Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 39 Filed 03/01/21 Page 1 of 28
`
` GEORGE A. ZELCS (pro hac vice)
`ROBERT E. LITAN (pro hac vice)
`RYAN Z. CORTAZAR (pro hac vice)
`KOREIN TILLERY LLC
`205 North Michigan Avenue
`Suite 1950
`Chicago, Illinois 60601
`Telephone: (312) 641-9750
`Facsimile: (312) 641-9751
`
`MICHAEL E. KLENOV (277028)
`CAROL O’KEEFE (pro hac vice)
`KOREIN TILLERY LLC
`505 North Seventh Street
`Suite 3600
`St. Louis, Missouri 63101-1625
`Telephone: (314) 241-4844
`Facsimile: (314) 241-3525
`
`ANN RAVEL (62139)
` aravel@mcmanislaw.com
`McMANIS FAULKNER
`a Professional Corporation
`50 West San Fernando Street, 10th Floor
`San Jose, California 95113
`Telephone:
`(408) 279-8700
`Facsimile:
`(408) 279-3244
`
`
`GLEN E. SUMMERS (176402)
` glen.summers@bartlitbeck.com
`KARMA M. GIULIANELLI (184175)
` karma.giulanelli@bartlitbeck.com
`ALISON G. WHEELER (180748)
` alison.wheeler@bartlitbeck.com
`BARTLIT BECK LLP
`1801 Wewatta Street, Suite 1200
`Denver, Colorado 80202
`Telephone:
`(303) 592-3100
`Facsimile:
`(303) 592-3140
`
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
`Joseph Taylor, Edward Mlakar, Mick Cleary, and
`Eugene Alvis
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`
`JOSEPH TAYLOR, EDWARD MLAKAR,
`MICK CLEARY, and EUGENE ALVIS
`individually and on behalf of all others similarly
`situated,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`vs.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
` Case No. 5:20-cv-07956-VKD
`
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
`GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION TO
`DISMISS
`
`Date: March 30, 2021
`Time: 10:00 a.m.
`Judge: Hon. Virginia K. DeMarchi
`
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 39 Filed 03/01/21 Page 2 of 28
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`
`
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`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED ........................................................................ 7
`
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 7
`
`THE PLEADED FACTS ........................................................................................................................ 10
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................................. 12
`
`I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING IF THEY ADEQUATELY PLEAD THE
`INVASION OF A LEGAL INTEREST PROTECTED BY CALIFORNIA
`COMMON LAW ............................................................................................................. 12
`
`II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE ADEQUATELY PLEADED CONVERSION ................................... 14
`
`A. Purchased Bytes of Cellular Data Are Property That Can Be
`Converted ........................................................................................................ 14
`
`1. Plaintiffs’ Interests Bear the Hallmarks of Property ................... 15
`
`2. Google Incorrectly Characterizes Plaintiffs’ Interest
`as a Contractual Right to Services .................................................. 19
`
`B. Google’s Interference with Plaintiffs’ Bytes Was Complete
`and Total ......................................................................................................... 21
`
`C. Plaintiffs Have Adequately Pleaded Conversion Damages ...................... 22
`
`II. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT CONSENT TO THE CONVERSION ....................................... 24
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`CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 28
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`ATTESTATION ....................................................................................................................................... 28
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 39 Filed 03/01/21 Page 3 of 28
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`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Acme Paper Co. v. Goffstein,
`125 Cal. App. 2d 175 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1954) .................................................................................. 23
`
`APL Co. Pte Ltd v. Extreme Linen, LLC,
`216CV06885CASFFMX, 2017 WL 3271704 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2017) ........................................... 27
`
`Bastanchury v. Times–Mirror Co.
`68 Cal.App.2d 217 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1945) ..................................................................................... 17
`
`Bentley v. Mountain,
`51 Cal. App. 2d 95 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1942) ...................................................................................... 22
`
`Boon Rawd Trading Intern. Co., Ltd. v. Paleewong Trading Co., Inc.,
`688 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ................................................................................................... 20
`
`Bradford v. Flagship Facility Services Inc.,
`17-CV-01245-LHK, 2017 WL 3130072 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2017) ................................................... 14
`
`Camp v. Ortega
`209 Cal. App. 2d 275 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1962) ............................................................................ 23, 24
`
`Clark v. State,
`14 Okla. Crim. 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917) ....................................................................................... 21
`
`Corey v. Struve,
`149 P. 48 (Cal. 1915) ................................................................................................................................ 23
`
`Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank v. Kuchman,
`224 Cal. App. 2d 490 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1964) .................................................................................. 27
`
`Csupo v. Alphabet, Inc.,
`No. 19CV352557 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2020) ............................................................................... 14
`
`DeLong v. Osage Valley Electric Cooperative Association,
`716 S.W.2d 320 (Mo.Ct.App.1986) ........................................................................................................ 20
`
`DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pahnke,
`405 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2005)...................................................................................... 15, 19, 22
`
`In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation,
`956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................................... 8, 13
`
`Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin,
`53 Cal. App. 4th 445 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1997) ................................................................................... 17
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`
`
`
`Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
`322 F. 3d 660 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................................. 14
`
`G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc.,
`958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................................... 15, 16, 18, 21, 22
`
`Good Sports of New York, Inc. v. Llorente,
`280 A.D.2d 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2001) ......................................................................... 17, 20
`
`Hagerman Irr. Co. v. McMurry,
`16 N.M. 172 (1911) .................................................................................................................................. 21
`
`In re iPhone Application Litigation,
`844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ................................................................................................. 18
`
`Kremen v. Cohen,
`337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................................. 15
`
`Leoni v. Delany,
`83 Cal. App. 2d 303 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1948) .................................................................................... 27
`
`Leuter v. State of California,
`94 Cal. App. 4th 1285 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2002) ................................................................................. 23
`
`Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
`184 Cal. App. 3d 1479 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1986) ............................................................................... 26
`
`Lujan v. Defender of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) .................................................................................................................................. 12
`
`In re Martinez,
`610 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) ................................................................................................... 24
`
`McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc.,
`142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2006) ............................................................................... 27
`
`Monster Energy Co. v. Vital Pharm., Inc.,
`EDCV181882JGBSHKX, 2019 WL 2619666 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2019) .................................. 19, 20
`
`Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone,
`898 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006) ..................................................................................................................... 14, 20
`
`Opperman v. Path, Inc.,
`87 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ................................................................................................... 13
`
`Payne v. Elliot,
`54 Cal. 339 (Cal. 1880) ....................................................................................................................... 13, 15
`
`People v. Davis,
`3 Cal. App. 5th 708 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2016) ..................................................................................... 20
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`
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`People v. Kwok,
`63 Cal. App. 4th 1236 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1998) ................................................................................ 18
`
`Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc.,
`376 P.3d 506 (Cal. 2016) .......................................................................................................................... 27
`
`In re Sec. 1031 Exch. Litig.,
`716 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D.S.C. 2010) ........................................................................................................ 20
`
`Seid Pak Sing v. Barker,
`240 P. 765 (Cal. 1925) .............................................................................................................................. 25
`
`Shein v. Canon U.S.A., Inc.,
`CV 08-07323 CAS EX, 2009 WL 1774287 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2009) ............................................. 21
`
`Smith v. Intuit Inc.,
`5:12-CV-00222 EJD, 2012 WL 3945485 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) ................................................ 14
`
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) .............................................................................................................................. 12
`
`Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen,
`220 Ariz. 401 (Ariz. App. 1st Div. 2008) .............................................................................................. 21
`
`Supply Pro Sorbents, LLC v. RingCentral, Inc.,
`2017 WL 4685705 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2017) ........................................................................................ 22
`
`Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co.,
`82 P. 562 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1905) ....................................................................................................... 14
`
`Voris v. Lampert,
`446 P.3d 284 (Cal. 2019) .............................................................................................................. 14, 15, 20
`
`Wade v. Sw. Bank,
`211 Cal. App. 2d 392 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1962) .................................................................................. 24
`
`Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora,
`223 Cal.App.4th 202 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2014) ....................................................................... 15, 19, 21
`
`Worldwide Travel, Inc. v. Travelmate US, Inc.,
`14-CV-00155-BAS DHB, 2015 WL 1013704 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) ............................................ 27
`
`In re Yahoo Mail Litigation,
`7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ..................................................................................................... 26
`
`Yunker v. Pandora Media, Inc.,
`11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) .................................................... 13
`
`Zaslow v. Kroenert,
`176 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1946) .............................................................................................................................. 21
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`
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`Statutes
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`Cal. Civ. Code § 654 ........................................................................................................................................ 14
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`Cal. Civ. Code § 1641 ..................................................................................................................................... 25
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`Cal. Civ. Code § 1654 ..................................................................................................................................... 27
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`Cal. Civ. Code § 3336 ............................................................................................................................... 22, 23
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`Cal. Civ. Code § 3337 ............................................................................................................................... 23, 24
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`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 216(a) ......................................................................................................................... 17
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`Other Authorities
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`California Rule of Court 8.1115(a) ................................................................................................................ 14
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`Restatement (First) of Torts .......................................................................................................................... 12
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`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
`1. To establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs must articulate an injury-in-fact by showing that
`they have a legally protected interest that defendants invaded. California law protects Plaintiffs’
`
`rights to bytes of cellular data that they purchased. Plaintiffs allege that Google invaded that
`
`interest by consuming those bytes without Plaintiffs’ consent. Do Plaintiffs have standing to
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`redress this injury?
`2. To state a claim for Conversion under California law, Plaintiffs must allege (1) a personal
`property right; (2) defendants’ taking of that property without permission; and (3) damages
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`equal to the market value of the property. Plaintiffs allege that Google consumed bytes of
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`cellular data that Plaintiffs purchased without ever obtaining Plaintiffs’ consent. Have
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`Plaintiffs stated a claim for Conversion?
`3. Under equitable principles of Quantum Meruit, Defendants must compensate Plaintiffs for
`the value of benefits that the Defendants unjustly receive at Plaintiffs’ expense. Plaintiffs allege
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`that Google used Plaintiffs’ cellular data to collect the valuable personal information that feeds
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`its surveillance and advertising empire. Have Plaintiffs stated a claim for Quantum Meruit?
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Google, one of the richest companies in the world, is asking this Court for a license to steal
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`bytes of cellular data from users of its Android operating system (“OS”) rather than pay for the
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`bytes itself. From the moment a user sets up a mobile device running Google’s Android OS,
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`Google’s servers begin to transfer information to and from that device. As one would expect, a
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`user’s active engagement with the device and native Google applications—e.g., browsing the internet
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`on Chrome or watching a video on YouTube—triggers active information transfers necessary to
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`deliver the content and functionality the user requests. Google’s various terms and conditions
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`disclose that much. What Google does not disclose, however, is that a persistent stream of
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`information transfers between Google’s servers and devices continues around the clock, even if a
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`user closes Google’s applications, sets the device aside, and never so much as looks at it.
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`///
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`The frequency of these background, passive information transfers is startling, both in
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`absolute terms and by comparison to devices running Apple’s rival iOS. Many of these passive
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`transfers shuttle to and from Google the raw material that feeds its trillion-dollar surveillance and
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`advertising empire. But it is not the content of these passive transfers that Plaintiffs complain of in
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`this case. Rather, it is the fact that without disclosure or consent, the transfers slowly but surely
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`devour bytes of cellular data that device users have purchased from their wireless carriers.
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`“Cellular data” refers to digital information, measured in “bytes,” transmitted over wireless
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`cellular networks. Wireless carriers sell the right to transmit cellular data to their customers and
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`generally charge customers a fee either for a maximum quantity of bytes each month or for a prepaid
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`number of bytes. Google’s Android code keeps the cellular data meter running, and, like a digital
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`pickpocket, nicks valuable bytes for Google’s benefit from the devices of unsuspecting targets when
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`their eyes are focused elsewhere. As a consequence, a material percentage of the money users pay for
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`cellular bytes becomes an undisclosed and unauthorized subsidy to one of the world’s wealthiest
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`companies.
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`In its first argument for dismissal, Google erroneously claims that these allegations do not
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`articulate an injury-in-fact sufficient to establish Article III standing. According to Google, its
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`unauthorized taking of the Plaintiffs’ bytes is immune from challenge in this Court unless Plaintiffs
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`allege some additional, consequential harm—e.g., throttled speeds or overage charges—beyond the
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`taking itself. Google asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing without
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`reaching Plaintiffs’ claims under California common law. But California conversion law creates a
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`“legally protected interest,” the invasion of which by Google is an injury-in-fact. Consistent with
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`Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit just last year rejected a duplicate of the argument
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`Google makes here and confirmed that well-recognized common-law claims for conversion and
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`unjust enrichment establish concrete injuries under Article III. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking
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`Litigation, 956 F.3d 589, 600–01 (9th Cir. 2020).
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`Next, Google misconstrues Plaintiffs’ allegations and California law to claim that bytes of
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`cellular data are not property capable of conversion. But in so doing, Google conflates the contracts
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`
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`through which Plaintiffs acquired bytes of cellular data with cellular data itself. Plaintiffs’ contracts
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`with carriers grant them a possessory interest in cellular data that exists independent of the
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`contracts. Cellular data has all the traditional hallmarks of property: it is capable of precise definition,
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`measurement, and attribution to a specific user, down to the byte; and it is capable of exclusive
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`possession and control, including the right to include or exclude others, such as by turning a device
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`into a mobile “hotspot” that shares a person’s purchased cellular data with others whom the user
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`authorizes.
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`Contrary to Google’s assertion, the fact that wireless carriers make pools of cellular data
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`available to many of their customers, and that specific bytes are allocated to specific customers only
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`upon request, does not strip those bytes of their status as property. Such on-demand delivery
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`arrangements are commonplace. For example, a utility may generate electricity for a local grid, which
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`is available for use by many customers. When a specific customer requests electricity by turning on
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`an appliance, it is delivered and charged to the customer’s account. Despite this commercial
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`arrangement, California law clearly recognizes electricity as personal property.
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`Google further confuses matters by characterizing Plaintiffs’ interest in the cellular data they
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`purchased as “intangible.” But unlike intangible property interests that are fictions created by
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`operation of law, cellular data exists in the physical world, much like electricity and radio waves. It is
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`intangible only in the sense that it is imperceptible to the human senses, which is ultimately beside
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`the point because California law has long recognized that even truly intangible property interests are
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`equally capable of conversion. As “a company built in the cloud,”1 Google knows better than
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`anyone that information, digital storage space, and other forms of intangible property can be worth
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`trillions.
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`Google is also wrong to claim that it did not sufficiently interfere with Plaintiffs’ property to
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`cause damage under California law. Plaintiffs have alleged not just substantial but complete
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`interference with their property interest in the converted cellular data. When Google consumed
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`1 Cortazar Decl., Ex. 2 (Alphabet, Inc., Form 10-K at 7, https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/
`20210203_alphabet_10K.pdf?cache=b44182d (last visited March 1, 2021)).
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`Plaintiffs’ cellular data bytes for unauthorized passive transfers, it exhausted those bytes, and
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`Plaintiffs could never use them again. This seizure and exhaustion of Plaintiffs’ purchased property
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`establishes damage under California law. Google says that this is insufficient, arguing instead that
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`Plaintiffs need to suffer damage through overage fees or throttling. But these are additional or
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`consequential damages that flow from the direct damage of being deprived of valuable property.
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`California law does not require victims of conversion to plead consequential damage to recover the
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`market value of their property, which by statute is the presumed measure of damages.
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`An unstated premise permeating Google’s arguments is that the marketing or billing scheme
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`through which a person acquires a possessory interest in property dictates whether an unauthorized
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`taking of that property is compensable. According to Google, if a person enters into a requirements
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`contract that grants them the right to as much property as they need in a given time-frame at a fixed
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`cost (i.e., an “unlimited” data plan), then anyone can take that person’s property without
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`consequence, because they can simply get more.
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`That is not and cannot be the law, because it would create a license to steal. By Google’s
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`logic, someone could pirate a subscription to Google’s cloud storage drive without paying for it,
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`because doing so would not cost Google anything out of pocket, and Google would in no way be
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`precluded from selling its additional storage space of nearly limitless capacity to paying customers.
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`Were Google required to establish some additional, consequential damage in order to get
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`compensation from this hypothetical thief, it would almost certainly reject its current reading of the
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`law.
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`THE PLEADED FACTS
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`
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`Plaintiffs are users of mobiles device that run Google’s Android OS. Plaintiffs entered into
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`contracts with wireless carriers whereby, in exchange for monthly payments, Plaintiffs were granted
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`the right to send and receive digitized information over the carriers’ cellular networks by consuming
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`bytes of cellular data. Compl. ¶ 6. One Plaintiff paid a monthly amount for the right to consume up
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`to a fixed number of bytes per month, while the others paid more for the right to consume as many
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`bytes per month as they required—i.e., a so-called “unlimited” data plan. Id. ¶¶ 8–11. The complaint
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 39 Filed 03/01/21 Page 11 of 28
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`refers to these bundles of bytes that Plaintiffs paid for each month as their “data allowances.” Id.
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`¶ 24.
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`By entering into these contracts, Plaintiffs gained the right to include others in and exclude
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`others from the use and enjoyment of their purchased bytes of data. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiffs could share
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`their cellular data with family and friends by letting them borrow their devices, or they could turn
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`their devices into mobile hotspots and share their cellular data with specific persons while excluding
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`all others—e.g., by requiring the use of a unique password. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
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`When Plaintiffs and other users interact with their Android devices and Google’s native
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`applications, those interactions cause information to be transferred between the devices and
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`Google’s servers in order to deliver the content and functionality that users request. Id. ¶ 29–30.
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`When users are not connected to Wi-Fi, these transfers consume cellular data allocated to users by
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`their wireless carriers in exchange for their monthly payments. These active transfers that consume
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`bytes of cellular data through the users’ contemporaneous engagement with devices and
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`applications—i.e., at the users’ request—are not at issue in this lawsuit. Id.
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`But Google programmed its Android OS to force users’ devices to exchange information
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`with Google’s servers even when the devices are idle and users are not engaging at all with Google’s
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`applications. Id. ¶ 31. These background passive transfers occur without users’ consent, and they
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`consume significant amounts of the cellular data users purchase from wireless carriers. Id. ¶¶ 31–44.
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`Google programmed the passive transfers largely for its own benefit to power its advertising and
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`surveillance products. Id. ¶¶ 7, 34, 38–39.
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`Technical research has revealed that such passive transfers occur with startling frequency.
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`One expert found they happen 900 times every day (38 times per hour) and consume roughly 350
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`MB per month. Id. ¶¶ 35, 41. Google’s programming of the Android OS to persistently eat up
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`cellular data through passive transfers stands in stark contrast to Apple’s rival iOS for the iPhone,
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`which manages to function perfectly well while transferring “a small fraction of information to
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`Apple’s servers, compared to the information transferred to Google from the Android device.” Id. ¶
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`40. Google integrates the user and device information it receives through passive transfers to fortify
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS; Case No. 5:20-cv-07956-VKD
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`and extend its surveillance and advertising businesses, meaning that much of the cellular data
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`consumed as a result inures to Google’s substantial benefit. Id. ¶¶ 1, 41–43.
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`Beyond failing to disclose these passive transfers to users, Google has also denied them any
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`meaningful option to prevent the transfers from draining their cellular data. Id. ¶¶ 45–53. Since the
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`transfers primarily benefit Google, there is no reason for Google to deny users the choice to either
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`prevent the transfers entirely, or at least delay them until devices are connected to Wi-Fi networks.
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`Id. ¶ 3. In fact, many of the passive transfers are LOG files that are not time-sensitive. Id. ¶ 34.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Many of Google’s arguments in its motion to dismiss rest on one underlying premise: Even
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`if Google took the cellular data that Plaintiffs paid for without their consent, Plaintiffs are powerless
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`to do anything about it because they were not hurt badly enough by Google. That premise not only
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`makes a mockery of fundamental property rights under California law, but it also fails to recognize
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`the nature of injury-in-fact under Article III of the Constitution.
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`I.
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`PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING IF THEY ADEQUATELY PLEAD THE INVASION OF A LEGAL
`INTEREST PROTECTED BY CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW
`Google’s invasion of Plaintiffs’ property interest and its unjust enrichment at their expense
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`establish standing under Article III. The definition of injury-in-fact in the Supreme Court’s standing
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`jurisprudence parallels the common-law definition of injury. That is no coincidence. In articulating
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`the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, the Supreme Court borrowed directly from background
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`principles of the common law. Compare Lujan v. Defender of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining
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`injury-in-fact as “an invasion of a legally protected interest”), with Restatement (First) of Torts § 7
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`(1934) (defining injury as “the invasion of any legally protected interest”).
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`The common law also informs and shapes the requirement that an invasion be “concrete.”
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`In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), the Supreme Court explained that “‘concrete’ is not
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`… synonymous with ‘tangible’” because “the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims
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`even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.” Id. at 1549 (citing Restatement (First) of
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`Torts). Instead, concreteness is “grounded in historical practice” and “consider[s] whether an alleged
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`intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a
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`basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. Historical practice confirms that Plaintiffs’
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`claims for conversion of personal property and quantum meruit have firm bases in at least 140 years
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`of California common law. E.g., Payne v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 339 (Cal. 1880). In short, if Plaintiffs
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`adequately plead their claims under California common law, then they adequately plead Article III
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`injury-in-fact.
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`Just last year, the Ninth Circuit confirmed this principle of law in In re Facebook, Inc. Internet
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`Tracking Litigation, 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020). There, the plaintiffs sued Facebook for using plug-
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`ins to track users’ browser histories. Facebook made virtually the same “concreteness” argument as
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`Google does here. Much like Google’s claim that Plaintiffs must plead that they planned to resell
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`their data or that they suffered separate, additional harms like overage fees or throttling (Mot. at 7–
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`8), Facebook argued that plaintiffs must “demonstrate that they either planned to sell their data, or
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`that their data was made less valuable through Facebook’s use.” 956 F.3d at 599.
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`The Ninth Circuit rejected Facebook’s argument. It explained that “state law can create
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`interests that support standing in federal courts,” and that a plaintiff’s legal “right to disgorgement of
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`profits resulting from unjust enrichment” sufficed for standing. Id. a