Filed 11/6/23 P. v. Cardenas CA6
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`NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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`California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
`publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
`or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
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`IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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`SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
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` H050411
` (Santa Clara County
` Super. Ct. No. 113917)
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`THE PEOPLE,
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`Plaintiff and Respondent,
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`v.
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`RAYMOND ANTHONY CARDENAS,
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`Defendant and Appellant.
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`In December 1986, Raymond Anthony Cardenas stabbed his ex-girlfriend Melissa
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`Rainey to death with a knife after hiding in the backseat of her car. Cardenas, 20 years
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`old at the time, was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 with a
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`lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and personal use of a deadly
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`weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)). He was ultimately sentenced to life in prison
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`without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
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`In June 2022, Cardenas filed a motion for an evidence preservation hearing
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`(motion) pursuant to section 1203.01 and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
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`(Franklin), seeking to make a record of mitigating evidence connected to his youth. The
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`trial court denied the motion, holding that Cardenas is statutorily ineligible for such a
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`hearing pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (h), because he was sentenced to LWOP for
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`a controlling offense committed after he was 18 years of age.
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`1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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`On appeal, Cardenas concedes, as he did in the trial court, that section 3051,
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`subdivision (h), categorically excludes individuals such as himself from the youth
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`offender parole hearing he seeks. He argues, however, that the statute is unconstitutional
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`because it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and California
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`Constitutions by excluding youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP, but allowing youthful
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`offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP to obtain a hearing.
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`We disagree and affirm.
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`I. DISCUSSION2
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`A. Applicable law and standard of review
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`1. Section 3051
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`In 2014, the Legislature enacted section 3051, “[i]n response to a series of
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`decisions addressing Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile sentencing,” such as Miller v.
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`Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48. (People v.
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`Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 197-198 (Sands), citing Sen. Bill No. 260 (2013-2014
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`Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2013, ch. 312, §§ 1, 4; In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980-
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`981, & fn. 6 (In re Trejo).) “In its current form, the statute provides an opportunity for
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`release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes
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`committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration,
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`depending on the sentence imposed for their ‘ “[c]ontrolling offense.” ’ ” (Sands, supra,
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`at p. 198, quoting § 3051, subds. (a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4).) A “controlling offense” is defined
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`as the offense or enhancement of which the sentencing court imposed the longest term of
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`imprisonment. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
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`Section 3051 thus was originally enacted “ ‘explicitly to bring juvenile sentencing
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`into conformity with Graham [and] Miller’ as well as decisions from the California
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`2 We omit a further statement of facts, as this appeal does not raise any issues
`concerning the facts of the underlying offenses beyond those already summarized above.
`(People v. Mendez (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 347, 351, fn. 2.)
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`2
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`Supreme Court.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, quoting Franklin, supra, 63
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`Cal.4th 261, 277.) As the Legislature explained, “recent developments in neuroscience
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`showed that ‘youthfulness both lessens a juvenile’s moral culpability and enhances the
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`prospect that, as a youth matures into an adult and neurological development occurs,’
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`such individuals can, by demonstrating rehabilitation and maturity, become contributing
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`members of society.” (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing Sen. Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg.
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`Sess.), Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1.)
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`Initially, section 3051 “limited eligibility for youth offender parole hearings to
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`juvenile offenders (although it excluded juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility
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`of parole).” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, citing People v. Morales (2021) 67
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`Cal.App.5th 326, 346 (Morales).) “However, the Legislature later amended it to apply to
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`most offenders who committed crimes before the age of 23, and then before the age of
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`26.” (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing In re Trejo, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 981, fn. 6;
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`Sen. Bill No. 261 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1; Sen. Bill No. 394
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`(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.)
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`“In broadening the statute’s reach, our Legislature again cited recent developments
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`in neuroscience that indicate the maturity process does not end at 18 and that, in many
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`cases, brain development involved in decision making and impulse control extends into
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`one’s early 20s.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, citing People v. Acosta (2021)
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`60 Cal.App.5th 769, 776-777 (Acosta); In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 434
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`(Williams).) “The Legislature also amended section 3051 to allow parole hearings, in
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`their 25th year of imprisonment, for juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of
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`parole for crimes committed before age 18.” (Sands, supra, at p. 198, citing § 3051,
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`subd. (b)(4); Sen Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5.) “That
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`amendment was aimed at remedying unconstitutional juvenile sentences without the need
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`for an expensive and time-consuming resentencing hearing.” (Sands, supra, at p. 198,
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`citing Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 347 [citations].)
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`3
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`Following these amendments, section 3051, subdivision (h), “continues to exclude
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`certain categories of youthful offenders from the youth offender parole hearing process.”
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`(Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 199, citing Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.)
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`Specifically, “[t]he process is unavailable to offenders ‘sentenced to life in prison without
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`the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had
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`attained 18 years of age.’ ” (Sands, supra, at p. 199, citing § 3051, subd. (h).)3
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`2. Equal protection principles
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`Constitutional guarantees of equal protection ensure that “the government does not
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`treat a group of people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Chatman
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`(2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288 (Chatman), citing People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172,
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`1207 [“ ‘[E]qual protection safeguards against the arbitrary denial of benefits to a certain
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`defined class of individuals.’ ”].)4 To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
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`“first must show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more
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`3 Section 3051, subdivision (h) provides in its entirety: “This section shall not
`apply to cases in which sentencing occurs pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b)
`to (i), inclusive, of Section 667, or Section 667.61, or to cases in which an individual is
`sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that
`was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age. This section shall not apply
`to an individual to whom this section would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to
`attaining 26 years of age, commits an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a
`necessary element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.”
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`4 Both the state and federal Constitutions provide for equal protection of law.
`(Chatman, supra, at p. 287; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)
`Although the California Supreme Court’s “analysis of state constitutional requirements
`sometimes deviates from how comparable federal requirements are analyzed, our
`precedent has not distinguished the state and federal guarantees of equal protection for
`claims arising from allegedly unequal consequences associated with different types of
`criminal offenses.” (Chatman, supra, at p. 287, citing Johnson v. Department of Justice
`(2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 (Johnson), People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199-
`1201; see also, People v. Laird (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 [“The California equal
`protection clause offers substantially similar protection to the federal equal protection
`clause.”].)
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`4
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`similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27
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`Cal.4th 537, 568; see also People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836 (Wilkinson).)
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`“This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but
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`‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ [Citation.]”
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`(Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) If the classification at issue
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`affects similarly situated groups unequally, and does not involve a suspect class or a
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`fundamental right, we inquire whether the classification is “ ‘rationally related to a
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`legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” (Wilkinson, supra, at p. 836, quoting Clark v. Jeter
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`(1988) 486 U.S. 456, 461.)5
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`“A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that
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`no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. [Citations.] The
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`underlying rationale for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ “ever actually
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`articulated” ’ by lawmakers, and it does not need to ‘ “be empirically substantiated.” ’
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`[Citation.] Nor does the logic behind a potential justification need to be persuasive or
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`sensible—rather than simply rational. [Citation.]” (Chatman, supra, at p. 289.)
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`We review a defendant’s equal protection claim de novo. (Morales, supra, 67
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`Cal.App.5th at p. 345.)
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`B. Analysis
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`Cardenas argues that section 3051, subdivision (h), violates equal protection
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`because it excludes youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP such as himself, but allows
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`youthful offenders sentenced to de facto LWOP to obtain parole hearings. According to
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`Cardenas, “there is no significant difference between a sentence of LWOP and a de facto
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`LWOP sentence of, for example, 100 years to life.” He cites a number of cases which
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`5 Cardenas argues the strict scrutiny standard applies to this court’s equal
`protection analysis. We disagree. (See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 838 [no
`fundamental interest in specific term of imprisonment or designation that a particular
`crime receives.].)
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`5
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`have recognized that certain lengthy terms-of-years sentences are the functional
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`equivalent to LWOP, albeit without that precise label: People v. Caballero (2012) 55
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`Cal.4th 262, 268 [100-year sentence]; Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 275-276 [50
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`years to life]; Moore v. Biter (9th Cir. 2013) 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 [254-year sentence];
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`People v. Lewis (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 108, 119 [115-year aggregate sentence]; People
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`v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 63 [84 years to life]. Cardenas contends that
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`“there is no rational basis for concluding that an 18 to 25 year old sentenced to LWOP
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`poses a greater threat of recidivism or danger to public safety than an 18 to 25 year old
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`sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence.”
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`We acknowledge the current split between appellate districts on the “similarly
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`situated” question, but we begin by assuming without deciding that individuals who are
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`subject to LWOP sentences for controlling offenses committed between the ages of 18
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`and 25 are similarly situated with individuals who are subject to de facto LWOP
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`sentences for controlling offenses committed between the ages of 18 and 25. (Sands,
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`supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 203; see also, Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 778-779;
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`but see In re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th 427 [youthful offenders sentenced to
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`LWOP not similarly situated to those sentenced to de facto LWOP].)
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`We next address whether the Legislature had a rational basis for the disparate
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`treatment of these similarly situated groups. The majority of cases that have considered
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`similar equal protection challenges have concluded the Legislature did have a rational
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`basis. For instance, in In re Williams, a 21-year old was sentenced to two consecutive
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`LWOP terms for shooting and killing two men during a robbery. (In re Williams, supra,
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`57 Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) The court stated: “The Legislature has prescribed an LWOP
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`sentence for only a small number of crimes. These are the crimes the Legislature deems
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`so morally depraved and so injurious as to warrant a sentence that carries no hope of
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`release for the criminal and no threat of recidivism for society. In excluding LWOP
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`inmates from youth offender parole hearings, the Legislature reasonably could have
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`6
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`decided that youthful offenders who have committed such crimes—even with diminished
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`culpability and increased potential for rehabilitation—are nonetheless still sufficiently
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`culpable and sufficiently dangerous to justify lifetime incarceration.” (Id. at p. 436.)
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`Other courts have similarly rejected equal protection challenges to section 3051,
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`subdivision (h): Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781; People v. Jackson (2021) 61
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`Cal.App.5th 189, 199–200; Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 347–349; Sands,
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`supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 204–205; People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 127
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`(Ngo), review granted May 17, 2023, S279458.
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`Cardenas relies on the lone case to have reached the opposite conclusion: People
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`v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273 (Hardin), review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487.
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`In Hardin, the defendant was convicted of special circumstance felony murder for a
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`crime committed when he was 25 years old, and was sentenced to LWOP. (Id. at pp. 277,
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`279.) The court found no rational basis for distinguishing between youthful offenders
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`sentenced to LWOP and other youthful offenders because the “superficially plausible
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`justification” of assessing relative culpability by excluding some offenders “is belied by
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`the statutory provisions that allow such a hearing for individuals who have committed
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`multiple violent crimes (albeit not special circumstance murder) and were sentenced to a
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`technically parole-eligible indeterminate state prison term that is the functional equivalent
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`of life without parole. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 289.)
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`Any distinction in culpability between those sentenced to LWOP and those who
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`receive parole-eligible indeterminate life sentences is “illusory,” the court explained.
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`(Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 290.) “In sum, while for some purposes it might be
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`reasonable to view special circumstance murder differently from murder with no special
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`circumstance finding, that is not a rational basis for the distinction in eligibility for a
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`youth offender parole hearing made by section 3051.” (Ibid.)
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`In Ngo, Division Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the
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`analysis in Hardin and explained why it declined to follow it: “The Legislature could
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`rationally distinguish between youthful offenders with de jure and de facto LWOP
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`sentences.” (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 126.) “A de jure LWOP sentence provides
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`a bright-line test. Moreover, using a special circumstance as a bright-line test of
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`culpability is well-established. By contrast, there is no established test of the culpability
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`of a youthful offender with a de facto LWOP sentence.” (Ibid.) The court also rejected
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`the implicit determination in Hardin that a de facto LWOP sentence is an equivalent
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`bright-line test, noting that, “in light of the many combinations of circumstances that
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`could result in a de facto LWOP sentence, [the Legislature] could rationally leave the
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`assessment of the culpability of such an offender up to a future Board.” (Ibid.)
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`The Ngo court further explained a possible rational basis for the distinction drawn
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`by the Legislature: “[Murder with special circumstances] is the most heinous crime
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`known to our Penal Code, and one of the few crimes subject to the death penalty in
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`California. (§ 190; see also §§ 37 [treason], 128 [procuring execution of innocent person
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`by perjury], 219 [train wrecking causing death].) In Graham, the Supreme Court held
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`that ‘for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids
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`the sentence of life without parole.’ [Citation.] It recognized that murder is different:
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`‘Although an offense like robbery or rape is “a serious crime deserving serious
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`punishment,” [citation], those crimes differ from homicide crimes in a moral sense.’
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`[Citation.] Thus, in a homicide case, it allowed a life without parole sentence for a
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`juvenile offender, as ‘a risk to society for the rest of his life,’ despite its concern in
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`nonhomicide cases about the difficulty of determining whether a juvenile is incorrigible.
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`[Citation.]” (Ngo, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 123-124.) Likewise, the court added,
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`“first degree murder with a special circumstance differs from ordinary first degree murder
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`in a moral sense. ‘It is the prerogative, indeed the duty, of the Legislature to recognize
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`degrees of culpability when drafting a Penal Code.’ [Citation.]” (Ngo, supra, at p. 124,
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`citing Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 840.)
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`8
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`We agree with our colleagues’ analysis in Ngo and will deny Cardenas’s equal
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`protection claim.
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`“We find a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship
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`between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose. [Citation.]
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`This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law is deemed to lack even
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`the minimal rationality necessary for it to survive constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a
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`rebuttable presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar helps ensure that
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`democratically enacted laws are not invalidated merely based on a court’s cursory
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`conclusion that a statute’s tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair. [Citations.]” (Chatman,
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`supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 288–289.) “A classification in a statute is presumed rational until
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`the challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
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`conceivable. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 289.)
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`“When conducting rational basis review, we must accept any gross generalizations
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`and rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have made. A classification is
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`not arbitrary or irrational simply because there is an ‘imperfect fit between means and
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`ends.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 77 (Turnage).) “At bottom,
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`the Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences
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`of criminal offenses. [Citations.]” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.) “A statute is
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`presumed constitutional, [citation], and ‘the burden is on the one attacking the legislative
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`arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,’ [citation].”
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`(Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 320 (Heller).)
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`Applying these standards here, we conclude the Legislature had a rational basis for
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`excluding LWOP-sentenced youthful offenders from section 3051. As we have
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`summarized above, courts have focused on the Legislature’s intent to assign relative
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`culpability for offenses and a legislative determination that youthful offenders sentenced
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`to LWOP are especially incorrigible so as to not warrant a parole hearing. (See, e.g., In
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`re Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.)
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`9
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`The trial court’s order denying the motion is affirmed.
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`II. DISPOSITION
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`___________________________________
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`Wilson, J.
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`WE CONCUR:
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`______________________________________
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`Greenwood, P.J.
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`______________________________________
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` Grover, J.
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`People v. Cardenas
`H050411
`
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