... 8
`
`Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Wok & Pan, Ind., Inc., 909 F.3d 1134, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................... 8, 10
`
`MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007) ........................................................................... 4
`
`Micron, 518 F.3d at 899 ......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Petzilla, Inc. v. Anser Innovation LLC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13623 (Fed. Cir., July 28, 2015) ....... 8
`
`Petzilla, Inc. v. Anser Innovation LLC, No. C-14-1354 EMC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134115, at *9
`
`(N.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2014) ................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................. 5, 6
`
`Radio Sys. Corp. v. Accession, Inc., 638 F.3d 785, 789 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .............................................. 8
`
`Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) ..................................................................... 7
`
`SanDisk Corp. v. ST Microelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ..................................... 4
`
`Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................... 4
`
`Voip-Pal.com, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., 798 Fed. Appx. 644 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 2020) .............................. 3
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`Webb v. Onizuka, CV. No. 08-00487 DAE-BMK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30075, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr.
`
`8, 2009) .............................................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391 .................................................................................................................................. 10
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) ............................................................................................................................. 10
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). ........................................................................................................................ 10
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) ......................................................................................................................... 10
`
`Cal. Code Civ. P. § 410.10 ..................................................................................................................... 7
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) .............................................................................................................. 1, 3, 4, 6
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`iv
`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 5 of 16
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) .............................................................................................................. 1, 3, 7, 9
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) .................................................................................................................. 1, 3, 9
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`v
`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 6 of 16
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`
`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 5, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
`before the Honorable Lucy H. Koh of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
`California, Defendant VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. (“VoIP-Pal”) will move the Court, under Rules 12(b)(1),
`12(b)(2), and 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this action. The grounds
`for this motion, as set forth in detail below, are simply that this case does not belong in this Court: the
`Court lacks personal jurisdiction over VoIP-Pal, venue is improper as to VoIP-Pal, and the Court
`lacks subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. Patent No. 10,218,606 (“the ’606 patent”). Accordingly,
`this case should be dismissed.
`
`
`ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
`1. Whether the Court should dismiss this declaratory judgment action because the Court lacks
`subject matter jurisdiction over this case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)?
`2. Whether the Court should dismiss this declaratory judgment action because the Court lacks
`personal jurisdiction over VoIP-Pal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)?
`3. Whether the Court should dismiss this declaratory judgment action because venue is improper
`as to VoIP-Pal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)?
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 7 of 16
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`
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`Twitter, Inc.’s (“Twitter’s”) declaratory judgment complaint should be dismissed because it
`suffers from serious jurisdictional infirmities. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
`there is no case or controversy between Twitter and VoIP-Pal, despite Twitter’s attempts to
`manufacture a superficial dispute over the ’606 patent. VoIP-Pal has never attempted to assert the
`’606 patent against Twitter. The Court also lacks personal jurisdiction over VoIP-Pal because VoIP-
`Pal has not directed enforcement activities regarding the ’606 patent against Twitter in this District.
`Consequently, venue is also improper as to VoIP-Pal in all three actions because VoIP-Pal does not
`reside in California and the Court does not otherwise have personal jurisdiction over VoIP-Pal.
`Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this action because it lacks a proper jurisdictional basis.
`
`II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
`
`A. Prior Litigation
`
`In 2016, Defendant VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. (“VoIP-Pal”) filed lawsuits in the District of Nevada
`against Twitter, Apple, Inc. (“Apple”), AT&T Corp., (“AT&T”), and Cellco Partnership dba Verizon
`Wireless (“Verizon ”), alleging infringement of United States Patent Nos. 8,542,815 and 9,179,005
`(the “’815 patent” and “’005 patent,” respectively). Between August and November of 2018, all four
`of those actions were transferred to this Court and consolidated for pretrial purposes: Twitter (Case
`No. 5:18-cv-04523-LHK), Verizon (Case No. 18-cv-06054-LHK), AT&T (Case No. 3:18-cv-06177-
`LHK), and Apple (Case No. 3:18-cv-06217-LHK). The Twitter action was transferred to this District
`as a result of an opposed motion to transfer venue that Twitter filed in the District of Nevada. See
`Case No. 5:18-cv-04523-LHK, Dkt. Nos. 41-42.
`In this District, Twitter and the other defendants in those cases filed a motion to dismiss under
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that the asserted claims of the ’815 and ’005 patents are invalid under 35
`U.S.C. § 101. On March 25, 2019, this Court granted the motion to dismiss and found all asserted
`claims of the ’815 and ’005 patents to be invalid. See Case No. 5:18-cv-04523-LHK, Dkt. No. 84.
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 8 of 16
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`VoIP-Pal appealed. On March 16, 2020, the Federal Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment of
`invalidity. See VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., 798 Fed. Appx. 644 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 16, 2020).
`
`
`B. The Instant Case
`
`Twitter filed this declaratory judgment action on April 8, 2020 seeking a declaration of non-
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`infringement of the ’606 patent. See Dkt No. 1. At the time Twitter filed the original complaint,
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`VoIP-Pal had not sued Twitter over the ’606 patent. Nor had VoIP-Pal threatened to sue Twitter,
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`taken any other steps toward enforcing the ’606 patent against Twitter, or even mentioned the ’606
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`patent to Twitter. Subsequently, Twitter moved to relate this case to Case No. 5:18-cv-04523-LHK,
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`which involved two materially different VoIP-Pal patents—the ’815 patent and the ’005 patent—and
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`had been closed for over a year. See VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., Case No. 5:18-cv-04523-
`
`LHK, Dkt No. 90 (N.D. Cal.). Without articulating any bases, the Court granted Twitter’s motion to
`
`relate. See id. at Dkt. No. 92.
`
`On June 26, 2020—over two months after filing the original complaint—Twitter filed a First
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`Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (“FAC”). See Dkt. No. 29. The FAC alleges that in
`
`early June, counsel for Twitter had asked counsel for VoIP-Pal for a covenant not to sue on the ’606
`
`patent, and VoIP-Pal’s counsel declined, citing the fact that this case was already pending and
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`therefore such a covenant did not need to be discussed under the circumstances. See id., ¶17.
`
`Because Twitter’s complaints fail to allege any facts that establish jurisdiction at the time Twitter
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`filed its Original Complaint, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`12(b)(1), personal jurisdiction over VoIP-Pal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and venue here is
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`improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Accordingly, Twitter’s Complaint should be dismissed.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 9 of 16
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`A. This Court Should Dismiss This Case For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
`
`If there is not subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it must be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
`12(b)(1); Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Twitter
`bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598
`F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, “[i]n a case of actual
`controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
`appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking
`such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “The
`phrase ‘a case of actual controversy’ in the Act refers to the types of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ that
`are justiciable under Article III of the Constitution.” See Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
`Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d in part on other grounds by
`Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). Thus, in a
`declaratory judgment case, if there is no case or controversy, there can be neither a claim for
`declaratory relief nor Article III subject matter jurisdiction. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Trans
`Video Electronics, Ltd., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (citing SanDisk Corp.
`v. ST Microelecs., Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
`A controversy must be “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having
`adverse legal interests.” Id. (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118 (2007)). It is no
`longer sufficient for a declaratory judgment plaintiff to have a “reasonable apprehension of imminent
`suit”; rather, an actual controversy requires “an injury in fact traceable to the patentee,” which exists
`only if the plaintiff alleges “both (1) an affirmative act by the patentee related to the enforcement of
`his patent rights and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity.” See
`Association for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1318.
`Courts in this District have identified 13 factors to examine to determine whether an
`affirmative act has taken place, including “the depth and extent of infringement analysis conducted
`by the patent holder,” and “whether the patent holder imposed a deadline to respond.” See Cepheid v.
`Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., No. C-12-4411 EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17,
`
`4
`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 10 of 16
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`2013). Twitter’s complaint merely alleges that VoIP-Pal has sued Twitter in the past, related to
`infringement of different patents, and that VoIP-Pal issued a press release about enforcement of the
`’606 patent in another jurisdiction, over other parties. See Dkt. No. 29, ¶¶ 4, 16, 18, 34. However, an
`examination of the relevant factors shows that none of these actions is sufficient independently, and
`they are not enough together, to constitute an affirmative act under Ninth Circuit law. (1) VoIP-Pal
`has not provided an infringement analysis of the ’606 patent to Twitter at all, let alone an in-depth
`one. See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *9; see also SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1374-76; (2)-(3)
`VoIP-Pal has not sent Twitter any threatening language about the ’606 patent, and has had no reason
`to impose a deadline to respond. See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *9; see also AAB Inc.
`v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 635 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron
`LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2009); (4)-(5) There has been prior litigation between the
`parties, but none related to the ’606 patent, and VoIP-Pal has never sued Twitter to enforce the ’606
`patent. See id.; Micron, 518 F.3d at 899; (6) As VoIP-Pal has made no explicit threats, there is no
`reason to think that Twitter would have changed its behavior to avoid infringing the ’606 patent. A
`simple press release about other lawsuits involving the ’606 patent that does not identify Twitter but
`merely states “we are not finished” is not enough. See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *9;
`Association for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1318; (7) While VoIP-Pal has contacted Twitter
`prior to this lawsuit, VoIP-Pal has not contacted Twitter about the ’606 patent. See Cepheid, 2013
`U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *9-*10; Hewlett-Packard, 587 F.3d at 1364; (8)-(9) VoIP-Pal is not
`“simply a holding company with no sources of income other than enforcing patent rights,” and has
`had no reason to give assurance that it would not enforce its patent. See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 7446, at *10; see also Hewlett-Packard, 587 F.3d at 1364; Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm.
`Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). While Twitter approached VoIP-Pal after this lawsuit
`was filed to ask for a covenant not to sue, post-suit negotiations are not relevant to whether
`affirmative acts took place that gave rise to subject matter jurisdiction at the time of filing of the
`Original Complaint. See Dkt. No. 29, ¶17; Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 823 F. Supp. 2d 980,
`984 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Webb v. Onizuka, CV. No. 08-00487 DAE-BMK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 11 of 16
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`30075, at *7 (D. Haw. Apr. 8, 2009) (“Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction
`and there is no presumption that a court has jurisdiction in any particular case. See U.S. Const. art.
`III. Hence, in order to properly sue in federal court, a plaintiff must affirmatively establish at the
`outset that subject matter jurisdiction existed at the time of filing.”). If anything, Twitter initiated the
`discussion regarding a covenant not to sue in an attempt to create a controversy, which weighs
`against finding jurisdiction. See Cepheid v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446,
`at *20 (citing Innovative Therapies, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 599 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
`2010)).; (10) VoIP-Pal did not identify the ’606 patent to Twitter nor identify any Twitter products
`that allegedly infringe it. See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *10; Applera Corp. v.
`Michigan Diagnostics, LLC, 594 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158-60 (D. Mass. 2009) see also In re Qualcomm
`Litig., Case No.: 17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185481, at *36 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
`2017) (rejecting contention that discussion of an entire portfolio, without identifying the specific
`patents-in-suit, gave rise to subject matter jurisdiction); (11) There is no identified product with
`which VoIP-Pal would be familiar. See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *10; Prasco, 537
`F.3d at 1334; and (12)-(13) No time has transpired after VoIP-Pal asserted infringement of the ’606
`patent, as VoIP-Pal has made no such assertion against Twitter, and aside from communications
`between Twitter and VoIP-Pal related to other lawsuits, there are no communications from Twitter to
`VoIP-Pal that would appear to attempt to create a controversy in anticipation of filing this lawsuit.
`See Cepheid, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7446, at *10; Innovative Therapies, 599 F.3d at 1380, cert.
`denied, 131 S. Ct. 424 (U.S. 2010).
`Here, the face of the Twitter complaint indicates that there has not been a specific, substantive
`threat from VoIP-Pal to Twitter about the ’606 patent, and there can be neither a genuine concern nor
`an actual case or controversy under Article III and for the purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See,
`e.g., Applera, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (finding no subject matter jurisdiction in a declarative judgment
`action even where the patent holder had sent a letter to the defendant mentioning a dispute over the
`patent in question). The only evidence of an alleged affirmative act that Twitter points to is a VoIP-
`Pal press release regarding the outcome of the appeal of Case No. 5:18-cv-04523. See Case No.
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 12 of 16
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`5:20-cv-02397-LHK, Dkt. No. 29, ¶34. The press release, however, did not mention Twitter, did not
`identify any Twitter products or services that infringe the ’606 patent, did not provide Twitter any
`infringement analysis of the ’606 patent, and did not threaten Twitter, or any entity, with litigation.
`Id.; Dkt. No. 29-9. In fact, the portion of the press release that Twitter cites in its Motion is plainly
`referring to moves that VoIP-Pal intended to take with respect to the appeal in this case, not Twitter:
`“Our legal team is assessing our next moves regarding this Alice decision and we expect to announce
`our intentions soon.” Id. (emphasis added). That move became evident on April 15, 2020, when
`Twitter filed its Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. See VoIP-Pal.com
`v. Twitter, Inc., Case No. 19-1808, Dkt. No. 89. The Federal Circuit has held that a declaratory
`judgment plaintiff must allege an affirmative act by the patentee relating to the enforcement of his
`patent rights. See 3M Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 673 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Under the
`circumstances of the Twitter case, Twitter cannot show that VoIP-Pal took affirmative steps to
`enforce the ’606 patent against Twitter such that a concrete case or controversy exists between the
`parties. Thus, there is no subject matter jurisdiction over Twitter’s claims related to the ’606 patent
`and they should be dismissed.
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`B. This Court Should Dismiss This Case For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction.
`
`1. Legal standard
`
`This case should also be dismissed because this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over
`VoIP-Pal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to seek dismissal of an
`action for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Faced with a challenge to a
`court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that
`jurisdiction is proper. See Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015). When no federal
`statute governs personal jurisdiction, a district court applies the long-arm statute of the state in which
`it sits. See id. California’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
`consistent with constitutional due process. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 410.10. Due process, in turn,
`requires that a non-resident defendant have minimum contacts with the forum “such that the
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
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`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 13 of 16
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`maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See
`Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citations and quotation marks
`omitted). Minimum contacts may be satisfied in two ways: general jurisdiction or specific
`jurisdiction. General jurisdiction applies where a nonresident defendant’s “affiliations with the State
`are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render it essentially at home in the forum state.” See
`Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
`In contrast, specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are more
`limited, but the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to those contacts. Id. at 754.
`In a declaratory judgment action for patent infringement or non-infringement and validity or
`invalidity, “The relevant inquiry for specific personal jurisdiction purposes then becomes to what
`extent has the defendant patentee ‘purposefully directed [such enforcement activities] at residents of
`the forum,’ and the extent to which the declaratory judgment claim ‘arises out of or relates to those
`activities.’” See Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
`(quoting Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
`In other words, the relevant inquiry is whether the declaratory judgment claim “arises out of or relates
`to the activities of the defendant patentee in enforcing the patent or patents in suit” in this District.
`Id. at 1332; see also Radio Sys. Corp. v. Accession, Inc., 638 F.3d 785, 789 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[O]nly
`those activities of the patentee that relate to the enforcement or defense of the patent can give rise to
`specific personal jurisdiction for such an action.”) (emphases added); Petzilla, Inc. v. Anser
`Innovation LLC, No. C-14-1354 EMC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134115, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 23,
`2014), aff’d by Petzilla, Inc. v. Anser Innovation LLC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13623 (Fed. Cir., July
`28, 2015). A declaratory judgment claim arises out of the patentee’s contacts with the forum state
`only if those contacts “relate in some material way to the enforcement or the defense of the patent.”
`See Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Wok & Pan, Ind., Inc., 909 F.3d 1134, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
`Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1336).
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`DEFENDANT VOIP-PAL’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
`AND AUTHORITIES
`Case No. 5:20-CV-02397-LHK
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`Case 5:20-cv-02397-LHK Document 31 Filed 07/10/20 Page 14 of 16
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`2. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction because VoIP-Pal has never enforced the
`’606 patent in this District.
`
`Twitter makes no allegation of general jurisdiction here, and so the only question is whether
`the Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 29, ¶¶15-17. Twitter alleges that
`the Court has personal jurisdiction because VoIP-Pal has engaged in “prosecuting a prior patent
`infringement lawsuit involving the [a different] patent against Twitter in this District,” has voluntarily
`transferred to this District another lawsuit against Twitter, and has “consciously and purposely
`directed allegations of infringement of the ’606 patent at Twitter.” Id. ¶¶18-19. But Twitter
`misapprehends the law: specific jurisdiction, in the context of patent declaratory judgment actions,
`must arise out of or relate to the activities that gave rise to the subject claim. See, e.g., Breckenridge,
`444 F.3d at 1362. To the extent that Twitter claims that VoIP-Pal purposefully directed allegations of
`infringement of the ’606 patent against Twitter in this District, Twitter is wrong: VoIP-Pal has never
`accused Twitter of infringing the ’606 patent, in this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction. See supra
`§ II.B. Further, litigating other cases against other parties in this District, or even other cases against
`Twitter in this District, is not enough to establish specific personal jurisdiction in this particular case,
`as VoIP-Pal has done nothing that might give rise to the subject claims. See, e.g., Breckenridge, 444
`F.3d at 1362. Although Twitter claims that VoIP-Pal consented to the transfer of a different case
`from Nevada to this District, and filed other actions in this District, there can be no legitimate claim
`that VoIP-Pal consented to personal juris