Case 3:20-cv-08570-JD Document 271 Filed 04/11/22 Page 1 of 20
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`FILED UNDER SEAL
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`BATHAEE DUNNE LLP
`Yavar Bathaee (Bar No. 282388)
` yavar@bathaeedunne.com
`445 Park Avenue, 9th Floor
`New York, NY 10022
`(332) 322-8835
`
`Interim Co-Lead Consumer Class Counsel
`
`[Additional counsel listed on signature page]
`
`
`
`SCOTT + SCOTT ATTORNEYS AT LAW LLP
`Kristen M. Anderson (Bar No. 246108)
` kanderson@scott-scott.com
`230 Park Avenue, 17th Floor
`New York, NY 10169
`(212) 223-6444
`
`Interim Co-Lead Advertiser Class Counsel
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`MAXIMILIAN KLEIN, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`META PLATFORMS, INC.,
`
`
`vs.
`
`Defendant.
`
` Consolidated Case No. 3:20-cv-08570-JD
`
`ADVERTISER PLAINTIFFS’
`OPPOSITION TO META’S MOTION TO
`DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED
`CONSOLIDATED ADVERTISER CLASS
`ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`Hon. James Donato
`Hearing Date: May 26, 2022
`Time: 10:00 a.m.
`
`Case No. 3:20-cv-08570-JD
`
`ADVERTISER PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
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`

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`Case 3:20-cv-08570-JD Document 271 Filed 04/11/22 Page 2 of 20
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`FILED UNDER SEAL
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ....................................................................................................... 1
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 1
`
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................... 3
`
`ADVERTISERS’ AMENDED SECTION 2 CLAIMS ARE AUTHORIZED AND
`TIMELY ................................................................................................................................ 3
`THE FAC’S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ANTICOMPETITIVE DATA
`A.
`SHARING AGREEMENTS (SECTIONS V AND VII) ARE TIMELY AND
`AUTHORIZED .......................................................................................................... 3
`THE FAC’S ONAVO ALLEGATIONS ARE AUTHORIZED AND FACIALLY
`TIMELY .................................................................................................................... 8
`THE FAC’S PRODUCT INTEGRATION ALLEGATIONS ARE TIMELY AND
`AUTHORIZED .......................................................................................................... 9
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`B.
`
`THE FAC ADEQUATELY ALLEGES SECTION 2-VIOLATIVE CONDUCT .............. 11
`THE FAC ALLEGES EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT AS PART OF A
`A.
`MONOPOLY BROTH, WHICH META CANNOT DISMEMBER ...................... 11
`THE FACIALLY TIMELY API AND DATA SHARING AGREEMENTS
`ALLEGED IN FAC SECTIONS V AND VII ARE ANTICOMPETITIVE AND
`FAIL UNDER THE RULE OF REASON ............................................................... 11
`THE ONAVO CONDUCT IS ANTICOMPETITIVE AND FAILS THE RULE OF
`REASON .................................................................................................................. 14
`META’S INTEGRATION OF AI / TARGETING SYSTEMS IS
`ANTICOMPETITIVE ............................................................................................. 14
`ADVERTISERS DO NOT SEEK DAMAGES FOR—OR ALLEGE
`MONOPOLIZATION BASED ON—CONDUCT OUTSIDE OF THE
`LIMITATIONS PERIOD, INCLUDING AS TO THE APRIL 2015 REFUSAL TO
`DEAL WITH DEVELOPERS ................................................................................. 15
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`III. META’S SECTION 1 ARGUMENTS FAIL ...................................................................... 15
`
`IV.
`
`REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ............................................................................... 15
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 15
`
`
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`Case 3:20-cv-08570-JD Document 271 Filed 04/11/22 Page 3 of 20
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp.,
`592. F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................... 14
`
`E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. Gen. Portland Inc.,
`885 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1989) ....................................................................................................... 5
`
`Free FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.,
`852 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ....................................................................................... 11
`
`FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc.,
`969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................... 11, 13, 15
`
`Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
`125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) ..................................................................................................... 11
`
`In re Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig.,
`383 F. Supp. 3d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ......................................................................................... 12
`
`Reveal Chat Holdco LLC v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,
`2022 WL 595696 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2022) .................................................................................. 10
`
`SmileCare Dental Grp. v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., Inc.,
`88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996) ......................................................................................................... 11
`
`United States ex rel. Jones v. Sutter Health,
`2020 WL 6544412 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2020) .............................................................................. 15
`
`United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
`253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ....................................................................................................... 15
`
`Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
`372 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................................................... 7
`
`Rules
`FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b) .......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
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`Case 3:20-cv-08570-JD Document 271 Filed 04/11/22 Page 4 of 20
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`On February 28, 2022, Advertisers filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” Dkt. 237)
`against Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) with leave of the Court. (See Dkt. 214.) The new
`allegations in the FAC allege overt acts exclusively within the Clayton Act’s four-year limitations
`period, including facially timely overt acts—all post-dating December 18, 2016—pertaining to (1)
`anticompetitive Extended API (“whitelist”) data agreements with targeted developers; (2)
`anticompetitive market division and data sharing agreements with eBay, Netflix, and Foursquare;
`(3) anticompetitive leveraging of deceptively obtained Onavo data to maintain Meta’s Social
`Advertising dominance; and (4) an anticompetitive integration of Meta’s disparate AI and machine-
`learning systems and sources. The FAC also alleges, in detail, that each of the foregoing overt acts
`was indeed anticompetitive—i.e., proscribed by Sherman Act § 2 as violating the rule of reason—
`and injured the Advertiser Plaintiffs, including by contributing to inflated advertising prices in the
`Social Advertising Market. Given the Court’s previous ruling that (i) the Social Advertising Market
`has been adequately pleaded and (ii) Advertisers adequately pleaded Section 1 and 2 claims based
`on Meta’s anticompetitive agreement with Google, the FAC plausibly asserts viable Section 2
`claims against Meta based on five categories of exclusionary conduct—all timely on their face.
`In view of the above, there are really no serious timeliness or plausibility questions left in
`this case. What remains are factual questions—and the parties have indeed proceeded into factual
`discovery, with expert discovery shortly on the way. Nonetheless, rather than answering, Meta has
`moved to dismiss portions of the FAC. (Dkt. 262, “Mot.”) Meta’s motion misstates the Court’s
`previous ruling as to the scope of leave to amend; makes meritless and incoherent timeliness
`arguments; and ignores and dismembers the FAC’s allegations of anticompetitive conduct by Meta
`in favor of blindered strawmen. The five categories of exclusionary conduct recited in the FAC are
`all timely; they are all adequately pleaded (and indeed, one category has already been upheld by this
`Court); and they all pertain to an adequately pleaded market. Meta’s motion should be denied.
`BACKGROUND
`Advertisers commenced this action on December 18, 2020. (See Affilious, Inc. v. Facebook,
`Inc., No. 5:20-cv-09217, Dkt. No. 1). After consolidation with the Consumer cases, which were
`
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`filed beginning December 3, 2020 (Dkt. No. 68), and the appointment of the undersigned as lead
`and executive committee counsel for the Advertiser classes (Dkt. No. 73), Advertisers filed a
`Consolidated Amended Complaint on April 22, 2021 (Dkt. No. 86, the “CAC”).
`Meta moved to dismiss the CAC. On January 14, 2022, after briefing and oral argument,
`then-District Judge Koh sustained Advertisers’ Social Advertising Market (Dkt. 214 at 33-38) and
`Advertisers’ Section 1 and 2 claims based on allegations that Meta and Google entered into an
`unlawful market division agreement in September 2018 (id. at 100-06). The Court gave Advertisers
`leave to amend as to the remaining Section 2 allegations in the CAC, which the Court referred to
`(collectively with Consumers’ similar allegations) as “Copy, Acquire, Kill” claims.1 (Id. at 70-100.)
`On February 28, 2022, Advertisers timely filed their FAC. In addition to facts supporting
`the Advertisers’ previously sustained Section 1 and 2 claims, the FAC alleges four more categories
`of exclusionary acts in further support of Advertisers’ Section 2 claims: (1) post-December 18, 2016
`anticompetitive API / whitelisting agreements providing certain developers access to portions of
`Meta’s scuttled developer Platform (FAC ¶¶ 302-315); (2) 2017 and 2018 anticompetitive data
`sharing agreements with eBay, Netflix, and Foursquare, which were extracted after
`
`
` (FAC ¶¶ 316-536); (3) post-December 18, 2016 anticompetitive use of
`deceptively obtained data acquired through Onavo spyware to surveil and target rivals and their
`users, including by using this deceptively obtained data to train Meta’s AI and machine learning
`targeting systems (FAC ¶¶ 537-569); and (4) the anticompetitive integration—begun in late 2019
`and lacking legitimate, non-pretextual technical justification—of Meta’s disparate AI and machine-
`learning systems from across its business (FAC ¶¶ 657-764). For the sake of brevity, detailed
`allegations concerning the above categories of conduct are discussed (as relevant) in the context of
`the arguments set forth below.
`On March 21, 2022, Meta moved to dismiss any claims in the FAC to the extent they are
`based on new factual allegations.
`
`
`1 The phrase “copy, acquire, kill” did not appear in the CAC.
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`ARGUMENT
`ADVERTISERS’ AMENDED SECTION 2 CLAIMS ARE AUTHORIZED AND
`TIMELY
`
`
`
`I.
`
`In its January 14, 2022 opinion, the Court analyzed the anticompetitive conduct alleged in
`the CAC, and with respect to allegations other than those concerning Meta’s anticompetitive market
`division agreement with Google (which it sustained under Sections 1 and 2), identified precisely
`what facts would have to be pleaded on amendment to state a timely claim. (Dkt. 214 at 88-96.) As
`explained below, the new allegations in the FAC are each addressed to subjects the Court expressly
`discussed in its opinion and authorized amendment for. Moreover, the new allegations are all timely
`on their face: they involve only overt acts entirely within the limitations period, which acts allowed
`Meta to unlawfully monopolize the Social Advertising Market, causing an overcharge injury.
`A.
`The FAC’s Allegations Regarding Anticompetitive Data Sharing Agreements
`(Sections V and VII) Are Timely and Authorized
`
`The CAC alleged, among other things, that Meta violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
`entering into anticompetitive data sharing agreements with developers. (Dkt. 214 at 86-88.)
`Beginning in 2012—executing a plan hatched by Mark Zuckerberg himself—Meta extracted data
`and other concessions from chosen developers by leveraging artificial competitive pressure, to wit,
`a pre-planned but secret forthcoming privatization of key Application Programming Interfaces
`(APIs) offered through Meta’s developer Platform. (Id. at 83-88.) The CAC alleged that this activity
`first occurred in 2012-2015, during which time Meta entered into so-called “whitelist and data
`sharing agreements” with targeted developers while planning to destroy others (id.), and continued
`thereafter with further anticompetitive data agreements between Meta and chosen developers until
`at least April 2018 (id. at 88).
`The Court’s first MTD opinion analyzed Advertisers’ data sharing allegations and held that
`they were untimely as pleaded because all specifically identified anticompetitive data agreements
`were made before December 3, 2016 (four years before this consolidated action was commenced).
`(Dkt. 214 at 93-94.) But the Court expressly gave Advertisers leave to amend their allegations,
`noting that Advertisers had pleaded that “[Meta] continued this discriminatory practice ‘at least until
`April 4, 2018.’” (Id. at 93.) The CAC was, in the Court’s view, deficiently pleaded in that it alleged
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`that Meta continued entering into anticompetitive data agreements with developers until 2018, but
`didn’t specifically identify or discuss any such agreements after December 3, 2016. (Id. at 93-94.)
`The Court identified numerous pre-2016 agreements identified in the CAC as not facially timely,
`including a 2015 data-sharing agreement with Netflix. (Id. at 93.) “Although Advertisers also
`alleged that ‘dozens of app developers entered into such Agreements with Facebook,’” the Court
`reasoned, the CAC did not allege the “precise number and identity” of these developers, leaving the
`allegations “bereft of any dates or details with regards” to agreements with these developers. (Id. at
`94.) The district court, identifying this conduct as part of what it referred to as part of the “Copy,
`Acquire, Kill” claims (id.), accordingly dismissed Advertisers’ anticompetitive data agreement
`allegations, but gave leave to amend them by February 28, 2022 (id. at 99-100, 107).
`The FAC cures the pleading defects identified by the Court with respect to Advertisers’
`anticompetitive data sharing allegations. Specifically, using documents produced in discovery in
`this case, the FAC particularly identifies and describes two groups of allegedly anticompetitive data
`agreements with developers that post-date December 18, 2016.2 First, in Section V (“Facebook
`Continues to Enter into Extended API Agreements after the April 2015 Platform Changes”), the
`FAC specifically identifies
` post-December 18, 2016 API whitelist agreements by party and
`date. (FAC ¶¶ 308-15 (identifying anticompetitive Extended API agreements entered between
`December 27, 2016, and August 2019).) Second, in Section VII (“Facebook’s Entry and Data
`Capture Conduct”), the FAC identifies and describes facially timely anticompetitive data
`agreements with developers Foursquare (FAC ¶¶ 418-28 (Foursquare
`
`), eBay (FAC ¶¶ 429-72 (eBay
`)), and Netflix
`(FAC ¶¶ 473-536 (Netflix
`
`)). These data agreements are, without exception, overt acts that fall
`within the four-year limitations period—they are timely on their face.
`The FAC also explains the context for these agreements and how they were extracted. It is
`the same context and story that appeared in the CAC—but bolstered with factual details and
`
`
`2 As noted earlier, the initial Advertiser complaint was filed December 18, 2020.
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`particulars that were previously nonpublic and could only have been found from internal Meta
`documents. For example, after having scuttled its Platform, which was its primary source of third-
`party social data, Meta continued leveraging API agreements where it could (see FAC § V), and at
`the same time
`
` for its social advertising business (FAC §§ VI-VII.A). Repeating the
`—where Meta
`company’s pattern of
`was a fiercely competitive new entrant, but not yet a monopolist—to benefit its social advertising
`monopoly, Meta reached anticompetitive data agreements with
` Netflix
`(whose CEO was on Meta’s Board) and eBay in
`. (See FAC § VII.C (eBay); id.
`§ VII.D (Netflix).) Specifically, Meta agreed
`
`
` that
`allowed Meta to maintain the Data Targeting Barrier to Entry (“DTBE”) surrounding its social
`advertising monopoly as Facebook users increasingly spent their time and attention elsewhere on
`the Internet and in other apps. (See FAC § VI (
`
`); id. at § VII (Meta’s monopoly-maintaining response).)
`Meta next argues that even if authorized, the new agreement allegations are untimely
`because they supposedly do not relate back to the allegations in the CAC. This argument is baseless.
`As an initial matter, Meta appears to concede that the FAC’s data agreement allegations “are part of
`the same allegedly exclusionary ‘Platform Scheme’” in the CAC. (Mot. at 7.) This is correct: the
`anticompetitive data agreements alleged in Sections V and VII of the FAC plainly “ar[i]se out of
`the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original
`pleading.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b); see also E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. Gen. Portland Inc., 885 F.2d
`1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[C]ourts should apply the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c) liberally
`and . . . ‘[t]his liberality is particularly persuasive in antitrust suits where there is ample opportunity
`for discovery and other pretrial procedures.’” (citation omitted)).
`Concessions aside, a review of the CAC lays to rest any relation back concerns. The CAC
`alleges that Meta scuttled its Platform in order to extract data sharing agreements from potential and
`
`
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`actual competitors that fell into defined app categories. (CAC ¶¶ 136-37, 186, 189.) If these app
`developers refused to enter into data sharing agreements, they would be cut off from core
`functionality available on the Facebook Platform. (CAC ¶ 140.) The anticompetitive agreements in
`the FAC are all anticompetitive data agreements that occurred as a result of, and as an effect of,
`Meta’s scuttling of the Facebook Platform and overall scheme, which left Meta vulnerable if it did
`not replace the social data (
`) that it lost when it blindsided
`developers and ejected tens of thousands of them from its Platform. (FAC ¶¶ 318-22, ¶¶ 395-410.)
`In other words, because Meta had destroyed its source of social data in April 2015, it now had to
`collect that social data itself or extract it from a third party.
`That is what the FAC alleges Meta did—using the lessons it learned from its 2012-2015
`Platform conduct. With respect to third parties that needed access to Meta’s Platform for social data,
`Meta entered into “whitelisting” agreements in exchange for their users’ data within the limitations
`period. (FAC ¶¶ 302-15.) As to third parties with valuable
` (FAC ¶ 330)—namely,
`Netflix and eBay—
`
`
`
`
`
` (FAC ¶¶ 316-393.)
`
`
`, strengthening the DTBE by ensuring that a new entrant would
`need both Meta’s places data and the licensed data to effectively enter the Social Advertising
`market. (FAC ¶¶ 423-428.) These FAC allegations use evidence drawn from discovery in this case
`to particularly support preexisting allegations of post-2015 data agreements in the CAC—
`allegations that Judge Koh specifically identified when analyzing Advertisers’ CAC and providing
`leave to amend. (Dkt. 214 at 93-94.) They not only provide, as the Court requested, the identity of
`each counterparty and the dates of each agreement, but also detailed allegations as to how Meta
`extracted the agreements from each company—
`
`
`
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`.
`Meta also argues that the exclusionary agreements with Netflix, eBay, and Foursquare, as
`well as facially timely Extended API agreements, are somehow untimely because they do not inflict
`“new and accumulating injury” with respect to pre-limitations period conduct. To the extent this
`standard—drawn from the “continuing harm” doctrine—is even applicable here, where the overt
`acts in Sections V and VII of the FAC are all timely on their face, it is unambiguously satisfied.
`Advertisers specifically and plausibly plead that Meta’s post-December 2016 data agreements
`distinctly strengthened the DTBE protecting Meta’s Social Advertising monopoly, distinctly helped
`Meta illegally maintain that monopoly, and distinctly contributed to the anticompetitive overcharge
`suffered by the Advertisers plaintiffs and class members. (See FAC ¶ 311 (Events API new and
`accumulating injury); ¶ 417 (“[B]eginning in 2016 (and extending to the present), [Meta] used the
`
` with the
`intent and effect of fortifying and maintaining [Meta’s] DTBE and concomitant Social Advertising
`monopoly. . . . Plaintiffs and the putative classes paid inflated prices for Facebook advertisements
`as a result of this anticompetitive conduct.”); ¶ 428 (Foursquare); ¶¶ 471-72 (eBay); ¶¶ 514, 535-36
`(Netflix); ¶¶ 819-22, 824-26, 828, 830-36.) Meta’s argument on this issue is both factually
`counterintuitive (indeed, the class periods in this case do not even begin until December 2016) and
`contrary to law—as the Court specifically recognized in its original MTD opinion. (See Dkt. 214 at
`57-58 (“[I]mproperly prolonging a monopoly is as much an offense against the Sherman Act as is
`wrongfully acquiring market power in the first place.” (quoting Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers
`Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.)).)
`
`Meta further argues that Meta’s anticompetitive
`—identified and specifically pleaded based on discovery obtained in this case—
`are somehow exempt from the Court’s MTD Order giving Advertisers leave to amend their Section
`2 claims to specifically identify “new Whitelist and Data Sharing Agreements after December 3,
`2016.” (Dkt. 214 at 94 (emphasis added).) This argument is inconsistent with the Court’s MTD
`
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`opinion, with the CAC, and with applicable law. As explained above, the agreements with
`Foursquare, eBay, and Netflix fit squarely within the conduct, transaction, and occurrence set out in
`the CAC, and the Court’s prior MTD opinion expressly stated that Advertisers could (indeed, must)
`newly identify and plead anticompetitive data sharing agreements after December 2016. Meta’s
`entire argument is to dismember the means by which Meta obtained the so-called “Entry and
`Capture” agreements, then state that this somehow renders them outside of the monopolization
`scheme previously alleged in the CAC. But the FAC is clear that the
`
`
`, and that these agreements were a substantial part
`of the post-December 2016 monopolization and overcharge in the Social Advertising Market that is
`at the heart of this case (id. §§ VII, XIII; see also id. at ¶¶ 839, 842 (class periods)).
`B.
`The FAC’s Onavo Allegations Are Authorized and Facially Timely
`
`The Court’s initial MTD opinion expressly authorized Advertisers to amend the Onavo
`allegations, and sought additional facts regarding (a) “how Facebook used data obtained through
`Onavo after December 3, 2016”; (b) the “companies which Facebook tracked using Onavo after
`December 3, 2016”; and (c) whether “users of Facebook’s social network services also were users
`of Onavo Protect.” (Dkt. 214 at 89-91.) The FAC, which devotes an entire new section specifically
`to post-December 2016 Onavo-related anticompetitive conduct (see FAC § VIII), includes
`additional factual allegations on each point—namely that (a) Meta used its Onavo spyware to spy
`on third-party app users (id. ¶ 564-69), then used the deceptively acquired user data to train its
`machine learning and analytics models during the limitations period, thereby directly connecting
`Meta’s deceptive data acquisition apparatus into an (anti)competitive advantage over Social
`Advertising rivals and would-be entrants (FAC ¶¶ 537-54, 564-69); (b) Meta used Onavo to surveil
`rival or potentially competitive mobile apps during the limitations period, including Snapchat,
`Google Photos, iMessage, Android Messages, and Twitter after December 18, 2016 (FAC ¶¶ 551-
`63); and (c) Meta matched users of third-party apps that incorporated Onavo’s SDK with their
`Facebook IDs after December 3, 2016 (FAC ¶¶ 564-69). These new allegations, made in response
`to the Court’s direction, were sourced from discovery obtained in the case and concern only overt
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`acts falling squarely within the limitations period. Moreover, each new allegation relates directly to
`Onavo allegations in the CAC. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 236, CAC ¶ 258 (real-time surveillance of users);
`FAC ¶ 290, CAC ¶ 312 (Onavo used to surveil top apps); FAC ¶ 297, CAC ¶ 319 (used by data
`scientists to monitor and model WhatsApp growth); FAC ¶¶ 230-31, CAC ¶¶ 252-53 (Onavo used
`to deceive users within the limitations period with hidden spyware).)
`Meta also argues that Advertisers’ post-December 2016 Onavo allegations do not “identify
`new and accumulating injury to plaintiffs,” as required under the continuing-harm doctrine (Mot. at
`6.) To the extent this standard is applicable to exclusively timely-on-their-face overt acts, it is plainly
`met here with respect to Onavo. The FAC expressly and specifically alleges post-December 2016
`Onavo conduct through which “[Meta] used deception to obtain a competitive edge in ad targeting
`between 2016 and 2019.” (FAC ¶ 540; see id. at ¶¶ 537-69.) This conduct “provided [Meta] with a
`further competitive advantage against would-be entrants to the Social Advertising Market, helping
`to maintain the DTBE and to seal off any erosion of [Meta’s] Social Advertising market power—
`and concomitant supracompetitive ad prices—between 2016 and 2019.” (Id. ¶ 542; see also id. at
`¶ 569 (post-2016 Onavo conduct gave “[Meta] an immense advantage over competitors” and
`inflicted overcharge on Plaintiffs); id. at ¶¶ 819, 821, 823.) Again, the law does not support Meta’s
`“new and continuing injury” argument any more than the facts do: as the Court explained in its
`MTD opinion, “‘improperly prolonging a monopoly is as much an offense against the Sherman Act
`as is wrongfully acquiring market power in the first place.’” (Dkt. 214 at 58 (quoting Xechem, 372
`F.3d at 902).)
`C.
`
`The FAC’s Product Integration Allegations are Timely and Authorized
`
`The FAC alleges an anticompetitive integration of Meta’s AI and targeting systems
`beginning in 2019. (FAC at § XI.) In its MTD opinion, the Court expressly analyzed allegations
`regarding Facebook’s publicly-announced 2019 integration of its Facebook, Messenger, Instagram,
`and WhatsApp as part of its “Copy, Acquire, Kill” analysis (Dkt. 214 at 94-96), and noted that
`Advertisers must identity an “overt act” within the limitations period (id. at 96). The FAC
`specifically responds to the Court’s observation that allegations concerning the 2019 integration
`were “sparse,” id., alleging additional facts obtained in discovery (see FAC at 657-764). The FAC
`
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`also makes clear that the complained-of “integration” is (and was) itself an anticompetitive act—
`effectively, a product- and data architecture-redesign across Meta’s entire data targeting business—
`entirely separate from the company’s 2012 and 2014 acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.
`Indeed, Meta’s integration was made possible by its anticompetitive AI and targeting agreement
`with Google (FAC ¶¶ 20, 657, 686-687), which this Court has already sustained as a violation of
`Sections 1 and 2 (Dkt. 214 at 100-06). Based on newly acquired discovery concerning the previously
`pleaded integration of Meta’s products and systems, the FAC provides a detailed account of the AI
`systems that were integrated (FAC ¶¶ 663-689, 729-749