Case 1:20-cv-02533-NYW Document 11 Filed 09/16/20 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 16
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
`
`
`Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02533-NYW
`
`4455 JASON ST, LLC,
`THE DENVER BEER COMPANY, LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`MCKESSON CORPORATION,
`
`Defendant.
`
`MCKESSON CORPORATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS 4455 JASON ST, LLC AND
`DENVER BEER COMPANY’S CLAIM FOR COMMON LAW TRESPASS
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02533-NYW Document 11 Filed 09/16/20 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 16
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLES OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ ii
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 2
`
`LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO 12(b)(6) MOTIONS ....................................... 3
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Trespass Allegations Do Not and Cannot Establish the
`Necessary Elements of a Common Law Trespass Claim in Colorado. .................. 3
`
`The Tenth Circuit Has Held That a Common Law Trespass Claim Cannot
`be Brought by a Successor Landowner Against a Prior Owner of the Same
`Land. ....................................................................................................................... 5
`
`Moore Is Consistent with a Long Line of Cases from Other Jurisdictions
`Holding that Successor Landowners Cannot Sue Predecessor Landowners
`for Trespass. ............................................................................................................ 7
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir.
`1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).................................................... 7
`
`Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93
`(D. Mass. 1990)........................................................................................... 8
`
`Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 893 F. Supp. 730 (N.D.
`Ohio 1995). ................................................................................................. 9
`
`Recent Decisions Are in Accord. .............................................................. 10
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`i
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`CASES
`
`TABLES OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Blocker v. ConocoPhillips Co.,
`380 F. Supp. 3d 1178 (W.D. Okla. 2019) ................................................................................. 10
`
`Casanova v. Ulibarri,
`595 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co.,
`893 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1995) ...................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`Forest Guardians v. Forsgren,
`478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
`59 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 1995) ......................................................................................................... 2
`
`Hoery v. United States,
`64 P.3d 214 (Colo. S. Ct. 2003) ...................................................................................... 1, 4, 6, 7
`
`Moore v. Texaco, Inc.
`244 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 5, 6, 7, 8
`
`One Wheeler Rd. Assocs. v. Foxboro Co.,
`843 F. Supp. 792 (D. Mass 1994) ......................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,
`762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir. 1985),
`cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) ....................................................................................... 7, 8, 9
`
`Robbins v. Oklahoma,
`519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`Rolan v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
`2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117437
`(N.D. Ind., July 26, 2017) ......................................................................................................... 10
`
`Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A.,
`335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (Md. 1994) ....................................................................................... 9
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`Smith v. United States,
`561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................. 3
`
`United States v. Osterlund,
`505 F. Supp. 165 (D. Colo. 1981),
`aff’d United States v. Osterlund,
`671 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................................. 4, 6
`
`Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
`747 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1990) ............................................................................................ 8, 9
`
`Williamson v. Fowler Toyota, Inc.,
`1998 OK 14, 956 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1998) .................................................................................... 6
`
`Wilson Auto Enterps., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
`778 F. Supp. 101 (D. R.I. 1991) ................................................................................................. 9
`
`STATUTES
`
`42 U.S.C. § 9607 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`42 U.S.C. § 9613 ............................................................................................................................. 2
`
`RULES
`
`D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1 .................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .................................................................................................................... 1, 3, 8
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 158(a) cmt. i, 159(1) (1965) ..................................................... 4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`iii
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`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant McKesson Corporation
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`(“McKesson”) moves to dismiss the single pendant state law claim for common law trespass
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`alleged by Plaintiffs 4455 Jason St, LLC (“Jason St.”) and The Denver Beer Company (“DBC”)
`
`(collectively, “Plaintiffs”).
`
`Pursuant to NYW Civ. Practice Standard 7.1(a) which incorporates D.C.COLO.LCivR
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`7.1(b), there is no duty to confer as this motion is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Jason St. currently owns property located at 4455 Jason St., Denver, Colorado 80211 (the
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`“Property”), has owned it since 2016, and leases it to DBC. In addition to the federal law claims
`
`asserted by Plaintiffs, they assert a claim for common law trespass against McKesson – former
`
`owner of the Property (through its legal predecessors) – for contamination allegedly tied to
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`operations during the time of McKesson’s prior ownership of the Property (alleged to have been
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`between 1947-1972).
`
`The basis for this motion is the legal authority set forth below. D.C.COLO.LCivR
`
`7.1(d): The Colorado Supreme Court defines common law trespass in the State of
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`Colorado as “a physical intrusion upon the property of another without the proper
`
`permission from the person legally entitled to possession of that property.” Hoery
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`v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. S. Ct. 2003) (emphasis added). This
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`motion asks whether Plaintiffs can bring a claim for common law trespass against
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`a prior owner of the same property? The answer is “no.”
`
`While there is no definitive Colorado state court decision, federal and state courts around
`
`the United States, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, consistently have
`
`held that plaintiffs cannot sue a prior landowner for common law trespass, finding that such
`
`claims can only be brought by neighboring, not successor, landowners.
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`1
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`Accordingly, McKesson requests this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ common law trespass
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`claim without leave to amend since there is no possible set of facts that Plaintiffs can allege on
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`which such a claim can be stated. Dismissal of the trespass claim will leave only federal
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`CERCLA claims remaining, which are resolved by bench trial, thereby simplifying trial of this
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`matter.1
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Cost Recovery
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`(“Complaint”) that Jason St. currently owns the Property, has owned it since 2016, and leases it
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`to DBC. (Complaint, ¶¶ 15-17.)
`
`Plaintiffs assert, as their Fourth Claim for Relief, a claim for common law trespass
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`against McKesson. (Complaint, ¶¶ 95-101.) They assert McKesson is responsible as the legal
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`successor in interest to the former owners and operators of the Chemical Distribution Facility on
`
`Property, who they allege caused the release of hazardous substances on the Property.
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`(Complaint, ¶ 100.) Plaintiffs allege that McKesson’s legal predecessors in interest owned the
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`Property and operated a Chemical Distribution Facility on it between approximately November
`
`1947 through 1972. (Complaint, ¶¶ 20-23.)
`
`In summary, Plaintiffs -- owner and lessor of the Property since 2016 -- bring a common
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`law trespass claim against McKesson-- the successor in interest to companies that last owned and
`
`operated on the Property almost 50 years ago.
`
`
`1 “[I]n suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 or 9613(f)(1), the parties are not entitled to
`a jury trial.” Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1995).
`
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`III. LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
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`Under Rule 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
`
`which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6),
`
`the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations
`
`in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir.
`
`2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)).
`
`To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions,
`
`“and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
`
`v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
`
`matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`
`556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008)
`
`(explaining that plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint,” and that the
`
`allegations must be sufficient to nudge a plaintiff’s claim(s) “across the line from conceivable to
`
`plausible.”) The duty of the court is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges
`
`facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal
`
`theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Trespass Allegations Do Not and Cannot Establish the Necessary
`Elements of a Common Law Trespass Claim in Colorado.
`
`The Colorado Supreme Court has held:
`
`“[t]he elements for the tort of trespass are a physical intrusion upon the property
`
`of another without the proper permission from the person legally entitled to
`
`possession of that property. (citations omitted). The intrusion can occur when an
`
`actor intentionally enters land possessed by someone else, or when an actor
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`
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`3
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`

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`causes something else to enter the land. For instance, an ‘actor, without himself
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`entering the land, may invade another's interest in its exclusive possession by . . .
`
`placing a thing either on or beneath the surface of the land.’ Restatement (Second)
`
`of Torts §§ 158(a) cmt. i, 159(1) (1965).”
`
`Hoery, supra, 64 P.3d at 217-18.
`
`As in many other jurisdictions, in Hoery, the Colorado Supreme Court references the
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`Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”), as a source of authority in determining the
`
`elements of an actionable common law trespass claim.2 This Judicial District, in United States v.
`
`Osterlund, 505 F. Supp. 165 (D. Colo. 1981), aff’d United States v. Osterlund, 671 F.2d 1267
`
`(10th Cir. 1981), also cited the Restatement, §§ 158-159, in defining what constitutes an
`
`actionable common law trespass claim in Colorado: “Trespass is defined as an entry upon the
`
`real estate of another without the permission or invitation of the person lawfully entitled to
`
`possession.” Id. at 167. Thus, drawing on the Restatement and prior case law, both Colorado
`
`state and federal courts agree on the elements of a common law trespass claim in Colorado: 1) a
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`“physical intrusion upon the property of another;” 2) “without the proper permission from the
`
`person legally entitled to possession of that property.” Id.
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`Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy neither element. First, the alleged trespass, a release of
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`chemicals on the Property by McKesson between 1947 and 1972, was not an intrusion on the
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`property “of another,” but on its own property. Plaintiffs are not owners of a neighboring
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`property that was contaminated, but of the same Property.
`
`
`2 No Colorado statute authorizes a civil claim for “trespass.” Thus, trespass claims in
`Colorado are necessarily common law claims.
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`
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`4
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`Second, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the alleged trespass was “without the proper
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`permission from the person legally entitled to possession of that property,” since at the time of
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`the alleged releases, McKesson itself owned the Property and was therefore “the person legally
`
`entitled to possession of that property,” not Plaintiffs. Jason St. did not take title to the Property
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`until September 2016, approximately 44 years after McKesson’s predecessor had sold the
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`Property. Moreover, Jason St. bought the Property, knowing contamination was present on it
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`because of a Phase II investigation report commenced in December 2015. See Complaint, ¶¶ 15-
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`17 and 33-38.
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`Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating either element of a viable common
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`law trespass claim in Colorado. Nor can they.
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`There do not appear to be any reported cases decided by Colorado state courts, or federal
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`courts applying Colorado law, specifically dismissing a common law trespass claim brought by a
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`subsequent property owner against a predecessor owner of that same property. However, a
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`Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, addressing nearly identical facts, dismissed a common
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`law trespass claim applying Oklahoma law, which is nearly identical to Colorado law. As such,
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`that Tenth Circuit decision should be deemed controlling authority on this issue in this case.
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`Moreover, a survey of cases from other jurisdictions, both federal and state, that have considered
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`the issue, all appear to have dismissed common law trespass claims brought by successor owners
`
`against predecessor owners of the same land. These cases are discussed below.
`
`B.
`
`The Tenth Circuit Has Held That a Common Law Trespass Claim Cannot be
`Brought by a Successor Landowner Against a Prior Owner of the Same
`Land.
`
`In Moore v. Texaco, Inc. 244 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit Court of
`
`Appeals was asked to review the district court’s dismissal of an Oklahoma common law trespass
`
`claim. The panel’s statement of the elements of such a claim in Oklahoma made clear that they
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`5
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`are identical, or nearly so, to the elements of a Colorado common law trespass claim. “Under
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`Oklahoma law, ‘trespass involves an actual physical invasion of the real estate of
`
`another without the permission of the person lawfully entitled to possession.’ Williamson v.
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`Fowler Toyota, Inc., 1998 OK 14, 956 P.2d 858, 862 (Okla. 1998). (emphasis added)." Id. at
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`1233. Compare with Hoery, supra, at 217-18 (stating the elements of a trespass claim in
`
`Colorado). Both Oklahoma’s and Colorado’s common law trespass claims require, as elements
`
`to be proven, that there was damage or invasion to property “of another,” and that the invasion
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`was not permitted by the person entitled to that property’s possession.3 In Moore, defendant
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`Texaco allegedly polluted its own property before selling it to the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged
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`common law nuisance and trespass claims.
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`The Moore panel first affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s nuisance claim:
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`“…Moore's claim for private nuisance, based on pollution and the erection of the
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`earthen berms, cannot proceed because he is a successor landowner to Texaco,
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`rather than an adjacent landowner. It is likely that Oklahoma would reach the
`
`same conclusion reached by nearly every other court to consider the issue: that an
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`action for private nuisance is designed to protect neighboring landowners from
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`conflicting uses of property, not successor landowners from conditions on the
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`land they purchased. (citations omitted).”
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`Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). The Moore panel then applied similar analysis in affirming
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`dismissal of plaintiff’s trespass claim:
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`“It is clear that the claimed pollution here does not qualify as a trespass under this
`
`standard. [Plaintiff] has presented no evidence that the pollution occurred after
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`3 Osterlund, supra, at 167; Williamson, supra, at 862.
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`Texaco sold the property. Rather, Moore’s argument is that the pollution
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`occurred while Texaco owned the property. This being the case, it did not involve
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`a physical invasion of real estate owned by anyone except Texaco itself. This is
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`not a trespass. (citation omitted).”
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`Id. at 1233. The factual background and law applied in Moore are, for all practical purposes,
`
`identical to the facts and law of this case. Moore should therefore be viewed as controlling
`
`authority. On the facts, like Texaco in Moore, defendant McKesson allegedly caused pollution
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`on the Property while it owned it, nearly 44 years before Jason St. bought the Property. On the
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`law, as noted above, the elements of a common law trespass claim in Oklahoma as stated by the
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`Tenth Circuit in Moore are identical, or nearly so, to those elements formulated for a similar
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`claim in Colorado in Hoery. Hoery, supra, 64 P.3d at 217-18. Therefore, the contamination
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`alleged in the present case, just like the contamination alleged in Moore, “is not a trespass.”
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`Moore, supra, 244 F.3d at 1233. Plaintiffs’ common law trespass claim must be dismissed.
`
`C. Moore Is Consistent with a Long Line of Cases from Other Jurisdictions
`Holding that Successor Landowners Cannot Sue Predecessor Landowners
`for Trespass.
`
`A survey of cases from other federal and state jurisdictions indicate that all other courts
`
`that have considered the issue, like the Tenth Circuit in Moore, have rejected common law
`
`trespass claims by successor owners. We found no cases supporting such a claim based on
`
`common law principles. Summaries of a few of the key cases in that line, presented
`
`chronologically, follow.
`
`1.
`
`Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir. 1985),
`cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
`
`In a seminal case, the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania common law, and referencing
`
`the Restatement, reasoned that common law nuisance and trespass claims are not available to
`
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`7
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`successor landowners against prior landowners because the plaintiff landowner’s purchase of the
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`land is caveat emptor: “The parties have cited no case from Pennsylvania or any other
`
`jurisdiction, and we have found none, that permits a purchaser of real property to recover from
`
`the seller on a private nuisance theory for conditions existing on the very land transferred.” Id.,
`
`at 313 (emphasis added). To do so would allow plaintiff “to circumvent limitations on vendor
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`liability inherent in the rule of caveat emptor.” Id. The court concluded: “We believe that this
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`result is consonant with the historical role of private nuisance [and trespass] law as a means of
`
`efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses.” Id. at 314
`
`(citation omitted). Sixteen years later, the Tenth Circuit, in Moore, cited a string of seven cases,
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`beginning with Phil. Electric, that applied the common law of six different states, all of which
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`came to the same legal conclusion and dismissed plaintiff successor landowner’s common law
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`trespass claims. Moore, supra, at 1232-33.
`
`2.
`
`Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass.
`1990).
`
`In Wellesley Hills, the district court addressed the viability of a common law trespass
`
`claim under circumstances like those here and in Moore. The defendant, Mobil, allegedly
`
`polluted its own property before selling it to plaintiff. Id. at 94. Plaintiff brought multiple claims
`
`against Mobil, including a common law trespass claim. Mobil responded with a Rule 12(b)(6)
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`motion to dismiss the common law trespass claim. Id. at 95.
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`The Wellesley Hills court granted the motion, holding: “A trespass … requires an
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`unprivileged, intentional intrusion on land in the possession of another.” Id. at 99 (citations
`
`omitted). The court further held that because “Mobil owned and was in possession of the
`
`property when it allegedly released the oil causing the contamination[,] Mobil's releases of oil
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`
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`8
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`were not unprivileged, and Mobil clearly was not intruding on land in the possession of another.”
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`Id. at 99.
`
`3.
`
`Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 893 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio
`1995).
`
`In Dartron, the district court held that just like trespass: “Private nuisance doctrine was
`
`not designed to permit ‘a purchaser of real property to recover from the seller . . . for conditions
`
`existing on the very land transferred.’ Rather, liability for creating a nuisance requires a ‘finding
`
`that [the defendant's] conduct violates a protected interest of the neighbor-plaintiff.’ (citations
`
`omitted).” Dartron, supra, at 741.
`
`Consistent with the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Phil. Electric six years earlier, and
`
`relying, in part, on Wellesley Hills, the Dartron court further found that: “Every other case that
`
`this Court has found also rejects private nuisance claims brought by landowners against their
`
`predecessors in title.” Id. at 741 (internal citations in footnote).4 With respect to plaintiff’s
`
`related trespass claim, the Dartron court, citing Phil. Electric, similarly held:
`
`“The Court's analysis of Dartron's continuing trespass claim parallels its analysis
`
`of Dartron's negligence and nuisance claims. A cause of action for trespass does
`
`not contemplate a vendee suing a land vendor for the vendor's past conduct on the
`
`land. … see [Phil. Electric]; see also One Wheeler Rd. Assocs. v. Foxboro
`
`Co., 843 F. Supp. 792, 797 (D. Mass 1994) ("a former owner of property owes no
`
`
`4 See, e.g. Wilson Auto Enterps., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. R.I.
`1991) ("A buyer of property cannot assert a private nuisance claim against a seller . . . for
`contamination that occurred before the sale"); Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 642
`A.2d 180 (Md. 1994); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 98-99
`(D. Mass 1990) ("a vendee of land does not have a private nuisance action against a vendor for
`its contamination of the property prior to the sale").”
`
`
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`9
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`duty to subsequent owners of property and any contamination left on the property
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`by that owner is not a nuisance or a continuing trespass").”
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`Id. at 741-42. Consequently, the Dartron court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
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`common law trespass claim. Id. at pp. 37-38.
`
`4.
`
`Recent Decisions Are in Accord.
`
`Federal district courts in Oklahoma and Indiana have reached similar results in the last
`
`few years, demonstrating the continuing vitality of this rule against nuisance and trespass claims
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`brought by successor landowners against predecessor landowners. In Blocker, the district court
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`relied on Moore to hold that a private nuisance claim cannot proceed against a former lessee or
`
`owner of the same property. Blocker v. ConocoPhillips Co., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1184-86
`
`(W.D. Okla. 2019). In Rolan, the district court held that a later purchaser of property cannot sue
`
`a prior owner of that same property for nuisance. Rolan v. Atl. Richfield Co., 2017 U.S. Dist.
`
`LEXIS 117437, pp. *39-43 (N.D. Ind., July 26, 2017) (unpublished) (attached hereto as Exhibit
`
`A).
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`Controlling authority, supplemented by abundant and consistent persuasive authority,
`
`provide that successor owners/tenants of property cannot bring common law trespass claims
`
`against preceding owners of the same property. This Court should therefore dismiss Plaintiffs’
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`common law trespass claim against McKesson without leave to amend.
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`Dated: September 16, 2020.
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` Respectfully submitted,
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` s/ Habib Nasrullah
` Habib Nasrullah
`Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP
`370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 4500
`Denver, CO 80202
`Telephone: 303.244.1800
`Facsimile: 303.244.1879
`Email: nasrullah@wtotrial.com
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` and
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` John D. Edgcomb
`Adam Pearse
`Edgcomb Law Group, LLP
`601 Montgomery Street, Suite 1200
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: 415.399.1555
`Facsimile:
`415.399.1885
`Email:
`jedgcomb@edgcomb-law.com
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`apearse@edgcomb-law.com
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` Attorneys for Defendant,
`McKesson Corporation
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`11
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`Case 1:20-cv-02533-NYW Document 11 Filed 09/16/20 USDC Colorado Page 16 of 16
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (CM/ECF)
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`I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 16, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing
`MCKESSON CORPORATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS 4455 JASON ST, LLC AND
`DENVER BEER COMPANY’S CLAIM FOR COMMON LAW TRESPASS with the Clerk
`of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following
`email addresses:
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`• Timothy R. Gablehouse
`tgablehouse@gcgllc.com
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`• Evan Chenault Singleton
`esingleton@gcgllc.com
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`s/ Habib Nasrullah
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`12
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