Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 1 of 17
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`MAHAN TALESHPOUR,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`APPLE INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 5:20-cv-03122-EJD
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`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`DISMISS THIRD AMENDED
`COMPLAINT
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`Re: Dkt. No. 68
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`Plaintiffs Mahan Taleshpour, Rory Fielding, Peter Odogwu, Wade Buscher, Gregory
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`Knutson, Darien Hayes, Liam Stewart, Nathan Combs, and Kendall Bardin bring this action
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`against Defendant Apple Inc. (“Apple”) on behalf of themselves and members of a putative class,
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`asserting eleven claims related to an alleged product defect in certain MacBook Pro laptops.
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`Before the Court is Apple’s Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). Mot. to
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`Dismiss Third Am. Compl. (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 68. The Court finds the motion appropriate for
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`decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons below, the
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`Court GRANTS the motion with limited leave to amend.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`In 2016, Apple introduced its updated 13- and 15-inch MacBook Pro models. Third Am.
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`Compl. (“TAC”), Dkt. No. 66 ¶ 17. To make these MacBook Pros thinner and sleeker than their
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`predecessors, Apple used thin, flexible backlight ribbon cables to connect the lighting mechanism
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`of the display screen to the display controller board. Id. ¶ 18. These backlight ribbon cables wrap
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`around the display controller board at the hinge of the laptop and are secured by a pair of spring-
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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 2 of 17
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`loaded covers. Id.
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`This configuration causes the backlight ribbon display cables rub against the control board
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`when the laptop is opened and closed. Id. ¶ 20. Over time, the rubbing causes the cables to tear,
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`which leads to various problems with the display screen. Id. For example, the tearing of the cable
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`can cause a “stage lighting” effect, consisting of alternating patches of darkness along the bottom
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`of the display. Id. ¶ 21. Further tearing can lead to more serious display issues, such as large
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`blocks of color that obscure portions of the screen, and eventually, can cause the display to fail
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`entirely. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. To varying degrees, these issues with the display screen all allegedly
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`render the laptop unusable and unfit for its ordinary purpose. Id.
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`Plaintiffs allege that the backlight cables tear because they are “too short and do not
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`provide enough slack to withstand the repetitive opening and closing of the MacBook Pros” (the
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`“Alleged Defect”). Id. ¶ 20. Faced with complaints from numerous consumers about the stage
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`lighting effect and the failure of the display, Apple attempted to remedy the Alleged Defect by
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`making the backlight cables two millimeters longer in the 13- and 15-inch MacBook Pro models
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`released in July 2018. Id. ¶¶ 30, 32.
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`In May 2019, Apple also introduced the “MacBook Pro Display Backlight Service
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`Program,” through which Apple agreed to replace the display on all 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro
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`models that exhibited the stage lighting effect or a total failure of the display backlight system. Id.
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`¶ 33. Under the service program, Apple will refund the owner of a 13-inch 2016 MacBook Pro
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`who paid to have the display fixed. Id. The service program covers only the 13-inch 2016
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`MacBook Pro; it does not cover the 15-inch MacBook Pro, or any MacBook Pro model released
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`after 2016. Id.
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`Plaintiffs are all owners of 15-inch 2016 MacBook Pro or MacBook Pro models released
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`after 2016 and allege that their laptops all suffered from the same backlight cable defect as the 13-
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`inch version. Id. ¶¶ 35, 41, 46, 51, 56, 61, 66, 71, 76. Plaintiffs all experienced issues with their
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`display screens, including the stage lighting effect or “vertical pink lines,” which ultimately
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`rendered their laptops inoperable. Id. ¶¶ 37, 43, 48, 53-54, 58-59, 63-64, 68, 73-74, 78-79. In all
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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 3 of 17
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`cases, these issues manifested after the one-year warranty Apple provided expired. Compare id.
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`¶¶ 35, 41, 46, 51, 56, 61, 66, 71, 76 with id. ¶¶ 37, 43, 48, 53-54, 58-59, 63-64, 68, 73-74, 78-79.
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A.
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`Rule 12(b)(6)
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with enough
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`specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
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`it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). A
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`complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may therefore be dismissed if it fails to state
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`a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule
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`12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts
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`to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,
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`1104 (9th Cir. 2008). When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept
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`as true all “well pleaded factual allegations” and determine whether the allegations “plausibly give
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`rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Court must also
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`construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915
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`F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
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`it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
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`plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).
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`A court generally may not consider any material beyond the pleadings when ruling on a
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`Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If matters outside the pleadings are considered, “the motion must be treated
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`as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, documents
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`appended to the complaint, incorporated by reference in the complaint, or which properly are the
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`subject of judicial notice may be considered along with the complaint when deciding a Rule
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`12(b)(6) motion. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Hal
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`Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).
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`Likewise, a court may consider matters that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by
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`resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Roca v. Wells Fargo Bank,
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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 4 of 17
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`N.A., No. 15-cv-02147-KAW, 2016 WL 368153, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2016) (quoting Fed. R.
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`Evid. 201(b)).
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`B.
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`Rule 9(b)
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`Consumer protection claims that sound in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading
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`requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317
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`F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003); San Miguel v. HP Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1084 (N.D. Cal.
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`2018). Rule 9(b) requires that “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
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`fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The circumstances constituting the fraud must be “specific enough to
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`give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud
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`charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything
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`wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, a party alleging
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`fraud must set forth “the who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct. Vess, 317 F.3d at
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`1106 (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[I]n a case where fraud is
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`not an essential element of a claim, only allegations . . . of fraudulent conduct must satisfy the
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`heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)” while “[a]llegations of non-fraudulent conduct
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`need satisfy only the ordinary notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a).” Id. at 1104–05.
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`With respect to Plaintiffs’ omissions-based fraud claims, “the pleading standard is lowered
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`on account of the reduced ability in an omission suit ‘to specify the time, place, and specific
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`content, relative to a claim involving affirmative misrepresentations.’” Barrett v. Apple Inc., No.
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`5:20-CV04812-EJD, 2021 WL 827235, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2021) (quoting In re Apple & AT
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`& TM Antitrust Litig., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1310 (N.D. Cal. 2008)); see also Falk v. Gen. Motors
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`Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Plaintiffs bring claims for: (1) violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal.
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`Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (“UCL”) (Count 1), (2) violation of the California Consumers
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`Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1761 and 1770 (“CLRA”) (Count 2), and (3) equivalent
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`deceptive trade practice laws in Alaska, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey,
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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 5 of 17
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`Texas, and Washington (Counts 4-11) (collectively, “the Deceptive Trade Practice Claims”); and
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`(4) fraudulent concealment (Count 3). Apple seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
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`granted. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
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`A.
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`Fraud Claims
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`1.
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`Affirmative representations
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`Plaintiffs allege with respect to each of their fraud claims that Apple committed fraud
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`through affirmative representations in its 2016 promotional campaign for MacBook Pros. The
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`TAC includes the same allegations from the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) concerning
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`Apple’s description of the displays on the relevant MacBook Pro models as the “brightest and
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`most colorful Retina display yet,” as well as an advertisement and an October 27, 2016 press
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`release stating that the new MacBook Pros had “the best Mac display ever.” Compare TAC ¶ 17
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`with Dkt. No. 30 ¶ 16. The TAC also includes new allegations of affirmative representations,
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`specifically that: (1) Apple’s promotional campaign stressed that the new display screens are the
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`best in the computer industry (TAC ¶ 17); (2) “the Retina display on the new MacBook Pro at 500
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`nits of brightness is an amazing 67 percent brighter than the previous generation, features 67
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`percent more contrast and is the first Mac notebook display to support wider color gamut” (id. ¶
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`24); and (3) Apple products will last for a minimum of four years (id. ¶ 16).
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`With respect to the allegations repeated from the SAC, the Court already determined those
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`representations to be nonactionable puffery. Dkt. No. 55 at 14–17 (citing Ahern v. Apple Inc., 411
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`F. Supp. 3d 541 (N.D. Cal. 2019)). With their current amendments, Plaintiffs seek to cure the
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`deficiencies the Court previously identified by distinguishing Ahern. Plaintiffs contend that,
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`unlike the Ahern plaintiffs, they have pled “a product design defect central to the function and
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`operation of their laptops,” not merely a defect affecting “the quality of the user experience.” Pls.’
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`Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Third Am. Compl. (“Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 71, at 8 (citing Ahern, 411 F.
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`Supp. 3d at 568); but see Opp’n at 9 (“Plaintiffs here plead Apple’s misrepresentations about
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`MacBook Pro monitor quality.”) (emphasis original). Plaintiffs appear to confuse Ahern’s ruling
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`on affirmative misrepresentations with its ruling on fraudulent concealment theories. See Ahern,
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`411 F. Supp. 3d at 568 (discussing pure omission allegations).
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`Instead, Plaintiffs contend that “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges such product ineffectiveness or
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`failure, representations about that product’s superior quality are provably false and thus not mere
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`‘puffery.’” Opp’n at 9. Plaintiffs cite Vigil v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., No. 15-CV-00079-JM-DBHx,
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`2015 WL 2338982 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) and In re Bang Energy Drink Mktg. Litig., No. 18-
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`cv-05758-JST, 2020 WL 4458916 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2020) in support of this proposition. In
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`Vigil, the district court found the defendant’s statement that its male supplement “[f]ormulated
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`with premium ingredients to provide maximum potency” was not nonactionable puffery because
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`the statement at issue arguably promised customers that the supplement was capable of having
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`some kind of effect on male potency when viewed in context with other statements on the product
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`label. 2015 WL 2338982, at *8–9 (“If Plaintiff can prove that Staminol is totally incapable of
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`doing so, this statement is provably false to the extent that it makes that representation, or at least
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`contributes to the likelihood that the packaging is deceptive as a whole.”). In Bang Energy, the
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`court found that the defendant’s use of the term “Super Creatine” was an actionable
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`misrepresentation because the defendant used it to qualify an ingredient about which it made
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`specific claims and was therefore capable of being proven true or false. 2020 WL 4458916, at *8–
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`9. Neither of these cases support Plaintiffs’ contention because they concerned statements that
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`were capable of being proven true or false. The Court finds no reason to alter its earlier finding
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`that the statements that the laptops are “revolutionary,” “groundbreaking,” offer “breakthrough
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`performance,” and contain “the best Mac display ever” are subjective and immeasurable assertions
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`and thus constitute nonactionable puffery. Dkt. No. 55 at 17.
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`Turning to the new allegations in the TAC, the Court first addresses the allegation that
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`“APPLE’s promotional campaign for the MacBook Pros stressed that the new display screens are
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`the best in the computer industry.” TAC ¶ 17. The Court perceives this allegation as an attempt to
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`plead an actionable statement akin to those in Beyer v. Symantec Corp., 333 F. Supp. 3d 966 (N.D.
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`Cal. 2018). The Court previously rejected Plaintiffs’ comparison to Beyer, finding that “the
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`statement that the MacBook Pro display is ‘the best Mac display ever’ does not imply Apple’s
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`adherence to industry best practices,” as it only compares the display to other Macs. Dkt. No. 55
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`at 16–17. This additional allegation does not support Plaintiffs’ case, however, as the TAC does
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`not contain any actual examples of or quotations from Apple making such a representation. The
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`only example of Apple’s promotional campaign that Plaintiffs provide is the October 2016 press
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`release1, which says nothing about the new MacBook Pro display being the best in the computer
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`industry. Plaintiffs do not address this inconsistency in their opposition brief. See Opp’n. The
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`Court thus finds no factual basis for such an allegation.
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`With respect to the statement about the Retina display, the Court previously held that this
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`statement was the only actionable statement from the 2016 MacBook Pro advertisement cited in
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`the SAC, because it consisted of more specific statements about the objective characteristics of the
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`MacBook Pro display capable of being proven false. Dkt. No. 55 at 17. However, the Court noted
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`that Plaintiffs had not alleged that those statements were false:
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`Nothing about this Alleged Defect relates to the thickness,
`brightness, or color gamut of the MacBook display touted in the
`quoted advertisement. Because Plaintiffs do not allege that the
`statements in the advertisements are false or that they would lead a
`reasonable consumer to draw inaccurate conclusions about the
`reliability of useful life of the display, the court dins that these
`statements are not affirmative misrepresentations sufficient to
`support Plaintiffs’ fraud claims.
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`Id. The TAC asserts that the advertisement’s “representations about the purportedly exceptional
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`brightness and quality of the MacBook Pro displays, however, are ultimately false,” and that the
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`Alleged Defect is “the complete opposite of the bright, clear, sharp display APPLE represents it to
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`be.” TAC ¶ 24. But those allegations still say nothing about the thickness, brightness, or color
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`gamut of the MacBook display. Moreover, Apple argues, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts
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`suggesting that these statements were false at the time they were made or at the time of sale. Mot.
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`at 8–9 (citing In re Sony Grand Wega KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HD TV Television
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`1 Judicial notice of the October 2016 press release is proper, as the release is incorporated in the
`complaint. TAC ¶ 17 n.2; Khoja, 899 F.3d at 998.
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`Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (S.D. Cal. 2010)). Plaintiffs do not directly address this issue
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`in their opposition brief and do not point to any facts suggesting otherwise. Opp’n at 9.
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`Last, with respect to the new allegation that Apple represents its products as lasting for a
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`minimum of four years, the Court finds that the TAC’s allegations mischaracterize Apple’s
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`statement. The webpage cited as the source of the statement is entitled, “Additional Questions:
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`More answers to your questions about Apple and the environment,” and it appears in the
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`“Environment” section of Apple’s website.2 Apple Inc., Environment – Answers – Apple,
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`Apple.com, https://www.apple.com/environment/answers/ (last visited July 17, 2021). The
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`relevant portion of the webpage reads:
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`2. How does Apple conduct its Product Greenhouse Gas Life Cycle
`Assessment?
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`Apple uses five steps when conducting a product life cycle
`assessment (LCA):
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`. . .
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`2. To model customer use, we measure the power consumed by a
`product while it is running in a simulated scenario. Daily usage
`patterns are specific to each product and are a mixture of actual
`and modeled customer use data. For the purposes of our
`assessment, years of use, which are based on first owners, are
`modeled to be four years for macOS and tvOS devices and three
`years for iOS, iPadOS and watchOS devices. Most Apple
`products last longer and are often passed along, resold, or
`returned to Apple by the first owner for others to use. More
`information on our product energy use is provided in our
`Product Environmental Reports.
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`Id. A review of this webpage reveals that the purported four-year lifespan representation concerns
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`modeling assumptions Apple made for the purposes of engaging in an environmental assessment
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`of greenhouse gas emissions resulting from Apple products. Id. Using a particular model for
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`environmental assessment purposes is not equivalent to guaranteeing a product lifespan of four
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`years without repair. It is simply not plausible that a consumer considering whether to purchase a
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`2 Judicial notice of the webpage is proper, as the statement appearing on the page is incorporated
`in the complaint. TAC ¶ 16; Khoja, 899 F.3d at 998.
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`Case No.: 5:20-cv-03122-EJD
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`MacBook Pro would seek technical information about the laptop’s specifications from the portion
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`of Apple’s website addressing frequently asked questions about its environmental practices.
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`Moreover, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Plaintiffs actually viewed the environmental
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`questions webpage and relied on it. The TAC alleges that each plaintiff “saw advertisements and
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`marketing materials on APPLE’s website in which APPLE represented the MacBook had the best
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`display to date.” TAC ¶¶ 36, 42, 47, 52, 57, 62, 67, 72, 77. The environmental questions webpage
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`cannot be fairly described as an advertisement or marketing material, and it says nothing at all
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`about the MacBook in particular, much less that it had “the best display to date.”
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`Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated any fraud claims based on
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`affirmative misrepresentations.
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`2.
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`Fraud by omission
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`Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment and various Deceptive Trade Practice Claims all stem
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`from the contention that Apple failed to disclose the Alleged Defect in the MacBook Pros. “To
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`state a claim for fraudulent omission, the omission must be contrary to a representation actually
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`made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.” In re
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`Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig. (In re Apple II), 386 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1175 (N.D. Cal.
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`2019) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). “When a defect does not relate to an
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`unreasonable safety hazard, a defendant has a duty to disclose when (1) the omission is material;
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`(2) the defect is central to the product’s function; and (3) at least one of the following four factors
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`is met: the defendant is the plaintiff’s fiduciary; the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material
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`facts not known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff; the defendant actively conceals a material
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`fact from the plaintiff; or the defendant makes partial representations that are misleading because
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`some other material fact has not been disclosed.” Id. at 1176.
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`Apple now contends that no duty to disclose exists where the defect arises only after
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`expiration of the warranty period, and that such an omission is not material (and thus not
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`actionable) as a matter of law except when the defect poses a safety hazard. Mot. at 12–17. The
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`Court’s previous ruling did not address this warranty argument, which Apple made only obliquely
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`Case No.: 5:20-cv-03122-EJD
`ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 3D AM. COMPL.
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`

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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 10 of 17
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`with respect to the fraud by omission claims.3 See Dkt. No. 33 at 14–19.
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`As the Ninth Circuit and other courts in this District have acknowledged, “[t]he state of the
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`law on the duty to disclose under California law is in some disarray.” In re Apple Inc. Device
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`Performance Litig. (In re Apple I), 347 F. Supp. 3d 434, 458 (N.D. Cal. 2018). In 2012, the Ninth
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`Circuit concluded based on California state law that in the absence of affirmative
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`misrepresentations, a plaintiff must “allege that the design defect caused an unreasonable safety
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`hazard.” Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Daugherty
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`v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824 (2006)); see also Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co.,
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`851 F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Wilson as “holding that where a defendant has not
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`made an affirmative misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege the existence of an unreasonable
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`safety hazard”). However, in 2015, the California Court of Appeal appeared to suggest that a
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`plaintiff pursuing a fraudulent omission claim need not always plead an unreasonable safety
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`hazard. See Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 238 Cal. App. 4th 1164 (2015) (allowing
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`consumer-protection claims to proceed even without “defects related to safety concerns”). More
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`recently, in 2018, the Ninth Circuit recognized this tension in the cases but declined to decide
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`whether the safety-hazard requirement applies in all circumstances. See Hodsdon v. Mars, 891
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`F.3d 857, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2018) (“While the recent California cases do cast doubt on whether
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`Wilson’s safety-hazard requirement applies in all circumstances, we have no occasion in this case
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`to consider whether the later state-court cases have effectively overruled Wilson.”).
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`However, the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have directly addressed the question of
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`whether a duty to disclose exists when the alleged defect arises only after a limited warranty
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`period expires. The last direct word from the Ninth Circuit on the subject appears in Wilson,
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`3 Apple moved for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s prior order granting in
`part and denying in part Apple’s motion to dismiss the SAC, arguing that the Court committed
`manifest error by not considering the warranty argument in analyzing Plaintiffs’ fraudulent
`omission claims. Dkt. No. 59. In view of the operative TAC and the fact that the Court is now
`considering what would presumably be Apple’s same arguments on the issue, the motion for leave
`to file a motion for reconsideration is DENIED as moot.
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`Case No.: 5:20-cv-03122-EJD
`ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 3D AM. COMPL.
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`

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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 11 of 17
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`which states that “California federal courts have generally interpreted Daugherty as holding that
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`‘[a] manufacturer’s duty to consumers is limited to its warranty obligations absent either an
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`affirmative misrepresentation or a safety issue.’” 668 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Oestreicher v.
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`Alienware Corp., 322 F. App’x 489, 493 (9th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs contend that Rutledge and
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`Hodsdon have rejected Wilson’s strict “safety hazard” pleading requirement altogether in omission
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`cases, and that the expiration of a limited warranty period is otherwise irrelevant. Opp’n at 2–6.
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`The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ reading of Rutledge and Hodsdon. In Rutledge, the
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`California Court of Appeals stated:
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`HP argues Degenshein and class members similar to him do not
`have a claim for fraudulent concealment under the UCL, because
`they received notebooks with inverters that functioned for the
`duration of the one-year warranty, and were not damaged by HP’s
`alleged failure to disclose the fact of the faulty inverter. However, a
`claim for fraudulent business practices reflects the UCL’s focus on
`the defendant’s conduct, rather than the plaintiff’s damages, in
`service of the statute’s larger purpose of protecting the general
`public against unscrupulous business practices. The question under
`the UCL is related to HP’s conduct in failing to disclose the faulty
`inverter, not on whether the notebook’s computer functioned for
`one-year. HP’s argument that the expiration of the warranty period
`precludes a claim for fraudulent concealment under the UCL is
`incorrect.
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`238 Cal. App. 4th at 1175. As Apple correctly observes, the individual Rutledge plaintiff
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`mentioned above experienced the defect prior to the warranty expiration, and the plaintiff who
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`only experienced the defect after the warranty period expired adequately alleged reliance on an
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`affirmative representation. Id. at 1171, 1176 (“Degenshein experienced problems with his display
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`screen blacking out shortly before the expiration of his one-year warranty . . . .”). Rutledge does
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`not appear to stand for the proposition that the expiration of the warranty period is irrelevant to a
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`materiality analysis. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged that one possible reading
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`of Rutledge is that “there is a duty to disclose defects that go to the central function of the product
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`and which arise during the warranty period.” Hodsdon, 891 F. Supp. 3d at 863 (emphasis added).
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`Plaintiffs’ proposed application of Rutledge would run afoul of longstanding public policy against
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`disregarding a warranty’s limits. See, e.g., Williams, 851 F.3d at 1029 (“[T]he fact that the alleged
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`Case No.: 5:20-cv-03122-EJD
`ORDER GRANTING MOT. TO DISMISS 3D AM. COMPL.
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`Case 5:20-cv-03122-EJD Document 75 Filed 07/19/21 Page 12 of 17
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`defect concerns premature, but usually post-warranty, onset of a natural condition raises concerns
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`about the use of consumer fraud statutes to impermissibly extend a product’s warranty period.”);
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`In re Apple II, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (“California law is clear that its consumer fraud statutes
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`cannot be used to extend a product’s warrant[y].”); Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th
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`249, 257 (2011) (“To allow a CLRA claim in these circumstances would be to supplant warranty
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`law; failure of a product to last forever would become a defect and a manufacturer would no
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`longer be able to issue limited warranties.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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`District courts within the Ninth Circuit—including the Northern District of California—
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`discussing the issue post-Rutledge and -Hodsdon have repeatedly held that “a manufacturer has a
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`duty to disclose any defects that fall within the warranty period, whether relating to safety or to
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`costly repairs, that would have caused the consumer to not purchase the [product] if they had been
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`disclosed.” Baranco v. Ford Motor Co., 294 F. Supp. 3d 950, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting
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`Apodaca v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 13-00725 JVS (ANx), 2013 WL 6477821, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
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`8, 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d
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`840 (N.D. Cal. 2018), order clarified, No. 16-CV-07244-EMC, 2018 WL 1156607 (N.D. Cal.
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`Mar. 5, 2018), and on reconsideration, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (same); In re Apple
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`II, 386 F. Supp. 3d at 1178–79 (alleged defect was not material where plaintiffs did not allege that
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`it occurred on devices still under warranty); Zuehlsdorf v. FCA US LLC, No.
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`EDCV181877JGBKKX, 2019 WL 2098352, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019) (noting that
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`“different rules [apply] to claims based on defects that manifest during the warranty period versus
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`after the warranty period”); Loo v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., No. 819CV00750VAPADSX,
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`2019 WL 7753448, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019) (acknowledging different materiality
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`standard based on warranty status). But if the defect arises outside of the warranty period,
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`however, then the manufacturer only has a duty to disclose “safety issues.” Baranco, 294 F. Supp.
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`3d at 960; Sloan, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 869 (“With respect to defects that