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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`ANTHONY P. FOREMAN, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`APPLE, INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 22-cv-03902-VC
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`ORDER COMPELLING
`ARBITRATION AS TO PLAINTIFF
`SLEIGHTER
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`Re: Dkt. No. 32
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`Connor Sleighter agreed to arbitrate “[a]ll disputes related in any manner to [his]
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`employment relationship” with Apple. Dkt. No. 32-5 at 2. He now makes various arguments why
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`he should not be compelled to arbitrate his wage claims. Those arguments are meritless.
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`Sleighter’s primary argument is that his arbitration agreement contained an opt-out
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`provision, and that he is now opting out of it. His evidence for this provision is not any text in the
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`agreement, or any contemporaneous document or statement, but rather testimony that an Apple
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`executive gave to Congress three years later. The executive claimed that Apple began including
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`an opt-out provision “starting in June 2016.” Dkt. No. 35-2 at 15. Sleighter signed his arbitration
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`agreement early in June 2016, but no such provision is to be found. Dkt. No. 32-5 at 4.
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`Presumably Apple changed its standard arbitration agreement later in the month. Or perhaps the
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`Apple executive’s testimony was inaccurate or imprecise. What one cannot conclude from the
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`testimony, though, is that Sleighter’s agreement contained a secret opt-out provision. That idea is
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`fantastical. The same goes for the argument that the agreement does not “exist” because it does
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`not contain such a provision. Dkt. No. 35 at 10.
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`Sleighter’s backup argument is that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. But this
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`Case 3:22-cv-03902-VC Document 44 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 2
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`theory reprises the absurd idea of an undisclosed opt-out provision. Sleighter says the
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`unconscionability “derives primarily” from the absence of this “required” clause—which is to
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`say his unconscionability argument is “primarily” fantasy. Id. at 13. In terms of substantive
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`unconscionability, he states that the cost of arbitration would exceed the cost of filing a
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`complaint in court. He never elaborates on this assertion, perhaps because it doesn’t seem to be
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`true. Instead, he turns to a provision that apportions arbitration fees “in accordance with
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`applicable law.” Id. It’s hard to fathom how following applicable law could be substantive
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`unconscionability.
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`Sleighter’s claims are compelled to arbitration. Since there is no other named plaintiff for
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`the class action claims, those claims are dismissed. The FLSA collective action will go forward
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`on the schedule previously set. Dkt. No. 40. As this litigation continues, counsel for the plaintiffs
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`must be mindful of their Rule 11 obligation not to make frivolous contentions.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: November 22, 2022
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`______________________________________
`VINCE CHHABRIA
`United States District Judge
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`2
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