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`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`JOSHUA S. LIPSHUTZ, SBN 242557
` jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com
`VICTORIA WEATHERFORD, SBN 267499
` vweatherford@gibsondunn.com
`NICHOLAS PARKER, SBN 297860
` nparker@gibsondunn.com
`555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
`San Francisco, CA 94105-0921
`Telephone:
`415.393.8200
`Facsimile:
`415.393.8306
`
`MICHAEL HOLECEK, SBN 281034
` mholecek@gibsondunn.com
`ANDREW WILHELM, SBN 302849
` awilhelm@gibsondunn.com
`333 South Grand Avenue
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
`Telephone:
`213.229.7000
`Facsimile:
`213.229.7520
`Attorneys for Defendant DOORDASH, INC.
`
`
`ELECTRONICALLY
`F I L E D
`
`Superior Court of California,
`County of San Francisco
`12/21/2020
`Clerk of the Court
`BY: JUDITH NUNEZ
`Deputy Clerk
`
`SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
`CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
`
`
`THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
`CALIFORNIA,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`DOORDASH, INC., and DOES 1 through 10,
`inclusive,
`
`Defendants.
`
` CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
`DEFENDANT DOORDASH, INC.’S NOTICE
`OF MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
`AND MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS;
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
`[[Proposed] Order filed concurrently herewith]
`Department 304
`Honorable Judge Anne-Christine Massullo
`
`SAC Filed: November 23, 2020
`Hearing Date: February 3, 2021
`Hearing Time: 9:15 a.m.
`Trial Date: None set
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`DOORDASH, INC.’S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
`
`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
`
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`
`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on February 3, 2021 at 9:15 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the
`matter may be heard before the Honorable Anne-Christine Massullo of the San Francisco Superior Court,
`Department 304, located at 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California 94102, Defendant DoorDash,
`Inc. will, and hereby does, move this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128(a) for an order
`staying proceedings in this action pending the completion of substantially similar litigation.
`DoorDash has demurred to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and asked the
`Court to dismiss this action in its entirety or hold it in abatement pursuant to the doctrine of exclusive
`concurrent jurisdiction. (See Demurrers at pp. 7–8.) If it does not do so, the Court nevertheless should
`exercise its “inherent power to stay [these] proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial
`efficiency” pending the resolution of Marciano v. DoorDash, Inc., No. CGC-18-567869 (S.F. Super.
`Ct.), a Private Attorneys General Act action before another department of the San Francisco Superior
`Court similarly alleging that workers who perform deliveries through DoorDash’s platform are
`misclassified as independent contractors, and seeking similar relief. (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo
`(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) Plaintiff will not suffer prejudice as a result of the requested stay.
`This Motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128(a), the common law rule
`of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, and the court’s inherent authority; it is based on this Notice and
`Motion to Stay Proceedings, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support
`thereof, DoorDash’s Demurrers to Plaintiff’s SAC and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
`other documents filed in support thereof, all records and pleadings on file with the Court in this matter,
`all other matters of which the Court may take judicial notice, and all further evidence and argument
`that may be presented in reply to any opposition to this Motion or at the hearing on the Motion.
`
`Dated: December 21, 2020
`
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`
`
`
`
`
`By:
`
`
`
`Joshua Lipshutz
`
`Attorneys for Defendant DOORDASH, INC.
`
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`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 5
`ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................................ 6
`A.
`The Doctrine of Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction Requires a Stay in This
`Action ............................................................................................................................ 6
`Alternatively, the Court Should Exercise Its Inherent Authority to Stay These
`Proceedings ................................................................................................................... 6
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 7
`
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`B.
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`DOORDASH, INC.’S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Arias v. Superior Court (2009)
`46 Cal.4th 969 ...................................................................................................................................5
`Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993)
`15 Cal.App.4th 800 ...........................................................................................................................6
`Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Cal. (2000)
`83 Cal.App.4th 677 ...........................................................................................................................6
`EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002)
`534 U.S. 279 ......................................................................................................................................7
`Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995)
`33 Cal.App.4th 1484 .....................................................................................................................5, 6
`Landis v. N. Am. Co. (1936)
`299 U.S. 248 ..................................................................................................................................5, 6
`Marciano v. DoorDash, Inc.,
`No. CGC-18-567869 (S.F. Super. Ct.) ..............................................................................................5
`Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997)
`16 Cal.4th 953 ...................................................................................................................................6
`Rynsburger v. Dairymen’s Fertilizer Coop., Inc. (1968)
`266 Cal.App.2d 269 ..........................................................................................................................7
`Sanchez v. Martinez (2020)
`54 Cal.App.5th 535 ...........................................................................................................................7
`Simmons v. Superior Court (1950)
`96 Cal. App. 2d 119 ..........................................................................................................................6
`Tavaglione v. Billings (1993)
`4 Cal.4th 1150 ...................................................................................................................................7
`Thomson v. Cont’l Ins. Co. (1967)
`66 Cal. 2d 738 ...................................................................................................................................6
`Walker v. Superior Court (1991)
`53 Cal.3d 257 ................................................................................................................................5, 6
`
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`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
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`INTRODUCTION
`DoorDash has demurred to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on the basis that
`Proposition 22 (“Prop 22”) abates this action and independently bars all of Plaintiff’s claims. (See
`Demurrers at pp. 11–19.) Alternatively, the Court should hold this case in abatement pursuant to the
`doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction pending resolution of Marciano v. DoorDash, Inc., No.
`CGC-18-567869 (S.F. Super. Ct.), a Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) action before another
`department of the San Francisco Superior Court similarly alleging that workers who perform deliveries
`on DoorDash’s platform (“Dashers”) are misclassified as independent contractors, and seeking similar
`relief. (See Demurrers at pp. 19–21.)
`If the Court does not dismiss this action in its entirety, or hold it in abatement pursuant to the
`doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, it nevertheless should exercise its discretion to stay these
`proceedings pending the resolution of Marciano, which is awaiting court approval of a class-action and
`PAGA settlement that would resolve the same unpaid wage claims of the same class members on whose
`behalf Plaintiff seeks restitution here, and that would “bind[] … the state.” (Arias v. Superior Court
`(2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 985–986 [“[T]he judgment in [a PAGA] action is binding … on government
`agencies.”].) This Court has inherent authority to manage its own docket to achieve efficiencies for
`itself, for counsel, and for litigants by staying these proceedings pending resolution of an earlier-filed
`action raising the same claims and addressing the same controversy asserted by Plaintiff here. (See,
`e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254; Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257,
`267; Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.)
`The passage of Proposition 22 (“Prop 22”) provides a compelling case for the Court to exercise
`its inherent authority. Whatever urgency Plaintiff may once have claimed in this suit has evaporated, as
`Plaintiff has acknowledged by withdrawing its motion for preliminary injunction. And even if Plaintiff
`(wrongly) claims that it may still seek some relief on behalf of Dashers for alleged historic violations
`of the repealed ABC worker classification test, that is precisely the relief the plaintiffs in Marciano are
`seeking for themselves—and that DoorDash has agreed to provide in a class-action and PAGA
`settlement of that case, in the amount of $88.5 million. A motion for preliminary approval of the
`revised settlement is pending before the Marciano court (Hon. Andrew Cheng). If this Court does not
`
`Gibson, Dunn &
`Crutcher LLP
`
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`DOORDASH, INC.’S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
`
`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
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`

`

`A.
`
`
`sustain DoorDash’s demurrers, it should still stay this action to conserve judicial and party resources,
`rather than permit it to proceed and risk inconsistent rulings and an impermissible double recovery.
`ARGUMENT
`The Doctrine of Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction Requires a Stay in This Action
`As explained in greater detail in DoorDash’s Demurrers to the SAC, if this action is not dismissed
`in its entirety, the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction mandates that it be held in abatement
`pending resolution of Marciano. (See Demurrers at pp. 19–21.)
`Alternatively, the Court Should Exercise Its Inherent Authority to Stay These Proceedings
`B.
`If the Court does not dismiss this action in its entirety, or hold it in abatement pending the
`resolution of Marciano pursuant to the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, it should stay these
`proceedings in an exercise of its inherent authority to control its own docket to achieve efficiencies for
`itself, for counsel, and for the parties. (See Landis, supra, 299 U.S. at p. 254 [“The power to stay
`proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes
`on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”]; see also
`Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [“It is … well established that courts
`have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power
`to control litigation before them.”]; Walker, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 267 [“[C]ourts have inherent
`authority to control their own calendars and dockets.”]; Simmons v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d
`119, 124 [the power to stay an action is predicated “upon principles of wisdom and justice, to prevent
`vexation, oppression and harassment, to prevent unnecessary litigation, and to prevent a multiplicity of
`suits”]; Freiberg, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489 [“Trial courts generally have the inherent power to
`stay proceedings in the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.”].)
`There is ample justification for this Court to exercise that authority here.
`First, as discussed in DoorDash’s Demurrers (at pp. 19–21), the factual and legal issues in this
`action and in Marciano are “substantially identical.” (Thomson v. Cont’l Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d
`738, 746.) A stay thus would avoid wasteful and duplicative litigation and guard against the “threat of
`inconsistent judgments.” (Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Cal. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
`677, 693; see also Caiafa Prof. Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
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`800, 804 [same]; Rynsburger v. Dairymen’s Fertilizer Coop., Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 269, 279
`[with overlapping actions, “restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings” and
`“to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory
`decisions relating to the same controversy”].)
`Second, allowing this action to proceed concurrently with Marciano would unnecessarily risk
`a double recovery by the hundreds of thousands of California Dashers who are included in the proposed
`Marciano settlement and on whose behalf Plaintiff purports to seek the same relief here. (See EEOC
`v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 296 [courts can and should preclude double recovery];
`Tavaglione v. Billings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1150, 1158–1159 [plaintiffs “not entitled to more than a single
`recovery for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence”]; Sanchez v. Martinez
`(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 535, 546 [“Double or duplicative recovery … amounts to overcompensation
`and is therefore prohibited,” quotation omitted].) The Marciano settlement would pay $88.5 million to
`the State and more than 380,000 Dashers, in exchange for the release of misclassification-related class
`and PAGA claims through December 31, 2020. Plaintiff’s overlapping action seeks restitution for the
`same Dashers in the same court for claims that allegedly accrued during the same time period.
`Third, Plaintiff cannot claim any prejudice from a temporary stay. The passage of Prop 22 has
`extinguished any right to prospective relief that Plaintiff may have once claimed here—as Plaintiff
`appears to have recognized in withdrawing the preliminary injunction motion—which means Plaintiff
`will not suffer any prejudice if this action is stayed until resolution of the Marciano proceedings.
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, if the Court does not dismiss this case in its entirety or hold it in
`abatement pursuant to the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, it should exercise its inherent
`authority to stay this case pending resolution of Marciano to conserve judicial resources by avoiding
`wasteful and duplicative litigation, inconsistent results, and the risk of a double recovery.
`
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`DOORDASH, INC.’S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
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`

`

`
`Dated: December 21, 2020
`
`
`
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`
`By:
`
`
`
`Joshua Lipshutz
`Attorneys for Defendant DoorDash, Inc.
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`CASE NO. CGC-20-584789
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`

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