Case 5:22-cv-04486-BLF Document 83 Filed 08/26/22 Page 1 of 118
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`WILLIAM V. ROPPOLO, pro hac vice
` william.roppolo@bakermckenzie.com
`BAKER McKENZIE LLP
`1111 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1700
`Miami, Florida 33131 USA
`Telephone: 305.789.8900
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`Attorneys for Phil Mickelson
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`(additional counsel on signature page)
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`RACHEL S. BRASS, SBN 219301
`rbrass@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
`San Francisco, California 94105-0921
`Telephone: 415.393.8200
`Facsimile: 415.393.8306
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`ROBERT C. WALTERS, pro hac vice
`rwalters@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 2100
`Dallas, Texas 75201-2911
`Telephone: 214.698.3100
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`JOHN B. QUINN, SBN 90378
` johnquinn@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN
`LLP
`
`865 South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor
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`Los Angeles, California 90017
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`Telephone: 213.443.3000
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`ROBERT P. FELDMAN, SBN 69602
` bobfeldman@quinnemanuel.com
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN
`LLP
`555 Twin Dolphin Dr., 5th Floor
`Redwood Shores, California 94065
`Telephone: 650.801.5000
`Facsimile: 650.801.5100
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`Attorneys for Plaintiffs Talor Gooch, Hudson
`Swafford, Matt Jones, Bryson DeChambeau, Ian
`Poulter, Peter Uihlein, and LIV Golf Inc.
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`PHIL MICKELSON, TALOR GOOCH,
` CASE NO. 5:22-cv-04486-BLF
`HUDSON SWAFFORD, MATT JONES,
`AMENDED COMPLAINT
`BRYSON DECHAMBEAU, IAN POULTER,
`PETER UIHLEIN, and LIV GOLF INC.
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
`PGA TOUR, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
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`AMENDED COMPLAINT – DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`CASE NO. 5:22-cv-04486-BLF
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`With knowledge as to their own conduct and on information and belief as to all other matters,
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`Plaintiffs Phil Mickelson, Talor Gooch, Hudson Swafford, Matt Jones, Bryson DeChambeau, Ian
`Poulter, Peter Uihlein, and LIV Golf Inc. (“LIV Golf”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege:
`INTRODUCTION
`The PGA Tour, Inc. (sometimes “the Tour”) began when Jack Nicklaus, Arnold Palmer,
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`and other elite golfers in the 1960s determined the PGA of America was not compensating them their
`market value; they split off the Players Tournament Division and formed the Tour, a tax-exempt entity
`organized ostensibly to “promote the common interests of professional tournament golfers.” From that
`seemingly laudable origin, the Tour has evolved into an entrenched monopolist with a vice-grip on
`professional golf. As the Tour’s monopoly power has grown, it has employed its dominance to craft
`an arsenal of anticompetitive restraints to protect its long-standing monopoly. Now, threatened by the
`entry of LIV Golf, and opposed to its founding mission, the Tour has ventured to harm the careers and
`livelihoods of any golfers, including Plaintiffs Phil Mickelson, Talor Gooch, Hudson Swafford, Matt
`Jones, Bryson DeChambeau, Ian Poulter, and Peter Uihlein (“Player Plaintiffs”), who have the temerity
`to defy the Tour and play in tournaments sponsored by the new entrant. The Tour has done so to crush
`nascent competition before it threatens the Tour’s monopoly.
`Before LIV Golf’s entry, golfers who sold their services in the elite professional golf
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`services market had no meaningful option but to play on the Tour if they wanted to pursue their
`profession at the highest levels. This provided the Tour with enormous power over the players,
`including the ability to force players into restrictive terms that foreclose them from playing in
`competing events and the ability to suppress player compensation below competitive levels. Members
`of the Tour receive a lower percentage of the Tour’s revenues than professional athletes in other major
`sports, even though the Tour is a tax-exempt non-profit corporation and other major sports leagues are
`for-profit enterprises. This control has also given the Tour the power to impose restrictions on
`players—who are independent contractors but are denied independence by the Tour—that make it risky
`and costly for players to affiliate with another promoter and prohibitively difficult for any would-be
`entrant to challenge the Tour’s monopoly. And, in its response to LIV Golf’s competitive challenge,
`the Tour has exercised this power by punishing the players to choke off the supply of elite professional
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`golfers—an essential input to LIV Golf’s competitive challenge—and cement its dominance over the
`sport. The Tour’s monopoly power has also allowed it to weaken golf itself, by its failure to innovate
`and broaden the game’s appeal and bring the game into the 21st century.
`As part of its orchestrated plan to defeat competition, the Tour has threatened lifetime
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`bans on players who play in even a single LIV Golf event. It has backed up these threats by imposing
`unprecedented suspensions on players (including the Player Plaintiffs) that threaten irreparable harm
`to the players and their ability to pursue their profession. It has threatened sponsors, vendors,
`broadcasters, and agents to coerce players to abandon opportunities to play in LIV Golf events. And it
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`has orchestrated a group boycott with the European Tour,0F1 which is unlawful under either the per se
`rule or the Rule of Reason, to amplify the Tour’s anticompetitive attacks and foreclose LIV Golf from
`having access to players. The PGA Tour also has leaned on other entities in the so-called golf
`“ecosystem,” including certain entities that put on golf’s “Majors,” to do its bidding in its effort to
`maximize the threats and harm to any golfer who defies the Tour’s monopsonistic requirements and
`plays in LIV Golf events.
`The Tour’s unlawful strategy has been both harmful to the players and harmful to LIV
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`Golf in threatening its otherwise-promising launch. For example, the Tour’s conduct caused LIV Golf
`to cancel its 2022 business plan to launch its full competing League. LIV Golf was not deterred,
`however, and it changed its 2022 strategy and launched a smaller version of its concept—the LIV Golf
`Invitational Series—with no League, no franchises, no broadcast deal, fewer elite players, and fewer
`tournaments. Some players (including Player Plaintiffs) were interested nonetheless. So, in response,
`the Tour ratcheted up its strategy and doubled-down on its efforts to punish Plaintiffs and to protect its
`monopoly. The Tour (1) enforced its unlawful player restrictions that deny players (including Player
`Plaintiffs) the ability to sell their services to others, (2) imposed lengthy suspensions on players for
`exercising their right as independent contractors to play in a competing promoter’s events, and (3)
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`1 The European Tour recently changed its name to DP World Tour, but, because it was called
`European Tour for most of the time period relevant to this case and in most of the relevant
`documents, it is referred to herein as the European Tour for consistency and clarity.
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`ramped up its threats targeting Player Plaintiffs and others. The Tour has likewise threatened and
`blacklisted numerous other third parties with whom LIV Golf has sought to contract, in its effort to
`defeat LIV Golf’s entry and entrench its monopoly.
`The Tour’s conduct serves no purpose other than to cause harm to players and LIV Golf,
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`and foreclose the entry of the most meaningful competitive threat the Tour has ever faced. Banning
`Player Plaintiffs and other top professional golfers from its own events degrades the Tour’s strength of
`field and diminishes the quality of the product that it offers to golf fans by depriving them from seeing
`many top golfers participate in Tour events. The only conceivable benefit to the Tour from degrading
`its own product in this manner is the destruction of competition. Indeed, the Tour has conceded its
`anticompetitive purpose in attacking and injuring the players. When the Tour adjusted its rules to
`render them more effective in defeating competitive entry, a memorandum authored by PGA Tour
`Commissioner Jay Monahan made clear that the rule change was expressly designed to enable the Tour
`to foreclose competition. And when the Tour imposed unprecedented punishments on the players for
`playing in LIV Golf events, the Tour explained to the players that it was doing so precisely because
`LIV Golf is attempting to compete with the Tour.
`Player Plaintiffs have devoted the bulk of their professional careers to growing the PGA
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`Tour. Yet the Tour has repaid them of late with suspensions, punishments, threats, and disparagement
`for merely playing professional golf for another promoter and embracing competition for their services.
`The Tour has denied them income-earning opportunities, attacked their goodwill and reputation,
`interfered with their businesses, attacked their business partners, threatened them with multiple
`punishments—including threats to deny them from participating in golf’s marquee events, even when
`they have earned placement or exemptions to participate in those tournaments—and unlawfully
`prevented them from exercising their independent contractor rights. And, at every step, the Tour has
`repeatedly admitted that it has done this to destroy nascent competition.
`The Tour long stood alone as the only tour anywhere in the world that features the best
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`golfers in the world. The PGA Tour Commissioner Jay Monahan boasted on June 22, 2022 that the
`“Tour is doing everything it possibly can . . . [to] mak[e] certain that the best players in the world are
`competing on the best Tour in the world, the PGA Tour.” The Tour has ensured that remains the case
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`through its anticompetitive PGA Tour Player Regulations. First, the Tour’s Conflicting Events
`Regulation prohibits its members from participating “in any other golf tournament or event” in North
`America, without exception, if a Tour-sanctioned event is scheduled in the same week, regardless of
`whether the players would otherwise have any plans to participate in the Tour’s sanctioned event. The
`Tour has a sanctioned event almost every week of the year, hence the Conflicting Event Regulation
`effectively prohibits Tour members from playing in any non-Tour golf event in North America. The
`effect is both a naked restraint on competition and a reduction in output, as Tour members are
`foreclosed from playing anywhere else when they are not playing in Tour events. For international
`tours or events, a player may request up to three exemptions a year, but the Tour Commissioner has
`complete discretion whether to grant these exemptions, something he has refused to do for each of the
`LIV Golf events. The Conflicting Events Regulation thus invests the leader of the incumbent
`monopolist with unbridled discretion to foreclose players from participating in any competing events.
`And while the Tour has historically granted releases to players that allow them to compete in other
`events throughout the world, Tour Commissioner Monahan has taken a different stance regarding LIV
`Golf, denying event releases even for LIV Golf events overseas. As Commissioner Monahan admitted,
`he has departed from past practice in prohibiting members from participating in LIV Golf events
`outside North America because LIV Golf plans to compete with the Tour. And he has enforced the
`Conflicting Events Regulation to deny players permission to participate in LIV Golf events in North
`America because LIV Golf’s North American events compete with the Tour.
`Second, the Tour uses its Media Rights Regulation as an additional means of foreclosing
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`players from participating in competing events. This regulation prohibits any members from appearing
`in any “golf program” (“any golf contest, exhibition or play”) that takes place “anywhere in the world”
`and is shown on any media of any type. It is fundamental for any organizer of elite-level professional
`golf tournaments to broadcast the tournament on television and other media, yet the Tour contends no
`PGA Tour members may participate in any such televised non-Tour golf event anywhere in the world.
`This broad prohibition is no accident, as the PGA Tour specifically broadened this provision to prevent
`competitive entry of leagues such as LIV Golf. The provision serves no procompetitive purpose nor
`benefits consumers, but rather restricts output and forecloses competition, as it prevents all Tour
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`members from playing golf, even casually, if it is recorded for distribution over any media anywhere
`in the world during weeks when they are not participating in PGA Tour events.
`In short, these regulations—the Media Rights Regulation and the Conflicting Event
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`Regulation—foreclose the players, who are independent contractors, from participating in any golf
`event that the PGA Tour deems to be a competitive threat. These provisions limit output by keeping
`golfers on the sidelines when not playing on the Tour. And these provisions, in turn, foreclose
`competition and entrench the PGA Tour’s monopoly power. If these provisions are not enjoined, they
`will foreclose LIV Golf’s nascent entry into the markets and prevent LIV Golf from fulfilling its
`competitive promise, thus harming LIV Golf, the Player Plaintiffs, golf fans, the game of golf, and
`competition itself.
`It is no secret that the PGA Tour is targeting players in order to defeat the threat of
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`competitive entry. The PGA Tour has been clear since the threat of competitive entry emerged that its
`most powerful weapon to defeat competition is to target its members—who comprise virtually all of
`the elite professional golfers in the world—to prevent them from playing on a competing tour. For
`example, PGA Tour Commissioner Monahan wrote in a January 2020 strategy memorandum that the
`best way to prevent a competitor from emerging is to prevent PGA Tour members (including Player
`Plaintiffs) from supporting the new promoter:
`The impact that [the new league] could have on the PGA TOUR is dependent on the level
`of support it may receive from these players. Without this support, [the new league’s]
`ability to attract media and corporate partners will be significantly marginalized and its
`impact on the TOUR diminished.
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`A nascent golf league without the golfers necessary to put on elite events is no threat at all. Deprive
`the new league of access to virtually all of the top golfers in the world, and it will pose no challenge to
`the Tour’s dominance.
`Accordingly, the Tour set out to destroy competition in its infancy by doing everything
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`in its power to lock up its members (including Player Plaintiffs) and deny them the opportunity for
`sustained competition for their services. The Tour’s conduct has included at least seven practices, each
`of which is exclusionary, anticompetitive and unlawful under the Sherman Act:
`The Tour has repeatedly threatened its members (including Player Plaintiffs) with
`a.
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`devasting consequences if they join LIV Golf. On multiple occasions, the Tour
`threatened a lifetime ban for any player who joins or participates in LIV Golf. Then,
`in June and July 2022, the Tour imposed a career-threatening ban on Player
`Plaintiffs (and others) for playing in LIV Golf events. For other golfers who
`resigned their Tour membership because they did not want to be subject to the
`Tour’s punishments, the Tour responded by actually imposing a lifetime ban.
`The Tour amended and expanded its Media Rights and Conflicting Events
`Regulations in response to the threat of competitive entry. And it then enforced
`these unlawful provisions to foreclose members from participating in LIV Golf
`events.
`The Tour orchestrated a group boycott with the European Tour to ensure that any
`golfer who considers defying the Tour’s threats by playing in any LIV Golf events
`(including Player Plaintiffs) cannot pursue his career and livelihood anywhere in the
`global golf “ecosystem.” The Tour’s agreement is established through the
`statements of its partners. For example, during a meeting in Malta in July 2021,
`representatives of the entity that sponsored LIV Golf met with the CEO and other
`representatives of the European Tour to seek a partnership with the European Tour
`in launching the new league. The minutes from that meeting prepared by the
`European Tour’s title sponsor state that the CEO of the European Tour, Mr. Keith
`Pelley, “Confirmed new series appeal and fit, however, stated main issue is US PGA
`mighty power and need to avoid a collision course between ET [European Tour] and
`PGA.” Under pressure from the “mighty power” of the PGA Tour, the European
`Tour agreed to boycott and rejected the opportunity to partner with the new entrant,
`and instead strengthened its strategic alliance with the PGA Tour. As part of this
`illegal partnership, the PGA Tour pressured the European Tour to amend its
`Regulations to restrict European Tour golfers from playing in LIV Golf events, and
`it pressured the European Tour to punish its members who played in LIV Golf events
`with ~$125,000 fines and suspension from any tournaments the PGA Tour and the
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`European Tour co-sanction. The European Tour agreed to all of the PGA Tour’s
`demands to implement the group boycott.
`Similarly, the PGA Tour has encouraged the PGA of America (a separate entity) to
`threaten to disallow LIV Golf players from playing both in the Major tournament it
`sponsors (the PGA Championship) and the Ryder Cup, one of golf’s marquee
`events. And it has leaned on other golfing entities to do its bidding. The Tour leaned
`on Augusta National to pressure golfers against joining LIV Golf. The Tour has
`also leaned on the Royal & Ancient (“R&A”) (sponsor of The Open) to publicly
`question whether LIV Golf players could play in their respective tournaments. And
`the Tour has leaned on the Official World Golf Ranking (“OWGR”) to call into
`question whether LIV Golf tournaments would be eligible for OWGR ranking
`points. This conduct serves no beneficial purpose, but rather serves to harm the
`careers of the players (including Player Plaintiffs) who play in LIV Golf events, and
`to deter other players from joining LIV Golf to avoid career destruction at the hands
`of the Tour.
`At various points, the Tour has threatened Tour members’ agents and business
`partners with punishment if the players joined LIV Golf. In addition, the Tour has
`threatened numerous vendors and small companies in the golf and sports production
`industry that they will be blacklisted from working with the Tour if they work with
`LIV Golf.
`The Tour has threatened non-member golfers with exclusion from the golf
`“ecosystem” if they participate in any LIV Golf events. For example, the Tour
`threatened college golfers (who are not PGA Tour members and have no obligation
`to conform to the Tour’s rules for its members) that if they played in any LIV Golf
`events they would be banned from entry into the PGA Tour University program,
`which provides top college golfers entry into the Tour’s developmental tour (Korn
`Ferry Tour).
`The Tour has also threatened sponsors and broadcasters that they must sever their
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`relationships with players who join LIV Golf, or be cut off from having any
`opportunities with the PGA Tour. Based on these threats, several sponsors have cut
`ties with players who have joined LIV Golf (including the Player Plaintiffs),
`sometimes ending years-long relationships. The Tour has also intimidated sponsors
`and vendors into not doing business with LIV Golf, lest they lose the opportunity to
`do business with the dominant golf tour in North America, the PGA Tour.
`These restraints have damaged competition and harmed Plaintiffs. They have harmed
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`Player Plaintiffs by, for example, (1) diminishing competition for their services and reinforcing the
`Tour’s monopsony power in the markets in which the Plaintiffs sell those services; (2) denying them
`income-earning opportunities, tournament performance opportunities (including denying them
`opportunities to participate in tournaments in which they have qualified), sponsorship revenue, and
`independent contractor rights; and (3) harming their reputations, goodwill, and brands. These restraints
`have likewise proved effective at harming competition in the relevant markets by preventing other
`players from joining LIV Golf who would have joined the new league but for these competitive
`restraints, thus threatening the competitive viability of LIV Golf and any other potential competitor by
`protecting the PGA Tour’s monopoly power and monopsony power over the purchase of services from
`professional golfers to participate in elite golf events. The Tour’s restraints have harmed LIV Golf by,
`for example, (i) raising to supracompetitive levels its costs to recruit players who are subject to the
`Tour’s threats; (ii) completely preventing LIV Golf from securing the services of many players who
`have been subjected to the Tour’s threats of severe punishments should they participate in LIV Golf
`events; (iii) forcing LIV Golf to scrap its launch plans for 2022, and instead launch a smaller-scale
`series; and (iv) preventing LIV Golf from entering into agreements with third parties and raising to
`supracompetitive levels its costs for contracting with those third parties who are willing to defy the
`Tour’s threats, thus raising LIV Golf’s costs and degrading its product offerings. The impacts of the
`Tour’s continuing restraints threaten LIV Golf’s competitive viability and existence.
`13. Without fair process, PGA Tour Commissioner Monahan—who is necessarily partial—
`imposed a 21-month Tour suspension on some Player Plaintiffs, through March 31, 2024 (other Player
`Plaintiffs’ suspensions are indefinite or 9 months as of this Complaint), for exercising their independent
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`contractor rights to play in the first two LIV Golf events. After imposing these suspensions, the Tour
`followed its procedurally and substantively unconscionable appeals process to maintain the suspension
`without giving Player Plaintiffs fair proceedings to be heard by neutral and independent decision-
`makers. Plaintiffs Gooch, Swafford and Jones (among other Player Plaintiffs) had earned the right to
`play in the FedEx Cup Playoffs (a series of lucrative and high-profile events scheduled at the end of
`the PGA Tour’s 2022 season) through strong performance and dedication to the Tour, but the Tour
`banned them from playing in those tournaments, diminishing the strength of its own fields and harming
`these Plaintiffs. The injury to these players extended beyond mere foreclosure from these tournaments
`(itself a substantial and irreparable injury), but also crippled their chances of qualifying for both the
`Majors and the Tour’s premier invitationals in future seasons. The punishment that accrued to these
`players from not being able to play in the FedEx Cup Playoffs is substantial, and involves both
`monetary injury (as the Tour has maintained) as well as irreparable injuries.
`The Tour has argued that the Player Plaintiffs have already been fully compensated by
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`LIV Golf for all suspensions the Tour might impose and all of the consequential harms that may flow
`from those suspensions (including exclusions from the Majors and other important professional golf
`tournaments and lost sponsorship opportunities). That is simply not true. While the supracompetitive
`payments LIV Golf was required to make in order to attract players in the face of the Tour’s
`anticompetitive threats were in many cases above the compensation levels that would have been
`required in the absence of the Tour’s anticompetitive conduct, it is also true that (a) many of the injuries
`the players will suffer are not compensable through money, (b) the monetary injuries the players have
`suffered and/or will suffer have exceeded and will exceed substantially the amounts they have been
`paid by LIV Golf, and (c) the negotiated amounts reflect a mutual understanding by the parties that at
`some point the PGA Tour would adjust its position and allow fair competition from LIV Golf. None
`of these Player Plaintiffs has agreed to a potential ban from the Majors or other important tournaments,
`or a long-term ban from the Tour should the Tour succeed in blocking successful long-term entry by
`LIV Golf.
`15. Without injunctive relief prohibiting the PGA Tour’s anticompetitive conduct, the
`Tour’s antitrust violations will continue. Without injunctive relief prohibiting the PGA Tour’s
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`9
`AMENDED COMPLAINT – DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`CASE NO. 5:22-cv-04486-BLF
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`anticompetitive conduct, Player Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed, including by the Tour’s unlawful
`suspensions that have denied and will continue to deny them income earning opportunities, tournament
`performance opportunities, sponsorship revenue, and independent contractor rights that they have
`earned, as well as by the actions of the Tour and the European Tour that deny them the opportunity to
`participate in events sponsored by others throughout the golf “ecosystem.” LIV Golf will also be
`irreparably harmed if the Tour’s anticompetitive conduct is not abated. While LIV Golf has been able
`to pursue the launch of its business in the face of supracompetitive costs and artificially reduced access
`to supply (i.e. players), facing headwinds of this nature is not sustainable. As a result, if the Tour’s
`anticompetitive conduct is not enjoined, LIV Golf’s entry will be thwarted and its ability to maintain a
`meaningful competitive presence in the markets will be destroyed, which will harm not only LIV Golf,
`but also competition. The Tour will continue to enforce its unlawful Regulations and take
`anticompetitive actions unless and until a Court enjoins the Tour’s unenforceable Regulations and
`unlawful conduct. Moreover, the Player Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed in that the Tour’s
`unreasonable control over their media rights and their participation in non-Tour events will continue
`unless enjoined permanently. And, if LIV Golf’s entry into the relevant markets is thwarted by the
`PGA Tour’s anticompetitive conduct, Player Plaintiffs’ careers will be detrimentally impacted, they
`will lose the most significant avenue to gain entry into the Majors, they will lose the platform to display
`their craft, and they will lose the opportunity to sell their advertising and sponsorship space and sell or
`license their name image and likeness for their branding, reputation and businesses. On the other hand,
`with an injunction, the anticompetitive conduct of the PGA Tour will be lifted, LIV Golf will have the
`opportunity to compete on the merits, and Player Plaintiffs and other professional tournament golfers
`will enjoy the benefits of competition for their services that the antitrust and other laws protect.
`PARTIES
`Plaintiff Phil Mickelson is a Hall of Fame American professional golfer who resides in
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`San Diego, California. Mr. Mickelson was a three-time NCAA Champion at Arizona State University.
`In 1991, he won the Northern Telecom Open, which was the last time an amateur won a tournament
`on the PGA Tour. He is a 30-year veteran of the PGA Tour who has won 57 worldwide professional
`events, including six Majors—the most recent in 2021, which earned him the title of the oldest Major
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`10
`AMENDED COMPLAINT – DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`CASE NO. 5:22-cv-04486-BLF
`
`

`

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`winner in the game’s history. He spent over 26 consecutive years in the top 50 of the Official World
`Golf Ranking (the only player in the history of the sport to ever do so), including over 700 weeks
`ranked in the top 10 in the world. Mr. Mickelson has represented the United States as a professional
`golfer in 24 team tournaments, which includes 12 Presidents Cups and 12 Ryder Cups, both American
`records. He participated as a vice captain in additional United States team tournaments, and played in
`the Dunhill Cup, World Amateur Team Championship and two Walker Cups for the United States as
`an amateur. Mr. Mickelson also has a strong commitment to giving back through the Phil and Amy
`Mickelson Foundation. Since its inception in 2004, the Foundation has focused primarily on supporting
`a variety of youth and family initiatives. He also founded Birdies for the Brave, the PGA Tour’s
`national military outreach initiative, which raises money for a variety of charities supporting veterans
`and military families. Mr. Mickelson dedicated his entire professional career, 30 years, to the PGA
`Tour. He has hosted tournaments on the Tour and engaged in countless endeavors to advance the Tour,
`its purpose, and the game of golf. Mr. Mickelson has invested in himself and his investment has
`benefited the Tour’s business tremendously over the last 30 years. As a lifetime member—a hard-
`earned accomplishment and honor, requiring 20 PGA Tour wins and 15 years of membership on the
`Tour—Mr. Mickelson desires to continue being a member of the Tour and to play in events on the
`Tour.
`
`Plaintiff Talor Gooch is a 30-year-old professional golfer who resides in Texas. He is
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`a member of the Tour. Mr. Gooch played golf at Oklahoma State University until 2014 when he began
`his professional career. He joined the PGA Tour Canada in 2015 and earned his way onto the Korn
`Ferry Tour in 2016. In 2017, Mr. Gooch won the News Sentinel Open (which later became the Visit
`Knoxville Open on the Korn Ferry Tour) and then earned his way onto the PGA Tour in 2018. In 2021,
`he won his first PGA Tour tournament at the RSM Classic. Mr. Gooch was on top of the PGA Tour’s
`FedEx Cup Rankings for the 2021-22 season following the RSM Classic. Mr. Gooch has played in
`over one hundred PGA Tour events. As of the filing of the Complaint in thi