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`v.
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`AMAZON.COM, INC., and DOES 1-
`10
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`Defendants.
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`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
` JONATHAN CORRELL, on behalf of
` CASE NO. 3:21-cv-01833-BTM-MDD
`himself and all others similarly
`
`
`situated,
`REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
`SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
`PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULES
`OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) and
`12(b)(6)
`
`[FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)]
`
`SPECIAL BRIEFING SCHEDULE
`ORDERED
`
`
`PER CHAMBERS, NO ORAL
`ARGUMENT UNLESS REQUESTED
`BY THE COURT
`Hearing Date: June 3, 2022
`Time: 11:00 a.m.
`Judge: Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz
`Courtroom: 15B
`
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-01833-BTM-MDD Document 15 Filed 05/09/22 PageID.166 Page 1 of 15
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`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`Elizabeth Deeley (SBN 230798)
`Montgomery Street, Suite 2000
`San Francisco, CA 941111-6538
`Tel: 415.391.0600 / Fax: 415.395.8095
`Email: elizabeth.deeley@lw.com
`
`Colleen C. Smith (SBN 231216)
`12670 High Bluff Drive
`San Diego, California 92130
`Tel: 858.523.5400 / Fax: 858.523.5450
`Email: colleen.smith@lw.com
`
`
`
`
`Counsel for Defendant,
`AMAZON.COM, INC.
`
`LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
`Roman Martinez
`(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`Daniel Meron
`(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`Charles S. Dameron
`(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
`Peter E. Davis (SBN 320256)
`555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
`Tel: 202.637.2200 / Fax: 202.637.2200
`Email: roman.martinez@lw.com
`Email: daniel.meron@lw.com
`Email: charles.dameron@lw.com
`Email: peter.davis@lw.com
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
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`CASE NUMBER: 3:21-cv-01833-BTM-MDD
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 2
`A.
`Correll Lacks Article III Standing To Pursue This Case ..................... 2
`B.
`Correll’s Complaint Fails On The Merits Because
`Amazon’s Initiatives Do Not Violate The Unruh Act ......................... 6
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 10
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Angelucci v. Century Supper Club,
`158 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2007) ...................................................................................... 6
`Bradley v. T-Mobile US, Inc.,
`2020 WL 1233924 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020) ..................................................... 5
`Braunstein v. Arizona Department of Transportation,
`683 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) .............................................................................. 2
`Candelore v. Tinder, Inc.,
`19 Cal. App. 5th 1138 (2019) ............................................................................... 8
`Carroll v. Nakatani,
`342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................ 2, 3, 5
`Diamond v. Charles,
`476 U.S. 54 (1986) ............................................................................................... 6
`Georges v. Bank of America, N.A.,
`845 F. App’x 490 (9th Cir. 2021) ......................................................................... 7
`Heckler v. Mathews,
`465 U.S. 728 (1984) ............................................................................................. 6
`Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc.,
`242 Cal. App. 4th 1386 (2015) ............................................................................. 6
`Koire v. Metro Car Wash,
`707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985) .............................................................................. 1, 2, 6
`Namisnak v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
`971 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 5
`Northeast Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City
`of Jacksonville,
`508 U.S. 656 (1993) ................................................................................. 2, 3, 5, 6
`Opiotennione v. Facebook, Inc.,
`2020 WL 5877667 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020) ........................................................ 5
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`Planned Parenthood of Greater Washington & North Idaho v. U.S. Department of
`Health & Human Services,
`946 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 3
`Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
`523 U.S. 83 (1998) ........................................................................................... 1, 4
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ......................................................................................... 1
`Vargas v. Facebook, Inc.,
`2021 WL 214206 (N.D. Cal. Jan 21, 2021) ......................................................... 5
`White v. Square, Inc.,
`446 P.3d 276 (Cal. 2019) .................................................................................. 2, 4
`White v. Square, Inc.,
`891 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................................................. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
`STATUTES
`15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(1) ................................................................................................. 7
`15 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(1) .............................................................................................. 8
`Cal. Educ. Code § 71028 ........................................................................................... 9
`Cal. Gov’t Code § 12100.61(b) ................................................................................. 8
`Cal. Gov’t Code § 12100.61(i) .................................................................................. 9
`Cal. Gov’t Code § 12100.63(h)(2)............................................................................. 8
`Cal. Ins. Code § 927.2(a)(1) .................................................................................... 10
`Cal. Ins. Code § 10140 ............................................................................................ 10
`Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25230(b)(2) ............................................................................ 9
`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8281(a) ............................................................................ 7, 10
`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8281(b)(1)(A) ...................................................................... 10
`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8283(a) .................................................................................. 8
`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8283(b) .................................................................................. 8
`CASE NUMBER: 3:21-cv-01833-BTM-MDD
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`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiff Jonathan Correll is eager to argue about anything except the legal
`issues presented by Amazon’s motion to dismiss. His Opposition, which mainly
`reiterates the allegations in his complaint, purports to vindicate “disfavored” sellers.
`But Correll’s arguments are unfounded. Amazon does not prevent any seller from
`using its stores on the basis of their race, gender, or sexual orientation. Rather,
`Amazon has implemented initiatives designed to help customers access a diverse
`range of sellers. For example, Amazon allows Amazon Business customers to
`search for sellers
`that meet
`their specific needs.
` Amazon also helps
`underrepresented businesses—including veteran-, women-, and minority-owned
`small businesses—get their start in Amazon’s stores. What is at issue here is whether
`Correll’s disagreement with these initiatives gives rise to a cognizable claim under
`the Unruh Act. For the reasons Amazon has explained, it does not.
`Correll’s Opposition does not show why his complaint should survive
`dismissal. He tries to rebut Amazon’s Article III standing argument largely by
`pointing to a decision regarding statutory standing under the Unruh Act. But that is
`a red herring: Statutory standing is fundamentally different from Article III
`standing. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998).
`And the dispute here concerns Article III standing. To demonstrate Article III
`standing, Correll must show “an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and
`actual or imminent.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021).
`He has not done so. Instead, Correll’s only argument about Article III standing rests
`on readily distinguishable precedent.
`Correll’s Unruh Act claims also fail on the merits, as a matter of law.
`Amazon’s efforts to foster a diversity of choice are specifically and expressly
`encouraged by numerous provisions of California and federal law. Because
`Amazon’s initiatives are consistent with established public policy, they do not
`violate the Unruh Act. See MTD 13-23; Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195,
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`198 (Cal. 1985). Correll ignores most of the statutory provisions articulating this
`public policy, and focuses instead (at 17-18) on three California pro-diversity laws
`he characterizes as inapposite. He is wrong. Each of those statutes strongly
`reinforces the public-policy interests supporting Amazon’s actions. Further,
`Correll’s failure to dispute the myriad other policies and statutes cited in Amazon’s
`motion speaks volumes. He has no response because California and federal policy
`clearly encourage Amazon to do precisely what it is doing. Correll’s Unruh Act
`claims therefore fail as a matter of law.
`ARGUMENT
`A. Correll Lacks Article III Standing To Pursue This Case
`Correll’s standing argument rests on two decisions that are inapposite. See
`Opp. 7-9 (citing White v. Square, Inc., 446 P.3d 276 (Cal. 2019) and White v. Square,
`Inc., 891 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2018)). One addresses statutory standing under
`California law—not Article III standing. It is therefore irrelevant, because Amazon
`is not challenging Correll’s statutory standing at this stage of the litigation. Although
`the other case addresses Article III standing, Correll misinterprets its holding in a
`way that violates settled precedent from the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit. It is
`also factually distinguishable. Correll’s failure to allege Article III injury in fact
`requires dismissal of his case.
`To establish Article III injury in fact, Correll must show that Amazon’s
`actions “personally denied [him] equal treatment.” Braunstein v. Az. Dep’t of
`Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). It is not enough to
`allege an initiative rooted in “racial classification”; a plaintiff “must establish
`standing through showing a particularized denial of equal treatment.” Carroll v.
`Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 946 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). When a plaintiff
`argues that a defendant’s policy deprives him of the ability “to compete on an equal
`footing,” he must show that he was “‘able and ready’” to compete. Id. at 941, 942
`(quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
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`Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)). “It is a plaintiff’s ability and readiness”
`that “ensures an injury-in-fact is concrete and particular; the requirement precludes
`the airing of generalized grievances.” Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N.
`Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020).
`Correll does not meet that standard. He does not argue that he was “able and
`ready” to sell products in Amazon’s store: He offers no facts about his business (if
`any), the kinds of products he might sell, and whether he was even ready to sell his
`unspecified goods. Instead, Correll asserts he has standing merely because he visited
`Amazon’s store “with the intent to use Amazon’s internet-based sales services” and
`“encountered” Amazon’s diversity initiatives. Compl. ¶ 43; Opp. 7-10. A
`hypothetical “intent” does not confer Article III standing. See MTD 7-10. In
`Carroll, the plaintiff wanted “to obtain a loan to start a copy shop,” but was barred
`by the defendant’s policy excluding non-Native Hawaiians. 342 F.3d at 941.
`Although the Ninth Circuit credited plaintiff’s “legitimate intention to apply for a
`loan,” it held that such “intention” did not confer standing. Id. at 942 (emphasis
`added). Rather, the plaintiff had to show that he was “able and ready” to compete
`for the loan—and his “materially deficient” application and absence of “work
`history” prevented him from meeting that standard. Id. Correll likewise fails to
`show that he was “able and ready” to sell anything in Amazon’s store.
`Rather than address these points, Correll relies on two inapposite decisions
`arising from different stages of the same case. The plaintiff in White v. Square was
`a bankruptcy attorney who tried signing up for Square’s payment-processing service
`for his bankruptcy practice, but could not do so because Square’s terms of service
`barred bankruptcy attorneys. 891 F.3d at 1175-76. The attorney brought an Unruh
`Act claim against Square. Id. at 1176. The Ninth Circuit determined the plaintiff
`had Article III standing. It explained that the plaintiff was a bankruptcy attorney
`who “sought to use Square’s services, but was unable to do so because of its
`discriminatory policy against bankruptcy attorneys.” Id. at 1176-77. It found that
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`the plaintiff was personally “denied equal treatment solely because of [his]
`membership in a disfavored group,” and “state law can create interests that support
`standing in federal courts.” Id. at 1177 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit then
`certified to the California Supreme Court the question whether the plaintiff had
`statutory standing under the Unruh Act—i.e., whether the Act, as matter of state law,
`empowered the plaintiff to bring his claim. The California Supreme Court held the
`answer was yes. It explained that a person ordinarily has Unruh Act statutory
`standing when he visits a business or website “with an intent to use its services but
`encounters an exclusionary policy that prevents him or her from using those
`services.” 446 P.3d at 277. The upshot was that a plaintiff need not “violate or
`attempt to violate the stated exclusionary policy before bringing a claim.” Id. at 281.
`Correll contends (at 7) that those two decisions are “controlling” because
`Correll is “similarly situated” to the plaintiff there. He argues those decisions give
`him standing to sue based solely on his allegation that he visited Amazon’s store
`with the intent to use its services and encountered Amazon’s diversity initiatives.
`Correll misunderstands Amazon’s standing argument and misreads the decisions.
`First, the California Supreme Court’s Square decision focused on statutory
`standing—i.e., whether the Unruh Act gives Correll a cause of action. That statutory
`inquiry “has nothing to with whether there is a case or controversy under Article
`III.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 97. At this stage, Amazon has not disputed Correll’s
`statutory standing. What is in dispute is whether Correll has Article III standing,
`that is, whether he has suffered an injury that would permit him to bring his asserted
`cause of action in federal court. MTD 6. Correll’s claim (at 8 n.3) that Amazon’s
`motion should have cited a decision that concerned a type of standing that neither
`party contests at this juncture is wrong.
`Second, the Ninth Circuit’s Square decision—which does address Article III
`standing—is factually inapposite. In Square, the plaintiff satisfied the Supreme
`Court and Ninth Circuit’s “able and ready” test, because he was plainly prepared to
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`use Square’s service: He properly alleged that he was a practicing “bankruptcy
`attorney” and “sought to use” Square’s service to collect payments for an established
`“bankruptcy practice.” 891 F.3d at 1176-77. Here, however, Correll has offered no
`allegations about any purported business, interest, or experience in selling products.
`And, unlike in Square, Amazon has not barred Correll from participating as an
`Amazon seller. Cf. Namisnak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 971 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir.
`2020) (plaintiff need not download Uber app to challenge “categorical” denial of
`service to disabled but would need to do so to challenge alleged refusal to provide
`service on “equivalent terms”). In fact, there was no impediment to Correll
`becoming a seller except his purported distaste for Amazon’s initiatives.
`Correll’s interpretation of the Ninth Circuit’s Square decision also treats that
`decision as inconsistent with settled precedent. As explained, Carroll rejected
`Correll’s argument (at 7) that a mere “intent” to obtain a benefit subject to a “racial
`classification” is enough to confer standing. 342 F.3d at 942, 947. Yet on Correll’s
`reading of Square, the plaintiff in Carroll would have automatically had standing,
`despite his lack of ability or readiness to apply for a loan. Correll does not reconcile
`his unsupported reading of Square with Carroll, or with the long line of Supreme
`Court and Ninth Circuit decisions applying the “able and ready” standard. See, e.g.,
`City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666; see also MTD 8-9 & n.6.1
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`1 District courts have correctly applied Carroll to similar claims after Square.
`In Opiotennione v. Facebook, Inc., the court held that the “able and ready” standard
`governs Unruh Act claims “based on the denial of the opportunity to obtain a
`benefit.” 2020 WL 5877667, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020). There, the plaintiff
`claimed that Facebook had denied her “full and equal access” to its service by
`denying her “advertisements and information due to her age and gender.” Id. at *1,
`*5. Citing Carroll, and distinguishing Square on its facts, the court explained that
`the plaintiff lacked standing because she had not alleged she was “able and ready”
`to obtain the benefits at issue. Id. at *4. Two other courts reached the same
`conclusion in similar cases without citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Square.
`Vargas v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 214206, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2021); Bradley
`v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 2020 WL 1233924, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020). Correll’s
`novel suggestion that Square sub silentio changed the governing legal test is
`baseless.
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`Applying the “able and ready” standard is critical to ensure that Correll has
`suffered the “concrete” and “particularized” injury required by Article III. If Correll
`is unable or unprepared to compete as a seller in Amazon’s stores, then he could not
`possibly be “denied equal treatment solely because of [his] membership in a
`disfavored group.” Square, 891 F.3d at 1177 (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.
`728, 739 (1984)); City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 666 (“injury in fact” from “denial
`of equal treatment” requires plaintiff to show he is “able and ready” to compete and
`“a discriminatory policy prevents [him] from doing so on an equal basis”).
`If Correll’s theory were credited and an “intent” to pursue a service or benefit
`sufficed, courts would be flooded with lawsuits from parties with no personal stake
`in the outcome. Indeed, any company with a program advancing diversity in
`employment or contracting—which is to say, many American corporations—could
`face federal lawsuits from those unable and unprepared to apply for a job or bid for
`a contract. The result would be what Article III forbids: the use of the federal courts
`to “vindicate value interests,” not redress personal harms. Diamond v. Charles, 476
`U.S. 54, 66 (1986).
`At base, Correll has alleged the type of “generalized grievance” that, for good
`reason, does not confer Article III standing. His case must be dismissed.
`B. Correll’s Complaint Fails On The Merits Because Amazon’s
`Initiatives Do Not Violate The Unruh Act
`Correll’s Opposition also fails to rebut Amazon’s merits argument. The
`Unruh Act prohibits “arbitrary, invidious discrimination” that violates “state and
`national policy.” Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, 158 P.3d 718, 721 (Cal. 2007);
`see also Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1395
`(2015) (“[T]he Act renders unlawful only arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable
`discrimination.”). And it is well established that there is an exception to Unruh Act
`liability where the conduct at issue is backed by a “strong public policy.” Koire, 707
`P.2d at 198. As Amazon explained, the initiatives about which Correll complains
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`are consistent with California and federal statutes establishing a strong public policy
`of “aid[ing] the interests of women, minority, disabled veteran, and LGBT business
`enterprises in order to preserve . . . free competitive enterprise[.]” Cal. Pub.
`Util. Code § 8281(a); see 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(1); MTD 13-19. The Unruh Act’s
`public-policy exception therefore disposes of Correll’s claims as a matter of law.
`1. Correll first responds by trying to reframe Amazon’s legal argument as a
`factual dispute. He emphasizes (at 12-13) that “this case is in its nascent pleadings
`stage,” and asserts that “the Complaint is replete with allegations” that Amazon’s
`conduct “is arbitrary, unreasonable, and invidious.” This argument misses the point:
`The issue is whether Amazon’s alleged conduct is backed by identifiable public-
`policy interests. See Georges v. Bank of Am., N.A., 845 F. App’x 490, 491-92 (9th
`Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of Unruh Act claim on public policy grounds). That
`is a question of law, not fact. As discussed at length in Amazon’s motion, Amazon’s
`initiatives comport with established California and federal policies fostering the
`growth of underrepresented businesses. Correll may disagree with these policy
`choices, but his disagreement does not transform a legal issue into a factual dispute.
`2. Next, Correll argues (at 16) that there “is no strong public policy as
`evidenced in any statutory or legislative enactments cited by Amazon that favors a
`business categorically denying its services to another business based on that other
`business owner’s race, sex, or sexual orientation.” That is a straw man: Correll does
`not, and cannot, allege that Amazon categorically denied him services. And Amazon
`is not asserting that any public-policy interest supports the “categorical[]” denial of
`its “services” on the basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation.
`Instead, Amazon’s public-policy argument addresses Correll’s allegations
`that Amazon gives advantageous treatment to certain sellers by spotlighting certain
`businesses, permitting Amazon Business customers to search for sellers with third-
`party diversity certifications, and providing technical and financial assistance to
`Black-owned businesses through its Black Business Accelerator program. MTD 19-
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`23. California and federal law have made the clear policy choice to encourage these
`types of initiatives.2 As Amazon discussed at length in its motion, California
`expressly requires state utilities to identify “methods for encouraging both prime
`contractors and grantees to engage women, minority, disabled veteran, and LGBT
`business enterprises in subcontracts.” Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8283(b). To implement
`that policy, the California Public Utilities Commission oversees a “clearinghouse”
`of businesses that are certified as minority-owned, through which participating
`utilities may search for qualified suppliers by ethnicity or gender, see MTD 14.
`Likewise, California law directs the California Office of the Small Business
`Advocate to “prioritize [grant] funding for applications . . . that propose new or
`enhanced services to underserved business groups, including women, minority, and
`veteran-owned businesses.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12100.63(h)(2). And California law
`similarly directs the Office of Small Business Advocate to “collaborate with . . .
`programs” operated by federal agencies, including the “Minority Business
`Development Agency Center,” to provide “a seamless network of . . . programs,
`services, and activities that benefit small businesses.” Id. § 12110.61(b). The
`Minority Business Development Agency, which is directed by Congress to provide
`“financial assistance” for the ultimate support of “minority business enterprises,” 15
`U.S.C. § 9007(b)(1), is an advisory partner in Amazon’s Black Business Accelerator
`program. See MTD 21.3
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`2 The existence of state and federal statutory provisions precisely supporting
`Amazon’s particular policies distinguishes this case from Candelore v. Tinder, Inc.,
`19 Cal. App. 5th 1138 (2019), which concerned age-discriminatory pricing on a
`dating app. There, the court recognized that Tinder’s “age-based price discounts”
`must be “justified by social policy considerations evidenced in legislative
`enactments.” Id. at 1149. But Tinder failed to point to any legislation in favor of
`“increasing patronage among those under the age of 30 who may be interested in the
`premium features of an online dating app.” Id. at 1153. Here, California law
`specifically endorses measures to encourage the growth of underrepresented
`businesses, and Amazon’s initiatives are consistent with those state policy choices.
`Correll’s reliance on Candelore (at 15-16) is therefore misplaced.
`3 These statutes impose diversity requirements on private businesses, see, e.g.,
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`Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 8283(a), and direct funding to minority-owned businesses
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`Tellingly, Correll fails to address these statutory provisions and programs.
`Instead, Correll seizes on three other statutory provisions (at 17-18) that Amazon
`cited in a footnote, and insists that while these statutory provisions broadly evidence
`a public-policy interest in “fostering diversity,” Opp. 17, they do not provide public-
`policy support for Amazon’s
`initiatives.
` Specifically, although Correll
`acknowledges (at 17-18) that these provisions set “goals to increase diversity” and
`allow regulated parties to “track the diversity of contractors,” he argues that these
`provisions are inapposite because they do not “discriminat[e] against any group
`bearing certain protected personal characteristics.” Correll is incorrect. Amazon’s
`diversity initiatives help facilitate its customers’ diversity goals by, among other
`things, allowing them to “track the diversity of contractors,” without denying anyone
`the ability to sell products in Amazon’s stores on the basis of their protected
`characteristics. Correll points, for example, to Cal. Educ. Code § 71028, arguing
`that it is inapposite because it sets forth contracting-diversity goals for California’s
`community colleges. But Amazon’s initiatives facilitate those goals. It is far easier
`for California’s community colleges to meet their contracting-diversity goals if they
`can identify underrepresented sellers through programs like Amazon’s guided-
`buying program. Amazon’s initiatives also mirror the “clearinghouse database” for
`minority-owned businesses, which California makes available for use in “tracking
`the diversity of contractors,” Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25230(b)(2).
`Amazon also relied on numerous other statutory provisions that specifically
`encourage its initiatives, including its Black Business Accelerator, see MTD 21-22,
`which Correll has declined to address. Correll’s explanation (at 17) for that
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`through partnerships with private “corporate social responsibility programs,” among
`others, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12100.61(i). Correll’s argument (at 18 n.7) that many of
`the statutes referenced in the motion to dismiss impose diversity requirements on
`government agencies is of no moment: Amazon’s customers include state and
`federal government agencies, and Amazon’s initiatives help government agencies
`subject to contracting-diversity laws to identify minority-owned contractors.
`Moreover, Correll has identified no reason why California would encourage
`diversity in public-sector contracting but not in private-sector contracting.
`California law encourages diversity in both contexts.
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`omission—that he “has insufficient pages” to analyze those statutes—does not hold
`up. Correll included no r