Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 1 of 26
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`COOLEY LLP
`WHITTY SOMVICHIAN (194463)
`(wsomvichian@cooley.com)
`MAX A. BERNSTEIN (305722)
`(mbernstein@cooley.com)
`KELSEY R. SPECTOR (321488)
`(kspector@cooley.com)
`101 California Street, 5th Floor
`San Francisco, California 94111-5800
`Telephone:
`+1 415 693 2000
`Facsimile:
`+1 415 693 2222
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`GOOGLE LLC
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`JOSEPH TAYLOR, EDWARD MLAKAR,
`MICK CLEARY, and EUGENE ALVIS,
`individually and on behalf of all others
`similarly situated,
`
`Case No. 5:20-cv-07956-VKD
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`GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Date:
`Time:
`Judge:
`
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`March 30, 2021
`10:00 a.m.
`Hon. Virginia K. DeMarchi
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 2 of 26
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION ......................................................................................... 1
`STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT ............................................................................................ 1
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED .............................................................................. 1
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY .................................................................... 2
`I.
`INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 2
`II.
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`The Android Operating System. .............................................................................. 3
`B.
`Android Data Transfers. ........................................................................................... 3
`C.
`The Google Terms and Policies. .............................................................................. 4
`D.
`Plaintiffs’ Experiences with Android. ...................................................................... 5
`LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................................ 6
`III.
`IV. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 6
`A.
`Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue Their Claims. .................................................... 7
`B.
`Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Facts Sufficient to State A Conversion Claim. .................. 9
`1.
`Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in their data plans. ....................... 9
`a.
`Plaintiffs’ contractual right to receive cellular data services is
`not property subject to conversion. ................................................ 10
`Plaintiffs’ interest in their data plans bear none of the other
`traditional hallmarks of property. ................................................... 11
`Plaintiffs allege no facts to show that passive data transfers interfered
`with the use of their data plans and caused resulting damages. ................. 13
`a.
`No interference. .............................................................................. 13
`b.
`No damages .................................................................................... 15
`Plaintiffs’ conversion claim fails because they consented to the data
`transfers at issue. ........................................................................................ 16
`Plaintiffs’ Common Count for Quantum Meruit Also Cannot Survive
`Dismissal. ............................................................................................................... 19
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 19
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`C.
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`V.
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`b.
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`2.
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`3.
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`
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`Cases
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`Birdsong v. Apple, Inc.,
`590 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 7
`
`Boon Rawd Trading Int’l Co. v. Paleewong Trading Co.,
`688 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2010) .................................................................................... 10
`
`Cellco P'ship v. F.C.C.,
`700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 11
`
`Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 193 Cal. App. 4th 298 (2011) ............................................... 11
`
`DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pahnke,
`405 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2005) ................................................................................... 10
`
`English & Sons, Inc. v. Straw Hat Restaurants, Inc.,
`176 F. Supp. 3d 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .................................................................................... 16
`
`Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin,
`53 Cal. App. 4th 445 (1997).............................................................................................. 10, 19
`
`Farrington v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc.,
`59 Cal. App. 2d 468 (1943) ................................................................................................. 9, 16
`
`In re Forchion,
`198 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (2011).......................................................................................... 10, 12
`
`Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp.,
`148 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2007).................................................................................... 9, 13, 15, 19
`
`French v. Smith Booth User Co.,
`56 Cal. App. 2d 23 (1942) ....................................................................................................... 16
`
`G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc.,
`958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................... 11
`
`Infuturia Global Ltd. v. Sequus Pharms., Inc.,
`No. C 08-4871, 2009 WL 440477 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) ................................................. 10
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`ii
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 4 of 26
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`In re iPhone Application Litig.,
`844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ............................................................................ 12, 13
`
`In re iPhone Application Litig.,
`No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) ................................ 7
`
`Jordan v. Talbot,
`55 Cal. 2d 597 (1961) ................................................................................................. 13, 14, 15
`
`Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
`184 Cal. App. 3d 1479 (1986) ................................................................................................. 17
`
`Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`McAfee v. Francis,
`No. 5:11-cv-00821-LHK, 2011 WL 3293759 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) ................................ 19
`
`McBride v. Boughton,
`123 Cal. App. 4th 379 (2004).................................................................................................. 19
`
`McKell v. Wash. Mut. Inc.,
`142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (2006)............................................................................................ 9, 19
`
`Monster Energy Co. v. Vital Pharms., Inc.,
`No. EDCV 18-1882 JGB, 2019 WL 2619666 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2019) ........................ 10, 13
`
`Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
`51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990) ........................................................................................... 10, 11, 13, 19
`
`Navarro v. Block,
`250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................................... 6
`
`Opperman v. Path,
`84 F. Supp. 3d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .................................................................................... 8, 9
`
`Opperman v. Path,
`87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ...................................................................................... 8
`
`PCO, Inc. v. Christen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP,
`150 Cal. App. 4th 384 (2007)............................................................................................ 15, 16
`
`In re Section 1031 Exch. Litig.,
`716 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D.S.C. 2010) ......................................................................................... 10
`
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) .............................................................................................................. 7
`
`Steel Co v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
`523 U.S. 83 (1998) .................................................................................................................... 6
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`iii
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`

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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 5 of 26
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`Supply Pro Sorbents, LLC v. Ring Central, Inc.,
`No. 16-cv-02113-JSW, 2017 WL 4685705 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2017), aff’d 743
`F. App’x 124 (9th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................. 15
`
`Tsai v. Wang,
`No. 17-cv-00614-DMR, 2017 WL 2587929 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2017) ................................ 19
`
`Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Sep. of Church and State, Inc.,
`454 U.S. 464 (1982) .................................................................................................................. 7
`
`Virtanen v. O’Connell,
`140 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2006).................................................................................................... 9
`
`Voris v. Lampert,
`7 Cal. 5th 1141 (2019) ............................................................................................................ 12
`
`Wade v. Sw. Bank,
`211 Cal. App. 2d 392 (1962) ................................................................................................... 16
`
`Warth v. Seldin,
`422 U.S. 490 (1975) .................................................................................................................. 7
`
`White Lightning Co. v. Wolfson,
`68 Cal. 2d 336 (1968) ............................................................................................................. 19
`
`White v. Lee,
`227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) ......................................................................................... 6
`
`Worldwide Travel, Inc. v. Travelmate US, Inc.,
`No. 14-CV-00155-BAS (DHB), 2015 WL 1013704 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) ...................... 18
`
`In re Yahoo Mail Litigation,
`7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................................ 17, 18
`
`Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.,
`No. 11-cv-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ............................................... 8, 9
`
`Zaslow v. Kroenert,
`29 Cal. 2d 541 (1946) ............................................................................................................. 14
`
`Statutes
`
`Cal. Civ. Code § 3336 ................................................................................................................... 16
`
`///
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`///
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 6 of 26
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`Other Authorities
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`5 Witkin, Summary 11th Torts § 810 (2020) .......................................................................... 14, 15
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`Cal. Rules of Court 8.1115 .............................................................................................................. 6
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`3 California Torts § 40.48 ............................................................................................................. 16
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`Rule 12 .................................................................................................................................. 1, 6
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`v
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 7 of 26
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
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`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on March 30, 2021 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter
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`as the motion may be heard, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
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`California, Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) will move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint
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`(“Complaint” or “Compl.”). Google’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) is made pursuant to Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion,
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`the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Google’s Request for Judicial Notice,
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`the Declaration of Kelsey Spector, and all pleadings and papers on file in this matter, and upon such
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`matters as may be presented to the Court at the time of the hearing or otherwise.
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`STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
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`Google requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, and all claims
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`therein, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and
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`for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`12(b)(6).
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`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
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`1.
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`Whether Plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, where
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`they fail to allege they suffered any concrete harm from the practices at issue.
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`2.
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`Whether Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for conversion, where Plaintiffs fail
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`to allege a cognizable property interest, any interference with that purported interest, or resulting
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`damage, and where Plaintiffs consented to the challenged conduct.
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`3.
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`Whether Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for quantum meruit, where that
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`cause of action is dependent on Plaintiffs’ conversion claim.
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`COOLEY LLP
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`SAN FRANCISCO
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed because it seeks to manufacture liability for fully
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`disclosed practices that are necessary to enable common features of mobile devices. Plaintiffs are
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`owners of cell phones that use Google’s Android operating system. Like all modern cell phones,
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`Android devices cause data to be transmitted from the device to various servers. These data
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`transmissions serve an array of useful functions, from ensuring that devices have up-to-date security
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`protocols to enabling features of Google applications like Maps and Gmail. Plaintiffs, however,
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`claim that Google has “converted” their property and unjustly enriched itself because data
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`transmissions sometimes occur over cellular data networks and utilize a portion of Plaintiffs’
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`cellular data allowances.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims fail at the starting gate, as they fail to establish Article III standing. While
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`Plaintiffs make general references to hypothetical types of harm that might arise from the data
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`transmissions at issue, no Plaintiff claims to have actually suffered these injuries. Instead, Plaintiffs
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`appear to claim that the alleged use of their cellular data allowances is a per se injury regardless of
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`any concrete impact. This abstract theory of standing contravenes established precedent and should
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`be rejected.
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`To the extent the Court reaches the merits, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law for three
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`independent reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ cellular data plans are not property that can be “converted.”
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`Indeed, Plaintiffs’ contractual right to receive cellular data services under their data plans—the
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`alleged “property” that Google “converted”—does not meet the basic requirements for property
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`that can be subject to conversion. Plaintiffs offer no reason to extend the doctrine of conversion to
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`account for such a novel, intangible interest.
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`Second, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing a substantial interference with their cellular data
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`allowances, or any resulting damages, both of which are required to state a conversion claim. For
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`example, no Plaintiff alleges that they were forced to use less data or pay more money under their
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`cellular data plans because the Android system caused information to be sent from their devices to
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`Google. In fact, the three Plaintiffs with unlimited data plans could not have suffered any
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`2
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 9 of 26
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`substantial interference or resulting damages because they would have paid the same amount to
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`their carriers, and retained the right to use unlimited data, with or without the challenged data
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`transmissions to Google.
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`Third, Plaintiffs expressly agreed, as a condition of using their Android devices and
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`Google’s services, that information would be sent from their devices to Google’s servers. This
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`agreement is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims because consent is a complete bar to conversion. While
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`Plaintiffs complain that Google should have designed the Android operating system to transmit
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`information only when Plaintiffs were connected to Wi-Fi networks, there is no such limitation in
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`the consent that Plaintiffs provided, and they cannot rewrite the terms to which they agreed.
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`For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ conversion claim and the derivative claim for quantum
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`meruit should be dismissed as a matter of law.
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`II.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`A.
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`The Android Operating System.
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`Modern cell phones, like other computers, use an operating system to support software
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`applications. In 2008, Google introduced the Android operating system for cell phones. (Id. ¶¶ 17,
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`20.) Since then, the Android system has become “the most popular mobile platform in the world.”
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`(Id.) Due to its popularity, most of the world’s cell phone manufacturers, and virtually all cellular
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`network carriers, sell or support Android phones. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)
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`B.
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`Android Data Transfers.
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`Android devices are in regular communication with Google via the Internet for myriad
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`reasons. For example, Android devices “check in” with Google servers periodically to confirm
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`device health, to communicate usage statistics and crash reports, and to ensure that the device has
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`been updated with the latest software patches. (Compl. ¶ 47; Spector Decl., Ex. B at 3) Google
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`servers, in turn, may send security updates, bug fixes, new content, or a range of other data to
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`Android devices. (Compl. ¶ 47; Spector Decl., Ex. B at 3.) These data transfers happen
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`automatically as part of the day-to-day functioning of Android devices.
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`Additionally, many of the mobile applications (“apps”) that run on Android also must
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`communicate with Google servers. For example, the Gmail app must communicate with Google
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`COOLEY LLP
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`SAN FRANCISCO
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`

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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 10 of 26
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`servers to send and receive emails, and Chrome (Google’s Internet web browser) must
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`communicate with Google servers to “check for updates” and to “validate the current time,” among
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`other reasons. (Compl. ¶ 50; see also Spector Decl., Exs. B at 3, E at 2.) These data exchanges are
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`also handled by the Android operating system.
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`Transmissions of data from Android devices can occur over Wi-Fi networks when a Wi-Fi
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`network is available and the device is connected. Otherwise, when a user is not connected to Wi-
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`Fi, data will generally be transmitted over cellular data networks, pursuant to a user’s cellular data
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`plan. (Compl. ¶ 24.) For example, a user may receive a security patch from Google, even while
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`out for the day and not connected to Wi-Fi, or may get routing information in Google Maps, even
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`while driving. (See id. ¶¶ 24, 47, 49.) Some users do not regularly connect their Android devices
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`to Wi-Fi networks at all, instead relying on their cellular data networks. (Cf. id. ¶ 25.)
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`C.
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`The Google Terms and Policies.
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`That Android devices communicate with Google is no secret. Google expressly discloses
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`as much and requires Android users to consent to these data transfers. Plaintiffs are no exception.
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`(Compl. ¶ 45 (admitting that Android users must enter various agreements with Google to use
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`Android and other Google services).) Specifically, among other contracts, Plaintiffs and other users
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`agree to the Terms of Service, the Privacy Policy, the Managed Google Play Agreement, the Google
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`Play Terms of Service, and the Google Chrome Privacy Notice (collectively, “the Terms and
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`Policies”). (Compl. ¶ 46.) The Terms and Policies contain a number of provisions and disclosures
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`regarding the transfer of data between Android devices and Google. Examples include:
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` “If you’re using an Android device with Google apps, your device periodically
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`contacts Google servers to provide information about your device and connection to
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`our services. This information includes things like your device type, carrier name,
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`crash reports, and which apps you’ve installed.” (Spector Decl., Ex. B at 3; see also
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`Compl. ¶ 47.)
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` “We collect information about the apps, browsers, and devices you use to access
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`Google services . . . . We collect this information when a Google service on your
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`device contacts our servers—for example, . . . when a service checks for automatic
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 11 of 26
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`updates.” (Spector Decl., Ex. B at 3; see also Compl. ¶ 47.)
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` “Chrome periodically sends information to Google to check for updates, get
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`connectivity status, validate the current time, and estimate the number of active
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`users.” (Spector Decl., Ex. E at 2; see also Compl. ¶ 50.)
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` “[U]sage statistics and crash reports are sent to Google to help us improve our
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`products.” (Spector Decl., Ex. E at 3; see also Compl. ¶ 50.)
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`None of these terms requires Google to transfer data only over Wi-Fi. That is, there is no
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`requirement that Google must wait until a user is connected to Wi-Fi—which for some users may
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`not occur for prolonged periods—before the Android device communicates with a Google server.
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`D.
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`Plaintiffs’ Experiences with Android.1
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`Plaintiffs are individuals who purchased cell phones that run on the Android operating
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`system. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs also contracted with various mobile providers to receive cellular
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`data services: Plaintiff Taylor purchased a monthly unlimited data plan from Metro by T-Mobile;
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`Plaintiff Mlakar purchased a monthly unlimited plan from Sprint; Plaintiff Cleary purchased a
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`monthly unlimited plan from Verizon; and Plaintiff Alvis purchased a monthly limited plan from
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`Verizon. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.) Plaintiffs Taylor, Mlakar, and Cleary—by virtue of having an unlimited
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`plan—have no caps on their data usage and incur no additional charges based on the volume of data
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`they use. (Id. ¶ 26.) While Plaintiff Alvis is theoretically subject to such a cap, he does not specify
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`how much data is included in his allowance. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 26.)
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`Plaintiffs allege that Google committed tortious conversion of their property when their
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`Android devices transmitted information to Google servers using cellular data at times when they
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`were not “actively” using their devices. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 65-66.) Plaintiffs seek damages for this
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`alleged conversion of their data allowances. (Id. ¶ 78.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege what
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`damages they suffered. No Plaintiff alleges that he or she was prevented from using his or her
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`cellular data plan due to the alleged “conversion.” Nor does any Plaintiff allege that he or she paid
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`any amount, i.e., overage fees, or was in any other way damaged because information was
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`1 Google denies Plaintiffs’ allegations and characterizations in their Complaint. Nevertheless, even
`assuming the truth of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, Plaintiffs’ claims fail.
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 12 of 26
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`transmitted from their devices to Google over cellular networks. In fact, as discussed further below,
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`it is unclear how the three Plaintiffs with unlimited plans could have suffered any injury or damages
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`at all, and the Complaint does not clarify that issue.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that
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`is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals
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`of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to
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`save a claim from dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where “there is no
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`cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal
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`theory,” the claim must be dismissed. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
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`A court must also dismiss claims under Rule 12(b)(1) where a plaintiff has failed to establish
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`standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242
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`(9th Cir. 2000); Steel Co v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998). It is the
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`plaintiff’s burden, even at the pleadings stage, to establish standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
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`U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims, because they have failed to allege that they
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`personally suffered an injury in fact. For this reason alone, their Complaint should be dismissed in
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`its entirety. Moreover, should the Court consider the Complaint on the merits, Plaintiffs also fail
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`to state a claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ conversion claim fails because they do not allege a
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`cognizable property interest, interference, or damages and because they consented to the alleged
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`data use. Plaintiffs’ claim for quantum meruit is derivative of their conversion claim and, as such,
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`fails as well. Accordingly, should the Court reach the merits, Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be
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`dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim.2
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`2 Plaintiffs’ counsel previously brought a nearly identical complaint on behalf of a putative class of
`California users in California state court. See Csupo v. Google LLC, No. 19CV352557 (Sup. Ct.
`of Santa Clara). While the court there denied Google’s demurrer, see id. (Aug. 24, 2020 Order),
`that decision “must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action.” See Cal.
`Rules of Court 8.1115(a). In any event, Google respectfully maintains that plaintiffs in both cases
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 33 Filed 02/01/21 Page 13 of 26
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`A.
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`Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue Their Claims.
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`“[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority
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`to show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury.” Valley Forge Christian
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`College v. Ams. United for Sep. of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (internal
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`quotations and citation omitted); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). In
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`a putative class action, the named plaintiffs “must allege and show that they personally have been
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`injured, not that the injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which
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`they belong and which they purport to represent.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
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`Where plaintiffs attempt to rely on purported harms to a proposed class without demonstrating they
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`personally suffered a concrete injury, courts routinely dismiss complaints for lack of standing. See,
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`e.g., Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal for lack of
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`standing where plaintiffs alleged “a potential risk of hearing loss not to themselves, but to other
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`unidentified iPod users”); In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL
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`4403963, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (dismissing complaint for lack of standing where
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`“Plaintiffs have stated general allegations about the Mobile Industry Defendants, but Plaintiffs have
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`not identified an actual injury to themselves sufficient for Article III standing”).
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`The Complaint here fails for precisely this reason. While Plaintiffs speculate about harms
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`that other unidentified Android device users may have experienced, the Complaint is devoid of any
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`allegation that Plaintiffs themselves suffered these injuries. For example, Plaintiffs allege that
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`individuals with limited data plans may be subject to overage fees if they exceed their data
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`allowance, but the one named Plaintiff with a limited plan (Plaintiff Alvis) does not allege he was
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`ever subject to such fees, much less due to any alleged data transfer involving Google. (Compl.
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`¶¶ 11, 26.) Similarly, while Plaintiffs allege that individuals with unlimited plans may have their
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`“cellular connection speeds throttled if they exceed” their usage quotas, the three named Plaintiffs
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`with unlimited plans (Plaintiffs Taylor, Mlakar, and Cleary) do not allege their mobile data plans
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`are subject to such quotas or that their connection speeds were ever “throttled.” (Id.