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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
` Case No.: 18-cv-00780-KSC
`
`ORDER
`
`(1) GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL
`OF CLASS/ COLLECTIVE ACTION
`SETTLEMENT; and
`
`(2) GRANTING MOTION FOR
`ATTORNEYS’ FEES, LITIGATION
`COSTS, CLASS REPRESENTATIVE
`INCENTIVE AWARDS AND
`SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION
`EXPENSES
`
`[Doc. Nos. 86, 92]
`
`MONICA SMITH and ERIKA SIERRA,
`individually and on behalf of all others
`similarly situated individuals,
` Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, a
`California corporation,
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`Before the Court are plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class/Collective
`Action Settlement (the “Final Approval Motion,” Doc. No. 92) and Motion for Attorneys’
`Fees, Litigation Costs, Class Representative Incentive Awards, and Settlement
`Administration Expenses (the “Fee Motion,” Doc. No. 86, and collectively the “Motions”).
`The Motions are unopposed. The Court heard oral argument on the Motions on June 9,
`2021 (the “Fairness Hearing”). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ moving
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`papers, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated below, the
`Court finds the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and GRANTS the
`Final Approval Motion. The Court further finds that that the attorneys’ fees and other
`expenditures from the common fund are reasonable, and GRANTS the Fee Motion.
`I. BACKGROUND
`
`A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations
`Plaintiffs Monica Smith and Erika Sierra (“plaintiffs”) filed this action individually
`and on behalf of similarly-situated employees of defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
`(“defendant”), alleging that defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and
`California wage and hour laws. See generally Doc. No. 1 (complaint); Doc. No. 70
`(amended complaint). The Court has previously described plaintiffs’ allegations in detail
`and presumes familiarity with the facts of the case. Briefly stated, defendant employs
`“Telemedicine Specialists,” “Customer Support Specialists,” and “Wellness Specialists”
`to receive and respond to call center calls. Plaintiffs allege that defendant, in violation of
`federal and state labor laws, failed to compensate these employees for certain tasks
`performed at the start of each shift, during their off-the-clock breaks, and at the end of their
`shift. The allegedly uncompensated tasks included, inter alia, starting up and shutting
`down computers, logging into and out of applications, locating equipment, shredding
`patient notes, and traveling to defendant’s offices for training, meetings, and to pick up
`equipment. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant failed to reimburse employees for
`necessary business expenditures.
`B. Procedural History
`On February 13, 2019, following the exchange of “voluminous” information
`between the parties and two full-day sessions facilitated by a third-party mediator, the
`parties reached an agreement in principle to settle. Doc. No. 92-1 at 10-11; see also Doc.
`No. 65 (Notice of Settlement). Thereafter, plaintiffs twice moved for preliminary approval
`of the settlement. See Doc. Nos. 67, 72, 78, 81. The Court denied those motions, citing
`concerns with the structure of the settlement, the scope of the proposed FLSA collective,
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`failure to obtain proper consent for settlement of the FLSA claims, and inadequate notice.
`See, e.g., Doc. No. 72 at 18-23; Doc. No. 81 at 29, 31-33. The Court required plaintiffs to
`remedy these deficiencies in any renewed motion for preliminary approval.
`On October 6, 2020, plaintiffs moved for a third time for preliminary settlement
`approval. Doc. No. 82. The renewed motion was supported by a Second Amended
`Collective and Class Action Settlement Agreement1 and an amended proposed notice. See
`generally id. Upon review of plaintiffs’ renewed motion and supporting documents, the
`Court found that plaintiffs had “addressed all the deficiencies and concerns previously
`identified by the Court and have made all appropriate amendments and corrections to the
`Second Amended Agreement and the Amended Notice.” Doc. No. 84 at 2. The Court
`therefore preliminarily approved the settlement, provisionally certified the Class and the
`Collective,2 and directed that notice be mailed to each member of the Settlement Class. Id.
`The Court set a date for the Fairness Hearing and ordered that any objections to the
`settlement be filed with the Court no later than April 19, 2021. Id. at 3.
`The Fairness Hearing took place on June 9, 2021. All parties were represented by
`counsel. No class members filed objections to the settlement nor appeared at the Fairness
`Hearing. See Doc. No. 92-1 at 28; Doc. No. 95 at 3. Only six of the 474 Class or Collective
`members requested exclusion. See id.
`C. The Settlement
`The Settlement Agreement provides that defendant will pay a gross settlement
`amount of $1,475,000 (plus all applicable employer-side payroll taxes).3 Subject to the
`
`
`
` 2
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`1 The Court will hereafter refer to this document, which was attached to the motion for preliminary
`approval and to the Final Approval Motion, as the “Settlement Agreement.” See Doc. Nos. 82-1, 92-2.
`All citations to the Settlement Agreement are to the numbered paragraphs therein.
` The Court will hereafter refer to the Class and the Collective jointly as the “Settlement Class.” See Doc.
`No. 92-2 at ¶1.39.
` The Court will hereafter refer to this as the “Gross Settlement Amount” or the “Settlement Funds.”
`
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`Court’s approval, the following amounts are to be deducted from the Gross Settlement
`Amount:
`
`Class Counsel’s Fees
`Class Counsel’s Costs
`Service Awards
`Settlement Administration Costs
`PAGA Payment
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`$442,500.00
`$55,000.00
`$15,000.00
`$9,900.004
`$30,000.00
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`See Doc. No. 92-2 at ¶¶1.25, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. The remaining $922,600.00 (the “Net
`Settlement Amount”) will be distributed to members of the Settlement Class. Id. at ¶1.25.
`The parties have allocated $203,142.50 of the Net Settlement Amount to the FLSA
`Collective, to be distributed to its members according to the following formula:
`
`The FLSA Settlement Payment to a FLSA Collective Member will be
`calculated by dividing the number of Eligible Workweeks attributed to the
`FLSA Collective Member worked during the Collective Period by all Eligible
`Workweeks during the Collective Period attributed to members of the FLSA
`Collective, multiplied by $203,142.50. Otherwise stated, the formula for a
`FLSA Collective Member is: (individual’s Eligible Workweeks ÷ total FLSA
`Collective Eligible Workweeks) x $203,142.50.
`The number of Eligible Workweeks for Telemedicine Specialists shall be
`multiplied by 2.4, because they earned, on average, 2.4 times the amount
`earned by other FLSA Collective Members. Otherwise stated, the formula for
`a FLSA Collective Member who worked as a Telemedicine Specialist is:
`((individual Eligible Workweeks x 2.4) ÷ total FLSA Collective Eligible
`Workweeks) x $203,142.50.
`Doc. No. 92-2 at ¶5.5.1.
`
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`4 At the time plaintiffs filed their Final Approval Motion, they estimated the Settlement Administration
`Costs would not exceed $15,000. Doc. No. 92-1 at 23. Plaintiffs recently reported that their counsel’s
`actual costs were $9,900. Doc. No. 93 at 6.
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`The parties have allocated all remaining funds (i.e., the Net Settlement Amount
`minus the $203,142.50 allocated to the FLSA Collective) to the Settlement Class, to be
`distributed to its members according to the following formula:
`
`The individual settlement payment to a Settlement Class Member will be
`calculated by dividing the number of Eligible Workweeks attributed to the
`Settlement Class Member worked during the Class Period by all Eligible
`Workweeks during the Class Period attributed to members of the Settlement
`Class, multiplied by the Net Settlement Amount (after reduction of the
`$203,142.50 attributed to FLSA Collective Members). Otherwise stated, the
`formula for a Class Member is: (individual’s Eligible Workweeks ÷ total
`Settlement Class Eligible Workweeks) x (Net Settlement Amount -
`$203,142.50).
`The number of Eligible Workweeks for Telemedicine Specialists shall be
`multiplied by 2.4, because they earned, on average, 2.4 times the amount
`earned by other Settlement Class Members. Otherwise stated, the formula for
`a Class Member who worked as a Telemedicine Specialist is: ((individual
`Eligible Workweeks x 2.4) ÷ total Settlement Class Eligible Workweeks) x
`(Net Settlement Amount - $203,142.50).
`Doc. No. 92-2 at ¶5.6.1.
`Each eligible Settlement Class member will automatically receive a check for the
`appropriate amount(s) based on these formulas. Any distribution checks not cashed within
`the timeframes set forth in the Agreement will be cancelled. Id. at ¶5.6.2. If the total
`amount of cancelled settlement distributions is greater than $5,000, those funds will be re-
`distributed pro rata to members of the Settlement Class who cashed the first distribution
`check, and otherwise will be paid to California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. Id.
`In exchange for the Gross Settlement Amount, plaintiffs and all other members of
`the Settlement Class agree to release any and all claims that “relate in any way” to the
`allegations in the Complaint, including defendant’s alleged violations of California’s Labor
`Code and unfair competition laws, and further agree to a general release of claims under
`California Civil Code § 1542. See id. at ¶¶6.1, 6.3. The members of the FLSA Collective
`further agree to release claims related to the allegations in the complaint arising under the
`FLSA. Id. at ¶6.2. Ms. Smith and Ms. Sierra, as class representatives, generally release
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`all claims against defendant arising out of their relationship with defendant, not including
`any claims arising out of their participation in this lawsuit. Id. at ¶6.4.
`II. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS WILL BE CERTIFIED
`The Court begins with plaintiffs’ request that it “confirm as final” the certification
`of the Class (including appointment of the class representatives and class counsel) and the
`designation of the action as a collective action under the FLSA. Doc. No. 92-1 at 8. To
`do so, the Court must ascertain whether the Class satisfies the “four threshold requirements
`of … Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation,”
`as well as the requirements of one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Leyva v. Medline
`Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). The Court
`provisionally certified the Class when it preliminarily approved the settlement and is not
`aware of any reason to depart from its prior analysis. Nevertheless, the Court addresses
`each of the relevant requirements here.
`A. Numerosity
`Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement is satisfied where the class is “so numerous
`that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The Rule “provides
`no bright-line test or minimum number of class members necessary to meet the numerosity
`requirement,” although many courts have adopted a “rule of thumb” that a proposed class
`of more than 40 persons is sufficiently numerous. A.R. ex rel. Legaard v. Providence
`Health Plan, 300 F.R.D. 474, 480 (D. Or. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the Class
`consists of “approximately [468]5 hourly Telemedicine Specialists, Customer Support
`Specialists, and Wellness Specialists.” Doc. No. 92-1 at 7. Joinder of all these potential
`plaintiffs would be impracticable. Accordingly, the Court finds the numerosity
`requirement is met.
`///
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`5 This number has been revised to reflect the six opt-outs. See Doc. No. 95 at 3 (“As of this date, there
`are 468 Participating Class Members who will be paid their portion of the Net Settlement Amount…. “).
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`B. Commonality
`Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement is satisfied where “there are questions of law
`or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). A single common issue will suffice.
`See Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases).
`Here, the class members’ claims involve common questions of law and fact regarding
`whether defendant’s official or unofficial policies resulted in underpayment of work
`performed by Class members, and whether defendant issued wage statements that did not
`comply with California law. The answers to these questions would “‘resolve … issue[s]
`that [are] central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’” Id. (citations
`omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds the commonality requirement is satisfied.
`C. Typicality
`Rule 23(a) also requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
`typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “‘The test of
`typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is
`based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class
`members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
`Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Here, the claims of the named
`plaintiffs (and proposed class representatives) arise out of the same course of conduct and
`resulted in the same injuries as those of the subclasses they seek to represent. The wrongful
`conduct alleged in the complaint is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and the damages to
`the class members, if any, arise out of the non-payment of wages for time spent on required
`job functions at the beginning, middle, and end of their shifts and failure to provide accurate
`wage statements. The Court finds the typicality requirement is satisfied.
`D. Adequacy
`Rule 23(a)’s final requirement is that “the representative parties will fairly and
`adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). To determine
`whether this requirement is met, the Court must assess whether (1) the interests of the class
`representatives and their counsel conflict with those of other class members and (2)
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`whether the class representatives and their counsel will prosecute the action vigorously on
`behalf of the class. See Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985. “These inquiries require the court to consider
`a number of factors, including ‘the qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an
`absence of antagonism, a sharing of interests between representatives and absentees, and
`the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive.’” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D 356, 364 (E.D.
`Cal. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1992)).
`The Court finds that the proposed class representatives and their counsel have
`vigorously prosecuted this action, leading ultimately to the settlement now before it, and
`have faithfully discharged their duties as fiduciaries to the absent class members. The
`Court finds no evidence of collusion or antagonism. Furthermore, counsel for the class is
`experienced in employment litigation, and has successfully litigated numerous wage-and-
`hour class actions such as this one. Therefore, the Court finds this requirement has been
`satisfied.
`E. Rule 23(b)(3) – Superiority and Predominance
`In addition to “satisfy[ing] each prerequisite of Rule 23(a),” a party seeking class
`certification must also “establish an appropriate ground for maintaining the class action
`under Rule 23(b).” Walker v. Life Ins. Co. of the S.W., 953 F.3d 624, 630 (9th Cir. 2020).
`Here, plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which permits certification where
`“the [C]ourt finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
`over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
`other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R.
`Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
`The predominance inquiry asks whether a proposed class is “sufficiently cohesive
`to warrant adjudication by representation.” Walker, 953 F.3d at 630 (citations omitted).
`The Court should answer in the affirmative where there are significant, common questions
`that “can be resolved in a single adjudication” and there is “a clear justification” for
`adjudication on a representative, rather than individual, basis. See id. “Rule 23(b)(3)’s
`superiority test requires the court to determine whether maintenance of this litigation as a
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`class action is efficient and whether it is fair.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC,
`617 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2010). “In the settlement context,” however, the Court
`“‘need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management
`problems.’” Jabbari v. Farmer, 965 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
`The Court reaffirms its findings that the requirements of superiority and
`predominance have been satisfied here. See Doc. No. 81 at 14. The Court’s conclusions
`that resolution of the significant and common questions regarding defendant’s conduct and
`whether that conduct violated the law would “drive” resolution of the class members’
`claims, and that classwide adjudication of those claims was superior considering “the
`relatively limited potential recovery for the class members as compared with the costs of
`litigating the claims,” remain unchanged. Id.
`F. Certification of the Settlement Class Is Appropriate
`Having found the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are met, the Court certifies
`the following class for settlement purposes:
`All current and former employees who, between February 21, 2013 and
`February 18, 2021, worked for Kaiser Foundation Hospitals at its San Diego,
`California location, with the job title of Customer Support Specialist,
`Wellness Specialist, or Telemedicine Specialist, in job codes 20005, 50278,
`and 20186, and did not timely file a request for exclusion from the class.
`See Doc. No. 92-1 at 19; Doc. No. 92-2 at ¶1.6; Doc. No. 94-4 at 13. Named plaintiffs
`Monica Smith and Erika Sierra are appointed class representatives, and will hereafter be
`referred to collectively as the “Class Representatives.” Finkelstein & Krinsk, LLP and
`Sommers Schwartz, P.C. are jointly appointed to represent the class, and will hereafter be
`referred to collectively as Class Counsel.
`The Court further finds that the FLSA’s less stringent requirement that the members
`of the proposed collective be “similarly situated” is satisfied. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
`Plaintiffs “are similarly situated, and may proceed in a collective, to the extent they share
`a similar issue of law or fact material to the disposition of their FLSA claims.” Campbell
`v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). For the same reasons the
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`Court finds that the proposed Class may be certified pursuant to Rule 23, the Court finds
`plaintiffs are similarly situated with respect to other members of the proposed collective.
`Accordingly, the Court designates the following FLSA collective for the purposes of
`settlement:
`All current and former employees who, between December 21, 2014 and
`February 18, 2021, worked for Kaiser Foundation Hospitals at its San Diego,
`California location, with the job title of Customer Support Specialist,
`Wellness Specialist, or Telemedicine Specialist, in job codes 20005, 50278,
`and 20186, and who timely submitted an opt-in consent form.
`See Doc. No. 92-1 at 19; Doc. No. 92-2 at ¶1.7; Doc. No. 94-4 at 13, 19.
`III. FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL DETERMINATION
`A. Standard for Approval Under Rule 23(e)
`Judicial policy strongly “favors settlements, particularly where complex class action
`litigation is concerned.” In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008).
`Nevertheless, Rule 23 imposes upon district courts an “independent obligation to ensure
`that any class settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate,’” to ensure that neither the class
`representatives nor their counsel have “bargained away absent class members’ rights” in
`the settlement. Briseño v. Henderson, __ F.3d __, 2021 WL 2197968, at **4, 6 (9th Cir.
`June 1, 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)). “This requires a balancing assessment
`of:
`
`(1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and
`likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action
`status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent
`of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience
`and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8)
`the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.
`
`Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 980 F.3d 645, 669 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Churchill Vill.,
`L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004)). “The Court must also determine
`that the settlement is not the ‘product of collusion among the negotiating parties.’” Id.
`///
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`B. Standard for Approval of FLSA Settlement
`The Court’s approval is also required for settlement of an FLSA collective class
`action claim. See Kerzich v. Cty. of Tuolomne, 335 F.Supp.3d 1179, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2018)
`(“Because an employee cannot waive claims under the FLSA, they may not be settled
`without supervision of either the Secretary of Labor or a district court.”) (citing Barrentine
`v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981)). Before approving the settlement,
`the Court must determine that it constitutes “a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide
`dispute” over “the existence and extent of [d]efendant’s FLSA liability.” Selk v. Pioneers
`Mem’l Healthcare Dist., 159 F.Supp.3d 1164, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (citations omitted);
`see also Ambrosino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 11-cv-1319 L(MDD), 2014 WL
`3924609, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014) (noting that the Court may approve an FLSA
`settlement that “reflects ‘a reasonable compromise over [disputed] issues.’”).
`In considering whether to approve the proposed settlement of the collective’s FLSA
`claims, the Court will consider:
`
`(1) the plaintiff’s range of possible recovery; (2) the stage of
`proceedings and amount of discovery completed; (3) the seriousness
`of the litigation risks faced by the parties; (4) the scope of any
`release provision in the settlement agreement; (5) the experience and
`views of counsel and the opinion of participating plaintiffs; and (6)
`the possibility of fraud or collusion.
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`Selk, 159 F.Supp.3d at 1173. The Court will approve the settlement if, upon consideration
`the totality of the circumstances as reflected in these factors, it appears that the settlement
`“is a reasonable compromise” that will “vindicate, rather than frustrate, the purposes of the
`FLSA.” Id. at 1172-73.
`C. Application to the Proposed Settlement
`Although there are important distinctions between the policy objectives of – and the
`rights protected by – Rule 23 and the FLSA, the foregoing discussion demonstrates that
`there is considerable overlap between the factors considered for settlement approval. See
`Kerzich, 335 F.Supp.3d at 1184 (noting that “courts often apply the Rule 23 factors for
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`assessing proposed class action settlements when evaluating the fairness of an FLSA
`settlement, while recognizing that some of those factors do not apply because of the
`inherent differences between class actions and FLSA actions”). Furthermore, the Court
`has a “‘considerably less stringent’ obligation to ensure fairness of the settlement in an
`FLSA collective action [as compared to] a Rule 23 action because parties who do not opt
`in are not bound by the settlement.” Millan v. Cascade Water Svcs. Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593,
`607 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court finds that if the proposed
`settlement warrants approval under Rule 23, it should also be approved under the FLSA,
`and will therefore conduct its Rule 23 and FLSA analyses in tandem.
`1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case
`As a rule, “unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval
`are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” Nat’l Rural
`Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting 4 A.
`Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 11:50 at 155 (4th ed. 2002)). This is
`particularly true where “there are significant barriers plaintiffs must overcome in making
`their case.” Chun-Hoon v. McKee Foods Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
`Here, although plaintiffs believed their claims had merit, defendant raised many factual
`and legal defenses to plaintiffs’ allegations, including that due to a six-minute “shift
`tolerance” window, many members of the Settlement Class were likely overcompensated;
`that plaintiffs “grossly overstate[d] the amount of time spent on pre- and post-shift tasks;
`that defendant maintains a policy and trains employees not to clock in until their shift
`begins; and that plaintiffs’ FLSA and California claims were not actionable. Doc. No. 92-
`1 at 13-14. In the face of these many legal and factual disputes, continued litigation
`presented a real risk of negative outcomes at class certification, summary judgment, trial
`and appeal. The Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approval.
`2. The Value of the Settlement Compared to Plaintiffs’ Potential Recovery
`In deciding whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, the Court
`must “consider[]” the “settlement’s benefits … by comparison to what the class actually
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`gave up by settling.” See Campbell v. Facebook, 951 F.3d 1106, 1123 (9th Cir. 2020)
`(citation omitted). However, the Court must remain mindful that “‘the very essence of a
`settlement is compromise ….’” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959 (9th Cir. 2003)
`(citation omitted). The Court should not “withhold [its] approval” of a proposed settlement
`merely because it represents “a fraction of the potential recovery at trial.” Nat’l Rural
`Telecomms. Coop., 221 F.R.D. at 527.
`As noted, the Settlement Agreement calls for a gross non-reversionary payment of
`$1,475,000.00. Doc. No. 92-1 at 18. Based on counsel’s and their experts’ damages
`analysis, this amount represents between 82.35 and 189.69 percent of defendant’s potential
`off-the-clock wage claim exposure. Id. Further, even assuming plaintiffs were successful
`at trial on all “potentially meritorious” claims for labor code violations and including
`PAGA penalties, the Gross Settlement Amount represents between 28.84 and 35.97 percent
`of defendant’s greatest possible exposure. Id. After subtracting fees, counsel’s costs,
`settlement administration costs, incentive awards, and PAGA penalties, there remains a net
`settlement amount of $922,600.00 for distribution to the Settlement Class. Id. at 18-21. A
`total of $203,142.50 of the Net Settlement Amount (approximately 22%) will be allocated
`to the FLSA collective members, with the remainder (approximately 78%) apportioned to
`the Class. Id. at 21. Each Settlement Class member will automatically receive an average
`payment of $1,971.37 (the highest estimated payment being $5,894.70) calculated using a
`formula developed by expert economists. Id. at 20-21, 31; see also Doc. No. 95 at 4.
`The Court finds that the amount of the settlement as compared to plaintiffs’ potential
`recovery weighs in favor of approval of the settlement.
`3. Extent of Discovery
`Next, the Court assesses whether the “‘parties have sufficient information to make
`an informed decision about settlement.’” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454,
`459 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)). “A settlement following sufficient discovery and
`genuine arms-length negotiation is presumed fair.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop., 221
`F.R.D. at 528. Plaintiffs here represent that at the time of the settlement, defendants had
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`produced, and plaintiffs’ counsel had reviewed, extensive documents and data related to
`plaintiffs’ claims, including: time and pay records; policies for timekeeping, logging in and
`logging off; training manuals; badge swipe records; and data modeling and statistical
`analyses for identifying pre-shift and post-shift activities for the members of the Settlement
`Class. Doc. No. 92-1 at 11. In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel conducted intake interviews,
`reviewed intake forms for potential opt-in plaintiffs, and consulted with expert economists.
`Id. at 11-12. The parties attended two full-day mediation sessions facilitated by a neutral
`mediator, in preparation for which plaintiffs’ counsel spent a significant amount of time
`researching the law and engaging with their damages expert. Id. at 10, 29.
`Given this history, the Court is persuaded that the parties entered into the Settlement
`knowing the relevant facts and strengths and weaknesses of their claims and defenses. The
`Court finds this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.
`4. Views of Counsel
`“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of
`reasonableness.” In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D.
`Cal. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, Kevin Stoops, lead counsel for the Settlement Class,
`has submitted a declaration in support of the Final Approval Motion. Doc. No. 92-3. Mr.
`Stoops has nearly 17 years’ experience litigating in the areas of employment law and
`commercial litigation, including complex and class actions. Id. at 5-10. Mr. Stoops
`represents that once an agreement in principle was reached with defendant, both Class
`Counsel and defendant’s counse