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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`TINGYU CHENG,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`PAYPAL, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 21-cv-03608-BLF
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`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`COMPEL ARBITRATION; GRANTING
`IN PART REQUEST FOR COSTS
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`[Re: ECF No. 14]
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`This case involves a dispute over Plaintiff Tingyu Cheng’s account held with Defendant
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`PayPal, Inc. Cheng alleges that he held an account with PayPal to receive compensation from
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`college students to whom he offered tutoring services. PayPal allegedly accused Cheng of
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`receiving payments to his account in violation of PayPal’s Acceptable Use Policy, terminated
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`Cheng’s account, and confiscated the $76,994.40 balance of the account as liquidated damages.
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`PayPal has brought a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that Cheng agreed to a binding
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`arbitration provision in PayPal’s User Agreement, and seeks the fees and costs it incurred in
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`prosecuting an identical state court case brought by Cheng. See ECF No. 14 (“MTC”); see also
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`ECF No. 20 (“Reply”). Cheng admits the existence of the provision but opposes the motion on the
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`grounds that the arbitration provision is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. See ECF
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`No. 18 (“Opp.”). The Court previously found this motion suitable for disposition without oral
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`argument. See ECF No. 25; Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motion to compel
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`arbitration is GRANTED and PayPal’s request and costs is GRANTED IN PART.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`As alleged in the Complaint, Chen created a PayPal account around May 11, 2009 to
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`receive compensation from college students to whom he was offering tutoring services. ECF No.
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 2 of 12
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`1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 11. When he signed up for the PayPal account, Cheng agreed to the PayPal User
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`Agreement (“UA”). The second paragraph of the UA states that its “terms include an agreement
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`to resolve disputes by arbitration on an individual basis.” ECF No. 14 at 39 (“UA” at 1).1 When
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`clicked, the blue text takes a user directly to the “Agreement to Arbitrate” section within the UA.
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`In relevant part, that section reads:
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`You and PayPal each agree that any and all disputes or claims that
`have arisen or may arise between you and PayPal, including without
`limitation federal and state statutory claims, common law claims, and
`those based in contract, tort, fraud, misrepresentation or any other
`legal theory, shall be resolved exclusively through final and binding
`arbitration, rather than in court, except that you may assert claims in
`small claims court, if your claims qualify and so long as the matter
`remains in such court and advances only on an individual (non-class,
`non-representative) basis. This Agreement to Arbitrate is intended to
`be broadly interpreted. The Federal Arbitration Act governs the
`interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement to Arbitrate.
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`UA at 37. The UA also specifies certain “Restricted Activities” that users of PayPal agree not to
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`do, including activities that violate PayPal’s separate “Acceptable Use Policy” (“AUP”). See UA
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`at 25. PayPal states, and Cheng does not dispute, that he assented to the UA by (1) checking a box
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`next to language stating that he had “read and agree[d] to the User Agreement;” and then (2)
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`clicking a large blue button labeled “Agree and Create Account.” Simons Decl., ECF No. 14 at
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`32, ¶ 6.
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`On or around June 16, 2020, Cheng received an email from PayPal alleging that two of his
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`transactions violated the AUP.2 Compl. ¶ 12. PayPal requested that Cheng log in to its Resolution
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`1 The Court finds that the UA is incorporated into the Complaint by reference, see Compl. ¶ 11,
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`and is properly considered for this motion. See Trudeau v. Google, 349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 876
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`(N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that Google’s Terms of Service was incorporated by reference into the
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`complaint). Cheng has not disputed that the UA attached to PayPal’s motion is the one to which
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`he agreed when he opened his account. References to the UA will use the page numbers on that
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`document rather than pagination generated by ECF.
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`2 PayPal has since alleged that the transactions violated its AUP because Cheng was accepting
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`payments for “completing homework assignments, attending classes and taking test[s]” for others.
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 3 of 12
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`Center to resolve the issue. Id. Cheng allegedly did so and submitted information to PayPal. Id.
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`Notwithstanding that action, on July 13, 2020, PayPal notified Cheng that his PayPal account was
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`permanently restricted. Id. ¶ 13. PayPal informed Cheng that the entire balance of his PayPal
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`account was frozen for 180 days and that PayPal would inform Cheng via email how to retrieve
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`the balance. Id. PayPal allegedly did not do so and instead confiscated the entire balance of his
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`account—$76,994.40—on November 9–10, 2020. Id. ¶ 14. Cheng’s efforts to get PayPal to
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`return the money—through its customer service department, a demand letter, and a complaint with
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`the California Consumer Protection Bureau—have been unsuccessful. Id. ¶¶ 15–17.
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`Cheng originally filed a lawsuit in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, asserting claims
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`for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment,
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`conversion, and common count over the same allegations as asserted in this case. Cheng v.
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`PayPal, Inc., No. 21CV3755684 (Santa Clara Cty. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 4, 2021). In response to
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`the state court complaint, PayPal filed a motion to compel arbitration. See Notice of Motion and
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`Motion to Compel Arbitration, id. (filed Apr. 1, 2021). Instead of responding to the motion,
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`Cheng dismissed the case. See Request for Dismissal, id. (filed Apr. 30, 2021).
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`Less than two weeks later, on May 13, 2021, Cheng filed this lawsuit. See Compl. Cheng
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`alleges the same causes of action as he did his state court action. See id. ¶¶ 18–39. Cheng seeks
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`$76,994.40 in damages, interest, costs of suit, punitive damages, restitution, and reasonable
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`attorneys’ fees. Id. at 7. PayPal filed this motion on June 17, 2021 and noticed a hearing for
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`January 13, 2022. See MTC. The Court submitted the motion without argument on January 7,
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`2022. ECF No. 25.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
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`enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
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`contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
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`arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Benson v. Casa de Capri Enters.,
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`Compl. ¶ 17.
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 4 of 12
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`LLC, 980 F.3d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet,
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`Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 156 (Del. 2002) (same under Delaware law). Under the FAA, a court must
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`determine two issues in deciding a motion to compel arbitration: “(1) whether there is an
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`agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.”
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`Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015); Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising,
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`LLC, 2020 WL 7624620, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2020).
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`Delaware law governs the interpretation of the UA. See UA at 42 (“You agree that . . . the
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`laws of the State of Delaware, without regard to principles of conflicts of laws, will govern this
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`user agreement and any claim or dispute that has arisen or may arise between you and PayPal.”).
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`The Court will thus apply Delaware substantive law in answering the two questions above. Ebner
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`v. Financial Architects, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 697, 700 (D. Del. 2011) (“When an agreement
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`contains both a choice-of-law clause and an arbitration clause, the reviewing court will apply the
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`substantive law of the state named in the choice of law clause.”) (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson
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`Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1995)).
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`Because the second question under FAA is easily answered, the Court will take the two
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`questions in reverse order.
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`A. The Agreement to Arbitrate Covers this Dispute
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`The Court has no trouble concluding that the answer to the second question—“whether the
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`[arbitration] agreement covers the dispute”—is yes. Brennan, 796 F.3d at 1130. The arbitration
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`agreement states that “any and all disputes or claims that have arisen or may arise” between Cheng
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`and PayPal, “including without limitation federal and state statutory claims, common law claims,
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`and those based in contract, tort, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory, shall be
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`resolved exclusively through final and binding arbitration, rather than in court.” UA at 37. This
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`lawsuit is a dispute that has arisen between Cheng and PayPal, and it includes “common law
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`claims” based in contract and tort. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–39. Cheng does not dispute this point.
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`Accordingly, the arbitration agreement covers this dispute if the agreement is valid.
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 5 of 12
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`B. The Agreement to Arbitrate is Valid and Enforceable
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`The dispute raised by Cheng’s opposition is whether the arbitration agreement is valid and
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`enforceable. Cheng argues that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable under Delaware law
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`and therefore unenforceable. Opp. at 4–6. Cheng complains that PayPal, the entity with superior
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`bargaining power, unilaterally drafted the UA and the arbitration agreement. Id. at 4. Cheng says
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`that the arbitration agreement “contains many unfair practices,” such as (1) a limited 30-day opt-
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`out period via physical mail only; (2) a limited promise from PayPal to pay for arbitration fees if a
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`claim is made for less than $10,000, with the claimant paying arbitration costs otherwise; and (3)
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`the location of the arbitration agreement deep in a “54 page[]” document with “multiple sections
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`and subsections.” Id. at 5–6. PayPal responds by defending the enforceability of the arbitration
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`provision. Reply at 1–6. PayPal says that its UA is an enforceable clickwrap agreement under
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`Delaware law. Id. at 1–3. PayPal contends that the individual provisions as not unconscionable,
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`pointing to Delaware case law rejecting Cheng’s arguments that similar provisions in other
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`contracts are unconscionable. Id. at 3–6.
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`The Court agrees with PayPal that the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable. First,
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`the arbitration agreement is part of a valid clickwrap agreement under Delaware law. “A
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`clickwrap agreement is an online agreement that requires a ‘webpage user [to] manifest assent to
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`the terms of a contract by clicking an ‘accept’ button in order to proceed.’” Massage Envy
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`Franchising, 2020 WL 7624620, at *2 (quoting Newell Rubbermaid Inc. v. Storm, 2014 WL
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`1266827, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2014)). “Clickwrap agreements are routinely recognized by
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`courts and are enforceable under Delaware law.” Id. (citing Newell Rubbermaid, 2014 WL
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`1266827, at *1). The agreement here is a clickwrap agreement. To proceed with creating a
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`PayPal account, Cheng needed to (1) check a box indicating that he had “read and agree[d] to the
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`User Agreement,” and then (2) click a large blue button labeled “Agree and Create Account.”
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`Simons Decl., ECF No. 14 at 32, ¶ 6. Cheng was required to click two items indicating his assent
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`to the UA. The UA was thus a presumptively valid clickwrap agreement containing an arbitration
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`clause.
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`A contract provision is unconscionable under Delaware law only if “no man in his senses
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 6 of 12
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`and not under delusion would make [it] on the one hand, and as no honest or fair man would
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`accept [it], on the other.” Tulowitzki v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978).
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`Ignoring the outdated language of the Delaware test, this formulation has been divided into
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`procedural unconscionability—the lack of a meaningful choice—and substantive
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`unconscionability—unreasonably favorable terms to one party. Progressive Int’l Corp. v. E.I. Du
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`Pont de Nemours & Co., 2002 WL 1558382, at *11 n.46 (Del. Ch. Jul. 9, 2002). It is Cheng’s
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`burden to prove unconscionability. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir.
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`1999). Cheng’s arguments that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable fit in both categories,
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`but none of them pass muster.
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`i. Procedural Unconscionability
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`Three of Cheng’s arguments involve alleged procedural unconscionability. Cheng first
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`complains that PayPal unilaterally drafted the UA and has superior bargaining power to him. Opp.
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`at 4. But “[u]nequal bargaining power, without more, is insufficient to hold an arbitration
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`agreement unconscionable.” Wells v. Merit Life Ins. Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d 570, 574 (D. Del.
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`2009); see also Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., 2021 WL 2763903, at *12 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 1, 2021
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`(“An otherwise clear intent to arbitrate will not be invalidated merely because a party did not
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`negotiate the arbitration provision or participate in its drafting.”). One of the cases Cheng cites in
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`support—In re Ritz Camera Image, L.L.C., 2014 WL 432192, at *4 (Bank. D. Del. Feb. 4,
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`2014)—is one in which the court found no procedural unconscionability, and other finds
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`procedural unconscionability in far more drastic circumstances than are present here. See Ryan v.
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`Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377 (Del. Ch. 1992) (contract transferring deed unconscionable where bank
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`lawyer took plaintiff, a 69-year-old man with ninth-grade education, without notice to lawyer’s
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`office, where he made plaintiff sign several documents transferring the deed without telling
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`plaintiff about the content of the documents or of his right to seek independent legal advice).
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`Second, Cheng argues that the arbitration agreement was buried in a “54 page[]” document
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`with “multiple sections and subsections.” Opp. at 5–6. But under Delaware law, “a party may
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`assent to an agreement on the internet without reading its terms and still be bound by it if []he is
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`on notice that []he is modifying [his] legal rights, just as []he may with a physical written
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 7 of 12
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`contract.” Newell Rubbermaid, 2014 WL 1266827, at *7. Cheng was on notice that he was
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`modifying his legal rights. He checked a box recognizing that he was agreeing to the UA and then
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`clicked a separate button saying “Agree and Create Account.” ECF No. 14 at 32, ¶ 6. Because he
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`was clearly on notice that his legal rights were being modified, whether he did or did not read the
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`UA is irrelevant. Even so, if he had opened the UA, its second paragraph indicated that the UA
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`contained “an agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration on an individual basis” and provided a
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`link directly to the arbitration agreement. UA at 1. The location of the arbitration agreement in
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`the UA does not make the arbitration agreement unconscionable.
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`Third and finally, Cheng complains about the requirement of physically mailing a notice to
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`PayPal in California within 30 days of agreeing to the UA to opt-out of the arbitration provision.
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`Opp. at 5–6. Cheng says this particularly places a burden on him because he is an international
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`resident. Id. But the very existence of the opt-out option forecloses the necessary finding under
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`procedural unconscionability that Cheng “lacked a meaningful choice” about agreeing to the
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`arbitration provision. Mikkilineni, 2021 WL 2763903, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Jul. 1, 2021)
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`(compelling arbitration where plaintiff “could have opted-out” but “did not opt-out” because the
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`opt-out made the arbitration provision “neither compulsory nor a mandatory condition to
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`contracting with [defendant]”). The Court declines to find that the minimal steps necessary here—
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`mailing a notice to PayPal within 30 days of agreeing to the UA—amounted to a true lack of a
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`meaningful choice for Cheng, notwithstanding his international residence.
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`The arbitration clause is accordingly not procedurally unconscionable.
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`ii.
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`Substantive Unconscionability
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`Cheng’s final argument against enforcing the arbitration agreement fits in the category of
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`substantive unconscionability. Cheng points out that PayPal only promises to pay arbitration fees
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`if the claimant is seeking less than $10,000. Opp. at 5. As PayPal states, its offer to pay litigation
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`costs is not so limited. PayPal in fact offers to pay additional arbitration costs, upon a showing of
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`need by the claimant, “as the arbitrator(s) deem necessary to prevent the cost of accessing the
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`arbitration from being prohibitive.” UA at 39. Regardless, PayPal’s promise to advance
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`arbitration fees in certain circumstances does not amount to substantive unconscionability because
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 8 of 12
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`it does not amount to a use of superior bargaining power “to take unfair advantage of another”
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`party. Fleck, 1999 WL 1847435, at *3 (Del. Com. Pl. Jan. 29, 1999); see also Graham v. State
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`Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 565 A.3d 908, 912 (Del. 1989) (substantive unconscionability requires
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`terms to “be so one-sided as to be oppressive”). PayPal’s offer to advance certain fees helps, not
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`harms, claimants. The arbitration clause is not substantively unconscionable.
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`Because Cheng has not met his burden to show that the arbitration agreement is
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`unconscionable, the agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable. Because PayPal has shown
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`that the claims asserted in this lawsuit are within the scope of the arbitration provision, the Court
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`will DISMISS this action WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing a later action to confirm or vacate any
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`arbitration award. See Trudeau v. Google, 349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 881 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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`C. PayPal is Entitled to Some of the Costs It Requests for Litigating the State
`Court Action
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`PayPal also asks the Court to award it costs that it incurred in defending the identical state
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`court action, which Cheng dismissed and refiled here upon receiving PayPal’s state court motion
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`to compel arbitration. MTC at 8–9. PayPal points to Cheng’s lack of explanation for dismissing
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`his state court case without warning and refiling it here. Id. Cheng says that the Court should
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`deny the request for costs, arguing that PayPal was able to reuse much of its research from its state
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`court motion to compel in the instant motion and that the relevant rule of civil procedure does not
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`allow for an award of attorneys’ fees. Opp. at 6–7.
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`“If a plaintiff who previously dismissed an action in any court files an action based on or
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`including the same claim against the same defendant, the court (1) may order the plaintiff to pay
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`all or part of the costs of that previous action; and (2) may stay the proceedings until the plaintiff
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`has complied.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d). The rule is intended to “discourage indiscriminate and
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`vexatious litigation and unnecessary expenditures” and reduce incentives to forum shop. Esquivel
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`v. Arau, 913 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Costs should be reduced or not awarded if the
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`work performed in the first case “will still be useful to defendants in the instant litigation.” Id.; cf.
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`Koch v. Hankins, 8 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff seeking Rule 41(a)(2) voluntary
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`dismissal to refile in another form can only be required to pay costs arising from “the preparation
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 9 of 12
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`of work product rendered useless by the dismissal of [the previous action]”).
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`i. Costs Will Be Awarded Under Rule 41(d)
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`The Court finds that a partial award of costs is warranted here. Cheng has provided no
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`justification—even in opposition, in response to PayPal’s accusations of questionable litigation
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`conduct—for dismissing his state court action while a motion to compel arbitration was pending
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`and refiling an identical case in this court. Without any explanation from Cheng, the Court can
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`only infer that Cheng was seeking to delay being sent to arbitration. This resulted in some
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`“unnecessary expenditures” for PayPal which should be compensated. Esquivel, 913 F. Supp. at
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`1391.
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`Cheng’s arguments against the award of costs are grounds for reducing the award, not
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`awarding nothing. First, the Court recognizes the split in authority over whether the word “costs”
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`in Rule 41(d) includes attorneys’ fees. Opp. at 6; compare, e.g., Esquivel, 913 F. Supp. at 1388–
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`92 (extensively analyzing competing cases and concluding that the purpose of Rule 41(d) provides
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`a basis for awarding attorneys’ fees as part of “costs”), with Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230
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`F.3d 868, 874–75 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that “costs” under Rule 41(d) does not include
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`attorneys’ fees). The Court finds the extensive discussion and analysis in Esquivel more
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`persuasive. The rule’s purpose of “discourag[ing] indiscriminate and vexatious litigation and
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`unnecessary expenditures by defending parties” would not be fulfilled if reimbursement was
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`limited strictly to costs like filing fees. Esquivel, 913 F. Supp. at 1391; see also Nielson v. Union
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`Bank of California, N.A., 2003 WL 27374136, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2003) (“majority rule” of
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`awarding attorneys’ fees within costs “more accurately reflects the intent of Rule 41(d)”). The
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`Court will include an award of attorneys’ fees here.
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`Cheng also contends that any fee award should be reduced because PayPal was able to
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`reuse its work in responding to the motion to compel in the instant case. Opp. at 6–7. PayPal
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`responds that the bulk of the fees it incurred were for “efforts to merely start the arbitration
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`process” and that “more than half of” its state court motion research was not reused in its federal
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`motion. Reply at 8–9. The Court finds that some of PayPal’s work from its state motion was
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`“useful” to it here. The background section of the state court motion is almost entirely reused, and
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`some of the research discussing the standards applicable under the FAA and Delaware law are
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`reused. Compare ECF No. 14 at 2–6, with ECF No. 18-2, Ex. 3 at 6–8, 9–12. PayPal did,
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`however, have to conduct additional research on the California Arbitration Act that was not useful
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`in this Court. See ECF No. 18-2, Ex. 3 at 8–9. It also incurred costs in the state court and in
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`beginning the arbitration process that were lost when it had to start over in this Court. Exercising
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`its discretion under Rule 41(d), the Court will reduce PayPal’s request to account for reused work.
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`ii. PayPal’s Request for Costs Is Reasonable With a Reduction for Reused
`Work
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`The Court finds that the data underlying the cost request itself supports an award of fees to
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`PayPal. Courts in this district follow the lodestar method to determine the reasonableness of a fee
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`request. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the lodestar
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`method, the most useful starting point “is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
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`litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
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`(1983), abrogated on other grounds by Tex. State Teachers Ass'n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist.,
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`489 U.S. 782 (1989). The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the
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`hours worked and rates claimed. Id. “In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court
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`should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys
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`of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205,
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`1210–11 (9th Cir. 1986). “Generally, the relevant community is the forum in which the district
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`court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th. Cir. 1997). Cheng does not address the data
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`underlying PayPal’s costs request. On an independent examination, the Court finds it reasonable
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`with reductions for reused work.
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`First, the Court finds that the billing rates for the four attorneys for whom PayPal requests
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`fees—which range from $360 per hour to $530 per hour—are well within the range of reasonable
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`rates approved in this district. See, e.g., Cataphora, Inc. v. Parker, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069
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`(N.D. Cal. 2012) (approving hourly rate of $500 per hour in contract case nearly one decade ago).
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`Second, the Court will reduce the number of hours that PayPal seeks to account for work
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`that was reused in this case. PayPal has submitted billing records reflecting a total of 23 hours of
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 11 of 12
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`work across the four attorneys for drafting its motion to compel arbitration, performing other work
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`in the state court proceedings (such as drafting its case management statement), and readying the
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`case for arbitration. Park Decl., ECF No. 14 at 98 ¶¶ 15–18. The Court finds that the work was
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`distributed among the attorneys appropriately. For example, Ms. Bohme spent the greatest
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`number of hours on the case, and she also has the lowest billing rate. Compare Carpenter’s
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`Pension Trust Fund for N. Calif. v. Walker, 2015 WL 1050479, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015)
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`(reducing fees because work on a motion for summary judgment was not properly delegated to
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`attorneys with lower billing rates).
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`Looking to the individual entries, the Court finds reductions appropriate to account for
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`work that could be reused in this Court. The Court recognizes that PayPal has already reduced its
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`request to eliminate work performed by paralegals and some work performed by the four
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`attorneys. See Park Decl. Ex. C, ECF No. 14 at 130–34 (highlighted entries not included in costs
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`request). But as the Court has already found, some of the work incurred in preparing the state
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`court motion to compel arbitration could be reused in this Court. For example, the Court will
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`reduce Ms. Bohme’s hours on March 31, 2021 spent “[d]raft[ing] motion to compel arbitration
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`and declaration under California law” from 4.2 hours to 2.5 hours to account for research reused in
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`the federal motion. Id. at 133. Similarly, the Court will reduce hours spent on initial strategy
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`discussions after which PayPal decided to move to compel arbitration. See, e.g., id. at 131 (entries
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`in late February 2021 involving strategy communications between counsel and PayPal). That
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`strategy was partially reexecuted when PayPal filed its motion to compel in this Court. The Court
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`will, in contrast, award PayPal its full request for the hours it spent on work solely useful in the
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`state court case, such as PayPal’s preparation of its case management conference statement. This
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`includes entries such as those by both Mr. Park and Ms. Bohme from April 28–30, 2021. See id.
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`at 134. After applying these principles to PayPal’s billing records, the Court has calculated the
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`following table of costs:
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`/ / /
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`/ / /
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`11
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`1
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`Case 5:21-cv-03608-BLF Document 27 Filed 01/13/22 Page 12 of 12
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`Jae K. Park
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`Ingrid A. Bohme Katie Jacobs Morgan J. Hanson
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`Hrs. Requested
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`Hrs. Awarded
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`6.9
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`4
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`15.4
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`9
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`Billing Rate
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`x $530
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`x $360
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`$ Awarded
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`= $2,120
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`= $3,240
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`0.4
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`0.2
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`x $375
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`= $75
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`0.2
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`0.1
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`x $450
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`= $45
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`The Court will also grant PayPal the $5.72 in filing fees it requests. See Park Decl. ¶ 19. Adding
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`this to the subtotals above, the Court will award PayPal $5,485.72 in total costs under Rule 41(d).
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`IV. ORDER
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`For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that PayPal’s motion to compel
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`arbitration is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to filing a later
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`action to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. PayPal is AWARDED $5,485.72 in costs
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`pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d).
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`Dated: January 13, 2022
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`
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`______________________________________
`BETH LABSON FREEMAN
`United States District Judge
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