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`POMERANTZ LLP
`Jordan L. Lurie (SBN 130013)
`Ari Y. Basser (SBN 272618)
`1100 Glendon Avenue, 15th floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90024
`Phone: (310) 432-8492
`Fax:
`(310) 861-8591
`Email: jlurie@pomlaw.com
`Email: abasser@pomlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class
`
`WOHL & FRUCHTER LLP
`Joshua E. Fruchter (pro hac vice to be
`requested)
`25 Robert Pitt Drive, Suite 209G
`Monsey, NY 10952
`Phone: (845) 290-6818
`Fax: (718) 504-3773
`Email: jfruchter@wohlfruchter.com
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`SYNERGY RX PBM LLC, Individually and
`On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated
`
` Case No.
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`LINKEDIN CORPORATION,
`
`Defendant.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`(1) Violation of Cal. Bus. & Bus. Prof.
`Code § 17200, et seq.
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`(2) Fraudulent Misrepresentation
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`(3) Negligent Misrepresentation
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`(4) Breach of Implied Duty to Perform With
`Reasonable Care
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`(5) Accounting
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 2 of 31
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`Plaintiff Synergy RX PBM LLC (“Synergy” or “Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of
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`all others similarly situated, by and through its undersigned counsel, brings this class action
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`complaint seeking monetary and injunctive relief against Defendant LinkedIn Corporation
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`(“LinkedIn” or the “Company”). Plaintiff alleges the following upon information and belief based
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`on the investigation of counsel, except as to those allegations that specifically pertain to Plaintiff,
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`which are alleged upon personal knowledge.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`LinkedIn promotes itself as the world’s largest online network of business
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`professionals with over 700 million members worldwide. As one of its primary sources of revenue,
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`LinkedIn charges advertisers for displaying ads to LinkedIn members. Advertisers pay for these
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`ads based on three metrics: each time an ad is displayed (“impressions”), each time a video ad is
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`watched for a minimum duration (“video views”), or each time an ad is clicked (“clicks”). It is
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`estimated that LinkedIn generated $1.7 billion from ad sales to US-based advertisers in 2020.
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`2.
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`LinkedIn sells its ads via real-time online auctions in which advertisers compete to
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`show their ads to LinkedIn members. LinkedIn runs a new auction every time a new member logs
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`in, and because LinkedIn boasts hundreds of millions of members, hundreds of millions of these
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`auctions occur every day. Bids in each real-time auction are based on what different advertisers
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`are willing to pay for a particular metric (i.e., impression, video view, or click), and then based on
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`those bids and other factors, LinkedIn’s software programmatically determines (within
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`milliseconds) which ad to show to a particular LinkedIn member and at what price.
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`3.
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`The prices advertisers are willing to pay for LinkedIn ads depends on ad
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`performance; that is, the rate at which LinkedIn members see and interact with the ads displayed
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`to them. To enable advertisers to measure ad performance — and make informed decisions
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`concerning ad spending — LinkedIn provides an interface called Campaign Manager that displays
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`impressions, video views, and clicks per ad, as well as numerous derived metrics that incorporate
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`those three base metrics as inputs (for example, “view rate,” which is calculated as video views
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`divided by impressions).
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 3 of 31
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`4.
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`LinkedIn has long represented to advertisers that they can rely on the metrics in
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`Campaign Manager to accurately analyze the performance of their ad campaigns. As noted, based
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`on such performance, advertisers determine their ad spending. For example, advertisers might
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`consider the percentage of members who watched a video ad (“view rate”) in deciding whether to
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`buy more video ads, and how much to pay for those ads (with higher video view rates motivating
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`advertisers to buy more video ads, and pay more for those ads in the auctions).
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`5.
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`Advertisers do not have access to the systems necessary to audit and verify the data
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`underlying the metrics displayed in Campaign Manager; only LinkedIn has such access.
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`Accordingly, advertisers rely on LinkedIn’s representations concerning the accuracy of the metrics
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`in Campaign Manager, and rely on LinkedIn to implement systems to detect any errors that might
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`inflate those metrics.
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`6.
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`On November 12, 2020, LinkedIn announced that measurement errors discovered
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`in August 2020 inflated metrics tied to impressions and video views for more than two years,
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`“potentially impacting” over 418,000 advertisers during that timeframe. For example, LinkedIn
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`recorded video views for video ads that continued to play off-screen, which would have inflated
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`video view rates (as a LinkedIn spokesperson confirmed). In other instances, LinkedIn recorded
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`impressions when members simply rotated their phones.
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`7.
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`The inflated metrics that LinkedIn disclosed went undetected for so long because
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`LinkedIn’s internal auditing processes and systems have been deficient for years. LinkedIn knew
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`this and admitted as much in its November 2020 announcement when it disclosed that, as a result
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`of discovering the inflated metrics, it would begin “investing in improvements to our processes
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`and systems,” and retain the Media Rating Council (“MRC”) — a media industry watchdog — to
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`“audit our metrics.” LinkedIn could and should have taken these steps years ago. Had it done so,
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`the inflated metrics only first discovered in August 2020 would have been promptly detected and
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`fixed before causing harm to advertisers. But it did not do so because inflated metrics boosted
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`LinkedIn’s revenue.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 4 of 31
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`8.
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`In its announcement, LinkedIn advised that it had issued “credits” to advertisers
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`“potentially impacted” by the inflated metrics. But it has never disclosed how it calculated these
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`“credits,” or how it determined which advertisers were “impacted.” Instead, LinkedIn has taken
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`the position that it is free to unilaterally decide without any accountability which advertisers to
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`compensate, and what sums to pay them (apparently based solely on PR considerations). That is
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`unacceptable. Having effectively admitted that deficient auditing systems inflated key metrics for
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`hundreds of thousands of advertisers for more than two years, LinkedIn is obligated to fully
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`compensate all impacted advertisers for all the harm caused by those inflated metrics.
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`In particular, since — as LinkedIn confirmed — invalid impressions and video
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`views inflated the metrics displayed in Campaign Manager for over two years, then during that
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`timeframe, ads appeared to perform better than they actually did. And since better ad performance
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`leads advertisers to buy more ads, and increase the prices they pay for those ads, then — for more
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`than two years — advertisers paid higher prices for ads than they otherwise would have paid, and
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`bought more ads than they otherwise would have bought, absent the inflated metrics. There is no
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`indication that LinkedIn is compensating advertisers at all for such harm (even though it
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`substantially benefitted from the higher revenue generated from the inflated pricing).
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`10. Moreover, it appears that LinkedIn’s measurement errors extend well beyond
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`inflated metrics tied to impressions and video views. According to credible expert and other public
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`sources, LinkedIn’s platform is plagued by fraudulent activity, including large volumes of invalid
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`clicks. Thus, for years, advertisers have also been buying more ads, and paying higher prices for
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`ads, based on inflated metrics tied to clicks. Advertisers must also be compensated for this harm.
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`11.
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`Finally, the fact that LinkedIn has failed to acknowledge the invalid clicks and other
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`fraudulent activity on its platform discovered by third parties means that Plaintiff and other
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`advertisers continue to face an actual threat of future harm of being further exposed to inflated
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`metrics on LinkedIn that can only be addressed by injunctive relief.
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`12.
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`To ensure LinkedIn fully compensates Class members for all harm caused by
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`inflated metrics on LinkedIn’s platform, and that LinkedIn implements adequate auditing
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 5 of 31
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`processes and systems to promptly detect and fix future errors that would inflate metrics, Plaintiff
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`asserts claims for violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
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`§17200 et seq. (“UCL”), fraudulent misrepresentation (or in the alternative, negligent
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`misrepresentation), breach of the implied duty to perform with reasonable care, and at a minimum,
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`an accounting, on behalf of itself and all other similarly-situated LinkedIn advertisers.1
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`PARTIES
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`13.
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`Plaintiff is an LLC organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its
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`principal place of business in New York.
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`14.
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`Defendant is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware,
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`with its principal place of business located at 1000 West Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California
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`94085. Defendant is wholly owned by Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”).
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`15.
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`Defendant conceived, reviewed, approved, directed, and controlled the misconduct
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`conduct alleged herein in California; and invoiced and collected the fees wrongfully earned from
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`such misconduct from California.
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`JURISDICTION, VENUE AND CHOICE OF LAW
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`16.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C.
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`§1332(d)(2), the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, because at least one member of the Class,
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`which exceeds 100 members in the aggregate, is a citizen of a different state than Defendant and
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`the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
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`17.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it transacts business
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`in this State, and because the tortious conduct alleged in this Complaint occurred in, was directed
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`to, and/or emanated from California.
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`18.
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`Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391 because Defendant is
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`headquartered in this District, and conducts business transactions in this District, and because the
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`wrongful conduct giving rise to this case occurred in, was directed from, and/or emanated from
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`this District.
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`1 All emphasis herein is added, unless otherwise noted.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 6 of 31
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`19.
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`Defendant’s ads agreement contains a choice of law and venue provision providing
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`that if “an issue arises under this Ads Agreement (including non-contractual disputes or claims)
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`and the contracting entity . . . is . . . LinkedIn Corporation, then this Ads Agreement is governed
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`by the laws of the State of California, and any action or proceeding (including those arising from
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`non-contractual disputes or claims) related to this Ads Agreement will be brought in a federal court
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`in the Northern District of California.”2
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`A. The Pricing of Online Ads Based on Viewability
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`20.
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`For many years, the common practice in the online advertising industry was to
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`charge advertisers for each ad displayed, regardless of where the ad appeared on a user’s browser
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`screen. But an ad served does not mean it was actually seen by the user on whose screen it
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`appeared. For example, an ad could appear at the bottom of a screen to where the user never scrolls
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`before leaving a website.
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`21.
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`An online ad that is never seen — and thus cannot be clicked or otherwise provoke
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`any user engagement — does not provide any value to an advertiser. That is because, at bottom,
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`advertising is a marketplace for attention. Websites sell the attention of their users to advertisers,
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`and when an ad cannot attract the attention of a real website user (because it is never seen), the
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`advertiser derives no value from that ad. For this reason, there has been growing interest among
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`advertisers in recent years to pay only for ads that were viewed, as measured by technology that
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`records how many pixels of each ad is within a user’s view and for how many seconds.
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`22.
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`Research has indicated that the inventory of online ad space that is “viewable” is
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`fairly low, while advertiser demand for “viewable” ads is high because “non-viewed” ads do not
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`2 https://www.linkedin.com/legal/sas-terms (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 7 of 31
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`provide value.3 Therefore, websites that offer to reliably charge advertisers based on specific
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`viewability standards can command premium prices.
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`23. When an advertiser purchases ads from a website offering to charge based on
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`“viewability,” the price the advertiser pays for the ads is based on the anticipated level of ad
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`viewability promised by the website. Accordingly, where “advertisers anticipate a high level of ad
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`viewability, they are keen to pay a higher price for ads….”4 On websites where advertisers cannot
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`verify the actual level of viewability, however, and unbeknownst to them, actual ad viewability
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`falls below the anticipated level of ad viewability for which they paid, advertisers are harmed
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`because they are paying a higher price than they otherwise would have paid had they known about
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`the lower level of ad viewability.5 As alleged below, LinkedIn’s inflated metrics similarly caused
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`advertisers to pay more for ads than they otherwise would have paid, and buy more ads than they
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`otherwise would have bought, absent the inflated metrics.
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`B. LinkedIn’s Advertising Offering
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`24.
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`LinkedIn promotes itself as the world’s largest online network of business
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`professionals with over 700 million members worldwide.
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`25.
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`Since December 2016, LinkedIn has been a division of Microsoft (which acquired
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`LinkedIn in 2016 for $26.2 billion). In its Form 10-K for the year ending June 30, 2020, Microsoft
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`announced that LinkedIn’s total revenue in 2020 had grown 20% to $8.1 billion.
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`3 “Advertising Viewability in Online Branding Campaigns,” at 5, 11, May 17, 2017,
`https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969891 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
`This article refers to websites that sell advertising as “publishers.”
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`4 Id. at 11.
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`5 Id. at 11-12.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 8 of 31
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`26.
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`One of LinkedIn’s business lines is Marketing Solutions, which enables advertisers
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`to create and display ads promoting their products and services to LinkedIn members. It has been
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`estimated that LinkedIn’s US-based advertising revenue would grow to $1.7 billion in 2020.6
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`27.
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`One of the advertising solutions available under Marketing Solutions is “Sponsored
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`Content,” which enables advertisers to display single image and video ads within the scrolling
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`news feed shown to LinkedIn members.
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`28.
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`Depending on their objectives, advertisers using Sponsored Content ads can elect
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`to be charged for one of three different “billable events” associated with their ads: impressions,
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`video views, or clicks (with LinkedIn distinguishing between “landing page clicks,” “engagement
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`clicks,” and “clicks”).7
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`29.
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`The actual price an advertiser pays for particular impressions, video views or clicks
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`is determined in real-time, online auctions in which advertisers compete to show their ads to
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`LinkedIn members. Bids are based on what advertisers are willing to pay for a particular metric
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`(i.e., impression, video view, or click), and then based on those bids and other factors, LinkedIn’s
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`software programmatically determines (within milliseconds) which ad to show to a particular
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`LinkedIn member. LinkedIn runs an auction every time a LinkedIn member logs in, and thus
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`hundreds of millions of these auctions occur every day.8 The Interactive Advertising Bureau —
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`the leading association for the online advertising industry — has analogized programmatic online
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`6 “Microsoft reports strong growth for LinkedIn and cloud platform Azure in Q3 2020” Oct. 29,
`2020 https://www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-shows-strong-growth-for-linkedin-azure-in-q3-
`2020-10 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`7 “Objective-based pricing for LinkedIn advertising”
`https://business.linkedin.com/content/dam/me/business/en-us/marketing-
`solutions/products/pdfs/Global_Pricing_Microsite_Page_Objective_Based_Pricing_Chart.pdf
`(last visited on Jan. 18, 2021). See also How much does it cost to advertise on LinkedIn
`https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/ads/pricing (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`8 LinkedIn’s Advertising Cost and Pricing – Overview
`https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/7431/linkedin-s-advertising-cost-and-pricing-
`overview (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 9 of 31
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`ad auction platforms like LinkedIn to the public financial markets given the high volume of
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`transactions on such platforms and the high speed at which transactions occur.9
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`C. LinkedIn Charges Premium Prices for its Ads
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`30.
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`To secure premium prices for its ads, LinkedIn has purported to incorporate
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`viewability standards into its advertising platform. For example, LinkedIn represents that it only
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`charges an advertiser for an “impression” whenever an ad is “at least 50% in view on a member’s
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`device screen or browser window for at least one second on desktop or 300 milliseconds on
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`mobile.”10 LinkedIn further represents that it only charges an advertiser for a “video view” for 2
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`or more continuous seconds of playback with at least 50% of the video visible on the screen (or a
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`click on a call-to-action, if that happens first).11
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`31.
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`The actions of a user viewing a LinkedIn ad that will lead to a chargeable click are
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`more complex. For example, if an advertiser’s campaign objective is user engagement, clicks for
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`single image ads are chargeable in a wide range of scenarios.12
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`32.
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`To further boost the prices advertisers are willing to pay for its ads, LinkedIn also
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`stresses that the individuals viewing ads on its platform are comprised of highly desirable business
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`professionals. For example, in an August 8, 2016 blog post, LinkedIn noted that “viewability” had
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`become a significant concern for online advertisers, and represented that with “LinkedIn Display
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`9 “OpenRTB” https://www.iab.com/guidelines/openrtb/ (“Real-time Bidding (RTB) is a way of
`transacting media that allows an individual ad impression to be put up for bid in real-time. This
`is done through a programmatic on-the-spot auction, which is similar to how financial markets
`operate.”).
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`10 “Sponsored Content Viewability Measurement”
`https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/88017 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`11 “Video Views Campaigns – Chargeable Clicks”
`https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/107902 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021); “Video
`Metrics in Campaign Manager – Definitions” https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/85305
`(last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`12 “Engagement Campaigns – Chargeable Clicks”
`https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/107901 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 10 of 31
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`Ads, programmatic advertisers can rest assured knowing their impressions are viewable to a
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`premium audience of professional decision makers and deal influencers.”13
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`D. The Materiality of Accurate Metrics
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`Accurate recording of impressions, video views, and clicks according to LinkedIn’s
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`viewability standards is material to advertisers since advertisers obviously do not want to pay for
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`billable events that are invalid (e.g., because a member did not see an ad at all, or did not play it
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`for the requisite amount of time; or a click was from an automated software program (i.e., a “bot”)
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`and not a real human).
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`34.
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`Accurate measurement of metrics is also material to advertisers because they use
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`these metrics to analyze the performance of their campaigns, and based on that performance, make
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`decisions concerning how much to spend on advertising and what price to pay for ads in auctions.
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`LinkedIn well-understands this, and to meet advertiser demand for analytics, offers advertisers
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`access to an interface called Campaign Manager that displays base metrics (i.e., impressions, video
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`views, and clicks) and numerous derived metrics for individual ads in tables designed to let
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`advertisers easily evaluate how their ads are performing.14
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`35.
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`For example, an advertiser that launched a video ad can access a derived metric
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`called “view rate,” which is a percentage calculated by dividing the number of video views by the
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`number of impressions, and then multiplying by 100 (to convert to a percentage). LinkedIn also
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`offers metrics that disclose how long LinkedIn members watched a video at different milestones
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`13 “How LinkedIn Is Solving the Viewability Conundrum in Programmatic Advertising” Aug. 8,
`2016 https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/blog/linkedin-b2b-marketing/2016/how-
`linkedin-is-solving-the-viewability-conundrum-in-programmati (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`14 As noted, a base metric is based on a direct count of raw data (i.e., the total number of
`impressions, video views or clicks) based on LinkedIn’s viewability standards, while a derived
`metric is based on calculations using direct metrics as inputs (e.g., view rate is derived by
`dividing video views by impressions, and click-through rate is derived by dividing clicks by
`impressions).
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 11 of 31
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`of the video from 25%, 50%, 75% to completion. The following screenshot depicts metrics in
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`Campaign Manager related to video ads: 15
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`36.
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`Similarly, Campaign Manager displays direct and derived metrics to help
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`advertisers analyze performance based on impressions and clicks:
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`15 Screenshot taken from frame in “LinkedIn Video Ads Tutorial”
`https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eTV-o5iJMY (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 12 of 31
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`E. LinkedIn’s Representations Concerning the Accuracy of the Metrics in Campaign
`Manager
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`37.
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`LinkedIn represents to advertisers that they can rely on the metrics in Campaign
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`Manager to accurately analyze the performance of their ads. For example, on its website, LinkedIn
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`represents that “Campaign Manager . . . reports a wide range of metrics for every campaign you
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`run. Learn how to use that info to measure ad performance and identify opportunities to improve
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`your ROI.”16 On that same page, LinkedIn also states, “If you want to build brand awareness,
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`you’d want a lot of views and interest (indicated by clicks on ads). Focus on these metrics: Clicks:
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`the number of clicks on links in your ad; Impressions: The number of times people saw your ad.”
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`Concerning video views, LinkedIn states “[g]etting your videos seen is the key result of the Video
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`Views ad objective. View a wide variety of reporting metrics from the Campaign Manager
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`reporting dashboard, including: Performance metrics; Engagement; Conversions; Bid and
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`Budget.”17
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`38.
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`LinkedIn represents the accuracy of the metrics directly in the Campaign Manager
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`interface that every advertiser uses to analyze its campaigns. For example, in the interfaces
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`depicted in the screenshots in paragraphs 35-36 above, when an advertiser hovers its mouse pointer
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`over the word “Impressions” at the top of the relevant column, LinkedIn displays a hovercard that
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`reads: “Number of times people saw your ad,” while hovering over the word “Clicks” at the top
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`of the relevant column displays a hovercard that reads: “Total chargeable clicks based on your
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`campaign’s objective,” and hovering over the word “Views” in the video metrics interface displays
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`a hovercard that reads: “2 or more seconds of playback while the video is at least 50% on screen,
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`or a click on the CTA [call to action], whichever comes first”:
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`16 “Analyze your campaign performance” https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-
`solutions/success/best-practices/analyze-your-performance (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`17 “Video Views - Ad Objective Overview” https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/104427
`(last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 13 of 31
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`39.
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`Advertisers rely on LinkedIn’s representations concerning the accuracy of the
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`metrics in Campaign Manager to analyze the performance of their campaigns, and make decisions
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`concerning their ad spending, since they do not have access to the systems necessary to audit and
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`verify the data underlying those metrics; only LinkedIn has such access. Accordingly, advertisers
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`also rely on LinkedIn to implement systems to detect any errors that might inflate the metrics.
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`As LinkedIn has recently acknowledged, however, its internal auditing processes
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`and systems have long been deficient, which means there have long been measurement errors
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`lurking undetected that inflated metrics for years. In turn, these inflated metrics deceived
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`advertisers into believing that their campaigns were performing better than they actually were,
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`which caused them to pay more for ads than they otherwise would have paid, and buy more ads
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`than they otherwise would have bought, absent the inflated metrics.
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`F. LinkedIn Discloses that Metrics Tied to Impressions and
`Video Views Were Inflated For More Than Two Years
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`41.
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`On November 12, 2020 — in a short 4-paragraph blog post — LinkedIn disclosed
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`as follows:
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`We are committed to the transparency and integrity of our ads products. This
`commitment guides us as we improve our offerings and systems to help ensure we
`maintain a trusted platform.
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`This also means that when something goes wrong, we address it. In August, our
`engineering team discovered and then subsequently fixed two measurement issues
`in our ads products that may have overreported some Sponsored Content
`campaign metrics for impression and video views. Together these issues
`potentially impacted more than 418,000 customers over a two plus year period.
`More than 90% of customers saw an impact of less than US $25, and we are
`currently working with all customers who were impacted to provide full credit to
`their accounts.
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`To ensure we are able to constantly learn and adjust, we are working with the
`Media Rating Council (MRC) to proceed with an audit of our metrics,
`collaborating with Moat by Oracle Data Cloud to measure video viewability, and
`investing in improvements to our processes and systems.
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`We are committed to delivering consistent advertising products and analytics that
`you can rely on and that align with industry and third-party standards. We’ll plan
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 14 of 31
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`to share updates on the ongoing work that we’re doing to keep our advertising
`platform safe and trusted.18
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`42. Media reports in the wake of the disclosure confirmed that LinkedIn’s “viewability”
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`standards were violated, which caused metrics to be inflated. For example, the Wall Street Journal
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`reported that video ads that continued to play off-screen were improperly recorded by LinkedIn as
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`video views. A LinkedIn spokesperson confirmed that such errors would have inflated video-
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`related metrics, including video view rates. The Wall Street Journal further stated that impressions
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`were also overreported when, for example, users would rotate their phones or quickly move to
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`other parts of the app.19 Another publication, Social Media Today, also reported that errors were
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`triggered when users rotated their phones, and that when this occurred, LinkedIn improperly
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`recorded video views, “which were then listed within [advertiser] campaign metrics.”20
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`43.
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`The Wall Street Journal noted that LinkedIn’s disclosure came “after years of
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`advertisers demanding more transparency and third-party auditing of the metrics provided by
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`social-media giants.” As an example, it referenced a September 2016 incident in which Facebook
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`— like LinkedIn — initially disclosed that a single video ad metric had been inflated for two
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`years.21 Over the next several months, media sources documented another eight measurement
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`18“We discovered two measurement issues. Here’s how we’re making it right” Nov. 12, 2020,
`https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/blog/linkedin-news/2020/how-we-re-working-
`to-improve (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`19 “LinkedIn Finds Measurement Errors That Inflated Video and Ad Metrics” Nov. 12, 2020
`https://www.wsj.com/articles/linkedin-finds-measurement-errors-that-inflated-video-and-ad-
`metrics-11605228577 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`20“LinkedIn Discovers Ad Metric Error Which Lead to Over 400k Advertisers Being
`Overcharged” Nov. 12, 2020 https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/linkedin-discovers-ad-
`metric-error-which-lead-to-over-400k-advertisers-bein/588960/ (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021).
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`21 “Facebook Overestimated Key Video Metric for Two Years” Sept. 22, 2016
`https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-overestimated-key-video-metric-for-two-years-
`1474586951 (last visited on Jan. 18, 2021). See also “Facebook Video Metrics Update” Sept. 23,
`2016 https://www.facebook.com/business/news/facebook-video-metrics-update (last visited on
`Jan. 18, 2021).
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 5:21-cv-00513-VKD Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 15 of 31
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`errors on Facebook.22 In February 2017, Facebook finally agreed to be audited by the MRC — a
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`nonprofit organization that audits and accredits the measurement of metrics reported by media
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`platforms to advertisers.23 Less than two weeks later, Google also agreed to work with the MRC.24
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`44.
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`LinkedIn, howe