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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
` Case No.: 19-cv-01082-AJB-AHG
`
`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
`DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR
`RECONSIDERATION
`
`WILLIAM LESSIN, CAROL
`SMALLEY, et al., on behalf of
`themselves and others similarly
`situated,
` Plaintiffs,
`v.
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware
`corporation; and Does 1 through 10,
`inclusive,
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`Presently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Co.’s motion for reconsideration
`
`of the Court’s Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for class
`certification. (Doc. No. 204.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Doc. No. 210), to which Ford
`replied (Doc. No. 211). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART
`AND DENIES IN PART Ford’s motion. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing
`set for February 27, 2025, at 2:00 p.m.
`I.
`BACKGROUND
`
`The facts of this case have been recited in previous orders. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 202.)
`Ford challenges the Court’s November 7, 2024 Order (1) granting in part and denying in
`part Ford’s motion for partial summary judgment, and (2) granting in part and denying in
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`part Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
`(the “November 7 Order”). (Doc. No. 204.) Specifically, Ford asserts the Court committed
`clear error as to several findings related to the motion for class certification. (Id.)
`
`As relevant to the instant motion, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff
`Hamilton’s Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (“MUTPA”) claim because the Court found
`Plaintiff Hamilton used her vehicle for business, not personal, use. (November 7 Order,
`Doc. No. 202, at 32–33.) Under MUTPA, a private right of action exists “only for those
`who have purchased goods, services or property ‘primarily for personal, family or
`household purposes.’” C-B Kentworth, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957
`(D. Me. 1988) (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 213(1)). Here, Hamilton stated throughout
`her deposition that her F-250 was her business vehicle. (See November 7 Order at 33.)
`Later, in analyzing Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the Court held that Plaintiffs’
`class definition—limited to persons who purchased or leased their vehicles for “personal,
`family or household purposes”—did not preclude a finding of predominance. (Id. at 51–
`53.) The Court found that “commercial purchasers (fleet and chassis-cab purchasers) can
`be excluded from the notice process using Ford’s data, leaving only retail purchasers to
`receive notice and an opportunity to submit proof that their vehicle purchases were
`primarily for personal use.” (Id. at 53.)
`
`Next, the Court granted class certification of Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims
`under Maine and South Carolina law. (Id. at 70–73.) The Court noted that manifestation of
`the alleged defect is an element for implied warranty claims under Maine and South
`Carolina law. (Id. at 71 (citing Lorfano, 569 A.2d at 197; Cole, 484 F.3d at 729).)
`Moreover, “[w]hile the Court in the instant case analyzes the substantive laws of Maine
`and South Carolina, they similarly require manifestation of the defect [as in California].”
`(Id. at 72.) Thereafter, applying the Ninth Circuit’s federal procedural law, the Court held
`that on class certification, the district court should not determine the merits of Plaintiffs’
`claims. (Id.) The Court ultimately found the predominance factor met and granted class
`certification. The Court further found predominance met as to merchantability, as
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`“Plaintiffs have alleged from the beginning of litigation that the Class Vehicles contain a
`design defect that was inherent in all Class Vehicles at the time of sale.” (Id. at 73.)
`
`The Court also found Ford’s argument as to the varying rates of manifestation of the
`defect unavailing. (Id. at 57–58.) Ford argued that field performance differences exist
`across all dampers, and that there are “significant differences in performance across
`different platforms, models, and model years . . . .” (Doc. No. 136 at 27.) The Court noted
`that Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses this argument. (November 7 Order at 57.) As
`discussed in the November 7 Order,
`Where the injury alleged is a design defect, the Ninth Circuit has “held that
`proof of the manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class
`certification.” Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173. This is because the injury occurred at
`the point of sale—when a putative member drove her car off the lot—not
`when the vehicle experiences the Shimmy. See Butler, 2017 WL 1398316, at
`*6 (“In general, courts have found consumer fraud claims amenable to class-
`wide treatment where the claims were premised on the existence of a common,
`class-wide defect present in all of the relevant products at the time of sale.”).
`
`
`(Id. at 57–58.)
`
`The Court further denied the motion for class certification as to the P131 (Model
`Year (“MY”) 2005–2007) and P538 (MY 2017–2019) models, finding that individual
`issues predominate over common questions as to Ford’s knowledge of a defect. (Id. at 61.)
`II. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`District courts have the discretion to reconsider interlocutory rulings until a final
`judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048–
`49 (9th Cir. 2000). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not set forth a standard
`for reconsidering interlocutory rulings, the “law of the case” doctrine and public policy
`dictate that the efficient operation of the judicial system requires the avoidance of re-
`arguing questions that have already been decided. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
`Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).
`///
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`As such, most courts adhere to a fairly narrow standard by which to reconsider their
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`interlocutory rulings. This standard requires: (1) an intervening change in the law;
`(2) additional evidence that was not previously available; or (3) that the prior decision was
`based on clear error or would work manifest injustice. Id.; Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v.
`Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009); Sch. Dist. No. 1J v.
`ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
`
`Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of
`finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229
`F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to renew
`arguments considered and rejected by the court, nor is it an opportunity for a party to re-
`argue a motion because it is dissatisfied with the original outcome.” FTC v. Neovi, Inc.,
`No. 06–CV–1952–JLS JMA, 2009 WL 56130, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan.7, 2009) (quoting
`Devinsky v. Kingsford, No. 05 Civ.2064(PAC), 2008 WL 2704338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July
`10, 2008)).
`
`Additionally, Civil Local Rule 7.1.i governs motions for reconsideration in this
`District. The rule provides that a party may apply for reconsideration “[w]henever any
`motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any
`judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” CivLR 7.1.i.1. The party seeking
`reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7.1.i.1 must show “what new or different facts and
`circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior
`application.” Id.
`III. DISCUSSION
`
`Ford requests reconsideration of the Court’s class certification order on the ground
`that the Court committed clear error. (See generally Doc. No. 204.) Ford argues: (1) the
`Court clearly erred when it certified a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim because
`the Court had previously dismissed that claim and Plaintiff did not seek certification of it;
`(2) the Court’s summary judgment order on Plaintiff Hamilton’s business usage shows that
`individualized issues predominate as to whether each class member purchased their vehicle
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`for personal, family, or household use; (3) the Court’s order certifying Maine and South
`Carolina implied warranty classes uses the incorrect standard for manifestation and
`conflicts with its summary judgment ruling regarding merchantability; and (4) Ford’s
`argument that differing rates of manifestation defeat class certification was not fully
`addressed by the Court. (See generally Doc. No. 204-1.)
`A.
`Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Claim
`
`
`First, in the November 7 Order, the Court granted mistakenly granted certification
`of a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim. (See November 7 Order at 85.) As noted
`by the Parties, this claim had previously been dismissed without leave to amend, (Doc. No.
`41 at 23–24), and Plaintiffs did not seek certification of this claim, (see Doc. No. 120 at 4).
`Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration as to this claim.
`B.
`Personal, Family, or Household Use of Class Vehicle
`
`
`Next, as to the argument that Hamilton’s business usage shows that individualized
`issues predominate as to whether each class member purchased their vehicle for personal,
`family, or household use, Ford previously made this argument in its opposition to
`Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (See Doc. No. 136 at 22–24.) The Court did not
`find it availing then, and Ford has not persuaded the Court it committed clear error, the
`initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there has been any relevant intervening law or
`newly discovered evidence the Court has not considered. Moreover, Ford’s argument that
`allowing class members to attest to their purchase of their trucks for personal use deprives
`Ford of an opportunity to cross-examine the class members has no basis in law. Case law
`has acknowledged that, “to comport with due process, the court must ‘preserve’ the
`defendant’s right ‘to raise any individual defenses it might have at the damages phase.’”
`Makaeff v. Trum Univ., LLC, 309 F.R.D. 631, 642 (S.D. Cal. 2015). However, courts have
`resolved this issue by permitting bifurcation of trial into a liability stage and a damages
`stage. Id. at 642–43 (citing Mahoney v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 4:09–cv–2327, 2011 WL
`4458513, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011), and Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161,
`1168 (9th Cir. 2014)). However, allowing such cross-examination of class members, as
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`Ford suggests, would be the death knell for class certification. As such, the Court rejects
`this claim.
`C. Maine and South Carolina Implied Warranty Classes
`
`
`Ford contends the Court used the incorrect standard for manifestation of defects for
`Maine and South Carolina implied warranty classes. (Doc. No. 204-1 at 9.) Ford asserts
`the Court applied California substantive law in finding Maine’s and South Carolina’s
`manifestation requirements did not defeat certification. (Id. at 9–10.) However, Ford
`misunderstands the Court’s previous ruling. In the November 7 Order, the Court first stated
`that “[m]anifestation of the alleged defect is an element for implied warranty claims under
`Maine and South Carolina law.” (November 7 Order at 71.) The Court went on to note that
`district courts within the Ninth Circuit, which apply a “substantial certainty” test under
`their substantive law, are split procedurally as to whether arguments as to manifestation of
`the defect is a “merits” issue that is suitable for class certification. (Id.) The Court did not
`apply the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial certainty” test in its November 7 Order, but rather
`held that “under federal procedural law on class certification, ‘the district court should not
`determine the merits of any claims.’” (November 7 Order at 72.)
`
`As to manifestation, Ford further asserts the Court should follow Chin v. Chrysler
`Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448 (D.N.J. 1998), and Payne v. FujiFilm U.S.A., Inc., No. 07–385
`(GEB), 2010 WL 2342388 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), two out-of-circuit cases which have no
`binding on either this Court or the courts of Maine and South Carolina, which held that
`certification was not proper when individualized evidence was needed for every class
`member to prove that the defect manifested. (Doc. No. 204-1 at 10.) Ford previously made
`this argument in its opposition to the motion for class certification and has not identified
`any grounds for reconsideration. (See Doc. No. 136 at 37–38.)
`
`Ford also argues the Court’s finding that the issue of merchantability can be proven
`with common evidence is irreconcilable with its summary judgment ruling. (Doc. No. 204-
`1 at 11.) Specifically, Ford asserts that by certifying the implied warranty classes, “the
`Court is depriving Ford of its right to demonstrate that even if other class members
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`experienced steering oscillation, their individual vehicle uses could nevertheless
`demonstrate merchantability.” (Id. at 12.) However, Ford’s assertion merely attempts to
`litigate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, and thus is improperly raised on a motion for
`reconsideration. Indeed, Ford’s argument as to merchantability are better suited for trial or
`a motion for summary judgment. The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration as to
`these claims.
`D. Differing Rates of Manifestation
`
`
`Finally, Ford argues “the Court appears to have misunderstood, and therefore did
`not fully address, Ford’s arguments that differing manifestation rates of steering oscillation
`show that non-classwide issues predominate on the question of defect.” (Doc. No. 204-1 at
`12.) To this point, as in its opposition to class certification, Ford asserts that warranty and
`complaint claim rates varied significantly across the platforms and model years. (Id.) As
`noted above the Court denied the motion for class certification as to the P131 (MY 2005–
`2007) and P538 (MY 2017–2019) models, with only the P356 (MY 2008–2010) and P473
`(MY 2011–2016) classes certified. While the Court noted that proof of a manifestation was
`not a prerequisite to class certification, it also stated that “the injury [as alleged by
`Plaintiffs] occurred at the point of sale—when a putative member drove her car off the
`lot—not when the vehicle experiences the Shimmy.” (November 7 Order at 57.) Thus, the
`Court did not find persuasive the differing manifestation rates across two of the four model
`year platforms. The Court considered, and rejected, Ford’s argument concerning differing
`rates of manifestation, and the Court does not find grounds for reconsideration.
`Because Ford fails to demonstrate entitlement to reconsideration, the Court DENIES
`
`its motion as to this claim.
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
`
`Ford’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s November 7, 2024 order. (Doc. No. 204.)
`The Court hereby AMENDS its November 7, 2024 Order to recognize that Plaintiffs’
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`Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim was previously dismissed, and clarify that only
`a Breach of Express Warranty claim has been certified under Texas law.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`Dated: January 14, 2025
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