`
`Filed 12/1/16
`
`IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
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`S033901
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`
`
`Los Angeles County
`Super. Ct. No. SA004363
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`
`)
`THE PEOPLE,
`)
`
`
`)
`
`Plaintiff and Respondent,
`)
`
`
`)
`
`v.
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`
`
`)
`CATHERINE THOMPSON,
`)
`
`)
`Defendant and Appellant.
`
` ____________________________________)
`
` A
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` jury in Los Angeles County Superior Court convicted defendant
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`Catherine Thompson on September 15, 1992, of both conspiracy to murder and the
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`first degree murder of her husband, Melvin ―Tom‖ Thompson. (Pen. Code,
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`§§ 182, 187; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
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`indicated). The jury also sustained a special circumstance allegation that
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`defendant committed the murder for financial gain. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) On
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`September 28, 1992, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence
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`presented by the parties, the jury set the penalty at death under the 1978 death
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`penalty law. (§ 190.1 et seq.) This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We
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`affirm the judgment in its entirety.
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`1
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`

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`A. Facts
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`I. GUILT PHASE
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`1. Financial Dealings Before the Murder
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`Melvin Thompson (Melvin) owned and operated Kayser Service and
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`Community Brake (hereafter Kayser Service), an auto repair shop in Santa
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`Monica, since 1982. Initially, he controlled the finances of his business. He had
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`separated from his wife, Mellie Thompson, in 1978, and they eventually divorced;
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`their marital dissolution agreement specified that Mellie could live in their jointly
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`owned home on South Sycamore Avenue until 1988, when their youngest child
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`would turn 18 years old, at which time either Melvin or Mellie would buy the
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`other out, or the house would be sold and they would split the proceeds.
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`Melvin and defendant married sometime after his divorce from Mellie, and
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`they bought a house together on Hillary Drive. Defendant eventually began
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`handling the finances of the Kayser Service business. From 1986 to 1988,
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`however, while working as an office manager at a business called Edith Ann‘s
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`Answering Service (hereafter Edith Ann), defendant incurred a debt to her
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`employer of more than $33,000.1 Defendant agreed to repay the amount and gave
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`Edith Ann a deed of trust on the Hillary Drive home on which she had forged her
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`husband‘s signature. Defendant did not tell him about the matter.
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`After paying $7,500 on the note she had given to Edith Ann, defendant
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`ceased payment and the house on Hillary Drive went into foreclosure in
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`September 1989. Tony DeGreef of BID Properties purchased the home and began
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`
`1
`In fact, defendant had embezzled the money from Edith Ann, but defendant
`avoided criminal prosecution by agreeing to repay the embezzled funds. The trial
`court initially ruled evidence of the embezzlement inadmissible at the guilt phase,
`but later admitted the evidence to show a motive for the murder, a decision
`defendant challenges on appeal. (See, post, pt. I.B.8.)
`
`2
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`

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`eviction proceedings. One of defendant‘s friends, Isabelle Sanders (Isabelle),
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`contacted DeGreef to discuss whether defendant could repurchase the home.
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`During these negotiations, defendant falsely told DeGreef that Isabelle was her
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`mother, and that defendant‘s husband was very ill and thus unavailable to
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`participate in the negotiations. In fact, defendant had instructed DeGreef not to
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`inform her husband about the foreclosure. Defendant told DeGreef she wanted to
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`buy back the house in her maiden name, Catherine Bazar, because of her bad
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`credit history. When DeGreef expressed concern that defendant did not have
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`sufficient funds to repurchase the home, she falsely told him she would be
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`receiving money from a trust and a life insurance policy. DeGreef agreed to rent
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`the home to defendant for $4,500 per month while they negotiated the terms of the
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`repurchase.
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`While this was occurring, Mellie Thompson was trying to purchase her ex-
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`husband Melvin‘s ownership interest in the South Sycamore Avenue house. At
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`the same time, in November 1989, defendant embarked on a fraudulent scheme to
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`obtain a loan using Mellie‘s South Sycamore Avenue home as collateral. To
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`facilitate the fraud, defendant obtained a temporary driver‘s license in Mellie
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`Thompson‘s name, and Isabelle‘s son, codefendant Phillip Sanders (hereafter
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`sometimes Phillip), obtained a temporary driver‘s license to pose as Melvin
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`Thompson. The two, along with Isabelle, met with Dorothy Reik, a mortgage
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`broker, and negotiated a refinancing of the South Sycamore Avenue house. Reik
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`testified that Isabelle appeared to be in charge of the negotiations and that she
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`introduced defendant and Phillip as ―Mellie and Melvin Thompson.‖ When Reik
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`noticed the temporary licenses, which had no photos, had been procured that very
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`day and that the listed weight for ―Melvin‖ was inconsistent with Phillip‘s
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`appearance, she was told the Thompsons recently lost their permanent licenses in a
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`robbery, and that ―Melvin‖ had been ill and lost some weight. When Reik
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`3
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`attempted to confirm this story by calling Kayser Service, a woman named ―Rene‖
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`answered the telephone and confirmed the robbery story. (Defendant‘s good
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`friend Rene Griffin testified, denying she ever told a loan representative the
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`Thompsons had been robbed, lost their identifications, or that Melvin had recently
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`lost weight.) Because they lacked photo identifications, Reik required
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`independent witnesses to verify the Thompsons‘ identity. This was provided by
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`Isabelle, her daughter, Carolyn Moore, and Isabelle‘s daughter-in-law, Carolyn
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`Sanders (Phillip‘s wife). Reik was satisfied, and defendant and Phillip, posing as
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`Mellie and Melvin Thompson, signed the loan papers in Reik‘s presence. Reik
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`later described the loan as a ―hard money‖ loan, based on the value of the South
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`Sycamore Avenue home and not the borrowers‘ creditworthiness.
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`Defendant and Phillip received $25,000 before escrow closed, and an
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`additional $27,822 thereafter. (The remainder of the $98,000 loan paid off the
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`first deed of trust and accrued property taxes on the South Sycamore Avenue
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`home.)
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`Around this same time, Isabelle approached Bruce Blum, an attorney, and
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`asked him whether he could help her ―daughter,‖ who allegedly had lost her house
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`in a foreclosure. Blum began working for defendant in December 1989 to help her
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`re-acquire the home on Hillary Drive. Defendant gave him a check for $20,000,
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`drawn on the Kayser Service account, to pay the rent on the home through April
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`1990. Defendant‘s poor credit prevented her from obtaining financing, so Blum
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`attempted to negotiate the sale in Isabelle‘s name. When that proved ineffective,
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`defendant obtained a driver‘s license and Social Security card in her maiden name,
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`Catherine Bazar, and attempted to obtain financing that way.2
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`2
`Blum testified he did not attempt to deceive BID Properties, and that
`defendant did not ask him to do so.
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`4
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`In March 1990, defendant (who introduced herself as Catherine Bazar),
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`along with Isabelle, met with mortgage broker David Yourist. Defendant told him
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`she wished to repurchase the Hillary Drive house, was married to a man who
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`operated an auto repair business, but that she would be taking title to the house in
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`her own name. On the application for the loan, she listed her bank as ―Community
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`Bank,‖ but the address and telephone number of the bank was, in fact, the address
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`and telephone number of Kayser Service. Yourist sent a request for verification of
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`deposit to a ―bank‖ at that address and received back confirmation that defendant
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`had money on deposit.
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`Yourist thereafter referred the matter to Jane Rogers, an escrow officer, to
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`prepare the paperwork for the sale. The terms of the loan required defendant to
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`put $42,500 down, with the remaining $412,500 to be financed by the bank and a
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`second mortgage carried by the seller. In lieu of defendant‘s payment, Rogers
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`received a copy of an assignment of proceeds from a life insurance policy to
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`Catherine Bazar, but Rogers never received any actual money and the sale did not
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`go through. Yourist later learned from the newspaper that the person he knew as
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`―Catherine Bazar‖ was, in fact, defendant Catherine Thompson. Rene Griffin later
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`denied representing herself to be the operations vice president of ―Community
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`Bank‖ and denied signing a verification of deposit for defendant in that capacity.
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`In December 1989, Mellie Thompson learned that her home on South
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`Sycamore Avenue had been refinanced without her knowledge or consent. She
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`sued her ex-husband, Melvin, defendant, and others for fraud.
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`2. Conspiracy to Commit Murder
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`Phillip Sanders lived in Sylmar with his wife, Carolyn Sanders (Carolyn).
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`Christine Kuretich met Carolyn in 1988 and the two became close friends. In mid-
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`May 1990, Kuretich moved in with the Sanderses and rented a room in their
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`5
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`house. From that time until the murder on June 14, 1990, Kuretich overheard
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`Phillip and Carolyn Sanders engage in several conversations concerning Melvin
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`Thompson‘s murder. Most of those conversations concerned killing him to obtain
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`proceeds of a life insurance policy. For example, Kuretich heard her housemates
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`say that defendant wanted her husband dead and would pay the Sanderses to
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`facilitate his murder. In addition, Carolyn told Kuretich that someone named
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`―Catherine‖ would pay the Sanderses ―thousands and thousands‖ of dollars to
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`have someone kill her husband, and asked Kuretich if she knew anyone who
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`would do the job. In June 1990, Kuretich took five or six telephone messages
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`from someone named Cathy, asking to speak to Phillip.
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`Shortly before June 14, 1990 (the day of the murder), Kuretich heard the
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`Sanderses say that Phillip himself was going to commit the murder because they
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`had already received—and spent—money intended as a down payment for the
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`killing, and they could not find anyone else to do the job. Carolyn Sanders‘s son,
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`Robert Jones, lived next door to them, and was present for some of these
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`conversations concerning the planned murder. According to Kuretich, Carolyn
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`asked Jones if he could procure a gun to do the job, and a few days before the
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`murder he told her he had done so.
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`Phillip worked at Barish Chrysler-Plymouth as a car salesman. Between
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`May 1 and June 13, 1990 (the day before the murder), the switchboard operator
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`there took several telephone messages for Phillip from ―Cathy‖ or ―Mrs.
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`Thompson.‖ The caller never asked to speak with anyone else.
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`3. The Murder
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`Charlotte Wark lived in a condominium next door to Kayser Service. On
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`June 14, 1990, she arrived home around 6:40 p.m. and, as she turned into her
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`garage, she stopped and chatted with Melvin, who was standing inside the gate to
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`6
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`his business. He seemed nervous. Wark parked her car but was still in her garage
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`a few minutes later when she heard four or five gunshots, which at the time she
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`thought were firecrackers.
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`Around 6:30 that evening, Michael Lutz was in a gas station across the
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`street from Kayser Service. He noticed two African-American males in a white
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`Plymouth Acclaim double-parked in the alley next to the car repair shop. Lutz
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`watched as the passenger exited and the car drove away. Shortly thereafter, Lutz
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`heard two loud ―bangs,‖ saw the passenger reemerge from the alley, and then saw
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`the white Acclaim return and pick the passenger up. The passenger held his arm
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`across his chest, as if he was concealing something under his jacket. As the white
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`Acclaim left the scene, Lutz wrote down the car‘s license plate number. Lutz then
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`saw defendant, who appeared distraught, emerge from the alley and use the pay
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`phone at the gas station. Lutz found another telephone and called 911. He later
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`identified Phillip as the passenger and Robert Jones as the driver.
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`Detective Kurt Wachter responded to the 911 call and found the victim,
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`Melvin Thompson, in the bathroom at Kayser Service suffering from three
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`gunshot wounds. He later died in the hospital. The victim was fully clothed and
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`had on his person a wallet with credit cards and over $1,300 in cash. When
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`searching the premises, police found a letter indicating that ownership of Kayser
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`Service had been transferred to someone named ―Catherine Jacquet.‖ City records
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`confirmed ownership of the business had been transferred to defendant eight days
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`earlier. The last name of defendant‘s previous husband was Jacquet, and
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`defendant sometimes went by the name Catherine Jacquet.
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`Detective Wachter proceeded to the hospital where he interviewed
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`defendant. She appeared calm and said she left Kayser Service around 5:45 p.m.
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`to recycle some cans. When she returned 45 or 60 minutes later, she thought she
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`heard gunshots and claimed she saw an unfamiliar African-American man about
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`7
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`30 years old walking away from the repair shop. She did not say the man she saw
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`was Phillip Sanders, and later denied to friends that he was the person she saw.
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`She also reported her husband had a Rolex watch that he kept either on his wrist or
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`in a desk drawer at Kayser Service. When Detective Wachter searched the
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`premises of Kayser Service, he failed to find the Rolex watch, although he noticed
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`two large bags of empty aluminum cans.
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`Police traced the license plate number provided by Lutz and discovered it
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`was a car Phillip had recently rented. Police went to Phillip‘s Sylmar home
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`around midnight on the night of the murder and found the car parked in the
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`carport, its hood still warm. Phillip‘s wife, Carolyn, admitted police into the
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`house; Phillip was sitting on the couch. Detective Wachter noticed a set of car
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`keys in plain sight on the kitchen table bearing a Thrifty Rent-A-Car tag, and
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`obtained Phillip‘s consent to search the car. Phillip denied he had driven the car
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`after 6:00 p.m. or had been in West Los Angeles that evening. Near the keys,
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`Wachter also observed a piece of paper with defendant‘s telephone number on it.
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`After confirming the keys fit the Acclaim, police arrested Phillip. In a subsequent
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`interview with police, Phillip continued to claim he had not used the car that
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`evening and also claimed he did not know who killed Melvin Thompson. He
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`would later testify that these assertions were untrue.
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`After Phillip‘s arrest, Carolyn Sanders immediately called Kuretich around
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`1:00 a.m. and asked her to return home. Carolyn was very upset and told Kuretich
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`what had happened. Gregory Jones, Phillip‘s brother-in-law, came over and
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`discussed the murder with Carolyn. After he left, Carolyn told Kuretich that she
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`believed Gregory Jones had provided police with information implicating Phillip
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`in the murder, and if asked by police Kuretich should place the blame for the
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`murder on Gregory Jones. Kuretich thereafter repeatedly told police Gregory
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`Jones was responsible for the murder, until police suggested she take a lie detector
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`8
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`test, at which point she changed her story and implicated defendant as well as
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`Phillip and Carolyn Sanders. Kuretich left the state after the preliminary hearing
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`but was later located in Kansas and returned to California.
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`Defendant‘s friend, Nancy Rankin, testified that after the murder she was
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`driving home from the hospital with defendant and Rene Griffin when she heard
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`defendant exclaim, to no one in particular, ―it wasn‘t supposed to happen this
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`way,‖ or ―I didn‘t mean for it to happen this way.‖
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`Rankin was under the impression the victim was killed for his Rolex watch.
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`Defendant told her two men had been arrested in San Francisco in possession of
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`the victim‘s watch. Although defendant told Rene Griffin the victim had brought
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`his Rolex watch to work, intending to take it to a jeweler for repairs, and that
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`someone had been arrested in San Francisco with the watch, police had no
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`information about anyone having been arrested in San Francisco in possession of
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`the victim‘s watch.
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`Carolyn Walsko, who worked for Prudential Insurance, testified the victim
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`was the subject of two life insurance policies, one for $100,000 (issued in 1988)
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`and a second one for $150,000 (issued in 1990, the year of the murder). The latter
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`policy had a double indemnity clause for accidental death, which included
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`homicide, making it potentially worth $300,000. A Prudential Insurance sales
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`agent testified that Melvin‘s insurance premiums were high (about $1,145 per
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`month) but not unreasonable given Melvin‘s reported income (about $250,000 per
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`year) and his lack of retirement savings. Shortly after the murder, defendant
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`submitted a claim on Melvin‘s life insurance policies and assigned the rights to the
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`policies to Tony DeGreef of BID Properties to enable her to repurchase the Hillary
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`Drive house.
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`On June 18, 1990, four days after the murder, police arrested defendant,
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`informing her she was being arrested for hiring someone to kill her husband. She
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`9
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`blurted out: ―I didn‘t know Phil at all. I only met him once and that was about the
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`sale of a car.‖ According to the arresting officers, they had not mentioned Phillip
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`Sanders or ―Phil‖ to defendant. She was released from custody a few days later.
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`Melvin Thompson‘s funeral occurred while defendant was in custody. She
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`instructed Rene Griffin to collect all of the jewelry from the victim‘s body after
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`the funeral and return the items to defendant. Defendant later pawned the jewelry
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`and used the money to go on a gambling vacation in Laughlin, Nevada. Rankin
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`and Griffin said the trip was their idea.
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`The victim‘s son, Tommy Thompson, Jr., worked at Kayser Service with
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`his father and continued to work there after the murder. After Melvin married
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`defendant, she took over managing the auto shop as well as other parts of his life.
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`When Tommy told Melvin his concerns about defendant‘s intrusiveness in the
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`business, he became angry. According to Tommy, defendant‘s friends Isabelle
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`Sanders, Rene Griffin, and Patricia Ceaser often hung out with defendant at
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`Kayser Service. In addition, Tommy had seen both Phillip Sanders and Robert
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`Jones at the shop in the weeks before the murder. After Melvin was murdered,
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`defendant had Rene Griffin come by the shop on a daily basis and collect the day‘s
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`cash. Tommy later learned that the rent on the business had not been paid and
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`confronted defendant about it. She falsely told him she had paid the rent and
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`promised to take care of the matter. Tommy eventually stopped allowing Griffin
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`to collect the receipts for defendant and began handling the financial aspects of the
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`business himself.
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`Tommy Thompson turned over to police several documents found in the
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`Kayser Service office. One was a letter written by someone named ―Katrina
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`Brazarre‖ on letterhead stationary from an institution named ―Guaranty Bank and
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`Trust Co.‖ Tommy also found some rub-on stencils that could be used to create
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`that letterhead, and a letter under the blotter on the desk where defendant usually
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`10
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`sat that contained a precise physical description of his father, as well as his exact
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`work schedule.
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`4. Phillip Sanders’s Evidence
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`Codefendant Phillip Sanders testified he met defendant though his mother,
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`Isabelle Sanders. Phillip admitted he obtained a driver‘s license in victim Melvin
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`Thompson‘s name, posed as Melvin, and helped defendant obtain a loan by
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`forging Melvin‘s signature 11 times on loan documents. His wife, Carolyn, and
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`sister, Carolyn Moore, were also in the real estate office when he posed as Melvin.
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`His mother asked him to do this to help her friend avoid losing her house. For
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`their trouble, Isabelle gave Phillip and Carolyn each $100. Phillip claimed not to
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`know how much money changed hands in the transaction, although he was
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`impeached by evidence showing he forged the victim‘s name on a $25,000 check.
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`When he later became worried about the fraudulent nature of the transaction,
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`Isabelle told him not to worry because ―it was not a problem‖ and ―it was going to
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`help her friend save her house and everybody was fine with the situation.‖
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`Phillip testified that defendant came to the car dealership where he worked
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`to inquire about purchasing a car for her son, Girard Jacquet. When a credit check
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`revealed neither defendant or Girard would be able to finance a car, defendant
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`asked him whether he knew anyone she could hire to kill her stepson, Tommy
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`Thompson, suggesting she would benefit financially should Tommy die.3 Phillip
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`told her he was unaware of anyone who would do such a thing, but later discussed
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`the conversation with his wife, Carolyn. Carolyn later mentioned the murder-for-
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`
`3
`Defendant‘s husband, Melvin Thompson, was also known as Tom
`Thompson. Phillip was quite clear in his testimony, however, that defendant had
`solicited him to kill her stepson, Tommy Thompson. Tommy Thompson later
`testified on rebuttal that he had no insurance on his life in 1990.
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`11
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`hire issue to her housemate, Christine Kuretich. A week later, defendant again
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`asked Phillip about killing her stepson for ―a couple of grand,‖ but he repeated that
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`he did not know anyone who could help her. Phillip denied Kuretich‘s account
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`that the Sanderses discussed killing defendant‘s husband, testifying, ―Those
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`conversations did not take place.‖
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`Records showed that in the six weeks prior to the murder, defendant and
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`Phillip were in constant telephone contact. Records showed numerous calls
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`between Phillip‘s home and Kayser Service, and between Barish Chrysler-
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`Plymouth, where Phillip worked, and defendant‘s home. Phillip admitted he
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`spoke to defendant several times in the weeks leading up to the murder, but
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`claimed the conversations involved a possible car purchase for defendant‘s son,
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`Girard. The prosecution showed this to be unlikely, as Girard had purchased a car
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`from a Ford dealership in February 1990.
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`Phillip testified that he had a cash flow problem and asked if defendant
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`could loan him $1,500. She agreed, and Carolyn Sanders received the money on
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`June 11, 1990. On the day of the murder, June 14, Phillip said he made
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`arrangements to have the terms of the loan reduced to writing so as to avoid any
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`disagreements. This was to be done that evening at Kayser Service. As he had
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`consumed between one and two 20-ounce cans of malt liquor and taken a pain
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`killer and a muscle relaxant, he had his stepson, Robert Jones, drive him in the
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`white Plymouth Acclaim to Santa Monica to meet defendant. Phillip said he
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`walked in the front gate and when he saw defendant inside, she waved him in but
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`motioned to him to be quiet. When he joined her inside the repair shop, the
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`bathroom door opened and, without warning, defendant produced a gun and fired
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`two shots at the person inside the bathroom. The victim, a man with whom Phillip
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`was unfamiliar, fell to the floor. According to Phillip, defendant (holding the
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`barrel of the pistol) handed him the weapon, told him to dispose of it, and that he
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`12
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`would be ―taken care of.‖ He took that to mean defendant was promising to pay
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`him money. Detective Wachter later testified on rebuttal that the barrel of the
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`weapon would have been uncomfortably hot to the touch after firing. Wachter
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`also offered the opinion that Phillip would not have been able to see inside the
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`bathroom if the door had been opened as he described it.
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`Phillip testified he walked back to the car and threw the gun into some ivy.
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`When he told Robert Jones what he had observed and that he had discarded the
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`gun, Jones told him to retrieve the gun, so he did. Once back home, Phillip gave
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`the gun to Jones and told him to destroy it. Police arrested Phillip later that night.
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`While in pretrial detention, Phillip received several unsigned letters which,
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`from their content, he assumed were from defendant, who was also in jail awaiting
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`trial. The letters urged him not to trust his lawyers and to change his account of
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`the murder, vaguely suggesting it would be financially advantageous for him to do
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`so. The letters suggested exactly what he should tell police. Phillip turned these
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`letters over to his attorneys, and at their suggestion wrote defendant back, hoping
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`she would continue the correspondence. Jennifer Lee testified she was a jail
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`inmate with defendant. Lee said she had acceded to defendant‘s request to copy,
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`in her own handwriting, letters that defendant had drafted. (Defendant‘s challenge
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`to the admission of these letters is discussed, post, part I.B.3.)
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`B. Discussion
`
`1. Wainwright v. Witt
`
`During the jury selection proceedings known as ―death qualification‖
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`(People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 170–171), the prosecutor challenged seven
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`prospective jurors for cause on the ground their views concerning capital
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`punishment rendered them unfit to serve on the jury. Defendant contends the
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`prospective jurors were not excludable for cause under the standard set forth by
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`13
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`the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412
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`(Witt), and that by excusing the seven prospective jurors, the trial court violated
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`her state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law, an impartial jury,
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`and a fair capital sentencing hearing. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.;
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`Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 5, 16 & 17.) We conclude the trial court did not err.
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`The law is settled. As the high court has explained, ―the systematic
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`removal of those in the venire opposed to the death penalty [can lead] to a jury
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`‗uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,‘ [citation], and thus ‗woefully
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`short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and
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`Fourteenth Amendments.‘ ‖ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 6 (Uttecht),
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`quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 518, 521; see also Uttecht,
`
`supra, at p. 9 [―a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from
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`a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective
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`prosecutorial challenges for cause‖].) The high court set forth the applicable test
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`in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, and we have explained and applied the Witt test in
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`many subsequent decisions. Thus: ―To achieve the constitutional imperative of
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`impartiality, the law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if
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`his or her views in favor of or against capital punishment ‗would ―prevent or
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`substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror‖ ‘ in
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`accordance with the court‘s instructions and the juror‘s oath.‖ (People v. Blair
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`(2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741, citing Witt, supra, at p. 424, and Adams v. Texas
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`(1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45.) ― ‗ ―[A] prospective juror who would invariably vote
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`either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely
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`to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating
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`and mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause . . . .‖ ‘ ‖
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`(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 915.) Even if the prospective juror would
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`not invariably vote one way or another, ―[a] prospective juror can properly be
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`excused for cause if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the
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`sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.‖ (People
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`v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 340.)
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`The degree of a prospective juror‘s impairment—that is, his or her inability
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`or unwillingness to perform the duties of a juror and follow the law—must be
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`substantial. ―[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose
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`the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if
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`the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.‖
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`(Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.)
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`Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have cautioned that
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`mere personal opposition to capital punishment is an insufficient basis on which to
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`justify dismissal of a juror during jury selection. ― ‗[N]ot all who oppose the death
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`penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe
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`that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so
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`long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own
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`beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‘ ‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
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`p. 915, quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176.) ―Because ‗[a]
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`man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the
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`discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State,‘ [citation], . . . ‗a sentence
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`of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was
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`chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general
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`objections to the death penalty . . . .‘ ‖ (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 6.)
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`The critical issue is whether a life-leaning prospective juror—that is, one
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`generally (but not invariably) favoring life in prison instead of the death penalty as
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`an appropriate punishment—can set aside his or her personal views about capital
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`punishment and follow the law as the trial judge instructs. ― ‗A prospective juror
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`personally opposed to the death penalty may nonetheless be capable of following
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`his oath and the law. A juror whose personal opposition toward the death penalty
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`may predispose him to assign greater than average weight to the mitigating factors
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`presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, unless that predilection would
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`actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing process and returning a
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`capital verdict.‘ ‖ (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446, italics omitted,
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`quoting People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699.)
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`That prospective jurors are not always clear in articulating their beliefs (or
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`accurately assessing their ability to set aside those beliefs) is a difficulty trial and
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`appellate courts frequently encounter in capital cases. Accordingly, although we
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`have cautioned that, ―[b]efore granting a challenge for cause, the ‗court must have
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`sufficient information regarding the prospective juror‘s state of mind to permit a
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`reliable determination as to whether the juror‘s views would ― ‗prevent or
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`substantially impair‘ ‖ ‘ performance as a capital juror‖ (People v. Leon (2015) 61
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`Cal.4th 569, 592, quoting People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445), we have
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`also recognized that, ― ‗ ―[i]n many cases, a prospective juror‘s responses to
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`questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting. Given the
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`juror‘s probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the
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`stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation
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`should be expected.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497.)
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`Thus, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized
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`that ― ‗ ―many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the
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`point where their bias has been made ‗unmistakably clear‘; these veniremen may
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`not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or
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`may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.‖ [Citation.]
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`Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror‘s statements, ―the trial
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`court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman‘s]
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`demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Jones
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`(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 41, quoting Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7.)
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`In light of the inherent ambiguities associated with the death qualification
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`of juries, two rules have emerged. First, a prospective juror‘s bias against the
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`death penalty, or the juror‘s inability to set aside his or her personal views and
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`follow the law, need not be demonstrated with unmistakable clarity. (People v.
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`Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 25; People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 497–
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`498.) Instead, after examining the available evidence, which typically includes the
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`juror‘s writte